State v. Medina

2019 UT App 49
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellant,
v.
S ERGIO BRISENO M EDINA,
Appellee.
Amended Opinion1
No. 20170328-CA
Filed March 28, 2019
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy
No. 161903223
Sean D. Reyes and Jeffrey S. Gray, Attorneys
for Appellant
Sarah J. Carlquist, Scott A. Wilson, and Jesse M. Nix,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE D AVID N. M ORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. O RME and M ICHELE M.
C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER concurred.
MORTENSEN, Judge:
¶1 	Because this case comes to us on interlocutory appeal, the
following 	facts 	and 	allegations 	remain 	undetermined. 	“On
interlocutory review, we recount the facts as alleged and in a
light most favorable to the ruling below.” State v. Stewart, 2018
1. This Amended Opinion replaces the Opinion in Case No.
20170328-CA issued January 17, 2019. After our original opinion
issued, Defendant filed a petition for rehearing. We grant the
petition. 	Paragraph 	1 	is new; 	paragraphs 3 	through 	8 	and
paragraph 12 of the original opinion have been deleted.

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	2 	2019 UT App 49
UT 24, ¶ 2 n.1 (cleaned up). A woman (Victim) was found fatally
stabbed on the side of a road. The ensuing investigation led
police to Sergio Briseno Medina. During an interview, detectives
(Detectives) read Medina his Miranda rights.2 Medina invoked
his right to counsel, but immediately after invoking, Medina
initiated 	a 	substantive 	conversation 	with 	the 	Detectives
regarding the investigation, the circumstances surrounding the
murder, 	and 	the 	pending 	charges 	against 	him. 	After 	the
Detectives told Medina that they had “questions for [him] about
[the murder],” Medina stated, “I’m gonna answer questions,”
and he demanded to know “what’s going on” and “[w]hy is it
me . . . being targeted for something that I wasn’t even nearby.”
During 	the 	resulting 	conversation, 	Medina 	made 	several
incriminating statements. Three days later, the Detectives, after
confirming that Medina understood he could have an attorney
present, interviewed him a second time. The State charged
Medina with murder and obstructing justice. Medina moved to
suppress his statements made during the interviews, arguing
that 	his 	Miranda 	rights 	were 	violated 	by 	the 	Detectives’
questioning without counsel present. The district court granted
Medina’s motion, and the State appeals.
¶2 	We reverse.
BACKGROUND
The Interviews
¶3 	Medina was in Denver, Colorado when law enforcement
located him. A search of Medina’s and Victim’s cell phone
records had established that Medina was in the vicinity of
Victim’s body and her jeep around the time of the murder; a
2. Miranda rights include the right to remain silent and the right
to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440 (1966); see also infra ¶ 11.

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	3 	2019 UT App 49
search 	of 	the 	jeep 	uncovered 	Medina’s 	fingerprints 	on 	the
outside of the jeep and Victim’s blood on the interior. Medina
was arrested 	and 	brought 	into 	a 	Denver police 	station 	for
questioning.
¶4 	Prior to any questioning, the Detectives read Medina his
Miranda rights, whereupon Medina invoked his right to counsel.
The conversation ensued as follows:
The Detectives: Okay well just so you’re aware we
just wanna make sure that you are aware of your
rights okay you still have those (inaudible) and
you 	wanna 	find 	out 	and 	you 	wanna 	have 	a
discussion with us and we wanna make sure you
know your rights okay?
Medina: Ya.
D: So you do know you have the right to remain
silent. Anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law. You have the right to
have an attorney present with you while you’re
being questioned. If you can’t afford to hire one,
one will be appointed to represent you before any
questioning if you wish. Okay?
M: Can I have an attorney present then?
D: So . . . and if you . . . so you’re saying you don’t
wanna talk to us without your attorney present?
M: Well ya the thing is I don’t know what’s going
on. I wanna know what’s going on.
D: Okay.
M: Why is it that my sister[’]s door gets kicked
in . . . I’ve got an officer asking if I got my hands . . .

