State v. Corona

2025 UT App 93
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
M ARCO A NTONIO C ORONA,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20221117-CA
Filed June 26, 2025
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Kraig Powell
No. 211400191
Freyja Johnson, Rachel Phillips Ainscough, and
Anna Grigsby, Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Emily Sopp,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE D AVID N. M ORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. O RME and A MY J. O LIVER concurred.
MORTENSEN, Judge:
¶1 	Finding 	that 	he 	sexually 	abused 	the 	eleven-year-old
daughter 	of 	his cousin’s girlfriend, 	a 	jury 	convicted 	Marco
Antonio Corona of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a
child. The abuse occurred after a party where many of the adults,
including Corona, were drinking. Corona appeals his convictions,
raising two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Corona first
alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a
directed verdict or to arrest judgment, asserting insufficient
evidence on a theory of inherent improbability. He next claims
ineffective assistance for his counsel’s failure to object to certain
statements by the child’s mother, which Corona claims were

State v. Corona
20221117-CA 	2 	2025 UT App 93
unfairly prejudicial. We reject these claims and affirm Corona’s
convictions.
BACKGROUND1
¶2 	One summer evening, Corona, his girlfriend, and their
children attended a party. The gathering was hosted at the home
of 	Corona’s 	cousin 	(Cousin), 	who 	lived 	with 	his 	girlfriend
(Mother) and her older children, including eleven-year-old Rita.2
Corona and many of the other adults in attendance that evening
were drinking. The drinking eventually led to an argument
between Mother and Cousin. Cousin left with one of his children.
Later, Rita and Mother also got into an argument.
¶3 	At some point that evening, Rita ended up in her room
crying. 	Corona 	went 	into 	Rita’s 	room. 	Corona’s 	daughter
(Daughter), who was near Rita’s age, was in the room initially, but
Corona made her leave. Corona then asked Rita if she knew how
girls got pregnant. Corona then got on the bed with Rita and lay
next to or on top of her such that she “couldn’t push him off.”
Corona 	“put 	his 	hand 	on 	[Rita’s] 	breast,” 	grabbing 	it 	and
“squishing it,” causing Rita to cry in pain. Corona then put his
hand underneath Rita’s pants on her pubic area. Rita said that she
could tell “he was going to put it lower” but that, when he tried
to do so, she yelled for Daughter. Corona responded by quickly
removing his hand from her pants, and she escaped from him and
fled the room.
1. “On appeal from a jury verdict, we review the record facts in a
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts
accordingly, presenting conflicting evidence only as necessary to
understand issues raised on appeal.” State v. Rogers, 2020 UT App
78, n.2, 467 P.3d 880 (cleaned up).
2. A pseudonym.

State v. Corona
20221117-CA 	3 	2025 UT App 93
¶4 	At some point after Rita escaped from her room, her aunt
(Aunt) arrived to pick her up from the house. Rita went outside
to meet Aunt, and Corona was running after her, “grabbing her,”
and “trying to hold her back.” Rita was crying, and Aunt
attempted to “separate them.” Rita and Aunt went inside to pack
her things, but Corona followed them and continued to call after
Rita, telling her to stay there.
¶5 	Aunt drove Rita back to her home. All the while, Rita “was
crying.” Aunt asked Rita if “she was okay” and “if anything had
happened to her,” but Rita “denied everything” until they were
nearing Aunt’s home. At that point, Rita “started crying again”
and “asked [Aunt] where babies came from.” This caused Aunt
some concern, so she continued asking Rita what had happened,
but Rita did not disclose anything at that point; Aunt told her to
“try to get some sleep.” Eventually, Rita told Aunt and Mother
about the incident. Mother reported the incident to the police.
¶6 	Rita was taken to a Children’s Justice Center (CJC), where
she was interviewed about the incident. During that interview,
Rita explained the story summarized above, but she also stated
that Corona “ended up slapping” her. She further stated that she
regarded Corona as her “uncle . . . because he’s like family.”
¶7 	Corona was arrested and charged with two counts of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child. At trial, the State presented
the 	evidence 	summarized 	above. 	The 	State 	called 	several
witnesses, 	including 	Aunt, 	Mother, 	Corona’s 	girlfriend,
Daughter, and Rita. Corona testified in his defense, along with his
brother, who had been present at the party.
¶8 	Rita testified that she had lied during her CJC interview
about Corona slapping her. She explained that she said this only
because she “felt rushed” and like she “needed to give a specific
answer.” Her entire CJC interview was then played for the jury.
On 	cross-examination, 	Corona’s 	defense 	counsel 	(Counsel)
highlighted 	some 	confusing 	statements 	and 	inconsistencies

