In re Hoopiiaina

2006 UT 53
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
In the matter of the Malualani B. No. 20050619
Hoopiiaina Trust, aka the Larayne J.
Hartman Trust and the Donald Hartman
Trust.
_____________________________________
Michelle Samantha Gatlin Nolan,
successor trustee of the Malualani B.
Hoopiiaina Trust; Michelle Samantha
Gatlin Nolan, individually; and Michael
Gatlin, individually,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Cuma S. Hoopiiaina, personal
representative of the Estate of
Malualani B. Hoopiiaina, Cuma S.
Hoopiiaina, individually; Marlin M.
Forsyth, individually; George K.
Fadel, individually; IFG Resources
Inc.; Lisa Goodwill; and F I L E D
John Does 1 through 10,
Defendants. September 19, 2006
---
Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn
No. 020910872
Attorneys: Nolan J. Olsen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs
Ralph C. Petty, Salt Lake City, for defendants
---
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURHAM, Chief Justice:
¶1 This case, which reaches us on certiorari in the form
of a quiet title action, involves a multi generational family
dispute over the ownership of certain real property that was

1 While there are several other named defendants, Cuma and
Mr. Forsyth are the only parties who appear to have taken actions
relevant to our decision. Therefore, Cuma and Mr. Forsyth are
the only defendants to whom we shall refer by name.
No. 20050619 2
placed into two irrevocable trusts over thirty years ago.
Defendants Cuma S. Hoopiiaina (Cuma), individually and as
personal representative of the Estate of Malualani B. Hoopiiaina
(Malu), and Marlin Forsyth1 request that we reverse the Utah
Court of Appeals’ decision. The court of appeals held that
plaintiffs Michelle Samantha Gatlin Nolan’s (Michelle)--both
individually and as trustee for the Malualani B. Hoopiiaina
Trusts--and Michael Gatlin’s (Michael) suit should be
characterized as a quiet title action and that quiet title
actions are not subject to a statute of limitations. We accepted
certiorari in order to clarify the legal principles underlying
the application of the statute of limitations to claims seeking
to quiet title to real property. We affirm the decision of the
court of appeals and hold that plaintiffs’ quiet title claims are
not subject to a statute of limitations. We also modify the
court of appeals’ holding that summary judgment was inappropriate
as to plaintiff’s remaining claims and hold that the concealment
version of the equitable discovery rule tolled the statutes of
limitation on these claims as a matter of law.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Because this case reaches us on certiorari from the
court of appeals following the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants, we recite the facts in a light
most favorable to plaintiffs, the non-moving party below.
Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 UT 25, ¶ 3, 116 P.3d
271.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶3 This case involves an intrafamily dispute between the
grandchildren of Malu (plaintiffs Michelle and Michael) and
Malu’s widow (plaintiffs’ step grandmother, Cuma) and her son
Marlin Forsyth. The facts underlying this dispute are somewhat
complicated and stretch back over thirty years. In 1974,
attorney George K. Fadel prepared two similar trust agreements
for Malu. These agreements were executed by Malu, as settlor of
the trusts, on April 10, 1974. They were subsequently recorded
in the Salt Lake County Recorder’s Office on April 18, 1974. The
first agreement (Trust I) conveyed the title to real property
located at 349 West 700 South in Salt Lake City to Trust I. The
second agreement (Trust II) conveyed the title to real property

2 The trust documents for Trust I and Trust II each contain
the same provision, which states, “This trust shall be
irrevocable. At no time shall any beneficial interest in the
property inure to the Settlor.”
3 No. 20050619
located at 345 West 700 South as well as all personal property
used in connection with the iron works business located at that
address to Trust II. Both Trust I and Trust II also provided
that additional property or assets could be deposited into the
trusts after their creation. Importantly, each trust
specifically provided that it was irrevocable.2
¶4 Under the terms of Trust I, three trustees were to
administer the trust: Malu, his daughter Inez Gatlin (Inez) (the
mother of plaintiffs), and LaRayne J. Hartman. Ms. Hartman was
also an initial beneficiary of Trust I. Trust I provided that
the trustees were to commence paying Ms. Hartman $400.00 per
month, to continue for her lifetime, upon the death of Malu or
when Ms. Hartman turned 65 years old, whichever occurred sooner.
The remainder beneficiaries of Trust I were Inez and her
children, plaintiffs Michelle and Michael. Trust I provided that
upon the death of Ms. Hartman, the trustees were to begin paying
the entire income of the trust property to these three
beneficiaries annually, an undivided one-third to each. However,
when Michelle reached the age of 21, the trust was to terminate
and the trust res was to be divided equally among the three.
¶5 Trust II also had three trustees: Malu, Inez, and
Donald Hartman. The only significant difference between Trust I
and Trust II is that the initial beneficiary of Trust II was Mr.
Hartman, and the trustees were to pay Mr. Hartman $300.00 per
month rather than $400.00. The income and res of Trust II were
to be distributed amongst Inez and plaintiffs in the same manner
as Trust I.
¶6 Larayne Hartman died on September 10, 1994. It is
undisputed that Donald Hartman is also deceased, although the
record does not disclose when he died. Inez died on April 24,
1996. Thus, plaintiffs eventually became the sole remaining
beneficiaries of both Trust I and Trust II. However, the record
does not indicate when Michelle turned twenty-one, which under
the terms of the trusts should have had the effect of terminating
the trusts and triggering the distribution of the res by the
trustee. This distribution never occurred.
¶7 Malu, the last remaining trustee, died on May 20, 1997.
Prior to his death, Malu drafted a holographic will and two
codicils; the will was dated March 6, 1996, and the codicils were

