RAPS Investments v. North Logan

2025 UT App 55
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
RAPS I NVESTMENTS LLC,
Appellant,
v.
NORTH LOGAN C ITY ,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20230292-CA
Filed April 24, 2025
First District Court, Logan Department
The Honorable Angela Fonnesbeck
No. 220100110
Troy L. Booher, Caroline A. Olsen, and Kevin E.
Anderson, Attorneys for Appellant
Seth J. Tait, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE D AVID N. M ORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES R YAN M. HARRIS and R YAN D. TENNEY concurred.
MORTENSEN, Judge:
¶1 	Bob Strebel purchased a lot that was the product of an
improper subdivision of a larger piece of property.1 He then
sought permission from the local city to build a home on the lot.
The city denied his application, asserting that access to the parcel
1. “In this opinion, in keeping with our understanding of the
parties’ preferences and usage,” In re B.D., 2024 UT App 104, ¶ 2
n.2, 556 P.3d 86, we refer to the owner of the parcel in question as
Strebel even though RAPS Investments LLC is the named party in
this appeal. We take no position on the corporate relationship
between Strebel and RAPS Investments LLC in adopting the
parties’ naming convention, which we follow for the sake of
continuity, simplicity, and narrative.

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was inadequate. That decision was ultimately confirmed by the
district 	court. 	On 	appeal, 	Strebel 	argues 	that 	the 	city
misinterpreted and misapplied its own ordinances and that the
district court erred in upholding the city’s decision. We agree with
Strebel and reverse the district court’s decision.
BACKGROUND
The Lot
¶2 	Strebel owns a parcel of real property (the Lot) in North
Logan City, Utah (the City). Prior to Strebel’s purchase, the Lot
was a part of a larger piece of property, which was subdivided
into three smaller parcels without observing the applicable land
use requirements or obtaining the approval of the City.
¶3 	The Lot is located at the far eastern end of 2500 North; the
two other lots created by the subdivision are located directly to
the west of the Lot. 2500 North is a pre-existing roadway that runs
east to west, providing access to eight other residential homes (not
involved in the subdivision) as well as the City’s cemetery. The
road is divided into two roughly equal sections: Lower 2500
North and Upper 2500 North. Lower 2500 North is approximately
1,900 feet long, running from 1600 East on the western side to an
underground canal crossing located at approximately 1850 East.
The other eight residences along the road are located on Lower
2500 North. Upper 2500 North runs from the canal crossing to its
eastern end, where it terminates at approximately 2050 East. The
distance from the canal crossing to the three lots is approximately
1,100 feet. Crucial to this dispute is the width of 2500 North.
Lower 2500 North varies in width from 13 feet to 19 feet, with an
average width of 15 feet. Upper 2500 North is approximately 20
feet wide for its entire length.

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The Ordinance
¶4 	In November 2021, Strebel, along with the owner of the two
adjoining lots, renewed a previously filed application to build
residential dwellings on their respective lots.2
¶5 	As counsel for the City explained during the district court
proceeding, 	in 	Cache 	County 	landowners 	have 	sometimes
subdivided large parcels of land that have been in their families
“not 	knowing 	that 	there’s 	such 	a 	thing 	as 	a 	subdivision
ordinance” and without complying with the requirements of such
ordinance. These noncompliant lots are problematic because they
make 	it 	difficult 	for 	municipalities 	to 	provide 	essential
infrastructure, such as “sewer, water, power, roads, curb, gutter,
sidewalk, etc.” To address this common 	situation, the City
enacted an ordinance entitled “12D-207 Post-Division Approval
of 	Improper 	Subdivision” 	(the 	Ordinance) 	as 	an 	additional
provision to the North Logan Municipal Code (the NLMC).3 The
Ordinance provides a way to transform a noncompliant lot into a
“legal lot” and allow its owner to obtain a building permit. The
Ordinance, which represented a collaborative effort between the
City and legal counsel for the owners of the three lots, was enacted
in 	November 	2018, 	just 	a 	day 	before 	Strebel 	renewed 	his
application to develop the Lot.
¶6 	The Ordinance begins with the following definitions in
subsection A:
2. The original application was filed in 2017.
3. The Ordinance is enumerated as section 12D-207 of the NLMC.
For ease of reading, we will refer to it as “the Ordinance” unless
we are citing a specific subsection, in which case we will refer to
it as “NLMC § 12D-207(X)” in proper citations and “subsection X”
in textual references.

