State v. Ashlee Marie Briggs

2008 UT 75
AMENDED OPINION*
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
State of Utah, No. 20070186
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
F I L E D
Ashlee Marie Briggs,
Defendant and Appellant. October 31, 2008
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Seventh District, Monticello
The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson
No. 061700126
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Kenneth A. Bronston,
Asst. Att’y Gen., Salt Lake City, Craig C. Halls,
Monticello, for plaintiff
William L. Schultz, Monticello, for defendant
---
On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals
DURHAM, Chief Justice:
¶1 The trial court, after a bench trial, convicted
defendant Ashlee Briggs of possession with intent to distribute,
a tax stamp violation, and possession of drug paraphernalia. She
challenges the convictions, arguing insufficiency of the
evidence. Because we do not find that the trial court’s decision
was against the clear weight of the evidence, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 In October 2006, Ashlee Briggs was arrested while
returning from a trip to Phoenix with Antonio Martinez. Briggs
and Martinez had met each other through a mutual friend, and
Martinez had offered to pay Briggs $200 to drive him to Phoenix
in a rental car because he did not have a driver’s license.
Martinez testified at trial that he told Briggs that the trip was
_________________________________________________________________
* The Court has removed footnote number 5 from the original
opinion.

1 The arresting officer also testified that Briggs told him
she was being paid to drive Martinez to Phoenix and she assumed
the trip was being made for drugs. However, Briggs testified
that she did not believe the trip was being made for drugs, and
she denied ever telling the officer that was the purpose of their
trip.
2 Briggs eventually denied this admission, but the trial
court found that “it impaired the defendant’s credibility that
her lawyer had to keep workin’ at her to finally get her to back
off on her earlier admission that she knew she was on a drug
run.”
3 Martinez had made sexual advances.
No. 20070186 2
to visit his mother and to “pick up some weed.” Briggs denied
this at trial; she testified that Martinez never told her about
the drugs, and she did not think that the purpose of the trip was
to obtain drugs.1 However, Briggs testified that she knew before
the trip that Martinez had drug connections, and she admitted
that she knew she would only be paid for driving if they were
able to pick up the drugs.2
¶3 After driving to Phoenix, the two stayed in a hotel
room paid for by Martinez. During this time, Martinez came and
went from the hotel, but Briggs did not leave the hotel for their
entire stay. Briggs spoke frequently with her boyfriend,
Johnathon Simpson, while she was at the hotel, and she asked
Simpson to come get her because she had grown uncomfortable with
Martinez.3 Simpson denied her request, and Briggs’ cell phone
service was cut off while she was in Phoenix. Briggs decided to
make the trip home with Martinez.
¶4 On the morning of October 23, before they left Phoenix,
Briggs and Martinez met Martinez’s friend, Courtney, and Martinez
purchased a package of marijuana. The parties’ recollections
differ as to where the purchase took place and what the
circumstances of the purchase were, but Martinez testified that
Briggs was not involved in the purchase. Nonetheless, both
Martinez and Briggs testified that a sample of the marijuana was
passed around while they were still in Phoenix, and the trial
court found that Briggs knew at this time that the item to be
transported was a brick of marijuana.
¶5 On their return trip to Grand Junction, Officer Workman
pulled Briggs and Martinez over near Blanding, Utah, because he
did not see any license plates on their vehicle. After routine
questioning and inspection of the rental agreement for the
vehicle, Officer Workman discovered that neither Briggs nor
Martinez was listed as a driver on the rental agreement. Officer