3 The holographic will and codicils made no mention of the
property held in Trust II.
4 At this point, neither of the plaintiffs had ever actually
seen the trust documents, and thus had no specific knowledge of
any of the provisions contained in the trusts. However, the
record indicates that plaintiffs were designated as heirs in the
probate proceeding and given notice. Moreover, plaintiffs had
been told in general terms by both Malu and Inez since they were
very young that they were the beneficiaries of a trust created by
Malu, and they were aware that Malu was the owner of the
properties that were held by the trusts.
5 Mr. Fadel also represented Malu in his capacity as trustee
in previous litigation in which the trusts were granted an
easement over a property abutting the trust properties. This
litigation terminated in a memorandum decision by the Utah Court
of Appeals in 1995.
6 Mr. Fadel was initially joined as a defendant in this
lawsuit but was dismissed pursuant to a stipulated motion to
dismiss with prejudice on October 9, 2003.
7 Although not present at the June 25th probate hearing,
plaintiff Michael contacted Mr. Fadel via telephone shortly
(continued...)
No. 20050619 4
dated May 23, 1996, and May 15, 1997, respectively. The first
codicil contained the following provision: “My daughter Inez
Gatlin having died, I remove all provisions for Inez and her
children.” The second codicil purported to bequeath the property
located at 349 West 700 South in Salt Lake City-–the same
property held in Trust I-–to defendants Cuma and Mr. Forsyth in
equal portions.3
¶8 A probate proceeding regarding Malu’s estate was
initiated on June 6, 1997, and a probate hearing was held on June
25, 1997. Cuma was appointed as the personal representative of
the estate, and Malu’s holographic will was found to be his last
will and testament. Plaintiff Michelle appeared before the
probate court at the June 25th hearing and objected to the will
being probated in a manner inconsistent with the trusts.4 After
voicing her objection, Michelle spoke off the record with Mr.
Fadel, the same attorney who had prepared the trust agreements
for Malu in 19745 and who was present at the hearing as the
attorney for Malu’s estate.6 Mr. Fadel represented to Michelle
that no trusts even existed, that Malu had disinherited her, and
that she had no interest whatsoever in Malu’s estate.7 Following

7 (...continued)
thereafter and was given substantially similar information.
8 Michelle did not even know where to seek copies of any
possible trust agreements other than through Mr. Fadel.
9 Mr. Olsen stated during oral argument that he became
involved in this matter after he discovered the trust documents
while conducting a title search at the Salt Lake County
Recorder’s Office. Realizing that plaintiffs were beneficiaries
of the irrevocable trusts, he enlisted the services of a private
investigator to locate them.
10 The probate petition does not mention Trust II.
5 No. 20050619
her conversation with Mr. Fadel, Michelle returned to the judge’s
chambers and waived her objection.
¶9 Shortly after the probate hearing, Michelle contacted
attorney Phil Dyer, with whom she discussed both Malu’s will and
the possible existence of the trusts. Mr. Dyer advised Michelle
that he could do little to help her unless she had copies of the
trust agreements. Because she did not have copies of the trust
agreements,8 and because Mr. Fadel had told her that no trusts
even existed, Michelle took no further action at that time.
¶10 On August 20, 1998, Cuma, as personal representative of
Malu’s estate, deeded the real property held in Trust I to
herself and Mr. Forsyth and the property held in Trust II to
herself. The deeds were recorded that same day at the Salt Lake
County Recorder’s Office. Nothing further of note occurred in
this dispute until August of 2002.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶11 On or about August 14, 2002, plaintiffs were contacted
by a private investigator employed to locate them by plaintiffs’
present counsel, attorney Nolan J. Olsen.9 This investigator
informed plaintiffs that they were the beneficiaries of a trust
created by Malu and put them in touch with Mr. Olsen. The record
indicates that this was the first point at which the plaintiffs
had confirmed knowledge that the trusts actually existed.
Michelle immediately contacted Mr. Olsen, who filed a probate
petition on Michelle’s behalf to have her appointed as successor
trustee of Trust I on August 26, 2002.10 Judge Noel was
initially assigned to the probate proceeding. On September 10,
2002, Judge Noel signed an order appointing Michelle as successor
trustee of Trust I and ordering her to convey the property held

11 Judge Henriod, who was later assigned to the probate
proceeding, granted this motion on January 5, 2003, finding that
Michelle was required to give notice to “any interested person”
under Utah Code section 75-1-401(1) (2005) and had failed to give
notice to Cuma and Mr. Forsyth.
12 Michelle was initially the only plaintiff in the civil
action; Michael could not be located. However, the defendants
moved to have Michael designated as a plaintiff and ordered to
appear. Michael eventually joined in Michelle’s amended
complaint and designated Mr. Olsen as his attorney.
No. 20050619 6
by the trust to the beneficiaries (Inez, Michelle, and Michael)
in one-third undivided shares, as provided by the trust
agreement. On the same day, Michelle executed a deed
transferring the property held by Trust I to the three
beneficiaries as directed by the court; this deed was recorded
with the Salt Lake County Recorder’s Office on September 10th as
well. Michelle also filed with the district court a petition to
determine Inez’s heirs-–Inez having died intestate-–and to
distribute Inez’s portion of the trust res. On September 25,
2002, the district court entered an order awarding plaintiffs
each a one-half undivided interest in the one-third undivided
interest owned by Inez in Trust I. During this same period of
time, the plaintiffs demanded that the defendants conduct an
accounting and turn over the property to the plaintiffs; the
defendants refused to do so.
¶12 On September 27, 2002, Cuma and Mr. Forsyth filed with
the district court a motion to set aside the order appointing
Michelle successor trustee as well as the trustee’s deed whereby
Michelle had deeded the real property held by Trust I to the
three beneficiaries.11 On this same date, Cuma filed a lis
pendens on the property held by Trust I.
¶13 On October 10, 2002, Michelle initiated a civil action
in district court against Cuma, Mr. Forsyth, and several other
defendants; Judge Nehring was initially assigned to the civil
suit. In her complaint, Michelle sought to quiet title to the
real property held by both Trust I and Trust II. Michelle also
sought to recover other undisclosed trust property and damages
for the period of time Cuma and the other defendants had deprived
her and Michael of the trust property. The plaintiffs12 filed an
amended complaint with the district court on January 24, 2003,
and the defendants filed their answer on February 11, 2003. In
their answer, the defendants also asserted a counterclaim seeking
to quiet title to the property in dispute and requested that they
be reimbursed for money expended to improve the subject