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• 	“Applicable Standard” refers to the “zoning ordinances and
standards that were in effect at the time that the Improper Lot
was created. If the exact date that the Improper Lot [was
created] cannot be determined, then the Applicable Standard
shall be the zoning ordinances and standards in effect when
the Improper Lot can first be identified on the records of the
Cache County Recorder’s Office.” NLMC § 12D-207(A)(1).
• 	“Innocent Owner” is an “owner of an Improper Lot provided
that the owner was not the party that created the Improper
Lot, and is not related either remuneratively or familially . . .
to the party that created the Improper Lot. If the owner of an
Improper Lot was the party, or is related in any way to the
party, that created the Improper Lot then that owner is not an
Innocent Owner.” Id. § 12D-207(A)(2).
• 	“Improper Lot” is “[a] lot, plot, tract of land, or parcel that was
subdivided without complying with [applicable subdivision
ordinances].” Id. § 12D-207(A)(3).
• 	“Improper Subdivision” refers to the “subdivision of a lot,
plot, tract of land, or parcel that created the Improper Lot.” Id.
§ 12D-207(A)(4).
• 	“Parent Lot” is a “lot, plot, tract of land, or parcel from which
the Improper Lot(s) were created.” Id. § 12D-207(A)(5).
• 	“Post-Division Review” is the “review of an Improper Lot
requested 	by 	an 	Innocent 	Owner 	to 	(a) 	determine 	the
Applicable Standard; (b) to determine if the Improper Lot
complies with the Applicable Standard and therefore should
be 	approved; 	and 	(c) 	upon 	approval 	of 	the 	Improper
Subdivision, 	establish 	the 	conditions, 	requirements 	and
improvements for the Improper Lot that are required by the
Applicable Standard.” Id. § 12D-207(A)(6).

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¶7 	In subsection B, the Ordinance provides the prerequisites
that an Innocent Owner must meet to use the process outlined in
the Ordinance:
If the Improper Lot has been subdivided from the
Parent Lot for a minimum of ten (10) years, and [the
Innocent 	Owner] 	has 	attempted 	to 	bring 	the
Improper Lot into compliance with the provisions
of this chapter but has been unable to do so either
because of (i) the lack of participation by other
owners that must participate in order to comply
with the provisions of this chapter; or (ii) any other
hardship on the Innocent Owner, then the Innocent
Owner 	may 	apply 	to 	have 	the 	Improper 	Lot
reviewed to avoid undue hardship and inequities
on the innocent owner.
Id. § 12D-207(B).
¶8 	Subsection C addresses the application of the NLMC and
the Design Standards Technical Manual (the DSTM)4 to the
procedure 	the 	Noth 	Logan 	City 	Planning 	Commission 	(the
Planning Commission) and the North Logan City Council (the
City 	Council) 	use 	to 	determine 	if 	an 	Improper 	Lot 	meets
development regulations:
Upon receipt of a request for Post-Division Review,
the Planning Commission and City Council shall
determine 	if 	the 	Improper 	Lot 	meets 	the
Development Regulations found in [the NLMC] and
the [DSTM] based on the Development Regulations
and requirements required at the time of the Post-
4. The City explains in its brief that the DSTM is a document
“published separately from the [NLMC]” that provides “the
engineering 	and 	technical 	requirements 	for 	infrastructure
improvements.”

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Division Approval. If the Improper Lot does not
meet these Development requirements, improvements
must 	be 	designed 	and 	constructed 	to 	meet 	all
applicable 	regulations 	in 	[the 	NLMC] 	and 	the
[DSTM].
Id. § 12D-207(C).
¶9 	Subsection D limits improvements that may be required to
be made to the Improper Lot to those found in the NLMC or the
DSTM:
Except as required in subsection E immediately
below, any improvements or dedications required
in connection with an approval of the Improper Lot
pursuant to a Post-Division Review shall be limited
to 	those 	improvements 	or 	dedications 	that 	are
required by the Development Regulations found in
[the NLMC], and the [DSTM] and that are located
on the Improper Lot. Each Improper Lot created as
a part of an Improper Subdivision must be part of a
Post-Division 	review 	at 	which 	time 	the
improvements 	or 	dedications 	required 	for 	that
Improper Lot may be imposed on that particular
Improper Lot.
Id. § 12D-207(D).
¶10 	And the fifth and last part of the Ordinance, subsection E,
regulates the overall development of Improper Lots and Parent
Lots, and it requires that
[t]he Improper Lot(s) and Parent Lot(s) conform
with all other land use ordinances including but not
limited to; lot size, width, access and frontage for the
zone in which it is located at the time of application
for Post-Division Review.

