Brian Brent Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
2011 UT 10
IN THE
SUPREME C OURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
___________
BRIAN B RENT OLSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
EAGLE M OUNTAIN CITY,
Defendant and Appellant.
___________
No. 20090831
Filed February 18, 2011
___________
Fourth District Court, Provo Dep’t
The Honorable David N. Mortensen
No. 090400584
___________
Attorneys:
M. David Eckersley, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
Gerald H. Kinghorn, Catherine L. Brabson, Salt Lake City,
for defendant
___________
J USTICE LEE, opinion of the Court:
¶1 	In this interlocutory appeal, Defendant Eagle Mountain
City asks us to reverse the district court’s denial of its motion to
dismiss an action filed by the City’s former mayor, Brian Brent Ol-
sen. The City’s motion challenged Olsen’s eligibility for reim-
bursement of attorney fees incurred in defending a criminal action
arising out of Olsen’s duties as mayor, asserting that the applica-
ble statute conditions eligibility for reimbursement on timely
submission of a request that the government employer defend the
employee in the underlying suit (a request that Olsen concededly
failed to submit). We find no such requirement in the statute and
accordingly affirm.

OLSEN v. EAGLE MOUNTAIN C ITY
Opinion of the Court
No. 20090831 	2
I
¶2 	Brian Brent Olsen was elected mayor of Eagle Mountain in
the November 2005 election. On October 23, 2006, the Utah Coun-
ty Attorney charged Olsen with seven counts of misusing public
funds while serving as mayor in violation of Utah Code section
76-8-402. Olsen resigned as mayor just prior to the announcement
of the charges. On September 25, 2008, after a four-day trial, a jury
found Olsen not guilty on all seven counts.
¶3 	Olsen employed private counsel in his successful defense.
Thirty-four days after acquittal, on October 29, 2008, Olsen sub-
mitted 	to 	Eagle 	Mountain 	a 	request 	for 	reimbursement 	of
$119,834.90 in attorney fees and costs. Eagle Mountain did not re-
spond, and on February 4, 2009, Olsen filed a complaint in the
Fourth District Court seeking reimbursement.
¶4 	Eagle Mountain moved to dismiss Olsen’s complaint, ar-
guing that Olsen failed to submit a timely request that Eagle
Mountain defend him at trial as required, according to Eagle
Mountain, by Utah Code section 63G-7-902. The district court de-
nied the motion.
¶5 	Eagle Mountain filed an interlocutory appeal in this court,
which we granted on December 8, 2009. “We review the district
court’s denial of [Eagle Mountain’s] motion to dismiss for correct-
ness, granting no deference to the district court’s ruling.” Pendle-
ton v. Utah State Bar, 2000 UT 96, ¶ 5, 16 P.3d 1230.
II
¶6 	The statutory scheme at issue here involves three separate
provisions: (1) Utah Code section 52-6-201(1) (2010) (the “Reim-
bursement Statute”); (2) Utah Code section 52-6-202(1) (2010)
(“Section 202”); and (3) Utah Code section 63G-7-902 (2008) (“Sec-
tion 902”). The Reimbursement Statute provides for reimburse-
ment of fees and costs as follows:
If a state grand jury indicts, or if an information is
filed against, an officer or employee, in connection
with or arising out of any act or omission of that of-
ficer or employee during the performance of the of-
ficer or employee’s duties, within the scope of the of-
ficer or employee’s employment, or under color of
the officer or employee’s authority, and that indict-