13 The court of appeals also held that Michelle’s request
that she be named successor trustee of the trusts was not time-
barred. Nolan v. Hoopiiaina, 2005 UT App 272, ¶ 19, 118 P.3d
861.
7 No. 20050619
properties in the event the plaintiffs prevailed on their quiet
title claim.
¶14 On March 4, 2003, Judge Nehring ordered that the
probate proceeding be consolidated with the civil proceeding.
Following the consolidation, Judge Quinn was assigned to the
case. On November 7, 2003, the defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the
plaintiffs’ claims. Judge Quinn granted the defendants’ motion
on November 26, 2003, although an order to that effect was not
entered until February 4, 2004. In his order, Judge Quinn ruled
that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by either the three-year
statute of limitations contained in Utah Code section 75-3-1006
(1993)-–which limits actions against distributees-–or the four-
year statute of limitations contained in Utah Code section 78-12-
25(3) (2002)-–which is the residual statute of limitations “for
relief not otherwise provided for by law.” Judge Quinn also
ruled that the discovery rule applied, but that the plaintiffs
had knowledge of fact sufficient to put them on notice to inquire
about the disposition of the trust properties as of June 25, 1997
(the day of the probate hearing regarding Malu’s estate).
¶15 The plaintiffs appealed Judge Quinn’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants to the Utah Court of Appeals,
which reversed the district court’s decision. Nolan v.
Hoopiiaina, 2005 UT App 272, ¶ 1, 118 P.3d 861. The court of
appeals held that Malu had no power to revoke or modify the
trusts and therefore could not transfer title to the trust
property via his will. Id. ¶¶ 14-16. Accordingly, the bequest
of the trust property to Cuma and Cuma’s subsequent transfer of
the trust assets to herself and Mr. Forsyth “were void and of no
effect.” Id. ¶ 16. The court further held that the plaintiffs’
suit primarily sought to quiet title to the real property held in
the trusts by removing “the cloud of Cuma’s [ineffective] deed of
the real property . . . to herself and her son.” Id. ¶ 19.
Relying on several of this court’s precedents, including Branting
v. Salt Lake City, 153 P. 995 (Utah 1915), and Davidsen v. Salt
Lake City, 81 P.2d 374 (Utah 1938), the court of appeals held
that no statute of limitations applied to the plaintiffs’ quiet
title action and therefore the action was not time-barred.13
Nolan, 2005 UT App 272, ¶¶ 18-19.

No. 20050619 8
¶16 The court of appeals held that a statute of limitations
would apply to the plaintiffs’ remaining claims for relief-–for
the recovery of personal property held by the trust, for damages
resulting from the defendants’ wrongful occupancy, and for an
accounting. Id. ¶ 20. Relying on Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v.
Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741, the court of appeals held that
summary judgment was improper as to the remaining claims because
material disputes of fact existed regarding whether the equitable
discovery rule would apply to toll the statute of limitations on
these claims. Nolan, 2005 UT App 272 ¶¶ 20-24. Accordingly, the
court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for a
determination of these issues. Id. ¶ 26.
¶17 Judge Jackson concurred in part and dissented in part,
taking issue with the majority’s conclusion that Malu could not
transfer the trust property to anyone other than the trust
beneficiaries. Id. ¶ 28-29. According to the dissent, “This
evades the well-established principle that a trustee can breach
the trust, thereby triggering the statute of limitations.” Id.
¶ 29. The dissent also argued that a quiet title action is
subject to a statute of limitations if it involves “an active
battle between adverse parties.” Id. ¶ 30.
¶18 Following the court of appeals’ decision, the
defendants petitioned this court for certiorari. We accepted
certiorari to consider whether plaintiffs’ quiet title action is
subject to a statute of limitations. This court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶19 On certiorari review, we review the decision of the
court of appeals, not the decision of the district court.
Longley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 2000 UT 69, ¶ 13, 9 P.3d 762.
“On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals
for correctness.” Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles,
2002 UT 48, ¶ 11, 48 P.3d 968. This is the same standard of
review we apply when we review a lower court’s decision regarding
the application of a statute of limitations, which is a question
of law. Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 18,
108 P.3d 741.
ANALYSIS
¶20 The issue on certiorari is whether plaintiffs’ quiet
title action is subject to a statute of limitations. We conclude
that no statute of limitations applies to plaintiffs’ claims
seeking to quiet title to the real property held in Trust I and
Trust II because the relief plaintiffs seek in these claims is

