Dahl v. Dahl

2026 UT App 131
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
C HARLES DAHL,
Appellee,
v.
K IM DAHL,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20240740-CA
Filed August 27, 2026
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Robert A. Lund
No. 064402232
Steve S. Christensen and Clinton R. Brimhall,
Attorneys for Appellant
Rosemond G. Blakelock and Megan P. Blakelock,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE JOHN D. L UTHY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES R YAN M. HARRIS and A MY J. O LIVER concurred.
LUTHY, Judge:
¶1 	Charles Dahl and Kim Dahl divorced in 2010. At the time
of the divorce, the marital home and some other marital assets
were held in a trust. But the trust was not joined as a party in the
divorce action. Because the trust was not a party, the divorce court
lacked authority to adjudicate the Dahls’ respective rights in the
trust’s assets, and the court therefore did not consider those assets
in distributing the marital estate. Instead, issues regarding the
trust were litigated in a separate action, which concluded with the

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20240740-CA 	2 	2026 UT App 131
district court ruling on summary judgment that Ms. Dahl1 had no
enforceable interest in the trust’s assets.
¶2 	Ms. 	Dahl 	appealed 	both 	the 	divorce 	decree 	and 	the
summary judgment order from the trust litigation to this court.
We certified the two appeals to the Utah Supreme Court, which
consolidated the two cases “for the purposes of appeal and
remand” and held that Ms. Dahl retained an enforceable interest
in the marital property held by the trust. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79,
¶¶ 1, 8, 11, 37, 459 P.3d 276. Accordingly, the supreme court
reversed the grant of summary judgment in the trust litigation
and remanded the consolidated case to the district court that
handled the divorce case, instructing the court to “determine
what 	property 	contained 	in 	the 	[t]rust 	[was] 	properly
characterized as marital property and either credit Ms. Dahl with
an offset equal to the value of that property or allow Ms. Dahl to
withdraw her share of the property.” Id. ¶ 212.
¶3 	On remand, the district court made determinations as to
which of the assets in the trust were properly characterized as
marital property, valued the relevant portion of that property as
of the date of the divorce decree, and distributed the marital
property that had been held in the trust. The court also distributed
funds 	that 	had 	been 	deposited 	with 	the 	court—following
remand—after the sale of certain marital property that had not
been held in the trust. Ms. Dahl now appeals a number of the
court’s rulings associated with the foregoing distributions. We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this matter for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1. Our usual practice in divorce cases is to refer to the parties by
their given names. However, because the Utah Supreme Court
referred to the parties as Dr. Dahl and Ms. Dahl in its opinion
resolving the prior appeals, see Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d
276, we do the same for consistency.

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20240740-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 131
BACKGROUND
The Marriage, the Trust, and the Relevant Assets
¶4 	The Dahls married in 1992 and remained married for
nearly eighteen years. Prior to the marriage, Dr. Dahl had
“accumulated substantial assets” that “included stocks, mutual
funds, and insurance policies, totaling $356,201.” During the
marriage, Dr. Dahl and his brother established the Dahl Family
Irrevocable Trust (the Trust). Ms. Dahl “had nothing to do with
the preparation of the Trust agreement and did not sign the Trust
or any related documents,” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 37, 459 P.3d
276 (cleaned up), but she “conveyed her interest in the couple’s
marital home to the Trust via a warranty deed,” id. ¶ 27. Dr. Dahl
conveyed his interest in the marital home to the Trust as well. In
addition to the marital home, the Trust held “an investment
account at Fidelity called ‘Marlette’” (the Marlette account). The
Marlette account contained both marital assets and Dr. Dahl’s
premarital assets. During the marriage, the parties also acquired
marital assets that were not placed in the Trust, including (as
relevant here) two parcels of investment property known as
Pheasant Run.
The Divorce Proceedings
¶5 	In 	2006, 	Dr. 	Dahl 	filed 	for 	divorce 	and 	the 	parties
separated. 	“The 	divorce 	proceedings 	were 	extremely
contentious,” and the “discovery process was rife with abuses on
both sides, which delayed trial.” Id. ¶ 5. “[T]he divorce court
conducted a bench trial over fourteen nonconsecutive days,
beginning in September 2009,” id. ¶ 4, and ending in November
2009. “Despite years of pretrial proceedings in the divorce action,”
Ms. Dahl’s counsel “failed to join the Trust as a defendant.” Id.
¶ 9. Instead, “just weeks before the start of the divorce trial,” id.,
Ms. Dahl initiated a separate lawsuit against the Trust, Dr. Dahl,
Dr. Dahl’s brother, and a real estate investment company owned
by Dr. Dahl (collectively, the Trust Defendants), see id. ¶ 7. “The
divorce court refused to consider the Trust assets in distributing

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20240740-CA 	4 	2026 UT App 131
the marital estate, ruling that the eve of trial was too late to join a
new party and that it could not consider Trust assets that were the
subject of other pending litigation.” Id. ¶ 9. Thus, in July 2010, the
divorce court issued a decree that did not address the Trust assets
but otherwise distributed the marital estate. See id. ¶¶ 4, 9, 118.
¶6 	In the decree, the divorce court ordered, among other
things, that Pheasant Run was to “be immediately liquidated and
any proceeds, or loss, divided equally between the parties.”
Relatedly, the court directed that “until such time as [Pheasant
Run was] sold,” Dr. Dahl was to “continue to pay the monthly
payment on” Pheasant Run and that he would “be entitled to a
credit against [Ms. Dahl’s] share of the proceeds for one-half of
the payments he [made from the date of the court’s findings and
conclusions] until such time as [Pheasant Run was] sold.” The
decree also noted that the marital home and some other marital
assets were part of the Trust and stated that the divorce court was
issuing “no orders in regard to” the Trust.
The Trust Litigation
¶7 	Meanwhile, in her action against the Trust Defendants,
Ms. Dahl sought “a declaration of her rights in the Trust assets
and request[ed] an accounting of the Trust’s activities and a copy
of the Trust agreement.” Id. ¶ 12. Following discovery, “both
[sides] moved for summary judgment,” and “[u]ltimately, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trust
Defendants.” Id. In its November 2011 order, the “district court
held that the Trust was irrevocable and that Ms. Dahl had no
enforceable interest in the Trust assets.” Id. ¶ 13. After the district
court made this ruling, Dr. Dahl began commingling certain of his
personal assets with the assets already in the Marlette account.
The Initial Appeal
¶8 	Ms. Dahl appealed—to this court—both the divorce decree
and the summary judgment order from the Trust litigation. Id. ¶ 8.
We certified the appeals to the Utah Supreme Court, which