4 At trial, Briggs denied making either of these statements.
3 No. 20070186
Workman questioned Briggs about the vehicle and eventually told
Briggs and Martinez that they were free to go. However, before
they left, Officer Workman asked if he could ask them some more
questions and inquired if they had “Any marijuana? Any cocaine?
Any methamphetamine?” Briggs and Martinez responded that they
did not and consented to a search of their vehicle.
¶6 Officer Workman’s search uncovered a small green pipe
that belonged to Martinez inside of Briggs’ bag. The pipe had
evidence of having been used to smoke marijuana. Officer Workman
also discovered 2.2 pounds of marijuana in a drawer underneath
the front passenger seat and $2,640 in a ziplock bag in the
sunglass holder of the vehicle. Following these discoveries,
Briggs and Martinez were placed under arrest and taken to the
police station for questioning.
¶7 At trial, Officer Workman testified that when
questioned, Briggs admitted that she assumed the trip to Phoenix
was being made for drugs and that Martinez had paid for their
hotel room with money that was for drugs.4 In her own testimony,
Briggs admitted that she knew that the pipe in her bag was used
for smoking marijuana, that Martinez had been smoking marijuana
on the trip, and that she was trying to hide the pipe when she
put it in her bag. Briggs also testified that she had used
marijuana in the past, although she had not smoked it for six
months. When the officers questioned Martinez about the
marijuana, he told them that he had intended to deliver half of
the marijuana to a friend in Grand Junction. Martinez also
testified at trial that he told the officers that Briggs had
nothing to do with the marijuana but that she did know it was in
the vehicle.
¶8 The trial court found that given the circumstances
surrounding the trip, it was unreasonable that Briggs did not
know that the purpose of the trip was to get drugs. The court
also found that Briggs knew in Phoenix about the marijuana and,
based on her experience with marijuana, she knew that the
quantity of marijuana was suitable for commercial sale and not
just personal use. Given these findings, the trial court found
that Briggs knowingly and intentionally helped Martinez and found
her guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, a tax stamp violation, and possession of drug
paraphernalia.
¶9 Briggs now appeals her conviction on the grounds that
there was insufficient evidence to convict her on any of the
three counts against her. Briggs filed a timely notice of appeal

No. 20070186 4
with the court of appeals. The court of appeals subsequently
certified the case for transfer to this court pursuant to rule 43
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(b) (2008).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 Because we are asked to review the results of a bench
trial for sufficiency of evidence, we will only reverse if the
trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous. “When reviewing a
bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the
trial court’s judgment unless it is ‘against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach[] a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.’” State v. Gordon, 2004
UT 2, ¶ 5, 84 P.3d 1167 (quoting State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786,
786-87 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1987))).
¶11 Additionally, “in those instances in which the trial
court’s findings include inferences drawn from the evidence, we
will not take issue with those inferences unless the logic upon
which their extrapolation from the evidence is based is so flawed
as to render the inference clearly erroneous.” Glew v. Ohio Sav.
Bank, 2007 UT 56, ¶ 18, 181 P.3d 791 (citing State v. Walker, 743
P.2d at 193).
DISCUSSION
¶12 At trial, the State based its case against Briggs in
part on the theory of accomplice liability, and the trial court
relied on this theory in convicting Briggs of all three counts.
I. ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
A. Intent Requirement Under Accomplice Liability
¶13 To show that a defendant is guilty under accomplice
liability, the State must show that an individual acted with both
the intent that the underlying offense be committed and the
intent to aid the principal actor in the offense. “Every person
acting with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests,
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for such conduct.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-202 (2003); see also State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215,
1220 (Utah 1986) (“Prior knowledge does not make a person an
accomplice when that person does not have the mental state
required and does not solicit, request, command, encourage, or
intentionally aid in perpetration of the crime.”). The criminal

5 No. 20070186
intent of a party may be inferred from circumstances such as
“‘presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the
offense . . . .’” Am. Fork City v. Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, ¶ 7,
12 P.3d 108 (quoting Watson v. State, 448 S.E.2d 752, 753 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1994)).
¶14 An accomplice must therefore have the intent that the
underlying offense be committed. See State v. Comish, 560 P.2d
1134, 1136 (Utah 1977) (“[A]n ‘accomplice’ is one who
participates in a crime in such a way that he could be charged
and tried for the same offense.”). However, it is not necessary
for the accomplice to have the same intent that the principal
actor possessed as long as the accomplice intended that an
offense be committed. See State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461
(Utah 1994) (“Party liability under section 76-2-202 does not
require that the persons involved in the criminal conduct have
the same mental state.”). An accomplice will be held criminally
responsible to the degree of his own mental state, not that of
the principal. See State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah
1983). This prevents an individual who is charged as an
accomplice from escaping criminal liability by arguing that the
principal actor had a lower intent or diminished capacity when
the crime was committed. Id. Therefore, the first step in
applying accomplice liability is to determine whether the
individual charged as an accomplice had the intent that an
underlying offense be committed.
¶15 Additionally, when prosecuting an accomplice for aiding
in the commission of a crime, the State must show that the
accomplice had the intent to aid. See State v. Chaney, 1999 UT
App 309, ¶ 46, 989 P.2d 1091 (“We conclude that the placement of
the word ‘intentionally’ directly before the word ‘aids’ evinces
a clear legislative intent that ‘intentionally’ modify only that
word.”). An accomplice must intentionally aid in the commission
of a crime to be held criminally liable. See Schreuder, 726 P.2d
at 1220 (“Prior knowledge does not make a person an accomplice
when that person does not . . . intentionally aid in perpetration
of the crime.”).
¶16 Briggs correctly argues that the nature of accomplice
liability makes it impossible for the State to charge an
individual with accomplice liability standing alone. See, e.g.,
State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, ¶ 12, 56 P.3d 969. However,
in this case, Briggs was neither charged nor found guilty under
Utah Code section 76-2-202 alone. The record clearly indicates
that three separate counts were brought against Briggs. At
trial, the State relied upon accomplice liability only as a
theory for convicting Briggs of the crimes included in the
information, and not as a separate offense.