14 Although we only granted certiorari to consider whether
defendants’ quiet title action is subject to a statute of
limitations, our determination that the statute of limitations
applies to defendants’ remaining claims forces us to address the
court of appeals’ decision regarding the applicability of the
concealment version of the equitable discovery rule as well. See
Nolan, 2005 UT App 272, ¶¶ 20-26.
9 No. 20050619
simply to quiet an existing title to property of which they are
already the equitable owners against defendants’ adverse claims.
As to plaintiffs’ remaining claims–-for the recovery of other
undisclosed trust property and for damages, including rents, for
the period of time defendants wrongfully deprived plaintiffs of
the real property held in Trust I and Trust II–-the statute does
apply. However, we hold as a matter of law, that the concealment
version of the equitable discovery rule tolled the statutes of
limitation with respect to these claims until August of 2002.14
Because defendants brought suit within two months of that time,
no statute of limitations could operate to bar any of defendants’
remaining claims.
I. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT APPLY TO
PLAINTIFFS’ QUIET TITLE CLAIMS
¶21 We begin with plaintiffs’ quiet title claims.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims seeking to quiet title
to the real property held in Trust I and Trust II are subject to
a statute of limitations because plaintiffs seek affirmative
relief. Defendants basically reiterate the argument made in the
dissent in the court of appeals’ opinion–-that a quiet title
action is subject to a statute of limitations if it involves “an
active battle between adverse parties.” Nolan v. Hoopiiaina,
2005 UT App 272, ¶ 30, 108 P.3d 741 (Jackson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). We disagree. Although we have
addressed this issue in several prior cases, the legal standard
is somewhat dated. Therefore, we take this opportunity to
clarify the rule regarding the application of the statute of
limitations to a quiet title action.
¶22 In Branting v. Salt Lake City, 153 P. 995 (Utah 1915),
we considered the applicability of the statute of limitations to
a suit brought by the plaintiff in equity. Id. at 1000-01. In
that case, Salt Lake City had passed several ordinances for the
purpose of constructing a sewer and had assessed and levied a
special tax on the property abutting the sewer-–including the
plaintiff’s-–to cover the construction costs. Id. at 996. The
plaintiff filed suit against the city, arguing that the city had
exceeded its authority and requesting that the court declare the

15 The current version of the catch-all statute of
limitations states that a four-year statute of limitations
applies to all actions “for relief not otherwise provided by
law.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (2002).
No. 20050619 10
city’s actions void and of no effect. Id. at 996, 1000. As a
defense, the city pleaded the four-year statute of limitations
contained in the version of the “catch-all” statute of
limitations then in effect. Id. at 1000. The plaintiff
responded that the statute did not apply because his suit was
merely “an action to remove a cloud from the title, or is one to
quiet the title to real property.” Id.
¶23 In addressing the plaintiff’s argument, this court set
forth the now well-established general rule that the catch-all
statute of limitations “applies to all actions for relief that
[are] not otherwise covered by any other section.”15 Id. at
1001. However, we also set forth an exception to this general
rule:
actions by which nothing is sought except to
remove a cloud from or to quiet the title to
real property as against apparent or stale
claims are not barred by the statute of
limitations . . . [though] all actions in
which the principal purpose is to obtain some
affirmative relief, as was the case here,
clearly come within the provisions of [the
statute of limitations].
Id. The plaintiff in Branting did not simply seek to have an
adverse claim to his property adjudicated because the city had
never questioned the plaintiff’s title or asserted an adverse
claim to it. Id. at 1000. Rather, the plaintiff sought to have
the proceedings whereby the city sought to assess and levy the
tax on his property declared illegal and annulled. Id. Because
this constituted affirmative relief and not merely a settling of
adverse claims to the title to real property, the four-year
catch-all statute applied, and the plaintiff’s claim was barred
because he had not filed his suit until nearly five years after
his cause of action accrued. Id. at 1001.
¶24 In Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 81 P.2d 374 (Utah 1938),
we considered an issue similar to that in Branting. In Davidsen,
the plaintiff had agreed to deed certain real property to the
city. Id. at 374. When he sent the deed to an agent of the
city, the plaintiff included a letter stating that the deed was
conditioned on the city making certain improvements. Id. The

11 No. 20050619
agent, annoyed that the conditions had not been mentioned in
previous negotiations, sent the deed to the city commission
without the letter. Id. The city accepted the deed and
thereafter had it recorded. Id. The plaintiff subsequently
demanded that the conditions specified in the letter be met, and
brought suit when the city refused. Id. at 374-75. In his suit,
the plaintiff asked to have the deed set aside on the grounds of
fraud, to quiet title, and for general relief. Id. at 374. We
held that the statute of limitations applicable to actions for
relief on the ground of fraud or mistake barred the plaintiff’s
entire suit, including the quiet title claim. Id. at 376-77.
The statute of limitations was applicable despite the fact that
the plaintiff sought to quiet title to the real property because
the relief sought by the plaintiff was “that a deed which he
executed to defendant be cancelled for fraud.” Id. at 376.
Citing Branting, we stated that the plaintiff was seeking
“affirmative relief other than removal of a cloud on his title.”
Id. We noted that the plaintiff could seek both to quiet title
and to have the deed set aside in the same suit, “[b]ut if his
relief in each case depends as here upon the cancellation of a
deed for fraud or mistake, he must bring his [quiet title] action
within the period provided by law for an action based on that
ground.” Id. at 376-77. Because the plaintiff’s quiet title
claim depended on the merits of the fraud claim, the statute of
limitations applicable to fraud applied to the quiet title claim
as well. Id.
¶25 In American Tierra Corp. v. City of W. Jordan, 840 P.2d
757 (Utah 1992), we updated the framework for determining statute
of limitations issues in Utah. There, we again stated that the
four-year catch-all statute of limitations applies to all causes
of action, legal or equitable, “in which affirmative relief is
sought” and another “more specific” statute of limitations does
not apply. Id. at 760 (citing Branting, 153 P. at 1001).
¶26 Under this framework, it is clear that all actions,
whether legal or equitable, are subject to a statute of
limitations in Utah. Id. (noting that Utah “long ago commingled
legal and equitable actions” and has consistently “applied
statutes of limitation to equitable actions”). However, suits
brought to quiet the title to real property have always been an
exception to this rule. A true quiet title action is a suit
brought “to quiet an existing title against an adverse or hostile
claim of another,” and “the effect of a decree quieting title is
not to vest title but rather is to perfect an existing title as
against other claimants.” State v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337-
38 (Utah 1979). Thus, the question becomes whether a claim is a
true quiet title action or whether the claimant really seeks
other relief; if the claim is a true quiet title action, it is