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consolidated the two cases. Id. ¶¶ 1, 8. As to the Trust litigation,
the supreme court held that the Trust was “revocable under Utah
law”; that Ms. Dahl was a settlor of the Trust, “regardless of the
fact that she [was] not so named in the Trust agreement”; and that
because she was a settlor, she could “revoke that portion of the
Trust funded with either her separate or marital property.” Id.
¶¶ 16, 35–38.
¶9 	Regarding the divorce case, the supreme court did “not
fault the divorce court for refusing to consider the Trust assets”
where Ms. Dahl had “fail[ed] to join the Trust as a defendant in
the divorce action.” Id. ¶ 9. But the supreme court determined that
because “[t]he Trust assets included marital property” and the
divorce court lacked “the power to consider and distribute the
Trust assets, the [divorce] court lacked the authority to fully and
fairly distribute the marital estate.” Id. ¶ 11. Thus, the supreme
court held that “the Trust should have been joined as a party to
the divorce action.” Id.
¶10 	The supreme court ordered a remand of the consolidated
case to the divorce court with instructions that it “join the Trust as
a party to the divorce action.” Id. It further ordered that “[o]n
remand, the district court [was to] determine what property
contained in the Trust [was] properly characterized as marital
property and either credit Ms. Dahl with an offset equal to the
value of that property or allow Ms. Dahl to withdraw her share of
the 	property.” 	Id. 	¶ 	212. 	The 	supreme 	court 	remitted 	the
consolidated case to the district court in early 2015.
The Sale of Pheasant Run
¶11 	Not long after the supreme court remitted the consolidated
case, 	the 	parties 	sold 	Pheasant 	Run. 	Although 	the 	divorce
decree—which 	issued 	in 	2010—required 	the 	“immediate[]
liquidat[ion]” of Pheasant Run, and although the parties had
contracted with “a qualified realtor” to facilitate a sale, the parcels
making up Pheasant Run did not sell until August and November

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	6 	2026 UT App 131
2015, netting $1,289,575.74. “Those funds were deposited with the
[district] court at the time of sale.”
The Appointment of a Special Master
¶12 	In 	January 	2017, 	the 	district 	court—proceeding 	on
remand—ordered the appointment of an accounting firm to serve
as a special master.2 The special master was to “have complete
and unfettered access to all financial records of [the Trust] and any
records that [had] been or [were] associated with [the Trust],” and
it was ordered to “report to the [c]ourt the contributions to the
[T]rust, management of those assets and the current value and
nature of [the Trust’s] assets.”
The Sale of the Marital Home
¶13 	In the meantime, Dr. Dahl had continued to live in the
marital home. But the home was sold in June 2019, netting
$805,845.05. “Those funds were [also] deposited with the court at
the time of sale.”
The Proceedings on Remand
¶14 	In December 2019, nearly three years after its appointment,
the special master produced its report. Following a hearing in
October 2021, the district court determined that the report was
“dissatisfactory and not helpful for ascertaining what money
2. The delay between the early 2015 remittitur by the supreme
court and the January 2017 appointment of a special master by the
district court appears to have been due largely to Ms. Dahl filing
an unsuccessful petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court; motions related to Pheasant Run that are not
relevant here; and discovery disputes that arose upon remand.

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20240740-CA 	7 	2026 UT App 131
[was] in the [T]rust and how it should be divided.”3 At the same
time, the court granted a request by Ms. Dahl for additional
discovery, with the court explaining that there was “no way to fill
[the] gaps [in the special master’s report] without discovery.”
¶15 	More discovery disputes then ensued, including the filing
by Ms. Dahl of two statements of discovery issues. At a status
hearing in May 2023, the court considered, among other things,
one of Ms. Dahl’s statements of discovery issues. In response to
that statement of discovery issues, the court approved an order
requiring Fidelity—the entity maintaining the Marlette account—
to comply with a subpoena Ms. Dahl had served upon it but
with 	which 	it 	had 	thus 	far 	failed 	to 	comply. 	The 	court
otherwise reserved ruling on Ms. Dahl’s statements of discovery
issues 	and, 	instead, 	ordered 	the 	matter 	to 	proceed 	to 	an
evidentiary hearing that had already been scheduled for two days
in August 2023.
¶16 	At the evidentiary hearing, the parties offered evidence
and argument regarding (1) the outstanding issues raised by Ms.
Dahl’s statements of discovery issues; (2) the marital versus non-
marital status of the Trust assets; (3) the distribution of the marital
property held by the Trust, including the marital portion of the
Marlette account and the proceeds of the sale of the marital
home; and (4) the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of
Pheasant Run. During the hearing, the court heard testimony
from Dr. Dahl, Ms. Dahl, and two forensic accountants—one for
each side.
¶17 	Among other things, Dr. Dahl testified that his premarital
assets originally included stock in several companies, that the
3. Both the poor quality of the report and the delay in its
production 	appear 	to 	be 	due, 	at 	least 	in 	part, 	to 	several
circumstances: 	the 	firm 	appointed 	as 	special 	master 	was
purchased while it was conducting its work, a key employee left
the firm, and the project was reassigned from the firm’s Salt Lake
City office to its Arizona office.