5 The State’s reliance on constructive possession in these
cases may be a result of the treatment afforded to constructive
possession in the definition of possession in Utah Code section
58-37-2(1)(ii) (2007):
For a person to be a possessor or user of a
controlled substance, it is not required that
he be shown to have individually possessed
[the substance] . . . it is sufficient if it
is shown that the person jointly participated
with one or more persons in the use,
possession, or control of any substances with
knowledge that the activity was occurring, or
the controlled substance is found in a place
or under circumstances indicating that the
person had the ability and the intent to
exercise dominion and control over it.
This definition does not, however, preclude the possibility of
accomplice liability being applied in cases dealing with
(continued...)
No. 20070186 6
¶17 As an affirmative defense in the trial court, Briggs
asserted that she intended to voluntarily terminate her
involvement with Martinez, and therefore should not be subject to
accomplice liability. Voluntary termination requires that the
individual “wholly deprive his prior efforts of effectiveness in
the commission.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-307(2) (2006). Although
the record does show that Briggs was uncomfortable with her
situation while in Phoenix, there is nothing in the record to
show that she did anything to deprive her prior efforts of their
effectiveness in aiding Martinez. Instead, Briggs further
facilitated Martinez’s commission of the offense of possession
with intent to distribute by driving when they left Phoenix.
Briggs’ subjective desire to find another way of returning to
Grand Junction and her request to her boyfriend to pick her up
were insufficient to show that she voluntarily terminated her
role in possessing the marijuana.
B. Constructive Possession Is Not Necessary
Under Accomplice Liability
¶18 Briggs argues that it is necessary for the State to
prove constructive possession before she can be convicted as an
accomplice to a crime of possession. The State has commonly
relied on the theory of constructive possession in cases where an
accomplice is not in physical possession of contraband. See
State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, ¶¶ 13-15, 985 P.2d 911; State v.
Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318-19 (Utah 1985); State v. Anderton, 668
P.2d 1258, 1263-64 (Utah 1983) (Durham, J., concurring); State v.
Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981).5 But constructive

5 (...continued)
possession, including those where constructive possession might
not exist.
7 No. 20070186
possession is not the only theory under which an accomplice may
be found guilty of possession without actually possessing the
contraband. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 682 N.E.2d 903, 906
(Mass. Ct. App. 1997) (“The theories of constructive possession
and joint venture are, however, alternative theories with which
to connect an accused to the crime.”).
¶19 Courts in other jurisdictions have repeatedly found
that it is not necessary for the State to prove actual or
constructive possession when the State’s case is founded upon a
theory of accomplice liability. See United States v. Paige, 470
F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2006) (“It is not necessary for aiding
and abetting, however, that the government prove that the
defendant actually or constructively possessed the cocaine.”);
United States v. Garcia, 242 F.3d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 2001) (“A
Defendant ‘need not have actual or constructive possession of the
drugs to be guilty of aiding and abetting possession with intent
to distribute.’” (quoting United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d
749, 753 (5th Cir. 1993))); see also United States v. Wesson, 889
F.2d 134, 134-35 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Fischel, 686
F.2d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir. 1982); Robinson, 682 N.E.2d at 906.
See generally J.A. Bryant, Jr., Annotation, Offense of Aiding and
Abetting Illegal Possession of Drugs or Narcotics, 47 A.L.R. 3d
1239 (1973).
¶20 If we were to hold that it is necessary for an
accomplice to be in actual possession of the contraband before
accomplice liability could be established, the State could
charge someone as an accomplice only when he or she had acted as
a principal. Accomplice liability would cease to have any
independent function. Since Briggs was convicted as an
accomplice to Martinez, and not for being in constructive
possession of the marijuana, it is not necessary to determine
whether Briggs had constructive possession.
II. POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
¶21 The trial court found Briggs guilty of possession with
intent to distribute. “[I]t is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally . . . possess a controlled or
counterfeit substance with intent to distribute . . . .” Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iii) (2007). To convict someone of
possession with intent to distribute, the State must show
“(1) that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a
controlled substance, and (2) that defendant intended to