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	4 	2019 UT App 49
if 	I 	have 	an 	injury 	on 	my 	hands 	and 	they’re
checking my hands and I was like no what’s goin
on . . . Does he have . . . What injury are you talking
about . . . What’s going on. You know what I
mean? 	I’m 	only 	here 	tryin 	(inaudible) 	cause 	I
wanna lay off the meth cause I was consumin
(inaudible) all this goin on and I was like what’s
goin on. My sister’s mad at me right and doesn’t
want to talk to me because the same situation.
D: Is it what happened with her . . .
M: Ya I mean come on wouldn’t you be mad?
D: Sure. I’d be frustrated absolutely and that’s . . .
We can have a discussion about that absolutely.
M: And that’s why I’m like okay what’s goin on. I
got people callin me hey there’s a homicide or
something . . . What are you guys talkin about, you
know what I mean?
D: Sure.
M: And that’s what I wanna know what’s going on
it’s like . . . I’m trippin out because that stuff you
don’t play around with.
D: Right.
M: You don’t joke around with. That’s not a joke so
all I wanna ask you is what’s going on here please.
I’m gonna answer questions, but at the same time I
don’t want to get bullshit all mixed up you know
what I mean?
D: And we’re here to talk about that. We’re here to
. . . we wanna discuss that with you.

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	5 	2019 UT App 49
M: Okay.
D: But you know we do have questions for you
about it. You know we’re trying to see . . . Your
name was brought up that’s how we’re here you
know? People brought your name up and so here
we are and we wanna be able to talk to you about
it, but it’s up to you I mean . . .
M: Okay (inaudible) what’s going on man please?
What’s goin on I actually want to know . . . That’s
what . . . That’s what I’m asking what’s goin on.
Why is it me that I’m being targeted for something
that I wasn’t even nearby. It’s like what the fuck.
D: Okay.
¶5 	Medina went on to explain that he was confused by the
circumstances of his arrest. Medina then agreed to answer the
Detectives’ questions and admitted that Victim was a “friend,”
that they sold drugs together, and that they had gotten into an
argument on the day of the murder. He continued to deny
involvement in Victim’s murder. The Detectives also questioned
Medina about his text messages to his fiancée and to another
individual.
¶6 	Three days later, the Detectives interviewed Medina for a
second time. The second conversation went as follows:
The Detectives: So you asked me to do a couple
things when we last talked. I did that okay so I got
some . . . some good news as far as that goes okay,
but just as we get talkin I just want to make sure
you still are aware of your rights okay? Do you
understand your rights too?
Medina: Yes.

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	6 	2019 UT App 49
D: That you do have the right to an attorney and
you don’t have to talk. You can have on[e] present
with you and all that right? So you still understand
those?
M: Yes.
D: You’re still okay to talk to me then?
M: Ya.
¶7 	Thus, the Detectives confirmed Medina’s understanding
that he could have an attorney present or continue to speak with
the Detectives without an attorney present. Medina then claimed
that he spoke with Victim on the phone while he was at or near a
specific Maverick gas station and that during the call, “[Victim]
was talking and laughing with somebody in the background.”
But surveillance footage obtained by police from the Maverik
store refuted Medina’s story—he was nowhere to be seen at or
near the store during the time Medina claimed to be there. The
State 	subsequently 	charged 	Medina 	with 	murder 	and
obstructing justice.
The Motion to Suppress
¶8 	After the State filed charges against him, Medina moved
to suppress the statements made to the Detectives during his
interrogation, arguing that they persisted in questioning him
after he had invoked his Miranda right to an attorney. The
district court granted the motion, finding 	that Medina had
invoked his right to counsel, and that even though he had
“initiated . . . further conversation, as he continued to talk after
his request for counsel,” he did not knowingly and intelligently
waive his right to counsel. The court further ruled that because
Medina 	did 	not 	waive 	his 	Miranda 	rights 	in 	the 	first
interrogation, his statements in the second interview were also
inadmissible. But the court qualified the ruling, stating that had
Miranda procedure been properly followed in the first interview,