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	8 	2026 UT App 131
stock in one of those companies was sold in 2000 and the stock in
another was sold in 2001, and that the cash proceeds of those sales
were “mixed in with all of the . . . other money in [the] Marlette
[account].” When asked whether he would “be able to trace those
amounts,” Dr. Dahl did not provide a definitive response, saying
instead, “You could look at the dollar amount and see if it stayed
the same.”
¶18 	Also during Dr. Dahl’s testimony, Ms. Dahl’s counsel
introduced an exhibit containing account statements that showed
transfers from the Marlette account to accounts outside the Trust.
In connection with that exhibit, Ms. Dahl’s counsel asked Dr. Dahl
whether he remembered “making wire transfers out of [the]
Marlette [account] in the summer and fall of 2009 in the amount
of $31,200.” Dr. Dahl responded that he could not recall. After Ms.
Dahl’s counsel drew Dr. Dahl’s attention to another transfer from
the Marlette account of “about $17,000”—this one to an account
number ending in 0442—Dr. Dahl said that he could not recall
what the transfer was for but that it looked like it went to a mutual
fund labeled “DWS Latin America.”
¶19 	The 	forensic 	accountants 	each 	testified 	regarding 	a
reasonable rate of return on the assets in the Marlette account
between 2010 and 2023. Dr. Dahl’s expert opined that a rate of
7.23% compounded annually would be reasonable, while Ms.
Dahl’s expert opined that a rate of 11% compounded annually
would be reasonable.
¶20 	Prior 	to 	issuing 	its 	ruling 	following 	the 	evidentiary
hearing, the court received written closing arguments from the
parties. In her closing argument, Ms. Dahl contended that Dr.
Dahl had dissipated assets of the Trust, stating, “At trial, Ms. Dahl
asserted that Dr. Dahl dissipated Trust assets. Dr. Dahl did not
provide any adequate response or explanation. This dissipation
totals $92,391.18 worth of Trust assets . . . .” Ms. Dahl asserted that
the $92,391.18 total consisted of these amounts:

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	9 	2026 UT App 131
• 	“$44,844.92 	[in] 	Wire 	Transfers 	from 	Fidelity 	2482 	to
Fidelity 0442”;
• 	“$16,290.00 [in] Checks from Fidelity 2482 to Unidentified
Recipients”; and
• 	“$31,289.26 	in 	Wire 	Transfers 	from 	Fidelity 	2481 	to
Unidentified Recipients.”
The District Court’s Ruling on Remand
¶21 	In November 2023, the district court issued its Ruling and
Order Regarding Property Distribution, which addressed the
following issues.
1. 	Discovery
¶22 	The court first addressed the outstanding issues related to
Ms. Dahl’s statements of discovery issues, saying,
Regarding the history of the case at bar, the
[Utah] 	Supreme 	Court 	noted 	that 	the 	“divorce
proceedings were extremely contentious,” and the
“discovery process was rife with abuses.” [Dahl v.
Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 5, 459 P.3d 276.] Lamentably,
contentious 	discovery 	disputes 	have 	persisted,
despite the [Utah] Supreme Court’s observations.
The passage of 14 years since the original trial and 9
years since the remand from the [Utah] Supreme
Court [has] exacerbated the [in]ability to comply
with certain discovery demands and the [in]ability
of the court to manage the discovery disputes. The
available records do not allow for forensic tracing of
every financial transaction that occurred over a
period of many years and that occurred many years
ago. Therefore, the court must decide the matter
based on the available records.

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 131
Before trial, Ms. Dahl filed two separate
Statements of Discovery Issues. The court denied
the requested relief in each instance. [4] In ruling on
the matters, the court found that Dr. Dahl produced
in 	discovery 	all 	the 	documentation 	that 	he
possessed that was relevant to the proceedings. In
addition to those materials, Ms. Dahl received by
way of subpoena to Fidelity Investments and [the
special master] a combined 13,843 pages of financial
records. One of the accounts for which Ms. Dahl
sought records did not belong to Dr. Dahl, rather it
belonged to Fidelity, and the records corresponding
to that account are not relevant to the instant
proceedings. The court determine[s] that materials
Ms. Dahl did receive were sufficient for her to fairly
address 	the 	issues 	at 	trial. 	The 	court 	further
determine[s] that requiring the production of any
additional materials sought by Ms. Dahl would be
disproportionate to the needs of the case and would
be unreasonably burdensome to attempt to produce
. . . .
2. 	The Trust Assets
¶23 	The court then addressed the question of which assets in
the Trust were marital property and which assets in the Trust
were Dr. Dahl’s separate property. The court began by finding
that “[a]t the time of divorce, the Trust held two assets: the family
4. On the same day the district court issued its Ruling and Order
Regarding Property Distribution, it also issued an Order Denying
Respondent’s Statements of Discovery Issues. Therein, the court
denied Ms. Dahl’s request for additional discovery, “find[ing]
that the requested additional discovery [was] not proportional to
the needs of the case . . . [and was] unreasonable and burdensome
given documents produced and the issues remaining in the
dispute.”

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 131
home . . . and [the Marlette account].” Regarding those assets, the
court further determined as follows.
a. 	The Marlette Account
¶24 	As to the Marlette account, the court noted that the divorce
decree had already 	“established 	that Dr. Dahl 	accumulated
substantial assets before the marriage,” which were held in the
Trust in the Marlette account and totaled $356,201. The court
found that “Dr. Dahl did not intend to commingle those assets
with marital assets.”
¶25 	The court then valued the Marlette account as of the date
of the divorce decree. It explained,
Consistent 	with 	the 	[Utah] 	Supreme 	Court’s
admonition, the court determine[s], to the extent
possible, that it [will] value the [T]rust assets as of
the date of the divorce decree. [Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT
79, ¶ 131, 459 P.3d 276] (“And it is well-settled that
assets should be valued at the time of the divorce
decree.” (citing Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1319
(Utah Ct. App. 1990))). Ms. Dahl suggests that the
court should value the Marlette account assets as of
the date of trial. However, the commingling by Dr.
Dahl of his separate property with the [T]rust
property, after entry of the order awarding the
[T]rust assets to him, together with the lack of
certain 	records, 	makes 	the 	calculus 	using 	that
method too speculative for the court to make a fair
estimation of the value [of the Marlette account as of
the date of trial]. Furthermore, that determination
would likely require expert testimony. The parties
offered no evidence in that regard. Based on the
evidence in the record, the court can more easily
determine the value of the property at the time of
divorce and apply the appropriate rate of return.