No. 20050619 12
not subject to a statute of limitations. Courts must proceed
cautiously when applying this rule, however, for parties should
not be able to avoid the statute of limitations on other claims
by simply disguising them as claims for quiet title relief.
¶27 The lesson from Branting and Davidsen is that a court
must examine the relief sought in order to determine whether the
statute of limitations applies. When a party asserts a quiet
title claim in which that party merely requests that the court
adjudicate the validity of an opponent’s adverse or hostile claim
to property the party already holds title to, no statute of
limitations applies. In other words, if it is not necessary that
the court grant other relief in favor of the party, such as
cancelling a deed on the basis of fraud, in order to rule on the
quiet title claim, then the statute of limitations cannot operate
as a bar to the party’s quiet title claim. See Davidsen, 81 P.2d
at 376-77. Thus, in order to determine whether the statute of
limitations applies to a quiet title claim, the court must assess
on what basis the party would be entitled to have title quieted.
If the party is entitled to have title quieted only if the court
first finds in his or her favor on another legal issue, then the
same statute of limitations that applies to that legal issue will
also apply to the quiet title claim. Id. Similarly, a party may
seek to quiet the title to real property in addition to
requesting other relief in the same action. Id. Despite the
fact that no statute of limitations applies to a true quiet title
claim, the respective statutes of limitation applicable to the
party’s other claims for relief may operate to bar those claims.
If the party’s claim for quiet title relief can only be granted
if the party succeeds on another claim, then the statute of
limitations applicable to the other claim will also apply to the
quiet title claim.
¶28 Defendants argue that all claims, including quiet title
claims, are subject to a statute of limitations if affirmative
relief is sought. According to defendants, a party requests
affirmative relief if it “seeks assistance from the court in
righting an asserted wrong.” Defendants also rely on the
argument made in the dissent below–-that a quiet title action is
subject to a statute of limitations if it involves “an active
battle between adverse parties.” Nolan, 2005 UT App 272, ¶ 30
(Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
However, each of these arguments would destroy the exception that
we have clearly carved out for quiet title actions. Virtually
every lawsuit, whether it be a suit to quiet title to real
property or otherwise, involves both a request that the court
right an asserted wrong and “an active battle between adverse
parties.” Id. Therefore, neither of these tests provides a
workable distinction between claims for true quiet title relief

13 No. 20050619
and other forms of relief, and each would have the effect of
subjecting all quiet title actions to a statute of limitations.
This would prevent a party seeking true quiet title relief from
removing invalid claims, such as wild deeds, from the title to
his or her property, thus rendering the property unmarketable.
This is a result we cannot sanction. Accordingly, we hold that
true claims for quiet title relief, determined under the legal
framework set forth above, are not subject to a statute of
limitations.
¶29 Having addressed the legal standard for determining
whether a quiet title claim is subject to a statute of
limitations, we must now apply this standard to determine whether
any statutes of limitation apply to plaintiffs’ claims seeking to
quiet title to the real property held in Trust I and Trust II.
This requires that we examine the basis for plaintiffs’ quiet
title claims and the relief plaintiffs are seeking in order to
determine whether they are asserting true quiet title claims or
whether we must first find in their favor on some other legal
issue in order to reach the quiet title claims.
¶30 The first step in our inquiry is to determine the basis
of plaintiffs’ quiet title claims. Plaintiffs’ claims to the
real property held in Trust I and Trust II arise from the
irrevocable trust agreements themselves. In order to address the
basis of plaintiffs’ quiet title claims, it is therefore
necessary to recite some trust principles and explain their
application to this case. In a recent case, we provided the
following description of trusts:
It is well settled that [a] trust is a form
of ownership in which the legal title to
property is vested in a trustee, who has
equitable duties to hold and manage it for
the benefit of the beneficiaries. Once the
settlor has created the trust he is no longer
the owner of the trust property and has only
such ability to deal with it as is expressly
reserved to him in the trust instrument.
Thus, a settlor has the power to modify or
revoke a trust only if and to the extent that
such power is explicitly reserved by the
terms of the trust. Furthermore, the
creation of a trust involves the transfer of
property interests in the trust subject-
matter to the beneficiaries. These interests
cannot be taken from [the beneficiaries]
except in accordance with a provision of the
trust instrument.