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	7 	2019 UT App 49
“the 	second 	recitation 	of 	Miranda 	preceding 	the 	[second]
interview 	would 	have 	been 	adequate.” 	The 	State 	then
successfully petitioned for leave to take an interlocutory appeal
from the district court’s order granting Medina’s motion to
suppress his statements to police.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 	We address only one issue in this case: whether the
district court correctly granted Medina’s motion to suppress.
Rulings regarding the validity of a Miranda waiver are reviewed
for correctness, while granting “some degree of discretion to the
trial 	court 	because 	of 	the 	wide 	variety 	of 	factual 	settings
possible.” State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, ¶ 16, 1 P.3d 1087 (cleaned
up). 	“When 	a 	district 	court 	bases 	its 	ultimate 	conclusions
concerning the waiver of a defendant’s Miranda rights, upon
essentially undisputed facts, in particular the transcript of an
officer’s colloquy with the defendant, its conclusions present
questions of law which we review under a correction of error
standard.” State v. Gardner, 2018 UT App 126, ¶ 11, 428 P.3d 58
(cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
I. The First Interview
¶10 	The State argues on appeal that Medina “validly waived
his Miranda rights by his conduct and words after initiating
further discussion with police.” We agree.
¶11 	The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court
held that law enforcement officers must “protect this privilege
by informing an accused person of his or her constitutional

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	8 	2019 UT App 49
rights 	before 	engaging 	in 	custodial 	interrogation.” 	State 	v.
Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Miranda,
384 U.S. at 444). Those rights include the right to remain silent
and the right to have an attorney present. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444.
¶12 	After an accused’s Miranda rights are read, they “must
unambiguously request counsel” in such a way that the “desire
to have counsel present” is sufficiently clear. Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). “Interrogation must cease if the
accused invokes his or her right to consult with an attorney, and,
with 	limited 	exceptions, 	the 	prosecution 	may 	not 	use 	any
statements made by the accused taken in violation of Miranda’s
protections.” Dahlquist, 931 P.2d at 866. Both Medina and the
State 	agree, 	and 	the 	district 	court 	ruled, 	that 	Medina
unambiguously invoked his right to counsel initially.
¶13 	But if, after invoking the right to counsel, the accused
himself 	“’initiates 	further 	communication, 	exchanges, 	or
conversations with the police,’ then he has effectively waived his
right to counsel and the interrogation may continue.” State v.
Gardner, 2018 UT App 126, ¶ 15, 428 P.3d 58 (quoting Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981)). An accused’s statements made
“after he has invoked his right to counsel and before counsel is
made available to him are admissible if three conditions are
satisfied.” State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985); see also
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 481–82; State v. Newton, 682 P.2d 295, 296
(Utah 1984).
¶14 	“First, it must be the accused, not the law enforcement
officers, 	who 	initiates 	the 	conversations 	in 	which 	the
incriminating 	statements 	are 	made. 	Second, 	the 	prosecution
must show . . . a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel. Third, the accused’s statements must be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence to have been voluntarily made.”
Moore, 697 P.2d at 236. We address each condition in turn.

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	9 	2019 UT App 49
A. 	Initiated Conversation
¶15 	The State argues that “immediately after invoking his
right to counsel, [Medina] initiated further conversation with
[the Detectives] about the investigation.” Medina counters with
the argument that “it is not enough for the defendant to initiate a
routine conversation about ‘something unrelated to the crime
charged,’ to relinquish his previously invoked right to counsel.”
To bolster his argument, Medina cites State v. Dahlquist, 931 P.2d
862 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), arguing that “Medina did not initiate a
conversation with police that related either directly or indirectly
to the investigation.” While we agree that initiating a routine
conversation about something unrelated to the crime charged is
not enough to relinquish an accused’s right to counsel, State v.
Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985), we are persuaded by the
State’s argument that Medina’s conversation was more than just
routine or unrelated to the crimes charged.
¶16 	In Dahlquist, this court reversed a district court’s denial of
a motion to suppress where the police continued to question a
defendant after the defendant had invoked counsel, but had
subsequently asked, “What am I being questioned about?” 931
P.2d at 864. The court explained, “In order for a defendant to
initiate a conversation with authorities that will be held to
constitute 	a 	willingness 	to 	talk 	about 	the 	charges 	without
counsel, he or she must indicate a desire to open up a more
generalized 	discussion 	relating 	directly 	or 	indirectly 	to 	the
investigation.” Id. at 866 (cleaned up). And the court went on to
state that,
[D]efendant 	initiated 	no 	such 	open-ended
conversation. After invoking his right to counsel,
he merely asked what he was being questioned
about. That question was succinctly answered and
his 	invocation 	of 	the 	right 	to 	counsel 	was
simultaneously acknowledged. There the matter
should have been left until Dahlquist had counsel