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20240740-CA 	12 	2026 UT App 131
¶26 	The court found that “[a]s of the date of the divorce decree,
the Marlette account held $1,842,089.81 in assets” and that,
“[e]xcluding Dr. Dahl’s separate property, the value of the marital
portion of the [Marlette account] at the time of divorce was
$1,485,888.81.” The court found “that Ms. Dahl’s share of the
assets in [the Marlette] account [was] $742,944.41, one half of the
marital portion of the [Marlette account] at the time of divorce.”
¶27 	The court then awarded Ms. Dahl prejudgment interest on
her portion of the marital funds in the Marlette account at the time
of the divorce, explaining, “When a party proves that its damages
were fixed at a particular point in time—even when it does not
establish that proof until trial—that party is entitled to the benefit
of its money from that time. Prejudgment interest remedies this
injury.” (Quoting Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County,
2015 UT App 173, ¶ 27, 355 P.3d 1047 (cleaned up).) The court
acknowledged that both parties had offered expert testimony
regarding a reasonable rate of return on the assets in the Marlette
account at the time of the divorce. But the court “decline[d] to
follow either party’s proposal.” Instead, it applied the statutory
interest rate formula for judgments not based on a contract. See
generally Utah Code § 15-1-4(3)(a) (setting the interest rate for
judgments not based on a contract “at the federal postjudgment
interest rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%”). Using that
formula, it arrived at an interest rate of 6.73%, which the court
ordered would “remain the interest rate for the duration of the
judgment.” The court also declined to award compound interest,
explaining that “[c]ompound interest is not favored by the law.”
(Quoting Watkins & Faber v. Whiteley, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979)
(per curiam).)
¶28 	Applying simple interest at the rate of 6.73%, the court
found that “the applicable interest total[ed] $666,502.12.” Adding
that interest to the underlying principal, the court awarded Ms.
Dahl $1,409,446.53 as her share of the Marlette account. The court
did 	not 	address 	Ms. 	Dahl’s 	contention 	that 	Dr. 	Dahl 	had
dissipated assets from the Marlette account.

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b. 	The Marital Home
¶29 	Regarding the marital home, the court found that it had
been sold in June 2019 and that the sale had “netted $805,845.05,”
which had been deposited with the court. The court further found
that over the nine-year period between the divorce and sale of the
home, Dr. Dahl had paid expenses related to the family home
totaling 	$511,293, 	including 	“mortgage 	payments, 	insurance
payments, property taxes, and routine maintenance.” But the
court denied Dr. Dahl’s request for reimbursement of those
expenses. In denying that request, the court observed that, rather
than “immediately liquidating the house,” Dr. Dahl had “decided
to keep the house and use it as his residence” for nine years
following entry of the divorce decree. The court then said it was
denying 	Dr. 	Dahl’s request 	because 	(1) 	Dr. 	Dahl 	“had 	the
exclusive use and enjoyment of the” marital home during those
years, (2) Dr. Dahl “did not cover any of Ms. Dahl’s housing costs
during those years,” (3) “[t]he expenses for which Dr. Dahl
[sought] reimbursement represent[ed] basic living expenses that
he would have incurred irrespective of where he lived,” and (4) “a
significant portion of the expenses related to issues that occurred
with the house several years after the divorce.”
¶30 	Ultimately, the court awarded “each party one half of the
sale proceeds of the home, $402,922.52.” And because the parties
had elected to leave the proceeds of the sale of the marital home
“on deposit with the court, rather than placing them in an interest-
bearing investment vehicle, the court decline[d] to award interest
on the underlying principal.”
3. 	Pheasant Run
¶31 	Turning to Pheasant Run, the court observed that the
Pheasant Run parcels had been sold in August and November
2015 and that the net sales proceeds—$1,289,575.74—had also
been deposited with the court. The court explained that although
it was “attempt[ing] to value all the marital property at the time
of the divorce, the evidence produced at trial prove[d] insufficient

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20240740-CA 	14 	2026 UT App 131
to do so regarding [Pheasant Run]” and, therefore, “the actual
sales price represent[ed] the only workable approach” for valuing
Pheasant Run. And, as with the proceeds of the marital home, the
court declined to award interest on this amount, which had been
deposited with the court.
¶32 	As to expenses related to Pheasant Run, the court found
that 	“Dr. 	Dahl 	incurred 	$522,683.61 	in 	expenses 	related 	to
maintenance of [Pheasant Run], including mortgage payments,
taxes, and fees,” following entry of the divorce decree. In this
instance, the court determined that Dr. Dahl was “entitled to
reimbursement of one half of the expenses he incurred” because
(1) Pheasant Run “was an investment property, not Dr. Dahl’s
residence, and he did not have exclusive use and enjoyment of the
investment property like he did with his home” and (2) “Dr. Dahl
made a good faith effort to sell [Pheasant Run] in a timely
manner” but, due to “factors beyond his control, the property
took [five] years to sell.”
¶33 	The court further ruled that Dr. Dahl was entitled to
interest on the amount he had paid in expenses, with the interest
running “from the sale of the property in November of 2015 to the
date of entry of the [court’s order] in November of 2023.” The
court calculated the interest amount to be $281,412.86. The
interest and underlying principal together “produce[d] an ending
balance 	of 	$804,096.47” 	of 	reimbursable 	expenses associated
with 	Pheasant 	Run. 	The 	court 	determined 	that 	the 	parties
were each entitled to half of the Pheasant Run sale proceeds and
were 	each 	responsible 	for 	half 	of 	the 	ending 	balance 	of
reimbursable expenses incurred by Dr. Dahl for maintenance of
Pheasant Run.
4. 	The Total Award
¶34 	Based on the foregoing, the court awarded Ms. Dahl
“$1,409,446.53 for the Marlette account, $402,922.52 for the marital