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Opinion of the Court
3 	No. 20090831
ment or information is quashed or dismissed or re-
sults in a judgment of acquittal . . . that officer or
employee shall be entitled to recover reasonable at-
torney fees and court costs necessarily incurred in
the defense of that indictment or information from
the public entity . . . .
U TAH C ODE A NN. § 52-6-201(1). Section 202, in turn, links the
Reimbursement Statute with Section 902, providing that “[a] re-
quest for reimbursement of attorney fees and court costs shall be
filed in the manner provided in Sections 63G-7-902 and 63G-7-
903.” 1 Id. § 52-6-202(1) (emphasis added).
¶7 	Finally, Section 902 sets forth standards and procedures for
a governmental entity’s defense of an action against its employee:
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a
governmental entity shall defend any action brought
against its employee arising from an act or omission
occurring:
1 Utah Code section 63G-7-903 provides:
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays a
judgment entered against him, or any portion of it,
that the governmental entity is required to pay un-
der Section 63G-7-902, the employee may recover
from the governmental entity the amount of the
payment and the reasonable costs incurred in the
employee’s defense.
(2)
(a) If a governmental entity does not conduct the
defense of an employee against a claim, or conducts
the defense under a reservation of rights as pro-
vided in Subsection 63G-7-902(6), the employee may
recover from the governmental entity under Subsec-
tion (1) if the employee can prove that none of the
conditions set forth in Subsection 63G-7-202(3)(c)
applied.
(b) The employee has the burden of proof that
none of the conditions set forth in Subsection 63G-7-
202(3)(c) applied.

OLSEN v. EAGLE MOUNTAIN C ITY
Opinion of the Court
No. 20090831 	4
(a) during the performance of the employee’s du-
ties;
(b) within the scope of the employee’s employ-
ment; or
(c) under color of authority.
(2)
(a) Before a governmental entity may defend its
employee against a claim, the employee shall make a
written request to the governmental entity to defend
the employee:
(i) within ten days after service of process upon
the employee; or
(ii) within a longer period that would not pre-
judice the governmental entity in maintaining a
defense on the employee’s behalf; or
(iii) within a period that would not conflict
with notice requirements imposed on the entity
in connection with insurance carried by the enti-
ty relating to the risk involved.
(b) If the employee fails to make a request, or fails
to reasonably cooperate in the defense, including the
making of an offer of judgment under Rule 68, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Offers of Judgment, the
governmental entity need not defend or continue to
defend the employee, nor pay any judgment, com-
promise, or settlement against the employee in re-
spect to the claim.
Id. § 63G-7-902.
¶8 	The question in this case concerns the “manner” prescribed
in Section 202 for reimbursement of attorney fees and costs under
the Reimbursement Statute. Eagle Mountain insists that Olsen was
ineligible for reimbursement because he failed to submit a timely
request that the City defend him under the terms of Section 902.
We disagree. The City’s construction is incompatible with the lan-
guage and structure of the statutory reimbursement scheme. De-
spite Eagle Mountain’s argument to the contrary, we also find no
basis in the statute for ascribing to the legislature an intent to in-
volve governmental entities in the selection of criminal defense

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Opinion of the Court
5 	No. 20090831
counsel by their employees or in controlling defense costs during
the course of the underlying criminal proceeding.
A
¶9 	We have repeatedly affirmed our commitment to interpret-
ing statutes according to the “plain” meaning of their text. See,
e.g., Blackner v. State Dep’t of Transp., 2002 UT 44, ¶ 12, 48 P.3d 949.
This principle is simple to articulate in the abstract, but often diffi-
cult to apply in contested cases where both sides offer conceivable
constructions of the language in question.2 In such cases, the sta-
tutory text may not be “plain” when read in isolation, but may be-
come so in light of its linguistic, structural, and statutory context.
See Kimball Condos. Owners Ass’n v. Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 943
P.2d 642, 648 (Utah 1997). Thus, when the words of a statute con-
sist of “common, daily, nontechnical speech,” they are construed
in accordance with the ordinary meaning such words would have
to a reasonable person familiar with the usage and context of the
language in question. O’Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ¶ 32, 217 P.3d 704
(internal quotation marks omitted). 3
2 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
C OLUM. L. R EV. 527, 527–28 (1947) (“When we talk of statutory
construction we have in mind cases in which there is a fair contest
between two readings, neither of which comes without respecta-
ble title deeds. A problem in statutory construction can seriously
bother courts only when there is a contest between probabilities of
meaning.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original In-
tent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & P UB . P OL ’ Y 59, 60
(1988) (“People spend the money to come to court only when it is
possible to draw conflicting inferences from the words alone.”).
3 See also id. (in the absence of contrary intent, nontechnical
words are “given the meaning which they have for laymen in . . .
daily usage” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Diversified Hold-
ings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, ¶ 42, 63 P.3d 686 (statutes are
construed in accordance with the “ordinary meaning of the words
used” (internal quotation marks omitted)); NLRB v. Federbush Co.,
121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (L. Hand, J.) (“Words are not peb-
bles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence;
and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other,
but all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in