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Id. § 12D-207(E).
The Recommendation of the Planning Commission
¶11 	The Planning Commission considered Strebel’s application
at meetings in December 2021 and January 2022. At the January
meeting, the Planning Commission voted “to make a negative
recommendation” to the City Council on the approval of Strebel’s
application.
¶12 	The Planning Commission’s negative recommendation
was accompanied by a report (the Report) written by the City
Planner that addressed each subsection of the Ordinance. The
Report concluded that the Improper Lot met all the requirements
of subsection B but fell short at subsection C. Specifically, the
Report stated, “Access is the only concern for this application. In
the [DSTM] and Fire code[,] . . . a minimum of twenty (20) feet in
width for an access road” is required. The Report explained that
while the “length of road from the canal crossing east to the
property [met] the required twenty (20’) in width,” the “length of
road from the canal crossing west to 1600 East [varied] in width
along its length,” from “16 feet at the widest, [with] most areas
measuring at 14–15 feet, and the most narrow found just west of
the canal at 13 feet.”
¶13 	The Report concluded with this factual finding related to
the application: Section “12D-114 within the [NLMC] requires
that adequate access be provided to each lot,” but “the drivable
access road to the [Lot] is not currently the 20 feet in width
excluding shoulders that is required as measured by city staff
(Public Works, 	Engineering, 	Fire, 	Admin).” 	Section 	12D-114
concerns 	improvements 	for 	subdivisions; 	it 	states 	that
“[i]mprovements shall be required and constructed in accordance
with the [DSTM].” And among required improvements, it lists
“[s]treets and roads providing adequate frontage and access to all
lots.” NLMC § 12D-114(A)(4).

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Consideration by the City Council
¶14 	About 	two 	weeks 	after 	the 	Planning 	Commission’s
negative recommendation, the City Council considered Strebel’s
application. At that meeting, the City Planner directed the City
Council’s attention to the Report, stating, “[T]he one thing in [the
Report] that we wanted to . . . point out is access,” specifically
noting, “[The Lot] does need to meet the rest of our development
codes, that includes adequate access as defined in our code.” The
City Planner went on to point out that “the minimum width fire
code-wise for this would be . . . 20 feet paved.” He then reported
that Lower 2500 North averaged only 15 feet wide, with the
narrowest portions being 13 or 14 feet and the widest point being
16 feet. He further noted that the road was only 11 feet when
plowed of snow owing to the proximity of the adjacent fences.
¶15 	City Council members then spent some time discussing
access issues surrounding 2500 North with the City Planner.
Much of this discussion focused on the width of 2500 North being
sufficient 	to 	allow 	access 	during 	a 	fire 	emergency. 	Strebel
addressed 	the 	City 	Council, 	disputing 	that 	the 	access 	was
inadequate under the NLMC to allow emergency services to reach
the Lot: “We’re not talking about fire, but just access. And . . . all
that [the NLMC] says is that you have to have adequate access to
get to your home.” He went on to assert, “And I don’t know how
you can argue that there’s not adequate access to get to our home
when people drive back and forth to that cemetery all the time.
And the nine people that [already] live on that road, they have
adequate access to their homes.” In response, one City Council
member said that she felt like they were “stretching the definition
of adequate” when the “bare minimum adequate access needs to
be [the] fire code” requirement of 20 feet in width. However, the
mayor of the City acknowledged at the meeting that she thought
“there is some ambiguity . . . about adequate access” and that she
did not “think that there’s a clear right answer here” in reference
to the City’s regulations, observing, “[W]e all appreciate . . . the

