In re I.R.C.

2010 UT 41
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
State of Utah, in the 	No. 20080665
interest of I.R.C., a person
under eighteen years of age.
_____________________________
State of Utah,
Appellee,
v.
F I L E D
I.R.C.,
Appellant. 	May 14, 2010
---
Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake
The Honorable C. Dane Nolan
No. 466532
Attorneys: 	Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Karen A. Klucznik,
Asst. Att’y Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee
Joan C. Watt, Patrick W. Corum, Deborah Katz Levi,
Salt Lake City, for appellant
---
On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 	Seventeen-year-old I.R.C. was charged with aggravated
robbery for providing transportation to a co-worker who planned
on robbing a Salt Lake City restaurant. 	Pursuant to the State’s
Serious Youth Offender Act (SYOA), the juvenile court bound over
I.R.C. to be prosecuted as an adult, finding sufficient probable
cause to believe that I.R.C. committed an aggravated robbery.
The juvenile court also found that I.R.C. failed to prove his
case should be retained by the juvenile court. 	I.R.C. challenges
both decisions.

1 	We identify Mr. Rodriguez by his name because, unlike
I.R.C., he was an adult at the time of the robbery.
No. 20080665 	2
¶2 	As to I.R.C.’s arguments regarding probable cause, the
question before us is whether, given the facts presented at
I.R.C.’s preliminary hearing, it is unreasonable to infer that
I.R.C. knew his accomplice planned to use a dangerous weapon in
the robbery. 	Under the SYOA, juveniles charged with aggravated
robbery may be bound over for trial as an adult, while juveniles
charged with robbery may not. 	The use of a weapon is a predicate
to elevating the charge against I.R.C. from robbery to aggravated
robbery.
¶3 	In determining whether there exists probable cause to
believe that a juvenile has committed an offense enumerated in
the SYOA, a juvenile court may draw upon the reasonable
inferences from the facts presented at a preliminary hearing.
And in doing so, the juvenile court is required to resolve all
reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution. 	Thus, unless
it is unreasonable to infer that I.R.C. knew of the plan to use a
weapon in the course of this robbery, the bindover for aggravated
robbery was appropriate. 	We conclude that the reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from the facts in this case give
rise to probable cause to believe that I.R.C. was an accomplice
to the offense of aggravated robbery.
¶4 	Alternatively, I.R.C. contends that the juvenile court
erred in finding that he failed to prove one of the retention
factors that would have led to his case being retained by the
juvenile court. 	Under the SYOA, I.R.C.’s case would have been
retained if he proved, among other things, that his role in the
crime was not premeditated. 	The juvenile court found he failed
to carry his burden of proof on this issue. 	We conclude that the
juvenile court did not err in so finding because the evidence
presented regarding premeditation showed that I.R.C. had
sufficient time to reflect and consider his participation in the
crime. 	Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the juvenile
court.
BACKGROUND
¶5 	It is undisputed that I.R.C. drove a co-worker, Javier
Rodriguez, 1 to a Salt Lake City restaurant where Mr. Rodriguez
intended to commit a robbery. 	Mr. Rodriguez targeted this
particular restaurant because an accomplice, Dale Lopez, was
employed by the restaurant and promised to leave an unusually
large amount of money in the register to be stolen by Mr.
Rodriguez. 	Mr. Rodriguez entered the restaurant with his head

