Jackson v. Halls

1. James H. Deans and Timothy S. Deans were on the brief; Reid W.
Lambert argued.
2. The Honorable Russell W. Bench, Senior Judge, sat by special
assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code Jud.
Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2014 UT App 152
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LEE JACKSON; ACTION INVESTMENT SERVICES, LLC; AND
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM, LLC,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
WILLIAM C. HALLS, CORINNE HALLS, TREVOR HALLS,
COUNTRYWIDE BANK FSB, AND MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendants and Appellees.
Memorandum Decision
No. 20121081-CA
Filed June 26, 2014
Second District Court, Farmington Department
The Honorable Thomas L. Kay
No. 110702569
James H. Deans, Timothy S. Deans, and Reid W.
Lambert, Attorneys for Appellants1
Bryan H. Booth and John W. Mann, Attorneys
for Appellees
JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Memorandum
Decision, in which JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH and SENIOR JUDGE
RUSSELL W. BENCH concurred.2

Jackson v. Halls
3. Jackson had recorded a notice of lis pendens to alert potential
purchasers or lenders that title to the Davis County property was
in question. But Jackson mistakenly recorded the lis pendens
against Lot 307, an adjacent lot, rather than Lot 308.
20121081-CA 2 2014 UT App 152
VOROS, Judge:
¶1 The central issue on appeal is whether, under our pre-2011
statutory scheme, a “renewed” judgment lien relates back in time
to the date of the original judgment. Under controlling precedent,
the district court ruled that it did not. We agree and affirm.
¶2 In December 1999, William and Corinne Halls held title to
Lot 308, a piece of property in Davis County. Lee Jackson filed an
action against William Halls in the Third District Court. The court
entered judgment in Jackson’s favor in 2001. Jackson then filed an
abstract of the judgment in the Second District Court in Davis
County and recorded a lien against Lot 308.
¶3 Jackson discovered that in February 2001—before the Third
District Court had entered judgment against William
Halls—William and Corinne had signed a quitclaim deed
transferring Lot 308 to Corinne alone. Jackson filed an avoidance
action seeking to void the quitclaim deed as a fraudulent transfer.
The court eventually dismissed Jackson’s avoidance action for
failure to prosecute.
¶4 In 2007, Countrywide Bank loaned Corinne Halls $469,500.
Unaware of Jackson’s judgment, Countrywide secured the loan
with a deed of trust against Lot 308.3
¶5 In 2008, Jackson took a series of steps to bolster his claim to
a lien on Lot 308. First, he filed an action to renew his 2001
judgment. The district court entered a second judgment in
November 2008. Jackson then moved to set aside the dismissal of

Jackson v. Halls
4. Jackson named Countrywide Home Loans as a defendant, but
Countrywide Home Loans was never served with a summons and
complaint. Countrywide Home Loans therefore never appeared in
the avoidance action.
20121081-CA 3 2014 UT App 152
his avoidance action. The district court voided the 2001 quitclaim4
transfer and returned title in Lot 308 to both William and Corinne
Halls. Finally, the district court issued a writ of execution, ordering
the sale of Lot 308. At the sheriff’s sale, Jackson purchased Lot 308
with a credit bid of $425,000.
¶6 Jackson then sought to evict the Hallses and to quiet title
against Countrywide and other lenders. The lenders moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Jackson’s 2008 judgment did not
relate back to the date of the original judgment and was thus
subordinate to the Countrywide trust deed. The district court
agreed and ruled the lenders’ interest in Lot 308 superior to
Jackson’s. Jackson appeals.
¶7 Jackson contends that a renewal judgment lien relates back
in priority to the original judgment lien. The district court rejected
this contention and granted the lenders summary judgment. We
review a district court’s summary judgment for correctness, giving
no deference to the district court’s ruling. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19,
¶ 15, 250 P.3d 56.
¶8 “A judgment lien is purely a creation of statute.” Cox Corp.
v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938, 939 (Utah 1988). Utah’s judgment-lien law,
once located in Utah Code section 78-22-1, now resides in Utah
Code section 78B-5-202. Under that section, “the entry of judgment
by a district court creates a lien upon the real property of the
judgment debtor” subject to certain statutory exemptions. Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-5-202(2) (LexisNexis 2008).
¶9 Judgments last for only “eight years from the date of
entry . . . unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the