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complexity of this.” Ultimately, the City Council voted to deny
the application because “it [did] not meet the code.”
Appeal to the Hearing Officer
¶16 	Strebel appealed the denial to the City’s Administrative
Appeals Hearing Officer (the Hearing Officer). Strebel filed a
memorandum in support of his appeal. In this memorandum,
Strebel asserted that the NLMC “appears to only require access
not adequate access.” From this, he argued that his application
was “in full compliance” with the “applicable ordinances and
codes” and that there was a “lack of a specific basis for the
determination of inadequacy.”
¶17 	At the hearing held in late February 2022, the City’s
counsel argued that the “access” needed to not just be “adequate”
but that it had to also meet the standards required by the DSTM.
And the “smallest road width available” in the DSTM is the “rural
roads option, which requires 22 feet of asphalt and 2 feet of curb
on each side, . . . plus some swell or landscape” on the side,
resulting in a “38-foot easement or access area.”
¶18 	The Hearing Officer upheld the denial of the application.
He 	concluded, 	“The 	record 	on 	appeal 	includes 	substantial
evidence for each essential finding of fact made by the City
Council. The City Council’s interpretation and application of the
relevant land use ordinances was correct.” He further concluded
that subsection C “plainly restricts approval of the application for
subdivision because the development regulations in [the NLMC
and the DSTM] are not satisfied.”
Appeal to the District Court
¶19 	Strebel timely filed a petition for review of the Hearing
Officer’s decision with the district court. Strebel argued that
subsection C did not apply to the width of a road some distance
away from the Lot because that subsection was limited to the Lot

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itself: “Upon receipt of a request for Post-Division Review, the
Planning Commission and City Council shall determine if the
Improper Lot meets the Development Regulations found in [the
NLMC and the DSTM] based on the Development Regulations
and requirements required at the time of the Post-Division
Approval.” 	NLMC 	§ 	12D-207(C) 	(emphasis 	added). 	Strebel
asserted that the City Council was to determine only if the Lot
itself complied with the requirements and that the City Council
could not extend this determination to offsite compliance, namely
the width of Lower 2500 North. Thus, Strebel took issue with the
denial of the application because the City Council’s “focus [was]
not the requirements or improvements located on the [Lot]” but
instead on “offsite street improvements far removed from the
[Lot].”
¶20 	The district court upheld the Hearing Officer’s decision. In
addressing section 12D-114(A)(4), the court noted that Strebel
argued the provision required only access to a public road while
the City maintained it required access to the entirety of 2500
North. The court concluded that the Hearing Officer correctly
interpreted subsection C as it related to section 12D-114(A)(4),
meaning that “adequate access” includes access from the Lot to
the rest of the City: “[A]dequate access would include the entirety
of [2500 North] because [Upper 2500 North], alone, does not give
[the Lot] access to a main road, only [Lower 2500 North] connects
to a main road. [Lower 2500 North] was correctly considered
when the Hearing Officer applied” the requirement from the
DSTM on the minimum width.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶21 	Strebel appeals, asserting that “the district court erred in
concluding” that the City Council and Hearing Officer “(i)
properly construed a land use ordinance as requiring ‘adequate
access’ when the ordinance itself included no such requirement,
and (ii) properly denied . . . Strebel’s land use application based

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on that erroneous construction.” “When a district court reviews
an order of a local land use authority and we exercise appellate
review of the district court’s judgment, we afford no deference to
the district court’s decision.” Outfront Media, LLC v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 2017 UT 74, ¶ 12, 416 P.3d 389 (cleaned up). “We review the
interpretation of ordinances for correctness as well.” Id.5
ANALYSIS
¶22 	A 	municipal 	land 	use 	decision 	is 	invalid 	if 	a 	court
determines it to be “illegal.” See Utah Code § 10-9a-801(3)(b)(ii).
Here, Strebel asserts that the City’s decision was illegal because it
was based on a misinterpretation of the law. A “land use decision
is illegal” when it “is based on an incorrect interpretation of a land
use regulation” or “is contrary to law.” Id. § 10-9a-801(3)(c)(ii); see
also 	Outfront 	Media, 	2017 	UT 	74, 	¶ 	12. 	“The 	fundamental
consideration in interpreting legislation, whether at the state or
local level”—a city ordinance in this case—“is legislative intent.”
Springville Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. City of Springville, 1999 UT
25, ¶ 29, 979 P.2d 332. And the best evidence of legislative intent
“is the plain language of the . . . ordinance itself.” Ferre v. Salt Lake
City, 2019 UT App 94, ¶ 14, 444 P.3d 567 (cleaned up). It is well-
established that “we read the plain language of the ordinance as
5. The City spends significant energy encouraging us to adopt a
more deferential standard of review. See Carrier v. Salt Lake
County, 2004 UT 98, ¶ 28, 104 P.3d 1208 (“We . . . review a local
agency’s interpretation of ordinances for correctness, but also
afford some level of non-binding deference to the interpretation
advanced by the local agency.”), abrogated by Outfront Media, LLC
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2017 UT 74, 416 P.3d 389. But we are bound
to follow the standard articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in
Outfront Media. See State v. Sundara, 2021 UT App 85, ¶ 60, 498 P.3d
443 (“[T]his court lacks the authority to overrule Utah Supreme
Court precedent.”).