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	10 	2019 UT App 49
present or definitively waived his right to counsel,
either 	expressly 	or 	by 	initiating 	a 	discussion
relative to the substance of the investigation. . . .
Instead of heeding his own recognition that he
could 	not 	ask 	Dahlquist 	any 	questions, 	[the
detective] 	continued 	the 	conversation 	by
“advising” Dahlquist, without request, of specific
“facts” related to the investigation.
Id.
¶17 	On those facts, the court held that the detective’s “tactic”
was “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
Dahlquist” and that “[b]y continuing the custodial dialogue after
acknowledging that Dahlquist had invoked his right to consult
an attorney, albeit in the form of a statement rather than a
question, [the detective] violated Dahlquist’s Miranda rights.” Id.
at 867.
¶18 	Here, Medina’s statements to the Detectives go beyond
the scope of those made in Dahlquist. They are more akin to the
statements made in State v. Gardner, 2018 UT App 126, 428 P.3d
58. In that case, two officers informed a defendant of his Miranda
rights and the defendant invoked those rights. Id. ¶ 16. But
before 	the 	officers 	could 	leave 	the 	interrogation 	room, 	the
defendant went on to “explain that [the victim] and her mother
had 	been 	threatening 	him 	for 	years 	about 	reporting
inappropriate conduct between himself and [the victim],” and
“told a long story about some problems with [the victim’s]
mother.” 	Id. 	One 	of 	the 	officers 	eventually 	interrupted 	the
defendant and “asked again if he should try to reach [the
defendant’s] attorney, to which [the defendant] again responded
in the affirmative.” Id. But after the first officer left the room to
call the defendant’s attorney, the defendant continued to speak
to a second officer—unsolicited—about domestic issues with
[the victim’s] mother. Id.

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	11 	2019 UT App 49
¶19 	There, this court held that “[o]nce [the defendant] told the
officers that [the victim] and her mother had been threatening to
report him for engaging in inappropriate conduct with [the
victim], without being asked a question by the officers,” he had
effectively waived his right to counsel because he “initiated
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
officers specifically related to the crime for which he was being
interrogated.” See id. ¶ 17 (cleaned up).
¶20 	Here, Medina invoked his right to counsel, but then,
without prodding from the Detectives, immediately went on to
state,
Well ya the thing is I don’t know what’s going on. I
wanna know what’s going on. . . . Why is it that my
sister[’]s door gets kicked in . . . I’ve got an officer
asking if I got my hands . . . if I have an injury on
my hands and they’re checking my hands and I
was like no what’s goin on . . . Does he have . . .
What injury are you talking about . . . What’s going
on. You know what I mean? I’m only here tryin
(inaudible) cause I wanna lay off the meth cause I
was consumin (inaudible) all this goin on and I
was like what’s goin on. My sister’s mad at me
right and doesn’t want to talk to me because the
same situation.
These 	types 	of 	statements 	are 	not 	simply 	“routine,” 	nor
“unrelated to the crime charged,” as Medina suggests. Rather,
upon invoking his right to counsel, Medina immediately asked
what was going on, and the context of his continuing questions
makes clear that he was not asking what process he would be
subject to, but was instead asking about the investigation of the
case and his actions as he spontaneously launched into an
extensive and elaborate explanation for the circumstances and
his whereabouts on the night of the murder.