State v. Corona
20221117-CA 	4 	2025 UT App 93
contained in Rita’s testimony and her CJC interview, including
whether Corona pushed Daughter out of the room or just told her
to leave; where Corona was and how he was positioned during
the abuse; and what happened after the alleged abuse, whether
Daughter came running into the room when Rita called for her or
whether Rita fled out of the room.
¶9 	Mother testified that she was “[u]pset and angry” when
she found out what Corona did to Rita. She was upset that she
“wasn’t there for [Rita] to protect her.” She explained, “[W]e
considered [Corona] like part of the family, and then, you know,
to find out that he would do such a thing like that, knowing that
he also has a daughter kind of around the same age.”
¶10 	The jury convicted Corona as charged.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 	Corona appeals, raising two claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. “A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for
the first time on appeal presents a question of law.” State v. Higley,
2020 UT App 45, ¶ 12, 463 P.3d 77.
ANALYSIS
¶12 	Corona claims Counsel provided ineffective assistance in
two ways: first, by failing to move for a directed verdict or to
arrest judgment, asserting insufficient evidence based on a theory
of inherent improbability regarding Rita’s testimony; and second,
by failing to object to Mother’s statements. To prevail on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
(1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) “that the
deficient 	performance 	prejudiced 	the 	defense.” 	Strickland 	v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “Both elements must be
present” to demonstrate ineffective assistance, and “if either is

State v. Corona
20221117-CA 	5 	2025 UT App 93
lacking, the claim fails and the court need not address the other.”
State v. Powell, 2020 UT App 63, ¶ 19, 463 P.3d 705 (cleaned up).
¶13 	Here, Corona’s inherent improbability claim fails because
he 	cannot 	demonstrate 	that 	Counsel 	rendered 	deficient
performance, and his improper testimony claim fails because he
cannot demonstrate he was prejudiced by Mother’s statements.
I. Inherent Improbability
¶14 	Corona 	first 	argues 	that 	Counsel 	was 	ineffective 	for
“failing to move for a directed verdict or to arrest judgment based
on Rita’s inherently improbable statements.” To prove deficient
performance, 	Corona 	must 	demonstrate 	Counsel’s
“representation 	fell 	below 	an 	objective 	standard 	of
reasonableness.” 	Strickland, 	466 	U.S. 	at 	688. 	The 	deficient
performance 	inquiry 	“should 	focus 	on 	whether 	counsel’s
assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”
State v. Gallegos, 2020 UT 19, ¶ 34, 463 P.3d 641 (cleaned up).
¶15 	To succeed on the deficient performance prong, Corona
would have to show that it was objectively unreasonable not to
make the motion. See State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 35, 462 P.3d 350.
Because we “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,”
this is a difficult standard to meet. Gallegos, 2020 UT 19, ¶ 34
(cleaned up). And it is only made more difficult in the context of
inherent improbability.
¶16 	Any 	reasonable 	attorney 	who 	has 	been 	tracking 	the
development of Utah’s case law surrounding the doctrine of
inherent improbability would know that it is a very high standard
to meet. The foundational case addressing the standard for
inherent improbability in Utah law is State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23,
210 P.3d 288. “The witness in Robbins was a minor whose
testimony contained many inconsistencies as well as patently
false statements to cover up those inconsistencies—including a

State v. Corona
20221117-CA 	6 	2025 UT App 93
made up story about a hearing problem—and no other evidence
pointed to the defendant’s guilt.” State v. Hughes, 2024 UT App
168, ¶ 37, 560 P.3d 188 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 564 P.3d 957 (Utah
2025).
¶17 	Not 	only 	did 	Robbins 	involve 	an 	extreme 	set 	of
circumstances, but it is also the “only Utah case in which a
witness’s testimony has been deemed inherently improbable
based on material inconsistencies.” Id. As we have pointed out, “a
case which actually falls within the Robbins–Prater rubric is
exceedingly rare.”3 State v. Rivera, 2019 UT App 188, ¶ 23 n.6, 455
P.3d 112. In 2019, we noted that “we have not found a single Utah
decision examined under that rubric that has reversed a verdict
since Robbins.” Id. That is still true six years later.
¶18 	Reasonable counsel could have—indeed probably would
have—concluded that there was no use in making a motion based
on inherent improbability in the present matter because such a
motion would almost certainly fail. While this court may be
confronted with another factual case like Robbins someday, this
case doesn’t come close. A reasonable attorney would be wary of
making a motion based on inherent improbability in all but the
most extreme case.4
3. State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, 392 P.3d 398 came nine years after
State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, 210 P.3d 288, and clarified that in
Robbins, it “was the inconsistencies in the child’s testimony plus
the patently false statements the child made plus the lack of any
corroboration that allowed this court to conclude that insufficient
evidence supported Robbins’s conviction.” Id. ¶ 38.
4. 	Traditionally, 	where 	a 	defendant 	claims 	that 	there 	was
insufficient evidence to support a conviction due to the inherent
improbability of specific evidence, “our analysis has two parts.”
(continued…)