16 Defendants have argued, based on the dissent below, that
Malu breached and repudiated the trust agreements, thereby
commencing the running of the statute of limitations. See Nolan,
2005 UT App 272, ¶ 29 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that the majority’s holding “evades
the well-established principle that a trustee can breach the
trust, thereby triggering the statute of limitations”).
Defendants assert that they should be allowed to develop facts
regarding Maku’s alleged breach and repudiation on remand.
Defendants’ argument is wholly without merit as to the Trust II
property. Maku could not have breached or repudiated Trust II
(continued...)
No. 20050619 14
Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, ¶ 9, 52 P.3d 1190 (alterations in
original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). If a
settlor does not specifically reserve the power to revoke the
trust in the terms of the trust agreement, then the trust may be
revoked only if all the beneficiaries consent to the revocation.
Clayton v. Behle, 565 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Utah 1977); Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-7-411(1) (2002).
¶31 We agree with the court of appeals regarding the
application of these general principles to the case before us.
See Nolan, 2005 UT App 272, ¶¶ 13-16. It is undisputed that
Maku, as settlor of Trust I and Trust II, did not reserve the
power to revoke or modify the trusts in the trust agreements and
that the trusts specifically state that they are irrevocable.
Nor did the trust agreements contain any provision that would
allow Maku, as trustee, to simply transfer the trust assets to
third parties without the beneficiaries’ consent. See Banks,
2002 UT 65, ¶ 9. Upon creation of the trusts, the beneficiaries
were therefore immediately vested with equitable title to the
trust properties; this title was recorded when the trust
instruments themselves were recorded in 1974. Furthermore, there
has been no contention in this case that the beneficiaries agreed
to revoke the trusts. Accordingly, Maku in his capacity as
settlor of Trust I and Trust II could not revoke or modify the
trusts. When he created the trusts, Maku relinquished all
ownership interests in the trust assets; he could thereafter act
only as trustee. Because Maku had no ownership interest in the
trust assets and no power as trustee to dispose of the trust
assets, he had no ability to revoke the trusts or transfer title
to the trust properties via his will.
¶32 With respect to the Trust II property, Maku did not in
fact take any action to transfer title to defendants because his
holographic will and the codicils to it-–found to be his last
will and testament-–did not even mention the Trust II property.16

16 (...continued)
because Maku took no action with respect to the Trust II
property. The only party who ever acted adversely to the Trust
II property was Cuma, who improperly attempted to deed it to
herself.
17 Defendants’ argument that the statute of limitations
commenced running when Malu breached and repudiated the trust
agreements is also without merit with respect to the Trust I
property. As discussed above, the statute of limitations does
not apply to plaintiffs’ claim to quiet title to the Trust I
property. Therefore, no action taken by Malu could have had any
effect on that claim. As to the rest of plaintiffs’ claims,
defendants’ argument regarding Malu’s alleged breach and
repudiation is irrelevant. As discussed infra at ¶¶ 34-39, the
concealment version of the equitable discovery rule tolled the
statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ remaining claims until
August of 2002. Because no statute of limitations could possibly
bar any of plaintiffs’ claims given that plaintiffs brought suit
(continued...)
15 No. 20050619
Rather, those documents simply contained the following blanket
statement: “My daughter Inez Gatlin having died, I remove all
provisions for her and her children.” While this language may
have had some effect as to the inheritance of Inez and
plaintiffs, it did not purport to-–nor could it-–have any effect
on their rights as beneficiaries of Trust II. Cuma therefore has
no basis to claim an ownership interest in the Trust II property,
and her attempt to transfer the real property held in Trust II to
herself in 1998 constituted nothing more than the assertion of an
invalid adverse claim; the deed she recorded is no more than a
wild deed. Plaintiffs’ quiet title claim with respect to the
Trust II property is thus simply an action to remove an adverse
claim to real property to which plaintiffs already hold equitable
title--in other words, a true quiet title action. See, e.g.,
Santiago, 590 P.2d at 337 (“[A] quiet title action, as its name
connotes, is one to quiet an existing title against an adverse or
hostile claim of another . . . .”). It is not necessary for this
court to rule in plaintiffs’ favor on any other legal issue in
order to determine whether plaintiffs are entitled to quiet the
title to the Trust II property against CDMA’s adverse claim.
Accordingly, no statute of limitations applies to plaintiffs’
quiet title action regarding the Trust II property.
¶33 The same result follows with respect to the real
property held in Trust I. Although Maku purported to transfer
the Trust I property to CDMA and Mr. Forsyth via the second
codicil to his holographic will, he had no ability to do so.17

17 (...continued)
within two months of that date, it makes no difference whether
Malu breached and repudiated Trust I or not. Moreover, it is not
entirely clear from the facts of this case that plaintiffs are
even suing Malu, and defendants’ argument regarding Maku’s
alleged breach and repudiation would only be relevant to claims
brought by plaintiffs, the beneficiaries, against Maku, the
trustee. See, e.g., Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U.S. 377, 386 (1887)
(noting that repudiation rule applies to suits by beneficiary
against trustee); Philippi v. Philippe, 115 U.S. 151, 157 (1885)
(same); Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20, ¶ 11, 998 P.2d 262 (same);
Wasden v. Coltharp, 631 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah 1981) (same); Thomas
v. Glendinning, 44 P. 652, 654 (Utah 1896) (same). Accordingly,
we hold that defendants are not entitled to the opportunity to
develop facts regarding Maku’s alleged breach and repudiation on
remand.
18 We note that this case does not involve any claim of
adverse possession, which would be an issue independent of the
quiet title claim and would be governed by a seven-year statute
of limitations. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-5, -7 (2002).
No. 20050619 16
Maku in his capacity as settlor had no power to revoke or modify
Trust I. We also agree with the court of appeals that Malu in
his capacity as trustee only had the power to deal with the trust
assets as specified in the trust agreement. Nolan, 2005 UT App
272, ¶ 15; see also Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-813(1)(a) (2002)
(stating that a trustee has those “powers conferred by the terms
of the trust”). Because Malu could not bequeath to Cuma and Mr.
Forsyth something he did not have, Cuma and Mr. Forsyth hold
nothing more than an adverse claim to the Trust I property. As
with the Trust II property, plaintiffs’ claim to quiet title to
the real property held in Trust I is an action to remove an
adverse claim to property to which they already hold title, and
this court is not required to adjudicate a separate legal issue
to reach plaintiffs’ quiet title claim. Accordingly, no statute
of limitations applies to plaintiffs’ action to quiet title to
the Trust I property.18
II. THE CONCEALMENT VERSION OF THE EQUITABLE DISCOVERY RULE
TOLLS THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION ON
PLAINTIFFS’ REMAINING CLAIMS
¶34 With respect to plaintiffs’ remaining claims-–for the
recovery of other trust property and for damages due to the
defendants’ wrongful occupancy, including rents–-the statute of
limitations does apply. Thus, the statutes of limitation
applicable to these claims would have commenced running from the