No. 20070186 8
distribute the controlled substance to another.” State v. Fox,
709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii) (1953)).
¶22 Because Briggs was not personally in possession of the
marijuana, the trial court relied on the State’s theory of
accomplice liability. As noted above, to properly convict Briggs
as an accomplice, the State was required to show that the she had
both “the mental state required for the commission of an offense”
and “intentionally aid[ed] another person to engage in conduct
which constitutes an offense.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (2003).
¶23 As to the element of possession, the record reveals
that Briggs admitted that she knew about Martinez’s drug
connections prior to the trip, that she did not believe she would
be paid for driving Martinez if they did not get the drugs, and
that she knew in Phoenix that the package they were transporting
contained marijuana. Given these admissions, it was not clearly
erroneous for the trial court to find that Briggs had the intent
that the underlying offense, Martinez’s possession of the
marijuana, occur. Additionally, Briggs’ action in driving
Martinez to and from Phoenix shows that Briggs intentionally
aided Martinez in his possession of the marijuana.
¶24 The intent regarding possession for distribution was
shown in the trial court’s finding that Briggs’ past experience
with marijuana provided a sufficient basis from which the trial
court could infer that Briggs knew the marijuana was for
distribution because the quantity in the package was too much for
personal use. The trial court’s inference is reasonable. “Where
one possesses a controlled substance in a quantity too large for
personal consumption, the trier of fact can infer that the
possessor had an intent to distribute.” Fox, 709 P.2d at 320
(citing State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1983)). In
view of these findings, it was not clear error for the trial
court to find that Briggs had the requisite intent and assisted
Martinez’s efforts to acquire and possess marijuana with intent
to distribute. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 21, 10 P.3d
346 (“‘It is well established that intent can be proven by
circumstantial evidence.’” (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781,
789 (Utah 1991))). Therefore, it was not clear error for the
trial court to find that Briggs acted as an accomplice to
Martinez’s possession of the marijuana with intent to distribute.
¶25 Briggs raises the concern that applying accomplice
liability in a case such as this could potentially leave bus
drivers or airline pilots subject to accomplice liability for
transporting someone who possesses drugs. This concern is
unfounded. Accomplice liability requires that the accomplice
both acts with the “mental state required for the commission of

6 Utah Code section 59-19-105(1) provides that dealers may
purchase the required tax stamps from the tax commission. This
section also protects the anonymity of anyone who purchases
stamps by guaranteeing that “[a] dealer is not required to give
his name, address, Social Security number, or other identifying
information on the form,” and that “[t]he commission or its
employees may not reveal any facts contained in any report, form,
or return required by this chapter or any information obtained
from a dealer.” Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105(4)(a)-(b).
9 No. 20070186
an offense,” and “intentionally aids” in the commission of the
offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. A bus driver or airline
pilot could not be found guilty as an accomplice without having
the intent that the crime be committed and intentionally aiding
in the commission of the crime. In this case, the trial court
found that Briggs knew about Martinez’s actions and intentions
regarding the marijuana and that she acted knowingly and
intentionally in aiding him in carrying out those actions. These
facts clearly distinguish Briggs from a bus driver who
unknowingly transports someone who possesses drugs or other
contraband.
¶26 Because there was sufficient evidence to find that
Briggs had the necessary intent and aided Martinez in possession
with intent to distribute, we affirm her conviction of possession
with intent to distribute.
III. TAX STAMP VIOLATION
¶27 Briggs was also convicted of failure to affix the
proper tax stamps to the marijuana as required under Utah Code
section 59-19-106 (2006). This statute holds that “any dealer”
who fails to affix the proper tax stamps will be subject to pay
the taxes required on the marijuana and will also be guilty of a
third degree felony. Id.6 For purposes of this statute,
“dealer” is defined as “a person who, in violation of Utah law,
. . . in any manner . . . transports, or imports into Utah or in
any manner acquires or possesses more than 42 1/2 grams of
mari[j]uana . . . .” Id. § 59-19-102(2).
¶28 When an accomplice is found guilty of a crime, he or
she is “criminally liable as a party for such conduct.” Id.
§ 76-2-202 (2003). An accomplice is treated the same as a
principal would be treated. State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256,
¶ 12, 56 P.3d 969 (“It is well settled that accomplices incur the
same liability as principals.”). This principal liability brings
Briggs within the broad definition of “dealer” as someone who “in
any manner . . . possesses more than 42 1/2 ounces of
mari[j]uana.” Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-102(2) (2006). Once Briggs