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a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with other
ordinances in the same chapter and related chapters.” Id. (cleaned
up); see also LPI Services v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 11, 215 P.3d 135;
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 17, 66 P.3d 592.
¶23 	However, in the context of a land use decision, the playing
field is not uniformly even. This situation arises because the
Municipal 	Land 	Use, 	Development, 	and 	Management 	Act
(MLUDMA), see generally Utah Code §§ 10-9a-101 to -1005, directs
that “[i]f a land use regulation does not plainly restrict a land use
application, the land use authority shall interpret and apply the
land use regulation to favor the land use application,” see id. § 10-
9a-306(2) (emphasis added); id. § 10-9a-707(4)(b) (“The appeal
authority shall . . . interpret and apply a land use regulation to
favor a land use application unless the land use regulation plainly
restricts 	the 	land 	use 	application.” 	(emphasis 	added)). 	The
question before us, then, is whether the Ordinance “plainly
restricts” Strebel’s application. If it does not, the Ordinance
should be interpreted in favor of granting Strebel’s application.6
6. The City asserted at oral argument that these provisions
requiring the interpretation of a land use regulation in favor of the
application apply only at the administrative stage and do not
apply to judicial review because Utah Code section 10-9a-801,
which addresses judicial review, does not separately contain this
requirement. The City’s argument in this respect is unpersuasive.
Section 10-9a-801 explicitly states that the reviewing “court shall
presume that a final land use decision of a land use authority or
an appeal authority is valid unless the land use decision is: (i)
arbitrary and capricious; or (ii) illegal.” Utah Code § 10-9a-
801(3)(b). Clearly, if the court is reviewing the decision of the
appeal authority, which was required to interpret the land use
regulation in favor of the application unless the regulation plainly
restricted the proposed use, then it follows that the judicial review
(continued…)

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¶24 	Strebel argues that the City Council was required to
approve his application because the Lot “satisfied all applicable
requirements under” the Ordinance. As Strebel sees it, the error
of the City Council—which he argues extended to the Hearing
Officer’s 	and 	the 	district 	court’s 	determinations—was 	in
considering off-lot conditions, namely, the width of Lower 2500
North. Strebel contends that the plain meaning of the Ordinance
“limited the [City] Council’s review to determining whether [the
Lot]—and 	only 	[the 	Lot]—complied 	with 	applicable 	design
requirements.” This alleged error, Strebel maintains, rendered the
City Council’s decision “illegal” because it was “based on an
incorrect interpretation of a land use regulation” or “contrary to
law.” See id. § 10-9a-801(3)(c)(ii). Strebel argues that his assertion
that nothing in the Ordinance authorized consideration of off-lot
conditions “follows from the text and structure of [the Ordinance]
and common sense.”
of the appeal authority’s decision proceeds under this same
requirement. “Furthermore, because zoning ordinances are in
derogation 	of 	a 	property 	owner’s 	common-law 	right 	to
unrestricted 	use 	of 	his 	or 	her 	property, 	provisions 	therein
restricting 	property 	uses 	should 	be 	strictly 	construed, 	and
provisions permitting property uses should be liberally construed
in favor of the property owner.” Patterson v. Utah County Board of
Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). And we too
proceed under the same provision given that we are reviewing
the decision of the district court. See Outfront Media, 2017 UT 74,
¶ 12 n.8 (“The lack of deference [afforded the district court’s
review of a land use authority’s decision] . . . does not mean that
we are not in fact reviewing the decision of the district court. So,
. . . when 	we 	exercise 	appellate 	review 	of 	a 	district 	court’s
judgment in connection with judicial review under Utah Code
section 10-9a-801, we review the intermediate court’s decision.”
(cleaned up)).