Jackson v. Halls
20121081-CA 4 2014 UT App 152
judgment is stayed in accordance with law.” Id. § 78B-5-202(1). A
judgment holder may, however, extend the life of a judgment
through renewal. A judgment renewal “is not an attempt to
enforce, collect, or expand the original judgment.” Barber v.
Emporium P’ship, 800 P.2d 795, 797 (Utah 1990). Rather, the
judgment holder seeking renewal is “only trying to maintain the
status quo by preventing the judgment’s lapse under the statute of
limitations.” Id.
¶10 But in 2008, when Jackson renewed his judgment against
William Halls, lien priority was not considered part of the status
quo maintained by a judgment renewal. In Cox Corp. v. Vertin, our
supreme court concluded that a renewal judgment does not extend
an existing judgment lien but instead creates a new lien. 754 P.2d
938, 939 (Utah 1988). And that new lien “attaches only from the
date of entry of the new judgment and does not relate back to the
date of the original judgment or extend the prior lien.” Id. Cox
applied the 1987 version of the judgment-lien statute, which stated,
“The lien shall continue for eight years unless the judgment is
previously satisfied . . . .” Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (Michie 1987).
¶11 The 1987 version of the statute applicable in Cox and the
2008 version applicable here have the same effect. The 2008 version
of the judgment-lien statute reads, in pertinent part, “Judgments
shall continue for eight years from the date of entry in a court
unless previously satisfied . . . .” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-202
(LexisNexis 2008). The statute was amended several times between
1987 and 2008, but no pre-2008 amendment altered the Cox rule
that a judgment lien expires in eight years. See Court Jurisdiction,
ch. 127, § 15, 1992 Utah Laws 553, 557; Recording Judgments on
Real Property, ch. 96, § 1, 1997 Utah Laws 348, 348; Judgment Lien
Amendments, ch. 370, §§ 5–6, 2001 Utah Laws 1670, 1672.
¶12 Under relevant law, Jackson’s judgment renewal created a
new lien. That lien attached from the new judgment’s date of
entry—November 25, 2008. Countrywide recorded its trust deed in
2007. Countrywide’s trust deed is therefore superior to Jackson’s

Jackson v. Halls
5. The current version of this statute does allow for judgment-
lien extensions. A 2011 amendment to the judgment-lien statute
created section 78B-5-202(9), which establishes a procedure for
judgment holders to “release, assign, renew, or extend a lien
created by a judgment.” See County Recorder Amendments, ch. 88,
§ 11, 2011 Utah Laws 536, 543. But the enrolled version of the bill
creating section 78B-5-202(9) states that the amendment “modifies
provisions related to the recording of a release, assignment,
renewal, or extension of a judgment lien.” Id. at 536 (emphasis
added). The parties agree that this later version of the statute does
not apply to the present dispute.
Jackson argued for the first time at oral argument that a 1997
amendment to Utah’s judgment-lien statute overruled Cox. See
Recording Judgments on Real Property, ch. 96, § 1, 1997 Utah Laws
348, 348. However, we will not reverse a district court’s decision
based on an argument raised for the first time at oral argument. See
Washington v. Kraft, 2010 UT App 266U, paras. 11–13. In any event,
the 1997 amendment does not purport to alter the law related to
the priority of renewed judgment liens. Given the clarity of the Cox
rule, we are disinclined to conclude that our legislature intended
to overrule it by implication. Cox therefore governs Jackson’s 2008
renewal. See Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938, 939 (Utah 1988).
20121081-CA 5 2014 UT App 152
judgment lien. Accordingly, the district court correctly granted
Countrywide summary judgment.5
¶13 Jackson also contends that even if a judgment renewal does
not enjoy the same priority as the original judgment, the Hallses’
fraud tolled the running of the eight-year life of the original
judgment lien. That tolling, Jackson argues, extended the life of the
initial lien and preserved its priority. Again, we review the
summary judgment on this issue for correctness, giving no
deference to the district court’s ruling. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19,
¶ 15, 250 P.3d 56.
¶14 Jackson bases his equitable-tolling argument on Free v.
Farnworth, a 1948 Utah Supreme Court case. 188 P.2d 731 (Utah

Jackson v. Halls
20121081-CA 6 2014 UT App 152
1948). In Free, a debtor obtained an injunction preventing a
judgment creditor from executing on his judgment during its eight-
year life. Id. at 735. Our supreme court held that under equitable
principles the debtor’s interference tolled the running of the
judgment lien:
“If the judgment debtor procures the injunction, and
thereby prevents the enforcement of the judgment,
he is, upon equitable principles, not permitted to take
advantage of his own wrong, and will not be heard
to urge that the lien has been lost by the delay
compelled by his writ.”
Id. (quoting 2 Freeman on Judgments § 1014, at 2113 (5th ed. 1925)).
The Free court based its decision on equitable principles. As this
court explained in Sittner v. Schriever, “The Free decision is
grounded upon the equitable principle that no one should be
allowed to profit from his own wrong.” 2001 UT App 99, ¶ 17, 22
P.3d 784.
¶15 Here, however, the lenders claiming priority for their
judgment did not prevent Jackson’s enforcement of his judgment.
See Free, 188 P.2d at 735. The lenders thus do not seek to profit from
their own wrong. See Sittner, 2001 UT App 99, ¶ 17. In fact,
Jackson’s failure to execute on Lot 308 appears to be due to his own
delay: the record indicates that Jackson was aware of the Hallses’
quitclaim transfer in October 2003, more than six years before his
judgment expired. The principle of equitable tolling therefore does
not apply to the lenders’ request for summary judgment. The
district court thus did not err on this point.
¶16 The district court’s grant of summary judgment is
accordingly affirmed.