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	15 	2026 UT App 131
home, [and] $433,516.07 for the Pheasant Run property, [5] totaling
$2,245,885.12.” From that total, the court deducted “$402,048.24
for her share of the Pheasant Run costs, resulting in a total award
of $1,843,836.88.” The court authorized the clerk of court “to
release to Ms. Dahl all of the funds [then] held with the court,”
which “result[ed] in a balance owing to Ms. Dahl in the amount
of $40,661.65.” Thus, the court entered “judgment against Dr.
Dahl in favor of Ms. Dahl in the amount of $40,661.65.”
Ms. Dahl’s Post-Judgment Motion
¶35 	Ms. Dahl filed a post-judgment motion seeking additional
findings regarding (1) the court’s rulings on certain discovery
issues she raised before trial, (2) the court’s determination that
assets could not be traced, (3) the court’s decision to not use the
date of trial as the valuation date of the Marlette account, and
(4) the court’s determination that Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets had
not been commingled with the marital assets in the Marlette
account in light of “evidence . . . that it would be impossible to
separate them now.” Ms. Dahl also reasserted her claim that Dr.
Dahl had dissipated marital assets from the Marlette account.
¶36 	Except as to one item that is not relevant here, the court
denied Ms. Dahl’s post-judgment motion. Regarding Ms. Dahl’s
request for additional findings on the discovery issues she raised
before the evidentiary hearing, the court reiterated that Ms. Dahl
had received more than enough discovery to make her case, and
it declined to make additional findings. As to asset tracing and the
court’s decision to value the Marlette account as of the date of
divorce, the court repeated its reasoning from its original order
and concluded that “those findings sufficiently addressed the
issues.” With respect to potential commingling of Dr. Dahl’s
premarital assets with the marital assets in the Marlette account,
the court simply said that its existing findings were supported by
5. Ms. Dahl had previously received a distribution of $211,271.80
of the Pheasant Run sale proceeds.

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	16 	2026 UT App 131
the record. The court again did not address Ms. Dahl’s dissipation
claim.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶37 	Ms. Dahl now appeals. She asserts that the district court
committed various errors in identifying, valuing, and distributing
the marital assets in the Marlette account and in distributing the
Pheasant Run assets. “Determining and assigning values to
marital property is a matter for the trial court, and an appellate
court will not disturb those determinations absent a showing of
clear abuse of discretion.” Mintz v. Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, ¶ 12,
525 P.3d 534 (cleaned up). We will likewise “not disturb a court’s
distribution of marital property unless it is clearly unjust or a clear
abuse of discretion.” Ouk v. Ouk, 2015 UT App 104, ¶ 10, 348 P.3d
751 (cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
I. Valuing the Trust Assets in the Marlette Account
¶38 	Ms. Dahl first contends that the district court abused its
discretion by valuing the Trust assets in the Marlette account “as
of 2010 (instead of 2023)” and by awarding Ms. Dahl “only simple
interest on her share of the [Trust assets in the Marlette account]
as of 2010.” We disagree on both fronts. Ms. Dahl further asserts
that the offset the district court awarded to Dr. Dahl based on his
premarital assets was not adequately supported by the court’s
findings and that the district court abused its discretion by
repeatedly 	overlooking 	her 	dissipation 	claims. 	Ms. 	Dahl’s
arguments in these regards are well taken. We address each of Ms.
Dahl’s arguments related to the Marlette account in turn.
A. 	Valuation Date
¶39 	“Generally, the marital estate is valued at the time of the
divorce decree or trial.” Knowles v. Knowles, 2022 UT App 47, ¶ 62,

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	17 	2026 UT App 131
509 P.3d 265 (cleaned up). “In its discretion, however, the trial
court may value the parties’ marital assets at a different time, such
as that of separation, if it determines that the circumstances so
warrant.” Godfrey v. Godfrey, 2024 UT App 156, ¶ 42, 560 P.3d 151
(cleaned up). “But any deviation from the general rule must be
supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain the
trial court’s basis for such deviation.” Id. (cleaned up). On the
other hand, if a court “follow[s] the general rule,” then it is “not
required to articulate any additional findings of fact explaining its
decision.” Knowles, 2022 UT App 47, ¶ 65.
¶40 	Here, not only did the district court follow the general rule
and value the Marlette account as of the date of the divorce
decree,6 but it also provided findings to explain that decision.
Specifically, the court stated that “the commingling by Dr. Dahl
of his separate property with the [T]rust property, after entry of
the order awarding the [T]rust assets to him, together with the
lack of certain records,” made calculating the present value of the
marital assets in the Marlette account “too speculative.” The court
further explained that a present-value determination “would
likely require expert testimony” that the parties had not provided.
Additionally, the court noted that the supreme court opinion
precipitating the remand in this case reiterated the “well-settled”
general rule “that assets should be valued at the time of the
divorce decree.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 131, 459 P.3d 276.
Where the district court followed the general rule and provided
findings and an explanation reasonably supporting its decision,
6. As noted, the general rule is that the marital estate is to be
“valued at the time of the divorce decree or trial.” Knowles v.
Knowles, 2022 UT App 47, ¶ 62, 509 P.3d 265 (cleaned up). Here,
the divorce trial occurred in late 2009, and the decree was entered
in 	July 	2010. 	Although 	the 	district 	court 	held 	a 	two-day
evidentiary hearing on remand in 2023, that was not the trial
contemplated by the general rule. See Godfrey v. Godfrey, 2024 UT
App 156, ¶ 42, 560 P.3d 151 (“The general rule concerning the
valuation of a marital estate is that it is valued at the time of the
divorce.” (cleaned up)).