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¶25 	We largely agree with Strebel because the Ordinance does
not “plainly restrict” Strebel’s application such that it authorized
the City Council to analyze off-lot conditions (here, whether the
width of a distant road was sufficient to provide adequate access
to the Lot) in determining if his application should be approved.
A. 	The Ordinance itself does not “plainly restrict” Strebel’s
application.
¶26 	The mayor of the City admitted that the city ordinances in
this matter were plagued by at least “some ambiguity” and that
she did not “think that there’s a clear right answer here” when
Strebel’s application was being considered by the City Council.
And before the district court, while asserting that the Ordinance
was “fairly straightforward,” the City’s attorney nevertheless
conceded that “[t]here is some ambiguity in the language.”
Moreover, even in its brief on appeal, the City continues to admit
that the Ordinance “may not have been expertly drafted.”7 We
agree with the City’s characterization that the Ordinance is
ambiguous. A consequence of this ambiguity is our conclusion
that the Ordinance does not plainly restrict Strebel’s application—
at least not for the sole reason identified by the City, which was
that the Lot does not have adequate access.
¶27 	First, the plain text of the Ordinance defines the term
“Improper Lot” in the singular to mean “[a] lot, plot, tract of land,
or parcel that was subdivided without complying with the
applicable requirements of this chapter.” NLMC § 12D-207(A)(3).
Strebel advances a convincing argument on this point. From this
use of the singular, Strebel argues, “By limiting the meaning
solely to the lot itself, the definition confirms that [subsection C’s]
reference 	to 	‘the 	Improper 	Lot’ 	does 	not 	include 	off-lot
7. The City said essentially the same in its brief submitted to the
district court: “While the Ordinance is admittedly not the most
artfully drafted, [its] sections do not conflict with one another.”

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conditions.” 	Strebel 	concludes, 	“[T]he 	word 	‘the’ 	before
‘Improper Lot’ particularized the [City] Council’s review to ‘the
Improper Lot,’ meaning [the Lot]. It functioned to restrict the
[City] Council’s review to [Strebel’s] property and precluded it
from considering conditions beyond [the Lot].” The express terms
of subsection C state that “the Planning Commission and City
Council shall determine if the Improper Lot meets the Development
Regulations found” in the NLMC and the DSTM “required at the
time of the Post-Division Approval.” Id. § 12D-207(C) (emphasis
added). Nothing in the plain text of subsection C suggests that the
City is authorized to consider off-lot conditions in this analysis.
¶28 	Second, the overall structure of the Ordinance confirms the
reading Strebel advances, namely that the City Council was
limited to assessing the condition on only the Lot. Subsection D
states that the review undertaken by the City Council “shall be
limited to those improvements or dedications that are required”
by the NLMC and the DSTM and that are “located on the
Improper 	Lot.” 	Id. 	§ 	12D-207(D). 	Moreover, 	subsection 	D
expressly 	provides 	that 	the 	“improvements 	or 	dedications
required for that Improper Lot may be imposed on that particular
Improper Lot.” Id.
¶29 	Strebel argues that this language lends support to his
assertion 	that 	the 	City 	Council 	is 	restricted 	to 	assessing
improvements on the Improper Lot. More specifically, Strebel
asserts, the City Council’s “review was restricted to determining
whether 	[the 	Lot] 	complied 	with 	applicable 	development
regulations.” His argument in this respect is persuasive. It is well-
settled that “we do not view individual words and subsections in
isolation; instead, our statutory interpretation requires that each
part or section be construed in connection with every other part
or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.” State v. Hatfield,
2020 UT 1, ¶ 16, 462 P.3d 330 (cleaned up); see also State v. Maestas,
2002 UT 123, ¶ 54, 63 P.3d 621 (“A statute is passed as a whole and
not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose