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	12 	2019 UT App 49
¶21 	Thus, Medina’s statements are far different from those in
Dahlquist, in which the defendant simply asked, “What am I
being questioned about?” Dahlquist, 931 P.2d at 866. They are
much more similar to the statements made in Gardner, in which
the defendant not only asked what was going on, but went on
to—without 	invitation 	or 	provocation—explain 	himself 	and
divulge further details regarding the crime charged. See Gardner,
2018 UT App 126, ¶ 16. Medina gave the Detectives no chance to
leave the room, let alone contact his attorney, before initiating
further conversation and insisting that he receive answers from
the Detectives. Unsolicited, Medina asked what was going on;
why the police had kicked in his sister’s door; questioned why
the police wanted to check his hands; and offered an explanation
for his trip to Denver. Accordingly, we conclude that Medina
initiated further communication with the Detectives and that the
district 	court 	incorrectly 	ruled 	that 	the 	statements 	did 	not
involve the underlying crime.
B. 	Knowing and Intelligent Waiver
¶22 	Because 	we 	have 	determined 	that 	Medina 	initiated
further contact with the Detectives, and thereby waived his right
to have counsel present during the interrogation, we must next
turn to the question of whether he waived this right knowingly
and intelligently. See State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985)
(holding that after showing that the accused initiated contact
with law enforcement, “the prosecution must show, on the
motion to suppress, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
right to counsel”); see also Martinez v. Cate, 903 F.3d 982, 992–93
(9th Cir. 2018) (holding that “[i]f the accused invoked his right to
counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning
only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the
police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he
had invoked” (cleaned up)); Bush v. Warden, 573 F.App’x 503,
510–11 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating that “even if the accused reinitiates
conversation 	with 	police 	after 	invoking 	his or 	her right 	to
counsel, the burden remains on the prosecution to demonstrate

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	13 	2019 UT App 49
that the reinitiation events constituted a knowing and intelligent
waiver under a totality of circumstances”).
¶23 	“The determination of whether a waiver of the right to
counsel was made knowingly and intelligently depends upon
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case,
including 	the 	background, 	experience, 	and 	conduct 	of 	the
accused.” Moore, 697 P.2d at 236 (cleaned up); see also Oregon v.
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 (1983) (stating that whether a
waiver is knowing and intelligent is based upon “the totality of
the circumstances”); Bone v. Polk, 441 F.App’x 193, 196 (4th Cir.
2011) 	(explaining 	that 	when 	“evaluating 	the 	totality 	of 	the
circumstances for the purposes of determining the validity of a
Miranda 	waiver, 	we 	consider 	factors 	such 	as 	a 	defendant’s
intelligence and education, his age and familiarity with the
criminal justice system, the proximity of the waiver to the giving
of the Miranda warnings, and whether he reopened the dialogue
with the authorities” (cleaned up)); State v. Barrett, 2006 UT App
417, ¶ 11, 147 P.3d 491 (explaining that “determin[ing] whether
[a d]efendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda
rights” 	is 	done 	by 	“examining 	the 	particular 	facts 	and
circumstances surrounding the case”).
¶24 	A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel
exists when a defendant expresses a desire to “tell . . . what
really happened,” and then proceeds to make incriminating
statements about what happened without further prodding by
the investigating officers,3 see State v. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 826, 831
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (cleaned up); see also Smith v. Duckworth,
824 F.3d 1233, 1247 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that to be
considered knowing and intelligent, “the waiver must have been
3. The waiver need not be express. It may be inferred from a
defendant indicating that he understands his rights and the
defendant’s subsequent course of conduct. See State v. Barrett,
2006 UT App 417, ¶ 11, 147 P.3d 491.