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	18 	2026 UT App 131
we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by valuing the
Marlette account as of the date of the divorce decree.
¶41 	Ms. 	Dahl 	pushes 	back 	by 	pointing 	to 	the 	following
instructions by the supreme court in this case:
Ms. Dahl is entitled to withdraw her share of the
marital property she contributed to the Trust as a
settlor. 	On 	remand, 	the 	district 	court 	should
determine what property contained in the Trust is
properly 	characterized 	as 	marital 	property 	and
either credit Ms. Dahl with an offset equal to the
value 	of 	that 	property 	or 	allow 	Ms. 	Dahl 	to
withdraw her share of the property.
Id. ¶ 212. Ms. Dahl contends that this language amounted to a
mandate that the district court perform a “present-day valuation”
of the Marlette account. In so asserting, she says it is “important
. . . to remember that part of the reason the supreme court ruled
this way was that [Ms. Dahl] was effectively a settlor of a
revocable trust.” This is important, Ms. Dahl asserts, because
when 	“a 	trust 	is 	revoked, 	the 	trust 	property 	(including
appreciation realized during the trust’s existence) goes back to the
settlor.” We are not persuaded.
¶42 	Given the supreme court’s reiteration prior to remand
(albeit while addressing an issue other than the Marlette account),
of the “well-settled” rule that “assets should be valued at the time
of the divorce decree,” id. ¶ 131, we believe that had the supreme
court intended to limit the district court’s discretion on that front
when it came to the Trust assets in the Marlette account, the
supreme court would have used more explicit language of
limitation than the language Ms. Dahl points us to. Additionally,
following the supreme court’s ruling and remand, Ms. Dahl took
no action to revoke her portion of the Trust and withdraw her
share of the property. Thus, while Ms. Dahl is correct that she was
a settlor of the Trust and that when a trust is revoked, the settlor

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	19 	2026 UT App 131
is 	entitled 	to 	any 	appreciation 	realized 	during 	the 	trust’s
existence, here the district court’s decision to value the Marlette
account as of the time of divorce effectively set the revocation date
for Ms. Dahl’s portion of the Marlette account as the date of the
divorce decree.
¶43 	For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by valuing the Marlette account as of the date of the
divorce decree.7
7. In connection with her argument that the district court abused
its discretion by valuing the Marlette account as of the date of the
divorce 	decree, 	Ms. 	Dahl 	asserts 	that 	“[t]he 	district 	court’s
decision 	to 	deny 	[her] 	request 	to 	compel 	[additional] 	fact
discovery [was] an abuse of discretion.” She concedes, however,
that this decision was “largely dependent on [the court’s] decision
to value [the] Trust assets as of 2010.” Indeed, in this instance, the
two issues are interdependent. And because we conclude that the
court did not abuse its discretion by valuing the Marlette account
as of 2010, we also conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion 	by 	denying 	Ms. 	Dahl’s 	requests 	for 	additional
discovery related to events after 2010.
Moreover, the court made the following findings related to
the discovery issues that arose on remand:
• 	“Dr. Dahl produced in discovery all the documentation
that he possessed that was relevant to the proceedings”;
• 	“The available records do not allow for forensic tracing of
every financial transaction that occurred over a period of
many years and that occurred many years ago”;
• 	“[The] materials Ms. Dahl did receive were sufficient for
her to fairly address the issues at trial”; and
• 	“[R]equiring the production of any additional materials
sought by Ms. Dahl would be disproportionate to the
needs of the case and would be unreasonably burdensome
to attempt to produce.”
(continued…)

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	20 	2026 UT App 131
B. 	Interest
¶44 	We are also not persuaded that the district court abused its
discretion by awarding Ms. Dahl simple interest on her share of
the marital assets in the Marlette account. As the district court
recognized, “compound interest is not favored by the law.” Brady
v. Park, 2013 UT App 97, ¶ 17, 302 P.3d 1220 (cleaned up).
Moreover, as Ms. Dahl states in her principal brief, “[c]ompound
interest was (or would have been) a substitute for determining the
actual present-day value of the Trust.” Where the admitted
purpose of using compound interest in this case would have been
to approximate the present-day value of the Trust and we have
affirmed the district court’s decision not to use present-day value,
and where compound interest is disfavored in any event, we
cannot say that the district court exceeded its discretion by
declining to award compound interest.
C. 	Offset for Dr. Dahl’s Premarital Assets
¶45 	Ms. Dahl argues that the offset the district court awarded
to Dr. Dahl based on Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets—which were
held in the Marlette account—was “not adequately supported by
the [court’s] findings.” Ms. Dahl’s argument in this regard is well
taken.
¶46 	The district court found that Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets
totaled $356,201 and that they had been deposited into the
Marlette account. The district court also found that Dr. Dahl did
not intend to commingle those assets with the parties’ marital
assets. On that basis, after the court determined that the 2010
value of the Marlette account was $1,842,089.81, it subtracted
$356,201 from that amount before evenly splitting the remaining
balance 	($1,485,888.81) 	and 	awarding 	the 	resulting 	amount
($742,944.41) plus interest (in the amount of $666,502.12) to Ms.
These 	findings—to 	which 	Ms. 	Dahl 	mounts 	no 	meaningful
challenge—further demonstrate that the court did not abuse its
discretion by declining her requests for additional discovery.