RAPS Investments v. North Logan City
20230292-CA 	16 	2025 UT App 55
and intent.” (cleaned up)). Here, the interrelationship between
subsections C and D supports a reading of the Ordinance that the
City Council’s authority to require improvements is strictly
circumscribed 	to 	on-lot 	conditions. 	Indeed, 	subsection 	D 	is
explicit 	in 	its 	choice 	of 	words: 	it 	states 	that 	required
improvements are “limited” to those “located on the Improper
Lot” and provides only that they can be imposed “on that
particular Improper Lot.” NLMC § 12D-207(D).
¶30 	The 	provision 	in 	subsection 	E 	does 	not 	change 	the
conclusion that improvements are limited to on-lot conditions.
That subsection requires “Improper Lot(s) and the Parent Lot(s)
[to] conform with all other land use ordinances including but not
limited to; lot size, width, access and frontage for the zone in
which it is located at the time of application for Post-Division
Review.” Id. § 12D-207(E). It’s important to note that subsection E
is situated as the gateway to subsection D. See id. § 12D-207(D)
(“Except as required in subsection E immediately below, . . .”).
And subsection D, as we just explained, is strictly limited to on-
lot improvements. The most natural reading of the Ordinance,
given this context, is that subsection E merely allows the City to
ensure that approving the improper lot will not create access
issues for the Parent Lot or other lots that were created in the
improper subdivision, for example, a situation where approving
one improper lot might completely cut off access to the Parent Lot
or other lots. Nothing in the subsection suggests that the City
Council should consider off-lot conditions outside of this narrow
exception.
B. 	The provisions of the DSTM do not “plainly restrict”
Strebel’s application.
¶31 	Thus, under the terms of the Ordinance, the provisions of
the DSTM are applicable only to the improper lot. The DSTM

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itself—at least that part of it in the record submitted to us8—does
not purport to establish a nexus between the width of a road and
adequate access to a lot in a subdivision some distance away from
the road in question. That connection, insofar as it does exist,
appears to have been drawn by the City’s representatives in
referencing the standards for a rural road in the DSTM. Insofar as
we can tell from the record, the DSTM merely provides the
specifications for a rural road. It doesn’t mention that its road
specifications 	are 	in 	any 	way 	related 	to 	access 	to 	lots 	in
subdivisions, and certainly not in a way that “plainly restricts”
Strebel’s application.
C. 	Section 	12D-114 	likewise 	does 	not 	“plainly 	restrict”
Strebel’s application.
¶32 	The City argues that because subsection E requires an
assessment of whether the Improper Lot complies “with all other
land use ordinances,” see id. § 12D-207(E), when it comes to access,
section 12D-114(A)(4) comes into play. As previously noted, that
section 	states 	that 	“[i]mprovements 	shall 	be 	required 	and
constructed in accordance with the [DSTM].” Id. § 12D-114(A).
Among required improvements, section 12D-114 lists “[s]treets
and roads providing adequate frontage and access to all lots.” Id.
§ 12D-114(A)(4). And as the Hearing Officer indicated, the DSTM
has a minimum width for rural roads of 22 feet. But we conclude,
contrary to the City’s assertion, that the Ordinance limits the
8. The record has only a few pages from the DSTM that was in
effect at the time of Strebel’s application. For the current version
of the DSTM, see Design Standards Technical Manual (DSTM), North
Logan, https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/municipalcodeonline.com-
new/northlogan/designtechmanual/documents/1709141515_North%20
Logan%20City%20Design%20Standards%20Technical%20Manual%20
(DSTM)%20240117.pdf [https://perma.cc/465X-DYZK].