OLSEN v. EAGLE MOUNTAIN C ITY
Opinion of the Court
No. 20090831 	6
¶10 Eagle Mountain and Olsen both defend their positions as
compelled by the plain meaning of the text of the statutory
scheme. For its part, Eagle Mountain contends that a request for
reimbursement “in the manner provided” in Section 902 must
conform to the timing requirements of Section 902. Since Section
902 requires a “written request . . . within ten days after service of
process upon the employee,” and because Olsen failed to submit
his request within that time frame, Eagle Mountain insists that Ol-
sen forfeited his right to reimbursement by failing to assert a time-
ly claim.
¶11 Olsen interprets the “manner” incorporated into the Reim-
bursement Statute through Section 202 more narrowly. The man-
ner required for reimbursement requests, in Olsen’s view, is li-
mited to the form (but not the timing) set forth in Section 902.
Since the form prescribed by Section 902 is simply a “written re-
quest to the governmental entity,” and because there is no dispute
that Olsen submitted a written request to Eagle Mountain, Olsen
argues that his request was proper and that the district court was
right to deny the City’s motion to dismiss.
¶12 If we read the term “manner” in isolation, both parties’
constructions might be defensible. Common dictionary definitions
of the term “manner” 4 arguably could encompass just the form of
an employee’s written request, as suggested by Olsen, in that the
which they are used, of which the relation between the speaker
and the hearer is perhaps the most important part.” (quoted in
part in King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991))); Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L.
R EV. 417, 417–18 (1899) (“[W]e ask, not what this man meant, but
what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker
of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were
used . . . .”).
4 See Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1980) (interpret-
ing a predecessor to Section 202 and defining “manner” as “‘the
mode or method in which something is done or happens: a mode
of procedure or way of acting.’” (quoting W EBSTER ’ S T HIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL D ICTIONARY 1376 (1961))); T HE A MERICAN HERIT-
AGE D ICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 795 (2d ed. 1981) (de-
fining “manner” as a “way of doing something or the way in
which a thing is done or happens”).

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Opinion of the Court
7 	No. 20090831
mode or method of requesting reimbursement is by submission of
a written request. On the other hand, the mode or method of
submitting such a request could be construed, in accordance with
the City’s position, to encompass the timing requirements set
forth in the statute. But we do not interpret the “plain meaning”
of a statutory term in isolation. Our task, instead, is to determine
the meaning of the text given the relevant context of the statute
(including, particularly, the structure and language of the statuto-
ry scheme).5
¶13 The fact that the statutory language may be susceptible of
multiple meanings does not render it ambiguous; “all but one of
the meanings is ordinarily eliminated by context.” Deal v. United
States, 508 U.S. 129, 131–32 (1993). In this case, we conclude that
Eagle Mountain’s construction is eliminated by the context of the
Reimbursement Statute. We instead adopt Olsen’s interpretation
as the way that the language in question would be understood by
a reasonable person familiar with the usage and context of the sta-
tute.
¶14 First, the timing provision of Section 902 expressly contem-
plates an underlying civil action and thus suggests its inapplicabil-
ity to a criminal reimbursement proceeding. The requirement to
submit a request “within ten days” is triggered by “service of
5 See King, 502 U.S. at 221 (“[T]he meaning of statutory language,
plain or not, depends on context.”); Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 47, ¶
22, 234 P.3d 1147 (noting that a party’s proposed interpretation of
a statutory provision, although “plausible” when read in isolation,
“loses its persuasive effect when we harmonize this subsection
with the rest of” the statutory scheme at issue); Day v. Meek, 1999
UT 28, ¶ 16 n.6, 976 P.2d 1202 (“[W]e cannot interpret the statute
we are charged with construing without looking to the overall
context of the statutory structure at issue.”); Kimball Condos. Own-
ers Ass’n, 943 P.2d at 648 (“When construing a statute, we look
first to the plain meaning of the words used and their statutory
context.”); Bus. Aviation of S.D., Inc. v. Medivest, Inc., 882 P.2d 662,
665 (Utah 1994) (“[T]erms of a statute are to be interpreted as a
comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal fashion.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); CP Nat’l Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
638 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1981) (words are to be determined in light
of their association with surrounding words and phrases).