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	21 	2026 UT App 131
Dahl to account for her portion of the marital assets in the Marlette
account. To the extent that Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets were not
commingled with the marital assets in the Marlette account, the
court did not abuse its discretion by subtracting $356,201 from the
2010 value of the account before distributing the remaining
balance between the parties. However, the court’s findings are not
adequate to support a determination that Dr. Dahl’s premarital
assets were not commingled with marital assets. See generally Lay
v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 19, 427 P.3d 1221 (“Findings are
adequate when they contain sufficient detail to permit appellate
review 	to 	ensure 	that 	the 	district 	court’s 	discretionary
determination was rationally based.” (cleaned up)).
¶47 	To 	be 	sure, 	“one 	rather 	obvious 	situation 	in 	which
commingling occurs is where one spouse has contributed all or
part of the property to the marital estate with the intent that it
become joint property.” Thorup v. Thorup, 2024 UT App 93, ¶ 24,
554 P.3d 329 (cleaned up). And the court found that Dr. Dahl did
not intend to commingle his separate assets that were deposited
in the Marlette account with the parties’ marital assets in that
account. But the court’s ruling did not address another method of
commingling 	potentially 	implicated 	here. 	Specifically, 	“even
short of an outright intended contribution, property that started
out as separate property may be considered commingled if it
becomes inextricably and untraceably intertwined with marital
assets.” Id. “Quite important to any commingling analysis, then,
is whether the property in question has retained its separate
character.” 	Id. 	(cleaned 	up). 	“[S]eparate 	property 	will 	be
considered commingled when it has been mixed in with marital
assets to such a degree that it is no longer reasonably possible to
distinguish between the separate and marital property.” Id. “On
the other hand, if the marital and premarital assets are still
reasonably capable of being traced and identified, then the
separate property retains its separate nature and will not be
considered commingled.” Id. (cleaned up).
¶48 	Here, Dr. Dahl testified that some of his premarital assets
originally held in the form of stock were sold prior to 2010 and the

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	22 	2026 UT App 131
cash proceeds of those stock sales were “mixed in with all of the
. . . other money in [the] Marlette [account].” When asked whether
he would “be able to trace those amounts,” Dr. Dahl was not
definitive and said, “You could look at the dollar amount and see
if it stayed the same.” Despite this testimony, the district court
made no findings as to whether by 2010 Dr. Dahl’s premarital
assets had become inextricably and untraceably intertwined with
marital assets. Without such a finding, we are unable to determine
whether the district court exceeded its discretion by crediting Dr.
Dahl with an offset of $356,201 before it distributed the assets in
the Marlette account. We therefore vacate the court’s distribution
of the Marlette account and remand this matter for the court to
make additional findings as to whether Dr. Dahl’s premarital
assets retained their separate character as of July 2010.
D. 	Dissipation
¶49 	Next, Ms. Dahl asserts that the district court exceeded its
discretion 	by 	repeatedly 	overlooking 	her 	claims 	concerning
dissipation. We agree.
¶50 	“Where one party has dissipated an asset, . . . the trial court
may, in the exercise of its equitable powers, . . . hold one party
accountable to the other for the dissipation of marital assets.”
Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 19, 316 P.3d 455 (cleaned
up). Factors that “may be relevant to determining whether a party
should be held accountable for the dissipation of marital assets”
include
how the money was spent, including whether funds
were used to pay legitimate marital expenses or
individual expenses; the parties’ historical practices;
the magnitude of any depletion; the timing of the
challenged actions in relation to the separation and
divorce; and any obstructive efforts that hinder the
valuation of the assets.

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	23 	2026 UT App 131
Id. (cleaned up). “After an initial showing of apparent dissipation
by one party, the burden shifts to the other party to show that the
funds were not dissipated, but were used for some legitimate
marital purpose.” Id. (cleaned up).
¶51 	Here, Ms. Dahl’s counsel introduced account statements
showing some transfers from the Marlette account to accounts
outside the Trust. When Ms. Dahl’s counsel asked Dr. Dahl
whether he remembered “making wire transfers out of [the]
Marlette [account] in the summer and fall of 2009 in the amount
of $31,200,” Dr. Dahl responded that he could not recall. He also
could not recall another transfer from the Marlette account
of “about $17,000” but said that it looked like it went to a
mutual 	fund 	labeled 	“DWS 	Latin 	America.” 	In 	her 	closing
argument, Ms. Dahl then contended that Dr. Dahl had dissipated
the Trust assets and that “Dr. Dahl did not provide any adequate
response or explanation.” She asserted that the dissipation totaled
$92,391.18, and she broke that total down into three line items,
two of which appear to correspond to transfers about which Dr.
Dahl was specifically questioned and was unable to provide an
explanation.
¶52 	Despite the evidence of apparent dissipation and Ms.
Dahl’s 	assertion 	of 	a 	dissipation 	claim 	in 	both 	her 	closing
argument and her post-trial motion, the district court never
ruled on Ms. Dahl’s dissipation claim. For this additional reason,
we vacate the court’s distribution of the Marlette account and
remand this matter for the court to rule on Ms. Dahl’s dissipation
claim.
* * * * *
¶53 	In sum, as to the Marlette account, we affirm the district
court’s decision to value the account as of the date of the divorce
decree and its decision to award simple rather than compound
interest to Ms. Dahl on her share of the marital assets in the
Marlette account. We nevertheless vacate the court’s distribution
of the Marlette account and remand the matter for the court to