State v. Corona
20221117-CA 	7 	2025 UT App 93
¶19 	“There 	are 	three 	hallmarks 	of 	inherently 	improbable
testimony that courts have often considered in their analysis:
material 	inconsistencies, 	patent 	falsehoods, 	and 	lack 	of
corroborating evidence.” State v. Barnes, 2023 UT App 148, ¶ 24,
542 P.3d 108 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 544 P.3d 459 (Utah 2024).
Corona argues that Rita’s testimony demonstrated all three of
these 	hallmarks. 	We 	find 	his 	arguments 	on 	each 	point
unpersuasive.
¶20 	First, 	Corona 	argues 	that 	Rita’s 	testimony 	contained
material inconsistencies because there were some inconsistencies
between her trial testimony and her CJC interview. Specifically,
Corona points to inconsistencies about whether Corona pushed
Daughter out of the room or just told her to leave; where Corona
was and how he was positioned during the abuse; what happened
after the alleged abuse, namely, whether Rita called for Daughter
and Daughter came running into the room or whether Rita fled
out of the room; and whether Rita called Aunt after the abuse or
whether Aunt was already there when Rita escaped.
¶21 	Here, it does appear that Rita’s testimony may have
contained some inconsistencies. For example, the exact timeline of
when the abuse occurred, what Rita did directly after it occurred,
and when Aunt arrived is unclear. But while Rita’s testimony may
have contained some inconsistencies, we have pointed out that
State v. Barnes, 2023 UT App 148, ¶ 19, 542 P.3d 108, cert. denied,
544 P.3d 459 (Utah 2024). “First, we must analyze the evidence
that 	[the 	defendant] 	claims 	is 	inherently 	improbable 	and
determine whether the challenged piece of evidence is of such a
poor quality that it should be disregarded. If we determine that
the challenged testimony is inherently improbable, we then
determine 	if 	sufficient 	evidence 	remains 	under 	which 	a
reasonable jury could have convicted.” Id. (cleaned up). Here, we
determine that Rita’s testimony was not inherently improbable,
and therefore, we do not proceed to the second step.

State v. Corona
20221117-CA 	8 	2025 UT App 93
“this is true with regard to many complaining witnesses; indeed,
it would be a rare case in which defense counsel could identify no
inconsistencies in the account given by the State’s main witness.”
Id. ¶ 27.
¶22 	“The inherent improbability standard generally is not
satisfied by the mere existence of a conflict in the evidence.”
Hughes, 2024 UT App 168, ¶ 33 (cleaned up); see also id. ¶ 40
(“Merely 	identifying 	a 	conflict 	in 	the 	evidence 	is 	wholly
insufficient 	to 	establish 	that 	the 	evidence 	with 	which 	one
disagrees is inherently improbable.”). Rather, the inconsistencies
in the evidence must, at the very least, be substantial for a
witness’s testimony to be considered inherently improbable. See
Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 17. Here, the inconsistencies in Rita’s
testimony 	were 	not 	material 	because 	they 	involved 	either
“tangential issues that had only indirect relevance to the issue at
hand” or “a matter of perception about which a person could
potentially simply be mistaken.” State v. Broadwater, 2024 UT App
184, ¶ 44, 562 P.3d 739, cert. denied, 564 P.3d 959 (Utah 2025).
¶23 	Second, Corona argues that Rita’s testimony contained
patent falsehoods. In her CJC interview, Rita said that Corona
slapped her during the abuse. But at trial, Rita explained that this
was a lie. In explaining why she lied, Rita said that she felt
“rushed” and like she “needed to give a specific answer.” Corona
argues 	that 	Rita’s 	explanation 	of 	her 	lie 	contained 	patent
falsehoods because “the record demonstrates that Rita was not
rushed or pressured to make any statement about [Corona]
slapping her in the CJC interview.”
¶24 	This argument is unavailing. Rita did not say that she was
rushed and pressured to give a certain answer, but only that she
felt that way. It is certainly within the realm of possible human
experience for a person—particularly a child—to have a feeling
that is inconsistent with reality and to act based on that feeling. It
would be an extremely unlikely scenario in which an attorney