2 	I.R.C. was also charged with one count of failing to
respond to an officer’s signal to stop, a third degree felony,
and one count of interference with a peace officer making an
arrest, a class B misdemeanor. 	The juvenile court dismissed the
misdemeanor charge, and the third degree felony charge is not
relevant to this appeal and will not be discussed.
3 	No. 20080665
covered and demanded the store manager turn over the money
contained in the cash register. 	Throughout the robbery, Mr.
Rodriguez kept his hand on an air soft gun that was partially
concealed within a pocket. 	There is no dispute that this weapon
looks like a genuine handgun except for its orange tip. 	The
manager told Mr. Rodriguez to take the money. 	While there was
approximately $400 more than usual in the cash register, Mr.
Rodriguez was unable to open the register and left with a blue
bag that contained approximately $100 in cash. 	I.R.C. remained
in his vehicle during the robbery and drove Mr. Rodriguez from
the restaurant.
¶6 	An eyewitness to the robbery reported to police that
the robbery suspect fled in a black Pontiac Sunfire. 	Shortly
after the robbery, two Salt Lake City police officers spotted the
suspect vehicle. 	As they approached I.R.C.’s car, Mr. Rodriguez
fled from the passenger side of the vehicle, leaving the weapon
behind. 	While one officer pursued Mr. Rodriguez, the other
officer ordered I.R.C out of the vehicle. 	I.R.C. initially
accelerated toward this officer, but stopped the car after a
number of other police cruisers arrived. 	Before I.R.C. exited
the car, the officer observed I.R.C. bend over and reach beneath
his seat. 	During a search of the vehicle, police found the
weapon under I.R.C.’s seat.
¶7 	Prosecutors charged I.R.C. with aggravated robbery, a
first degree felony, in juvenile court. 2 	The court held a
preliminary hearing to determine if, pursuant to the SYOA, I.R.C.
should be bound over for trial as an adult in the district court.
At the hearing, the State presented the testimony of Salt Lake
City Police Detective Jason Knight, who interviewed I.R.C. the
night of his arrest. 	Detective Knight testified that Mr. Lopez
and Mr. Rodriguez had planned the robbery. 	I.R.C. had only known
Mr. Rodriguez for one week when Mr. Rodriguez asked him for a
ride to the restaurant. 	It was during the ride, or possibly
earlier in the evening, that Mr. Rodriguez told I.R.C. that he
intended to rob the restaurant. 	Mr. Rodriguez also told I.R.C.
that the robbery would be “easy” because there was an inside
person, i.e., Mr. Lopez. 	According to Mr. Rodriguez, Mr. Lopez
intended to leave a large sum of money in the cash register and

3 	We emphasize that Detective Knight’s statement on I.R.C.’s
knowledge of the dangerous weapon came during the retention
hearing and not the preliminary hearing. 	By this time, the
(continued...)
No. 20080665 	4
I.R.C. would receive a portion of the stolen money for driving
Mr. Rodriguez to and from the restaurant.
¶8 	I.R.C. conceded that the State had presented sufficient
evidence to support probable cause on a charge of simple robbery
against him. 	He argued, however, that the State failed to
establish the aggravating factor--that he knew and intended that
a dangerous weapon would be used in the commission of the
robbery--necessary to elevate the offense to aggravated robbery.
The prosecution responded by arguing that, for purposes of the
preliminary hearing, the juvenile court could infer I.R.C.’s
knowledge of the weapon from the other facts presented at the
hearing. 	Specifically, the prosecution argued that it was
reasonable to infer that I.R.C. knew of the weapon because: 	it
is “inherent” in the commission of a robbery that a weapon be
used, I.R.C. knew of the robbery, I.R.C. was in the car with Mr.
Rodriguez and the weapon, I.R.C. drove Mr. Rodriguez to the
restaurant, and I.R.C. attempted to conceal the weapon after the
stop by police.
¶9 	The juvenile court agreed with the prosecution,
acknowledging that I.R.C.’s knowledge of the gun was the “key
element,” but that the standard for probable cause at a
preliminary hearing is very low, and all inferences must be made
in favor of the prosecution. 	After entering its conclusion on
probable cause, the juvenile court then held a retention hearing
as required by the SYOA. 	Under the SYOA, following the court’s
probable cause finding, a juvenile is given the opportunity to
prove three factors that require the juvenile court to retain the
case. 	The prosecution stipulated to the first factor--that
I.R.C. had no prior offenses involving a weapon. 	The defense
argued that I.R.C. met the second and third factors--that I.R.C.
was less culpable than his co-defendants and that his role was
not violent, aggressive, or premeditated--on the basis that his
participation was limited to driving the car, he did not help
plan the robbery, and there had been no evidence that he knew
about the gun beforehand.
¶10 	The prosecution countered I.R.C.’s claims with new
testimony from Detective Knight. 	Detective Knight testified that
during an interview with I.R.C., the teen admitted that Mr.
Rodriguez told him he intended to use the weapon in the robbery
while the pair drove to the restaurant. 3 	On cross-examination,