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	14 	2019 UT App 49
made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it”).
¶25 	The 	State 	argues 	that 	the 	district 	court 	incorrectly
concluded that Medina’s waiver was not knowingly made. We
agree. The district court based its decision, in part, on the fact
that 	the 	Detectives “had 	asked 	questions 	intended 	to 	elicit
additional 	information” 	and, 	in 	part, 	on 	the 	fact 	that 	the
Detectives did not “seek a clarification of [his] invocation of [the]
right to counsel” after Medina initiated further discussion about
the investigation.
¶26 	To the district court’s first point, we conclude that the
court 	incorrectly 	determined 	that 	the 	Detectives 	improperly
asked questions intended to elicit additional information from
Medina. 	The 	exchange 	between 	Medina 	and 	the 	Detectives
proceeded as follows:
Medina: Can I have an attorney present then?
The Detectives: So . . . and if you . . . so you’re
saying you don’t wanna talk to us without your
attorney present?
M: Well ya the thing is I don’t know what’s going
on. I wanna know what’s going on.
D: Okay.
M: Why is it that my sister[’]s door gets kicked in
. . . I’ve got an officer asking if I got my hands . . . if
I have an injury on my hands and they’re checking
my hands and I was like no what’s goin on . . .
Does he have . . . What injury are you talking about
. . . What’s going on. You know what I mean? I’m
only here tryin (inaudible) cause I wanna lay off
the meth cause I was consumin (inaudible) all this
goin on and I was like what’s goin on. My sister’s

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	15 	2019 UT App 49
mad at me right and doesn’t want to talk to me
because the same situation.
¶27 	Here, Medina implored the Detectives to discuss the
murder 	investigation 	with 	him, 	continually 	asking 	them
questions pertaining to the investigation and giving explanations
for the circumstances. The district court even conceded that “the
Detectives did not do much prodding.” While the Detectives did
go on to ask questions such as, “Is that what happened with
her,” and make statements such as, “We can have a discussion,”
those 	statements 	were 	made 	after 	Medina’s 	completely
unsolicited statements regarding his sister, his hands, the police,
his drug usage, and his demand to know more about the
investigation against him. Medina’s desire to “tell . . . what really
happened,” followed by making incriminating statements about
what happened without further prodding by the investigating
officers, 	constitutes 	a 	knowing 	and 	intelligent 	waiver. 	See
Hilfiker, 868 P.2d at 831 (cleaned up). There is no indication from
the record that Medina’s waiver was made without “a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” See Duckworth,
824 F.3d at 1247.
¶28 	To the district court’s second point—that the Detectives
did not “seek a clarification of [his] invocation of [the] right to
counsel” after Medina initiated further discussion about the
investigation—we conclude that such a clarification was not
required. The Utah Supreme Court has held that if “a defendant
makes an 	ambiguous 	or 	equivocal 	request 	for 	an 	attorney,
questioning 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	subject 	matter 	of 	the
investigation 	must 	immediately 	stop, 	and 	any 	further
questioning must be limited to clarifying the request.” State v.
Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 85 (Utah 1993), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 n.2 (Utah 1996). Here, all
parties 	agree 	Medina’s 	request 	for 	an 	attorney 	was 	not
“ambiguous or equivocal.” Therefore, a clarification was not
required. 	The 	request 	was 	unambiguous 	but 	Medina,

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	16 	2019 UT App 49
immediately 	and 	unprompted, 	proceeded 	to 	carry 	on 	a
discussion 	with 	the 	Detectives. 	“Police 	are 	not 	required 	to
rewarn suspects from time to time.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560
U.S. 370, 386 (2010); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485
(1981) (“[N]othing in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
would 	prohibit 	the 	police 	from 	merely 	listening 	to 	[a
defendant’s] voluntary, volunteered statements and using them
against [the defendant] at the trial.”). Accordingly, the district
court incorrectly ruled that Medina’s statement was not made
knowingly and intelligently.
C. 	Voluntary Statement
¶29 	Finally, the State argues that Medina’s statements were
made voluntarily. We agree. The test of whether a statement is
made voluntarily “is never mechanical, but must duly consider
both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation. 	The 	ultimate 	inquiry 	is 	whether 	physical 	or
psychological 	force 	or 	other 	improper 	threats 	or 	promises
prompted the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have
done so.” State v. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 826, 831 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(cleaned up); see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)
(noting that a voluntary statement is “the product of a free and
deliberate 	choice 	rather 	than 	intimidation, 	coercion, 	or
deception”). While an accused “will likely experience at least
some 	anxiety 	as 	a 	natural 	incident 	of 	being 	arrested 	and
incarcerated 	that 	may 	affect 	the 	accused’s 	psychological
condition,” a statement is not involuntary because “an accused
experiences 	some 	anxiety 	because 	of 	his 	arrest 	and
incarceration.” State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985).
¶30 	Here, the district court ruled that even though there was
“no 	evidence 	of 	coercion,” 	the 	State 	had 	failed 	to 	present
sufficient evidence that the statements were made voluntarily.
The 	district 	court 	erred 	by 	requiring 	the 	State 	to 	present
additional evidence, as evidence beyond the circumstances of
the interview is not required. See id. at 237 (holding that “there
must be some physical or psychological force or manipulation