State v. Corona
20221117-CA 	9 	2025 UT App 93
could prove that a witness offered patent falsehoods as to their
own feelings. Even if what Corona took issue with was the
admittedly false statement about the slap itself, that one falsehood
standing alone would not require the district court to ignore the
remainder 	of 	Rita’s 	testimony, 	particularly 	when 	Rita
acknowledged that the statement was false and explained why
she made it. See State v. LeVasseur, 2020 UT App 118, ¶ 28, 473 P.3d
204 (stating that, where a witness testified to lying to police at her
friend’s request, “the inconsistencies identified [were] not of a
kind to render [the witness’s] testimony inherently improbable”).
¶25 	Lastly, Corona argues that there was a lack of evidence to
corroborate Rita’s allegations of abuse because there was “no
physical evidence or eyewitness testimony confirming Rita’s
allegations.” But “corroborating evidence sufficient to defeat [an
inherent improbability] claim does not have to corroborate the
witness’s account across the board, in every particular. It just has
to provide a second source of evidence for at least some of the
details of the witness’s story.” State v. Skinner, 2020 UT App 3,
¶ 34, 457 P.3d 421 (cleaned up). Here, there were certainly
additional sources that corroborated some of the details of Rita’s
story.
¶26 	First, multiple witnesses corroborated Rita’s testimony that
Corona was drinking that night. Second, Aunt corroborated that
Rita was upset on the night of the party and that she went to pick
Rita up from the party. Third, Daughter and Aunt corroborated
Rita’s testimony that when Aunt arrived, Rita ran outside and
Corona 	followed. 	Fourth, 	Aunt 	further 	corroborated 	Rita’s
account when she testified that Rita was upset on the way home
and that she asked Aunt how girls got pregnant. Finally, Daughter
corroborated that Corona was in Rita’s room with her that night
while Daughter was outside of the room.
¶27 	Thus, we are not persuaded by any of Corona’s arguments
as to the three hallmarks of inherent improbability. We further

State v. Corona
20221117-CA 	10 	2025 UT App 93
note that while these hallmarks “are beneficial, they are not
controlling.” State v. Jok, 2021 UT 35, ¶ 36, 493 P.3d 665; see also In
re S.M., 2024 UT App 135, ¶ 32, 557 P.3d 649. “Rather, when
weighing 	the 	testimony 	in 	light 	of 	the other 	evidence, 	the
testimony 	of 	the 	witness 	must 	run 	so 	counter 	to 	human
experience 	that 	it 	renders 	the 	testimony 	inappropriate 	for
consideration in sustaining a finding of guilt.” Jok, 2021 UT 35,
¶ 36 (cleaned up).
¶28 	We can find nothing in the record that runs “so counter to
human experience that it renders the testimony inappropriate for
consideration.” 	Id. 	(cleaned 	up). 	Inconsistent 	testimony,
conflicting stories, and varying degrees of credibility are the
hallmarks of a trial. The inherent improbability standard is not
“satisfied where the appellant raises garden-variety credibility
questions, such as which witness to believe, or which version of a
witness’s conflicting account to believe.” In re S.M., 2024 UT App
135, ¶ 33 (cleaned up). What Corona complains of here is not an
issue of inherent improbability, but rather an issue of relative
credibility. “It is the jury’s prerogative to weigh the evidence,
infer the material facts from it, and apply the law stated in the jury
instructions to the facts.” State v. Bergwerff, 777 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989); see also State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 39, 392 P.3d
398 (“The question of which version of their stories was more
credible is the type of question we routinely require juries to
answer.”); Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 19 (stating that the Robbins
exception 	does 	“not 	allow 	defendants 	to 	challenge 	witness
testimony for generalized concerns about a witness’s credibility”
(cleaned up)). Here, the jury found Rita’s story to be more credible
than Corona’s. Obviously, Corona disagrees with that assessment
of 	the 	evidence, 	but 	that 	does 	not 	establish 	any 	inherent
improbability.
¶29 	There 	was 	no 	inherent 	improbability 	here, 	and 	thus,
“Counsel did not perform deficiently because reasonable counsel
could have concluded that a Robbins motion and a directed verdict