OLSEN v. EAGLE MOUNTAIN C ITY
Opinion of the Court
No. 20090831 	8
process upon the employee,” a procedural mechanism that is re-
quired in civil proceedings, see U TAH R. C IV. P. 4, but is unknown
to the criminal law. Olsen never received “service of process” in
connection with the criminal action against him, and thus by its
literal terms Section 902’s timing requirement arguably was never
implicated as to Olsen. It is true, as the City notes, that Olsen did
receive notice of the criminal information. The statute does not
speak of “notice,” however, but of “service of process,” and that
language uniquely applies in civil proceedings and thus supports
Olsen’s view that the timing provision does not extend to reim-
bursement requests for fees incurred in criminal actions.
¶15 Section 902’s timing requirement is also set forth in the spe-
cific context of a “governmental entity . . . defend[ing] its em-
ployee against a claim,” U TAH C ODE A NN. § 63G-7-902(2)(a) (em-
phasis added), which is defined by statute as an “asserted de-
mand for or cause of action for money or damages,” id. § 63G-7-
102(1) (2008). The criminal information filed against Olsen did not
assert a “claim” in this sense, so again there is contextual reason to
conclude that the timing provision of Section 902 does not apply
to Olsen’s request for reimbursement. This conclusion is streng-
thened by the fact that Section 902’s timing provision is expressly
connected to a request that a governmental entity “defend” an
employee, a right that is provided in civil cases under Section
902(1), but not in criminal actions. Where the government em-
ployee is subjected to criminal charges, his right is merely to
reimbursement of fees and costs, not to a defense provided by the
government employer. See id. § 52-6-201(1). This further indicates
that Section 902’s timing provision—which is associated with a
request made “[b]efore a governmental entity may defend its em-
ployee against a claim,” id. § 63G-7-902(2)(a)—applies to civil cas-
es (where a request to defend is viable) and not to criminal cases
(where a request to defend would be legally baseless and where
reimbursement is the only remedy).
¶16 Put differently, the City’s position that the “manner” re-
quired for reimbursement requests under Section 202 encom-
passes the entirety of Section 902 is untenable. At least part of Sec-
tion 902 is plainly incompatible with the Reimbursement Statute’s
reimbursement scheme, which clearly does not encompass a duty
that 	a 	“governmental 	entity 	shall 	defend” 	a 	criminal 	action
against its employee. Id. § 63G-7-902(1). Since that provision is not