19 It is irrelevant to our analysis whether any of the
statutes of limitation that may apply to plaintiffs’ claims
actually contain a discovery rule or not. Even if an applicable
statute of limitations contains a discovery rule, the statute
will not commence running until the plaintiff “has actual or
constructive knowledge of the relevant facts forming the basis of
the cause of action.” Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005
UT 14, ¶¶ 21-22, 108 P.3d 741. Because we hold that plaintiffs
did not have constructive knowledge of the facts forming the
bases of their various claims until August of 2002, no
limitations period would have commenced running until that time.
See infra ¶¶ 38-39. Thus, it is not necessary that we determine
what statutes of limitation apply and whether any of them contain
a discovery rule.
17 No. 20050619
date that plaintiffs had a completed cause of action on any of
these claims. See Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20, ¶ 10, 998 P.2d 262.
This would have occurred when defendants began asserting adverse
claims to the trust property–either at the probate hearing on
June 25, 1997, or when Cuma deeded the trust properties to
herself and Mr. Forsyth on August 20, 1998. Under the framework
set forth in American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840
P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1992), we would normally be required to
ascertain which statutes of limitation apply to plaintiffs’
various remaining claims. However, this step is unnecessary in
this case because we hold, as a matter of law, that the
concealment version of the equitable discovery rule tolled the
statutes of limitation on plaintiffs’ remaining claims until
August of 2002, when the existence of the written trust documents
became known to plaintiffs. Because plaintiffs brought suit on
all of their claims within two months of that date, no statute of
limitations could possibly operate to bar any of plaintiffs’
remaining claims.
¶35 While a statute of limitations generally begins running
when a plaintiff has a completed cause of action, the discovery
rule may nonetheless operate to toll a statute of limitations
until the time at which a party discovered or reasonably should
have discovered “facts forming the basis for the cause of
action.” Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 21,
108 P.3d 741 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The discovery rule may apply in either of two mutually exclusive
settings: if a statutory discovery rule applies or if an
equitable discovery rule applies. Id. ¶¶ 21-25. A statutory
discovery rule applies only when a statute of limitations
applicable to a cause of action, “by its own terms, mandates
application of the discovery rule.”19 Id. ¶ 21. In contrast,
there are two situations in which an equitable discovery rule

20 Because our holding with respect to the concealment
version of the equitable discovery rule is dispositive, we do not
address the exceptional circumstances version.
21 Even if the plaintiff either did know “or reasonably
should have known of the facts underlying his or her cause of
action before a limitations period expired,” he can nonetheless
benefit from the application of the concealment version of the
equitable discovery rule if he can “show that, given the
defendant’s actions, the plaintiff acted reasonably in failing to
file suit before the limitations period expired.” Russell
Packard, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 30. If the plaintiff does so, the statute
will not commence running “until the point at which the plaintiff
either discovered or reasonably should have discovered the
relevant facts forming the basis of the cause of action.” Id.
Because we hold that plaintiffs did not know and could not have
reasonably discovered the facts underlying their causes of action
before August of 2002, and because plaintiffs filed their suits
within two months of that time, we do not address this second
situation. See infra ¶¶ 38-39. Even if a relevant statute of
limitations expired between when plaintiffs had knowledge of
their causes of action-–in August of 2002-–and when they filed
suit-–within two months–-plaintiffs certainly acted reasonably
because they filed suit promptly once they were aware they had a
cause of action.
No. 20050619 18
will operate to toll a statute of limitations: “(1) where a
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of
the defendant’s concealment or misleading conduct, and (2) where
the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application
of the general rule would be irrational or unjust.”20 Id. ¶ 25
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶36 Under the concealment version of the equitable
discovery rule, “the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s conduct [is
evaluated] in light of the defendant’s fraudulent or misleading
conduct.” Id. ¶ 26. If the plaintiff has filed his claim
outside of the statutory period relevant to a certain cause of
action, he may raise the concealment version of the discovery
rule to toll the statute of limitations if he demonstrates that
he “neither discovered nor reasonably should have discovered the
facts underlying the cause of action before the limitations
period expired” due to the defendant’s concealment.21 Id. ¶ 29.
If the plaintiff can make such a demonstration, the statute of
limitations will not commence running “until the date the
plaintiff possessed actual or constructive knowledge of the facts
forming the basis of his or her cause of action.” Id.