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20230292-CA 	18 	2025 UT App 55
applicability of section 12D-114, insofar as it is applicable at all, to
on-lot conditions.
¶33 	First, the plain text of the Ordinance is far from clear that
section 12D-114 even applies. On the contrary, the Ordinance
states, “Upon receipt of a request for Post-Division Review, the
Planning Commission and City Council shall determine if the
Improper Lot meets the Development Regulations found in [the
NLMC].” Id. § 12D-207(C). But “Development Regulations” is the
title of section 12D-115, which addresses a wide variety of items
related to development but does not mention access to lots. Id.
§ 12D-115. The Ordinance does not reference section 12D-114
either by its descriptive title or its section number. While this does
not definitively mean that section 12D-114 does not apply, it does
mean that the plain text of the Ordinance in no way would lead
one to conclude that it does. Instead, the plain text of the
Ordinance explicitly invokes section 12D-115’s title. All this is to
say 	that 	because 	the 	Ordinance 	does 	not 	“plainly 	restrict”
Strebel’s application, the Ordinance should be interpreted and
applied “to favor the land use application,” see Utah Code §§ 10-
9a-306(2), 	-707(4)(b), 	at 	least 	insofar 	as 	section 	12D-114 	is
concerned. In other words, the City cannot use section 12D-114 to
assert that the Ordinance plainly restricts Strebel’s application
because its applicability to the Ordinance is dubious at best.
¶34 	Moreover, even if it is applicable, nothing in section 12D-
114 establishes that its regulations apply to conditions outside of
the subdivision in question. On the contrary, the language of
section 	12D-114 	indicates 	that 	its 	provisions 	apply 	to
improvements within the subdivision. The title of the section is
“Subdivision Improvements Required.” NLMC § 12D-114. And
the section expressly states, “The improvements required by this
ordinance 	apply 	to 	all 	subdividers and 	to 	all 	persons that
purchase, lease, rent or receive any interest in any land which is
located within a subdivision.” Id. § 12D-114(B) (emphasis added).
Given the overall structure of the section, the applicability of the

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20230292-CA 	19 	2025 UT App 55
specific 	subsection 	concerning 	streets 	and 	roads 	(requiring
“[s]treets and roads providing adequate frontage and access to all
lots”) is more readily understood as meaning that the roads within
the subdivision provide access to all lots rather than requiring
roads external to the subdivision provide adequate access. See id.
§ 12D-114(A)(4). This conclusion is further bolstered by the
current 	version 	of 	the 	section, 	which 	expressly 	states 	that
improvements “on existing and proposed streets” are limited to
those “in all proposed subdivisions.” Id. § 12D-116(A)(6) (2025).9
In sum, nothing in section 12D-114—either in its past or present
incarnations—would lead us to conclude that improvements
reach to conditions outside the subdivision in question. In fact, the
contrary conclusion is the more natural reading.
¶35 	Given that the Ordinance, the DSTM, and section 12D-
114—even when read together—do not plainly restrict Strebel’s
application, 	these 	land 	use 	regulations 	should 	have 	been
interpreted and applied in favor of the application. See Utah Code
§§ 10-9a-306(2), -707(4)(b). In light of the Ordinance’s ambiguity
and the questionable applicability of the DSTM and section 12D-
114, these land use regulations clearly were not so interpreted and
applied. Instead, the City engaged in what can only be described
as a rather strained analysis to tie the three together to reach the
conclusion that the Ordinance applied to off-lot conditions.
Because the City’s conclusion was based on such a tenuous
excursus into questionably applicable regulations, it can hardly be
said that the Ordinance plainly restricted Strebel’s application.
9. For the current version of the NLMC land use ordinances,
which includes regulations and requirements for subdivisions,
see 	North 	Logan 	City, 	Utah, 	Municipal 	Code 	ch. 	12 	(2025),
https://northlogan.municipalcodeonline.com/book?type=ordinan
ces#name=12_Land_Use [https://perma.cc/6648-UESB].

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CONCLUSION
¶36 	When read as a whole, the plain text of the Ordinance
limited 	the 	City 	to analyzing 	on-lot 	conditions in 	deciding
whether to approve Strebel’s application. At the very least, the
Ordinance, the DSTM, and section 12D-114 did not plainly restrict
Strebel’s application. Instead, given the apparent ambiguity of
these land use regulations, they should have been applied and
interpreted in favor of Strebel’s application. We therefore reverse
and remand this matter to the district court with instructions to
reverse the City’s denial of Strebel’s application for failure to meet
the requirements of the Ordinance.10
10. In reaching this conclusion, we take no position on whether
Strebel’s 	application 	to 	develop 	the 	Lot 	met 	the 	other
requirements of the NLMC or other land use regulations. Our
opinion addresses only whether Strebel’s application met the
requirements of the Ordinance. In other words, we are not saying
Strebel’s 	application 	should 	have 	been 	approved 	when
considered in light of all the NLMC requirements and other
regulations of the City for the issuance of a building permit. That
determination is beyond the scope of the issue on appeal. Rather
than saying his application should have been approved, we are
saying that his application should not have been denied, on the
access-related grounds advanced by the City, insofar as the terms
of the Ordinance are concerned. Accordingly, our opinion is
strictly cabined by these parameters.