3 	(...continued)
juvenile court had already reached its probable cause finding.
In our review of probable cause, we are limited to the evidence
that was before the juvenile court when it decided probable
cause.
4 	Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(c) (Supp. 2009).
5 	Id. § 78A-4-103(3).
6 	Id. § 78A-3-102(3)(b).
7 	See State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 27, 137 P.3d 787.
8 	Id. ¶ 26.
5 	No. 20080665
Detective Knight reaffirmed his earlier testimony that I.R.C. did
not participate in planning the robbery and that he only learned
about it sometime that night. 	The juvenile court found that,
although I.R.C. met his burden of proof as to the first two
factors, he failed to meet his burden as to the third factor,
that his role was not violent, aggressive, or premeditated. 	The
court noted that, but for Detective Knight’s additional testimony
establishing that I.R.C. knew of the gun beforehand, I.R.C. would
have met his burden as to the third factor.
¶11 	I.R.C. timely appealed his bindover to the court of
appeals, which certified his case to this court. 	The court of
appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from juvenile courts, 4 but
may certify those cases, in its discretion, to this court. 5 	We
have jurisdiction over cases certified from the court of
appeals. 6
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶12 	A juvenile court’s decision to bind over a criminal
defendant for trial presents a mixed question of law and fact and
requires the application of the appropriate bindover standard to
the underlying factual findings. 7 	As a result, “in reviewing a
. . . bindover decision, an appellate court should afford the
decision limited deference.” 8
ANALYSIS
¶13 	The SYOA permits sixteen- and seventeen-year-old minors
charged with any of nine enumerated felonies to be removed from
juvenile court and bound over for trial as an adult in the

9 	See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-702(1)(a), -702(3)(b) (2008).
Section 78A-6-702 formerly appeared as section 78-3a-602, but was
renumbered, effective February 7, 2008. 	Although I.R.C.’s arrest
occurred just prior to the renumbering, the legislature made no
substantive changes to the statute, so we refer to the most
current version.
10 	Id. § 78A-6-702(3)(a).
11 	Id. § 78A-6-702(3)(b)-(d).
12 	Id. § 78A-6-702(3)(d), -702(4).
No. 20080665 	6
district court. 9 	Under the SYOA, bindover to the district court
is appropriate only after the juvenile court reaches two
findings: 	(1) the State establishes sufficient “probable cause
to believe that one of the [listed felonies] has been committed
and that the defendant committed it,” 10 and (2) the defendant
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of
the three retention factors. 11 	If the defendant succeeds in
establishing all three retention factors, or the State fails to
establish probable cause, the case is retained by the juvenile
court. 12
¶14 	I.R.C. challenges his bindover with respect to both the
juvenile court’s finding of probable cause based on the State’s
evidence and the juvenile court’s determination that he failed to
establish the third retention factor. 	We conclude that the
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence
presented by the State at I.R.C.’s preliminary hearing are
sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that there is
probable cause that I.R.C. knew a dangerous weapon would be used
to commit the robbery. 	Accordingly, we conclude that the
juvenile court did not err in binding over I.R.C. for trial as an
adult. 	We also find that the district court did not err in
finding that I.R.C. failed to establish the third retention
factor. 	Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision.
I. 	THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE STATE
ESTABLISHED PROBABLE CAUSE THAT I.R.C. COMMITTED AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY
¶15 	To bind a juvenile defendant over for trial in the
district court under the SYOA, the State has “the burden of proof
to establish probable cause to believe that one of the [listed
felonies] has been committed and that the defendant committed

13 	Id. § 78A-6-702(3)(a).
14 	See id. § 78A-6-702(1)(a).
15 	State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 20, 137 P.3d 787 (quoting
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 16, 20 P.3d 300).
16 	State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ¶ 48, 227 P.3d 1251
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)).
17 	Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 20.
18 	Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
19 	Id. ¶ 24 (alterations in original) (quoting State v.
Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998)).
20 	Talbot, 972 P.2d at 438 (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995)).
21 	See Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 20.
7 	No. 20080665
it.” 13 	Aggravated robbery is one of the SYOA’s nine enumerated
crimes; robbery is not. 14 	The probable cause standard requires
the prosecution to “‘present sufficient evidence to support a
reasonable belief’” that the defendant committed the crime. 15
This determination hinges on “probabilities and ‘certain common-
sense conclusions about human behavior.’” 16
¶16 	Importantly, the evidence sufficient for probable cause
is less than that necessary to find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 17 	This is due to the fact that in a preliminary hearing
the court is not issuing a final decision on the merits of the
case. 	Rather, the court’s purpose is “to ferret out groundless
and improvident prosecutions.” 18 	At this stage, the juvenile
court must “‘view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution[,] resolv[ing] all inferences in favor of the
prosecution.’” 19 	The court should bind the defendant over for
trial as an adult “‘unless the evidence is wholly lacking and
incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which
supports the [prosecution’s] claim.’” 20
¶17 	The prosecution must establish probable cause for each
element of the charged crime. 21 	Here, I.R.C. was charged with
aggravated robbery. 	Under Utah law,
(1) A person commits robbery if:

22 	Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1)(a)-(b) (2008).
23 	Id. § 76-6-302(1)(a).
24 	Id. § 76-1-601(5)(a)-(b).
25 	Id. § 76–2-202.
No. 20080665 	8
(a) the person unlawfully and
intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of
another from his person, or immediate
presence, against his will, by means of force
or fear . . . ; or
(b) the person intentionally or
knowingly uses force or fear of immediate
force against another in the course of
committing a theft or wrongful
appropriation. 22
A robbery is elevated to aggravated robbery when “in the course
of committing robbery,” the person “uses or threatens to use a
dangerous weapon.” 23 	For purposes of the charge of aggravated
robbery, a “dangerous weapon” includes “a facsimile or
representation” of “any item capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury” if the facsimile is used in such a way that it
“leads the victim to reasonably believe [it] is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury.” 24
¶18 	The State’s evidence tended to prove that Mr. Rodriguez
used an air soft gun in the robbery. 	An air soft gun is a
“facsimile or representation” under the aggravated robbery
statute, and Mr. Rodriguez clearly showed that he was in control
of the gun. 	Therefore, the weapon qualifies as a dangerous
weapon under the statute.
¶19 	Because I.R.C. was only the vehicle driver and neither
used the weapon nor interacted with the victim, the State charged
I.R.C. under a theory of accomplice liability. 	Under the Utah
Code, “[e]very person, acting with the mental state required for
the commission of an offense who . . . intentionally aids another
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for such conduct.” 25 	Thus, the
burden to establish probable cause required the State to present
evidence that could lead the juvenile court to a reasonable
belief that I.R.C. intentionally aided Mr. Rodriguez and Mr.

26 	Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437-38.
9 	No. 20080665
Lopez with the commission of a robbery during which Mr. Rodriguez
used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon.
¶20 	The parties agree that the State did not present any
direct evidence on I.R.C.’s subjective knowledge of Mr.
Rodriguez’s possession of the weapon during the probable cause
phase of the hearing. 	That leaves the juvenile court’s probable
cause finding supported entirely by the inferences that may be
reasonably drawn from the other facts presented at the
preliminary hearing by the State. 	Those facts included that:
I.R.C. knew a robbery would occur; I.R.C. was in close proximity
to Mr. Rodriguez when I.R.C. was asked to participate in the
robbery and while I.R.C. drove Mr. Rodriguez to and from the
scene of the crime; Mr. Rodriguez was in possession of the weapon
while he and I.R.C. were in close proximity; and when police
stopped the car after the robbery, I.R.C. hid the weapon under
his seat. 	We turn now to analyze these facts and the reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from them.
¶21 	First, the State argues that it was reasonable for the
juvenile court to infer I.R.C. knew about the weapon because he
knew Mr. Rodriguez planned to rob the restaurant. 	To this end,
the State presented evidence that I.R.C. knew Mr. Rodriguez
intended to rob the restaurant. 	Second, the State suggests that
I.R.C. knew a dangerous weapon would be used in the robbery
because Mr. Rodriguez possessed the weapon while en route to the
restaurant and Mr. Rodriguez exited the vehicle with it in his
pocket. 	Finally, the State suggests that the juvenile court
could reasonably infer that I.R.C. knew of a dangerous weapon
because he attempted to hide the weapon left in the car when Mr.
Rodriguez fled from the vehicle.
¶22 	Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, as we
must at this stage, these facts are sufficient to establish the
probable cause necessary to support the juvenile court’s decision
to bind I.R.C. over for trial as an adult. 	If, at trial, the
State were to present only the evidence on which it relied to
support the finding of probable cause, the State would certainly
face substantial difficulty in persuading the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt that I.R.C. committed the alleged offense. 	But
the standard for determining probable cause is very different
from the standard for determining guilt. 	When deciding whether
the State has met its burden to establish probable cause, all
inferences arising from the proffered evidence must be resolved
in favor of the prosecution. 26 	And the defendant must be bound
over unless the evidence, examining the totality of the