22 In granting summary judgment for defendants, the district
court held that plaintiffs, “as a matter of law, had knowledge as
of June 25, 1997 of all the facts necessary to put them on notice
to inquire as to whether their failure to receive the [trust]
properties breached the trust. [Plaintiffs] knew nothing in 2002
that they did not know in 1997.” The record does not, however,
support this conclusion. See infra ¶ 38.
19 No. 20050619
¶37 The Utah Court of Appeals held that the district court
had erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiffs’ remaining
claims because issues of fact existed regarding the application
of the concealment version of the equitable discovery rule.22
Nolan v. Hoopiiaina, 2005 UT App 272, ¶¶ 23-24, 118 P.3d 861.
According to the court of appeals, “[a] fact finder could
certainly determine that [plaintiffs] acted reasonably in not
bringing suit within the applicable statute of limitations.
Indeed, it would be hard to find otherwise.” Id. ¶ 24. We agree
with the court of appeals that the district court clearly erred
in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. We,
however, disagree with the court of appeals that it is necessary
to remand this case to the district court for a trial on the
applicability of the equitable discovery rule. Id. ¶ 26. It is
true that determining when a plaintiff should reasonably have
discovered the facts sufficient to establish a cause of action
and whether a plaintiff acted reasonably under the circumstances
are both fact-intensive inquiries that “preclude [judgment as a
matter of law] in all but the clearest of cases.” Russell
Packard, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 39 (alteration in original) (quoting
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996)). While these
questions are usually left to the trial court, judgment as a
matter of law is appropriate when “the facts are so clear that
reasonable persons could not disagree about the underlying facts
or about the application of the governing legal standard to the
facts.” Id. (quoting Berenda, 914 P.2d at 54).
¶38 Because the undisputed facts underlying the case before
us unquestionably meet the concealment version of the equitable
discovery rule, this case is one of “the clearest of cases” in
which judgment as a matter of law is warranted. Id. (quoting
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 54). Though plaintiffs had been told when
they were children that they were the beneficiaries of a trust
created by their grandfather, Malu, they had no knowledge of any
of the details of the trusts. They had never seen copies of the
trust agreements and did not know what property was held in the
trusts. After being notified that Maku’s estate was being
probated, Michelle showed up at the probate hearing held on June
25, 1997, and generally asserted plaintiffs’ interests, although
she had no actual knowledge that they were entitled to anything.

23 We note that these misleading statements were clearly
false and may subject Mr. Fadel to disciplinary action.
Accordingly, we shall refer this matter to the disciplinary
committee of the Utah Bar for further investigation.
No. 20050619 20
At the hearing, Mr. Fade–-acting on behalf of Maku’s estate and
thus representing CDMA-–told the plaintiffs that no trusts even
existed, that they had been disinherited, and that they had no
interest in Maku’s estate, notwithstanding that he himself had
drafted the trust agreements and had represented Maku in his
capacity as trustee in an action brought on behalf of the trusts
only two years earlier.23 On the basis of Mr. Fade’s statements,
Michelle withdrew her objection to the probate proceeding. Mr.
Fade repeated these same statements to Michael in a telephone
conversation shortly after the probate proceeding. Therefore, at
the time CDMA and Mr. Forsyth began asserting adverse claims to
the trust property, plaintiffs were not aware that CDMA and Mr.
Forsyth were acting adversely to something plaintiffs were
entitled to because plaintiffs had been misled by Mr. Fade’s
statements to believe that no trusts existed. Moreover,
plaintiffs had no way to determine if the trusts did exist or
what their interests were because they did not know where to seek
copies of the trust agreements other than through Mr. Fade.
Plaintiffs did not have actual knowledge that the trusts even
existed until around August 14, 2002, when a private detective
hired independently by Mr. Olsen located them, and Mr. Olsen
subsequently informed them about the irrevocable trusts. Upon
receiving this information, plaintiffs promptly took legal action
to protect their interests; both the probate proceeding and the
civil action were filed within two months.
¶39 These circumstances clearly support the application of
the concealment version of the equitable discovery rule as a
matter of law. Plaintiffs’ claims arise from their ownership of
the Trust I and Trust II assets. Therefore, in order for
plaintiffs to be aware of the facts underlying their causes of
action, it was necessary that they first know of the existence of
the trusts. However, there is no question that plaintiffs did
not have actual knowledge that the trusts existed until on or
around August 14, 2002. Moreover, given defendants’ active
concealment of the existence of the trusts and plaintiffs’
interests, it was entirely reasonable for plaintiffs not to
discover “the facts underlying the[ir] cause[s] of action” until
that date. Id., ¶ 29. Accordingly, we hold as a matter of law
that the equitable discovery rule operates to toll any applicable
statutes of limitation until August 14, 2002. Because plaintiffs
filed both lawsuits that were consolidated in this action within

21 No. 20050619
two months of that date, no statute of limitations could possibly
operate to bar any of plaintiffs’ remaining claims.
CONCLUSION
¶40 We hold that plaintiffs’ claims seeking to quiet title
to the real property held in Trust I and Trust II are true quiet
title claims because the relief plaintiffs seek is simply a
determination that defendants’ adverse claims are invalid, and it
is not necessary that we find in plaintiffs’ favor on any other
legal issue in order to reach the quiet title claims. Thus,
plaintiffs’ quiet title claims are not subject to a statute of
limitations. We therefore remand this case to the district court
with instructions to quiet title to the real property held in
Trust I and Trust II in plaintiffs.
¶41 We also hold that, as a matter of law, the statutes of
limitation applicable to plaintiffs’ remaining claims were tolled
by the concealment version of the equitable discovery rule until
August 14, 2002. As plaintiffs brought suit within two months of
that date, no statute of limitations could operate to bar any of
plaintiffs’ remaining claims. Because plaintiffs’ remaining
claims require an accounting, we instruct the district court to
require defendants to render an accounting of the trust property
on remand and to conduct any other necessary proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
---
¶42 Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Chief Justice
Durham’s opinion.