State v. Corona
20221117-CA 	11 	2025 UT App 93
motion would have been futile.” Broadwater, 2024 UT App 184,
¶ 37; see also State v. Hart, 2020 UT App 25, ¶ 20, 460 P.3d 604
(“[C]ounsel’s performance is not deficient for declining to make a
motion, objection, or request that surely would have failed before
the 	district 	court.”). 	Accordingly, 	this 	claim 	of 	ineffective
assistance fails.
II. Mother’s Testimony
¶30 	Corona next alleges that Counsel was “ineffective for
failing to object to improper testimony from [Mother].” At trial,
Mother testified that she was “[u]pset and angry” when she found
out what Corona did to Rita. She testified she was upset that she
“wasn’t there for [Rita] to protect her.” She explained, “[W]e
considered [Corona] like part of the family, and then, you know,
to find out that he would do such a thing like that, knowing that
he also has a daughter kind of around the same age.” Corona
argues that Counsel should have objected to this testimony under
rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and that by failing to do so,
Counsel rendered ineffective assistance. This claim fails because
Corona cannot establish prejudice.
¶31 	In an ineffective assistance claim, “we do not need to
review the deficient performance element before examining the
prejudice element, and if it is easier to dispose of [the] claim on
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be
followed.” State v. Tapusoa, 2020 UT App 92, ¶ 17, 467 P.3d 912
(cleaned 	up). 	Assuming, 	without 	deciding, 	that 	Counsel
performed deficiently in not objecting to or seeking to exclude
Mother’s statements, we limit our analysis to the prejudice prong.
¶32 	To demonstrate prejudice, Corona must show that “there
is a reasonable probability that the case would have had a
different outcome had trial counsel not performed deficiently.”
State v. Whytock, 2020 UT App 107, ¶ 28, 469 P.3d 1150. “A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome” of the proceeding. Strickland v.

State v. Corona
20221117-CA 	12 	2025 UT App 93
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In assessing prejudice, we
“consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury and
then ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the
decision reached would reasonably likely have been different
absent the errors.” State v. Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 28, 424 P.3d 171
(cleaned up). “Prejudice analysis is counterfactual. To decide
whether a trial affected by error is reasonably likely to have
turned out differently we have to consider a hypothetical—an
alternative universe in which the trial went off without the error.”
State v. Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶ 42, 417 P.3d 86.
¶33 	On 	this 	issue, 	Corona 	cannot 	establish 	that 	he 	was
prejudiced 	by 	Counsel’s 	failure 	to 	object. 	If 	we 	imagine 	a
counterfactual 	scenario 	where 	Counsel 	objected 	to 	Mother’s
testimony, and even if we imagine that objection was sustained
and the testimony was excluded, there is still not a reasonable
likelihood that the outcome here would have been any different.
¶34 	“When we examine counsel’s alleged errors, we consider
the totality of the evidence to determine whether the errors altered
the 	entire 	evidentiary 	picture 	and 	whether 	the 	verdict 	is
supported by the record.” State v. J.A.L., 2011 UT 27, ¶ 38, 262 P.3d
1 (cleaned up). The Supreme Court has recognized that some
“errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be
drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture,
and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 695–96. Here, we are confident that Mother’s testimony did
not meaningfully alter the evidentiary picture and that the result
of the trial would have been the same without it. Mother’s
testimony was a passing comment in a three-day trial. Her
testimony did not speak to the ultimate question of the case,
whether Corona’s action satisfied the elements of sexual abuse of
a child. Instead, her comment centered on the idea that she was
upset when she learned about the abuse. It’s difficult to imagine
how the evidentiary picture would be meaningfully altered for

State v. Corona
20221117-CA 	13 	2025 UT App 93
the jury by a revelation so obvious as the fact that a mother was
upset to learn her child was the victim of a crime.
¶35 	Just as the mere sentiment of Mother being upset would
have been obvious to the jury, all the other information contained
in Mother’s statements would have come as no surprise. The jury
already knew that Rita’s family considered Corona to be a part of
their family. Rita herself stated in her CJC interview that she
called Corona her uncle “because he’s like family.” Similarly, the
jury already knew that Rita and Daughter were the same age. Rita
stated in her CJC interview that Daughter “was the same age” as
her. And Corona himself confirmed that Rita and Daughter were
“the same age.” Nothing about Mother’s statements would have
come as any surprise to the jury, and thus, those statements did
not meaningfully alter the evidentiary picture.
¶36 	There was abundant evidence in the record from Rita,
Aunt, 	and 	other 	people 	at 	the 	party to support 	the 	jury’s
conclusion that Corona was guilty of aggravated sexual abuse of
a child. Mother’s testimony did not change the evidentiary
picture. Thus, Counsel’s failure to object to this testimony did not
prejudice Corona, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim
fails.
CONCLUSION
¶37 	Corona has failed to establish that Counsel’s performance
was deficient when it comes to his inherent improbability claim,
and he has not demonstrated prejudice when it comes to his
improper testimony claim. We affirm Corona’s convictions.