27 	Id. at 433 (alteration in original) (quoting Pledger, 896
P.2d at 1229); see also Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ¶ 48 (“Probable cause
is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances . . . .”).
28 	Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437 (quoting Pledger, 896 P.2d at
1229).
No. 20080665 	10
circumstances, “‘is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable
inference to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution’s]
claim.’” 27 	This burden is purposefully lower than the burden for
proving guilt because this evidence need only be “‘sufficient to
warrant submission of the case to the trier of fact.’” 28
¶23 	Given this posture, the evidence presented to the
juvenile court is sufficient to support a finding of probable
cause. 	The evidence indicated that I.R.C. was asked to drive
Mr. Rodriguez to a restaurant for the sole purpose of robbing the
restaurant. 	I.R.C. agreed. 	He knowingly undertook the endeavor,
driving Mr. Rodriguez both to and from the scene of the crime.
During their trip, the two sat in close proximity to one another
in I.R.C.’s car. 	All the while, Mr. Rodriguez had in his
possession a replica of a firearm. 	After the completion of the
offense, when the police had stopped I.R.C.’s vehicle, Mr.
Rodriguez fled from the car, leaving the weapon behind. 	As the
police approached the car, I.R.C. hid the weapon under his own
seat.
¶24 	It is possible that throughout the course of his
participation in the robbery, I.R.C. was ignorant of the fact
that a weapon would be used. 	But it is also quite reasonable to
infer that I.R.C. was aware that a weapon would be used. 	And to
bind over a juvenile defendant for trial as an adult, the State
need not disprove every possibility that tends to negate probable
cause. 	Rather, the State has the burden of presenting evidence
that, considering the totality of the circumstances and taken
together with reasonable inferences resolved in the State’s
favor, supports a reasonable belief that the defendant committed
the crime charged.
¶25 	That burden has been satisfied in this case. 	While it
is possible that I.R.C. was ignorant of the weapon, the juvenile
court concluded that it was not unreasonable to believe that
I.R.C. acted with the understanding that a weapon would be used.
Resolving all of the relevant inferences in favor of the State,
it is not unreasonable to believe that I.R.C. understood the
manner in which the robbery would be committed. 	Such a
conclusion is certainly not “wholly lacking” in evidentiary

29 	Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-702(3)(b) (2008).
30 	Id. § 78A-6-702(3)(b)(i)-(iii).
31 	Id. § 78A-6-702(3)(d).
32 	The State stipulated to the first factor, and the
juvenile court found that I.R.C. sufficiently proved the second
factor.
11 	No. 20080665
support. 	Thus, the juvenile court did not err in binding I.R.C.
over for trial as an adult under the SYOA.
II. 	THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT I.R.C. FAILED
TO CARRY HIS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THE STATUTORY RETENTION
FACTORS
¶26 	The juvenile court correctly declined to retain I.R.C.
in juvenile court because I.R.C. did not establish all of the
statutory retention factors by clear and convincing evidence.
Under the SYOA, even where there exists probable cause to believe
that a juvenile has committed an enumerated offense, that
juvenile may prevent being bound over for trial as an adult by
establishing three retention factors. 29 	These factors are as
follows: 	(1) the juvenile must not have been “previously
adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving the use of a
dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an
adult”; (2) the juvenile must have “a lesser degree of
culpability” than any co-defendants involved in the commission of
the crime; and (3) the juvenile’s role in the offense must not
have been “committed in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated
manner.” 30 	The juvenile must establish each factor by “clear and
convincing evidence.” 31 	At issue in this case is the
premeditation element of the third factor. 32 	The juvenile court
concluded that I.R.C. failed to meet his burden of establishing
that his role in the robbery was not premeditated.
¶27 	No set period of time need be established to show
premeditation.
Essentially, “the time required for
premeditation is a question of fact.” 	The
time necessary for premeditation “need only
be long enough for some reflection and
consideration” of the act, no matter how
brief it is. 	Furthermore, elements of
premeditation may be inferred from facts that