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	24 	2026 UT App 131
address both (1) whether Dr. Dahl’s premarital assets retained
their separate character as of the date of the divorce decree and
(2) Ms. Dahl’s dissipation claim as argued in her closing argument
and post-trial motion. After the court addresses those issues, it
should redistribute the assets in the Marlette account in light of its
findings on those issues.
II. Pheasant Run Maintenance
¶54 	Next, Ms. Dahl asserts that the district court’s “allowance
of an adjustment in [Dr. Dahl’s] favor” based on amounts he paid
to maintain Pheasant Run after entry of the divorce decree was
“not adequately supported by the findings” and “ignore[d]” the
fact that Dr. Dahl apparently used money from the Trust to pay at
least some of the mortgage payments on Pheasant Run. We are
not persuaded that the court’s findings were inadequate or that
the court abused its discretion in granting Dr. Dahl an allowance
for all of the amounts he paid to maintain Pheasant Run after
entry of the divorce decree.
¶55 	The court found that “Dr. Dahl incurred $522,683.61 in
expenses related to maintenance of [Pheasant Run], including
mortgage payments, taxes, and fees,” following entry of the
divorce decree. In allowing an adjustment of half that amount in
favor of Dr. Dahl, the district court further found that Pheasant
Run “was an investment property, not Dr. Dahl’s residence,” and
that “he did not have exclusive use and enjoyment of the
investment property like he did with his home.” Ms. Dahl does
not dispute the foregoing findings. Instead, she contends that the
court should have determined the amount of Pheasant Run
maintenance costs that were paid after entry of the divorce decree
with money from the Trust and not allowed Dr. Dahl an offset for
maintenance costs that were paid with money from the Trust.
However, 	our 	determination 	to 	uphold 	the 	district 	court’s
decision to value the Trust as of the date of the divorce decree
renders Ms. Dahl’s argument as to the Pheasant Run maintenance
costs wholly unpersuasive.

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	25 	2026 UT App 131
¶56 	As Dr. Dahl explains in his brief,
Because the [c]ourt determined [Ms. Dahl’s] share of
the Trust as of the date of the [divorce decree] and
then elected to award [Ms. Dahl] one-half the value
of the Trust at the time of the divorce plus interest,
it is irrelevant where the source of the funds came
from to pay the costs of Pheasant Run expenses after
the divorce was granted because [Ms. Dahl’s] share
of the Trust was not impacted. Therefore, no matter
what funds [Dr. Dahl] used to pay for the expenses
for Pheasant Run, after the divorce was granted,
those funds could not possibly have come from [Ms.
Dahl’s] share of the funds.
We agree with this reasoning and affirm the district court’s
decision to allow an adjustment in favor of Dr. Dahl based on the
amounts he paid to maintain Pheasant Run after entry of the
divorce decree.
III. Interest on Funds Deposited with the Court
¶57 	Finally, Ms. Dahl asserts that the district court “abused its
discretion by not awarding [her] interest on the funds held on
deposit with the district court,” which consisted of the proceeds
of the sales of Pheasant Run and the marital home. Ms. Dahl’s
argument is unavailing.
¶58 	In denying Ms. Dahl’s request for an award of interest on
her share of the deposited funds, the district court cited decisions
from other states indicating that “[a]s a general rule, interest
cannot be recovered while a fund is on deposit in the registry of
the court.” Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. of St. Louis v.
Zitko, 386 S.W.2d 69, 84 (Mo. 1964); see also Ernest B. Williams IV,
PLLC v. Association of Unit Owners of Five Hundred & One Union
Bldg., No. M2019-02114-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 1306875, at *8
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2021) (“As a general rule, interest on funds
deposited with the court in interpleader actions is not recoverable

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	26 	2026 UT App 131
from the unsuccessful claimant because the funds were not in his
or her possession, available for investment. Awarding interest
would thus act as a penalty against the claimant.”(cleaned up));
Washington Irrigation & Dev. Co. v. United States, 751 P.2d 1178,
1181 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (“It is well established . . . that interest
is not charged against the party owing a debt when the funds
owed are in custodia legis.”).
¶59 	Ms. Dahl does not take issue with this general rule. Instead,
she says that she did “not elect[] to have the money deposited in
an interest-free account,” that Dr. Dahl was the one who “insisted
on [the] funds being held in escrow” with the court, and that he
did so to “prevent [Ms. Dahl] from having access to” them. We
are not persuaded that these asserted facts provided any basis for
the district court to deviate from the general rule and award
interest to Ms. Dahl on her portion of the funds deposited with
the court. If Ms. Dahl wished to receive interest on the deposited
funds, she could have asked the district court to deposit the funds
in an interest-bearing account. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-301(2)
(stating that when the amount of funds on deposit with the court
exceeds $5,000, “the court may order or the litigant may request
that such funds be deposited in an interest bearing trust account”
whose interest accrues to the litigant). Ms. Dahl made no such
request. For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision
not to award Ms. Dahl interest on her share of the marital funds
deposited with the court.
CONCLUSION
¶60 	We affirm the district court’s decision to value the Marlette
account as of the date of the divorce decree, as well as the court’s
decision not to award compound interest to Ms. Dahl on her share
of the marital assets in the Marlette account. We nevertheless
vacate the court’s distribution of the Marlette account and remand
this matter for the court to address both (1) whether Dr. Dahl’s
premarital assets retained their separate character as of the date
of the divorce decree and (2) Ms. Dahl’s dissipation claim as

Dahl v. Dahl
20240740-CA 	27 	2026 UT App 131
argued in her closing argument and post-trial motion. After the
court addresses those issues, it should redistribute the assets in
the Marlette account consistent with this opinion and in light of
its findings on those issues.
¶61 	We affirm the court’s decision to allow an adjustment in
favor of Dr. Dahl based on the amounts he paid to maintain
Pheasant Run after entry of the divorce decree. And we affirm the
court’s decision not to award Ms. Dahl interest on her share of the
marital funds deposited with the court.8
8. Dr. Dahl asks that we grant him an award of the fees he has
expended in defending this appeal. He bases his request on rule
33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which allows us to
award fees if we determine that an appeal was “either frivolous
or for delay.” Because Ms. Dahl’s appeal has prompted us to
vacate the district court’s distribution of the Marlette account and
remand for additional proceedings, we cannot say that Ms. Dahl’s
appeal was frivolous or for delay. We therefore deny Dr. Dahl’s
request for an award of fees.