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Opinion of the Court
9 	No. 20090831
part of the “manner” incorporated into the Reimbursement Sta-
tute, we likewise conclude that the timing provision—which is
expressly connected to an employee’s request that the employer
comply with its statutory duty to defend—is inapplicable.
¶17 The City’s argument is also undermined by the express
terms of Utah Code section 63G-7-903 (2008) (“Section 903”). Like
Section 902, Section 903 is incorporated by the express terms of
Section 202. Section 903, however, is also incompatible with the
standards for reimbursement set forth in the Reimbursement Sta-
tute, and thus we cannot read Section 202’s incorporation of Sec-
tion 903 literally without defeating the plain language of the
Reimbursement Statute.
¶18 By its terms, Section 903(1) has no application to requests
for reimbursement of fees in criminal proceedings, since that pro-
vision applies only if an employee “pays a judgment” the gov-
ernment was required to pay under Utah Code section 63G-7-902.
As for Section 903(2), Olsen was neither entitled nor required to
request a defense in order to qualify for reimbursement under the
Reimbursement Statute, so that provision similarly does not ap-
ply. In fact, Section 903(2) confirms that it cannot extend to re-
quests for reimbursement of fees in criminal proceedings, in that it
provides conditions for reimbursement of fees—that “none of the
conditions set forth in Subsection 63G-7-202(3)(c) appl[y],” id. §
63G-7-903(2)(b)—that 	are 	inconsistent 	with 	the 	standards 	for
reimbursement in the Reimbursement Statute. Compare id. § 52-6-
201(1) (providing for reimbursement upon dismissal of informa-
tion or “judgment of acquittal”), with id. § 63G-7-202(3)(c) (exclud-
ing claims arising out of employee’s acts involving “willful mis-
conduct,” driving under the influence of alcohol, false testimony,
fabricated evidence, or failure to disclose testimony). The Reim-
bursement Statute leaves no room for this court to add conditions
to the right of reimbursement that are not set forth expressly by
legislation. See Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah
1994) (“[C]ourts are not to infer substantive terms into the text
that are not already there.”). The City’s construction of Section
202—which would hold that everything in Sections 902 and 903 is
incorporated by reference as part of the “manner” required for
requests for reimbursement of fees and costs in defense of crimi-
nal actions—cannot be accepted without running afoul of this
principle and without undercutting the express language of the

OLSEN v. EAGLE MOUNTAIN C ITY
Opinion of the Court
No. 20090831 	10
Reimbursement Statute. We accordingly reject that approach and
find that Olsen’s construction is more consistent with the lan-
guage and structure of the statutory scheme.
¶19 The City insists that a refusal to incorporate the entirety of
Sections 902 and 903 fails “to render all parts [of the statutory
scheme] relevant and meaningful” and “render[s] portions” of it
“superfluous or inoperative.” Hall v. Utah State Dep’t of Corr., 2001
UT 34, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 958 (internal quotation marks omitted). We
acknowledge the canon of construction cited by Eagle Mountain,
which dictates that “‘effect must be given, if possible,’” to the en-
tire text of a statute and thus prefers a construction that “‘will give
force to and preserve all the words of the statute.’” State v. Maes-
tas, 2002 UT 123, ¶ 53, 63 P.3d 621 (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER ,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY C ONSTRUCTION § 46:06 (4th ed. 1984)).
Canons of construction, however, are not formulaic, dispositive
indicators of statutory meaning. They are merely tools that guide
our construction of statutes in accordance with common, ordinary
usage and understanding of language—in this instance, the expec-
tation that legislators typically use language advisedly and tend
not to speak in superfluous terms. Such tools must be understood
as one of several contextual indicators of statutory meaning,
which in this case encompass not just the aforementioned canon
but also the notion of interpreting statutory text in light of sur-
rounding language and the structure of the statutory scheme.
¶20 For the reasons noted above, we find that “the manner” re-
quired for requests under the Reimbursement Statute encom-
passes only the requirement of a written request. To interpret the
statute more broadly to encompass the timing provision of Section
902 (and the procedures in Section 903) would preserve indepen-
dent meaning for the legislature’s reference to these statutory
provisions, but it would also do substantial violence to the text
and structure of the overall reimbursement scheme (and of the
Reimbursement Statute in particular). Ultimately, then, this is a
case where no interpretation preserves reasonable meaning for all
provisions of the statutory scheme, as the City’s approach would
require us to find a request and a duty to defend in circumstances
that are plainly incompatible with the Reimbursement Statute. We
accordingly adopt Olsen’s construction of the statute as more con-
sistent with the statutory language as it would be understood in
its relevant context.