33 	State ex rel. W.H.V., 2007 UT App 239, ¶ 7, 164 P.3d 1279
(quoting State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 664 (Utah 1972)).
No. 20080665 	12
will provide “a reasonable foundation for
such an inference.” 33
I.R.C., therefore, bore the burden of showing that he undertook
his actions without the time necessary for “some reflection and
consideration.”
¶28 	The juvenile court did not err in concluding that
I.R.C. failed to carry this burden. 	The State presented evidence
that I.R.C. learned of the planned robbery sometime during the
drive to the restaurant. 	Although he did not participate in
planning the crime, he did have a sufficient amount of time,
albeit brief, to consider his participation. 	Thus, I.R.C.
focuses his argument on the fact that he had insufficient time to
premeditate the use of a dangerous weapon.
¶29 	To support the fact that I.R.C. premeditated the use of
a dangerous weapon, the State presented the following testimony
of Detective Knight:
Q: 	Officer, . . . when you interviewed
[I.R.C.] was there any discussion as to
his foreknowledge of the impending
robbery?
A: 	Yes. 	When he was going there - now he
stated that he only knew about the
robbery that night when they were going
there . . . he knew [Rodriguez] had a
gun, he knew it was an air soft gun with
the orange tip. [Rodriguez] was going to
go in and just show the gun, however,
don’t pull it all the way out so they
just knew that he had a gun and that was
how the robbery was going to go down.
I.R.C. provided no evidence to contradict this testimony. 	I.R.C.
did object to this testimony on the ground that it was
inconsistent with Detective Knight’s earlier testimony at the
probable cause hearing because at that earlier hearing he made no
mention of I.R.C.’s knowledge of a weapon.
¶30 	Although this contention may have cast doubt on the
validity of the officer’s testimony, it did not relieve I.R.C. of
his burden to prove that his actions were not premeditated.

13 	No. 20080665
Without more, I.R.C. failed to present the clear and convincing
evidence necessary to establish the third retention factor.
Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in determining that
I.R.C. failed to establish each of the factors necessary for the
case to be retained.
CONCLUSION
¶31 	We hold that the juvenile court did not err in finding
that the State established probable cause to believe that I.R.C.
had committed aggravated robbery. 	Viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, the evidence presented at the
probable cause hearing, along with the reasonable inferences
arising from that evidence, was sufficient to support the
juvenile court’s determination. 	We also hold that the juvenile
court did not err in finding that the evidence presented by
I.R.C. during the retention phase of the hearing was insufficient
to disprove that his acts were premeditated. 	Therefore, we
affirm the juvenile court’s decision to bind I.R.C. over for
trial as an adult.
---
¶32 	Justice Wilkins and Justice Nehring concur in Associate
Chief Justice Durrant’s opinion.
---
DURHAM, Chief Justice, dissenting:
¶33 	I respectfully dissent. 	As the majority opinion notes,
the State bears the burden of putting on evidence of all the
elements of an offense necessary for bindover on criminal
charges. 	Here the State’s evidence of the defendant’s knowledge
that a gun would be used in a robbery was: (1) he knew a robbery
was to take place; (2) it would be “easy” because there was an
insider involved; (3) he sat in close proximity to Mr. Rodriguez
when Mr. Rodriguez possessed a facsimile of a weapon; and
(4) after the event and a subsequent police stop, he apparently
hid the gun under a car seat. 	The sole question for us is
whether these facts give rise to a “reasonable inference” that he
knew of the planned use of a weapon.
¶34 	I cannot accept the State’s argument that knowledge of
a planned “robbery” permits an automatic inference of the use of
a dangerous weapon. 	Particularly in the context of an “easy”
inside job, the offense of robbery only requires force or threat
of force, not a weapon. 	Further, the defendant’s short

No. 20080665 	14
acquaintance with the perpetrator and his short notice even of
the planned offense give rise to no inferences that the presence
of a weapon was known to him; handguns are small and easy to
conceal. 	Finally, I am unpersuaded that the defendant’s attempt
to hide the weapon left in the car by the fleeing perpetrator
after the offense can give rise to any legitimate inference
regarding his knowledge before the offense. 	I would hold that
the State failed to produce sufficient evidence for the court to
bind over the defendant on the charge of aggravated robbery.
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¶35 	Justice Parrish concurs in Chief Justice Durham’s
dissenting opinion.