No. 20070186 10
falls within the definition of a dealer, she is liable for any
failure to affix the proper tax stamps to the marijuana, and she
can be charged with violating the statute.
¶29 Because Briggs was convicted as an accomplice to
possession with intent to distribute, it is not necessary for the
State to show that she had constructive possession of the
marijuana. As explained above, constructive possession presents
one option that the State may rely upon when prosecuting
individuals who aid in the possession of illegal drugs, but it is
not the only option available. In this case, the record clearly
indicates that Martinez made no effort to obtain the necessary
tax stamps, and no stamps were affixed to the marijuana when
Officer Workman discovered it in the vehicle. As we have already
discussed, the trial court found that Briggs acted knowingly and
intentionally in aiding Martinez in possession with intent to
distribute. For these reasons, we find that there was sufficient
evidence for the trial court to find Briggs guilty of failure to
affix the proper tax stamps.
IV. POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
¶30 Briggs was also convicted as an accomplice to
Martinez’s possession of drug paraphernalia. “It is unlawful for
any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to . . . inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body . . . .” Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-
5(1) (2007).
¶31 Briggs does not dispute that Martinez used the pipe to
smoke marijuana during the trip, that the pipe was in her
possession at the time of the search, or that the pipe is drug
paraphernalia. Nevertheless, Briggs argues that there was
insufficient evidence to convict her on this count because she
did not have the intent to use the pipe herself. The trial court
agreed and found that she did not have the intent to use the
pipe, but still found her guilty for aiding Martinez in his
possession of drug paraphernalia.
¶32 Briggs was convicted as an accomplice to Martinez’s
possession of the pipe, not as a principal. Therefore, it is not
necessary to show that Briggs intended to use the pipe herself.
For Briggs to be convicted as an accomplice, it is only necessary
for the State to show that she intended that Martinez have
possession of the pipe and that she intentionally aided Martinez
in his possession and future use of the drug paraphernalia. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (2003).
¶33 At trial, Martinez admitted that the pipe belonged to
him, and Briggs admitted that Martinez had used the pipe to smoke

11 No. 20070186
marijuana while they were traveling together. Based upon this
testimony, it is clear that Martinez possessed the pipe, he had
used the pipe, and he had the intent to use the pipe in the
future. The record shows that Briggs placed the pipe in her bag
when Martinez left the vehicle to speak with Officer Workman, and
she admitted that she did so in an effort to conceal the pipe.
Considering this evidence, the trial court found that Briggs’
attempt to conceal the pipe was aiding Martinez in his possession
of the pipe. Therefore, sufficient evidence did exist to convict
Briggs as an accomplice to possession of drug paraphernalia.
CONCLUSION
¶34 We conclude that it was not clearly erroneous for the
trial court to convict Briggs on all three counts because there
was sufficient evidence to allow the court to find that she acted
as an accomplice. It is not necessary for the State to show
actual or constructive possession when prosecuting an individual
as an accomplice to possession of illegal substances or drug
paraphernalia. When an individual is found guilty as an
accomplice, he or she is criminally liable in the same way that a
principal actor would be. Affirmed.
---
¶35 Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Wilkins,
Justice Parrish, and Judge McHugh concur in Chief Justice
Durham’s opinion.
¶36 Justice Nehring does not participate herein; Court of
Appeals Judge Carolyn B. McHugh sat.