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	17 	2019 UT App 49
that is designed to induce the accused to talk when he would not
otherwise 	have 	done 	so,” 	and 	because 	“[n]one 	ha[d] 	been
shown,” 	the 	statement 	was 	considered 	voluntary); 	see 	also
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (“Absent police
conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis
for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal
defendant of due process of law.” (emphasis added)); State v.
Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1993) (“To be involuntary, there
must be a causal relationship between the coercion and the
subsequent confession.”).
¶31 	The interrogation transcript, along with videos of the
interrogation, constitute a sufficient basis on which to conclude
that the statements were made voluntarily. We can presume that
“an individual who, with a full understanding of his or her
rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made
a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights
afford.” 	Berghuis 	v. 	Thompkins, 	560 	U.S. 	370, 	385 	(2010).
Accordingly, because all three conditions to the admission of
Medina’s statements were satisfied, the district court should
have denied Medina’s motion to suppress, and his statements in
the first interview should have been admitted.
II. The Second Interview
¶32 	The 	State 	argues 	that 	“[b]ecause 	Medina 	initiated 	a
conversation with the [D]etectives after invoking his right to
counsel and validly waived his Miranda rights” during the first
interview, 	the 	statements 	Medina 	made 	during 	the 	second
interview should also be admitted. We agree. Prior to the second
interview, the Detectives and Medina engaged in the following
conversation:
The Detectives: So you asked me to do a couple
things when we last talked. I did that okay so I got
some . . . some good news as far as that goes okay,
but just as we get talkin I just want to make sure

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	18 	2019 UT App 49
you still are aware of your rights okay? Do you
understand your rights too?
Medina: Yes.
D: That you do have the right to an attorney and
you don’t have to talk. You can have on[e] present
with you and all that right? So you still understand
those?
M: Yes.
D: You’re still okay to talk to me then?
M: Ya.
¶33 	The district court concluded that the Detectives’ second
recitation 	of 	Medina’s 	Miranda 	rights 	prior 	to 	the 	second
interview would have been adequate if Medina had voluntarily
waived 	his right 	to 	counsel 	in 	the 	first 	interview. 	And 	as
discussed, supra Part I, the Miranda warning given in the first
interview was sufficient. Consequently, it carried over to the
second interview that was given only three days later. See
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010) (holding that officers
need not re-recite Miranda warnings unless fourteen days have
passed since the break in custody). And here the Detectives
reminded Medina of his right to counsel and confirmed that he
understood his rights and still wanted to talk to the Detectives.
Therefore, 	the 	Detectives 	did 	not 	violate 	Medina’s 	right 	to
counsel in the second interview and the district court incorrectly
granted Medina’s motion to suppress the statements made in the
second interview.
CONCLUSION
¶34 	Medina 	initiated 	further 	communication 	with 	the
Detectives 	regarding 	topics 	that 	were 	not 	“routine” 	nor

State v. Medina
20170328-CA 	19 	2019 UT App 49
“unrelated to the crimes charged,” effectively waiving his right
to 	counsel. 	Further, 	his 	waiver 	was 	made 	knowingly 	and
intelligently, as well as voluntarily. We therefore conclude that
the Detectives did not violate Medina’s right to counsel in the
second interview, and we reverse the district court’s grant of
Medina’s motion to suppress the statements made in both the
first and second interviews.