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Opinion of the Court
11 	No. 20090831
B
¶21 Eagle Mountain challenges this construction of the Reim-
bursement Statute as inconsistent with our decision in State v.
Hulbert, 607 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1980). In that case, we interpreted a
predecessor to the current Section 202, which prescribed filing a
reimbursement request “‘in the manner provided in the Utah Go-
vernmental Immunity Act.’” Id. at 1219 (quoting U TAH C ODE A NN .
§ 63-30a-3 (1977)). In the course of rejecting the State’s argument
that only one provision of the entire Governmental Immunity Act
applied to Hulbert’s claim, we noted that “it would have been a
simple matter to designate the section number of the Governmen-
tal Immunity Act and stipulate [that] those provisions solely were
to” provide the “manner” for requesting reimbursement of attor-
ney fees and costs. Id. Since the current Section 202 does designate
specific statutory “section number[s]” that apply to requests for
reimbursement, Eagle Mountain insists that we are bound to con-
clude that the legislature intended to incorporate the designated
sections (902 and 903) in their entirety. Moreover, Eagle Mountain
attributes to the legislature a specific intent to provide the go-
vernmental entity with the opportunity to have a role at the incep-
tion of the criminal process—a role that could allow the govern-
ment employer to arrange for defense counsel if it so chose
and/or to help control the costs of litigation.
¶22 Our textual analysis of the Reimbursement Statute forec-
loses the need for a parsing of the legislative history in search of
legislative intent. Nelson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah
1995) (“Only when we find ambiguity in the statute’s plain lan-
guage need we seek guidance from the legislative history and re-
levant policy considerations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In any event, the intent that Eagle Mountain would ascribe to the
legislature is nowhere expressed in the language or history of the
Utah reimbursement scheme. The statute itself certainly does not
provide for involvement of the governmental entity at the incep-
tion of the criminal proceedings. To the contrary, the Reimburse-
ment Statute contemplates only a right “to recover reasonable at-
torney fees and court costs”—a right that vests only after the “in-
dictment or information is quashed or dismissed or results in a
judgment of acquittal.” U TAH C ODE A NN. § 52-6-201(1). If the leg-
islature had intended to give the government the right to partici-
pate in the defense or to have a role that would allow it to control

OLSEN v. EAGLE MOUNTAIN C ITY
Opinion of the Court
No. 20090831 	12
litigation costs, surely the legislature would have said so in the
text of the Reimbursement Statute. The fact that instead the rele-
vant statute provides for reimbursement of “reasonable attorney
fees” suggests that the government’s involvement in the process is
not at the inception of the criminal proceedings, as the City sug-
gests, but after dismissal or acquittal, at which point the govern-
ment can control its litigation costs by insisting that the court limit
the employee’s fees to what is “reasonable.”
¶23 Eagle Mountain fails to identify any committee report or
floor debate that would provide any insight into the meaning of
the term “manner” in its statutory context. Instead, the City spe-
culates as to the legislature’s possible intent in requiring a request
for reimbursement to be made in accordance with the timing re-
quirements of Sections 902 and 903. Yet Olsen identifies an alter-
native (and entirely plausible) explanation of the legislature’s in-
tent in incorporating the “manner” set forth in Sections 902 and
903 into the Reimbursement Statute: to give the governmental ent-
ity notice of an acquitted defendant’s reimbursement claim to al-
low for investigation and possible resolution of the claim without
the need for litigation. Because Olsen’s position is more consistent
with the statutory language and structure, we decline the City’s
request that we attribute a contrary intent to the legislature. 6 It is
true, as the City indicates, that the statute in question (unlike the
one in Hulbert) designates specific statutory section numbers as
setting forth “the manner” in which reimbursement requests are
to be submitted, but we are still left with the question of which
provisions of those sections dictate the manner of submitting a
reimbursement request and which provisions apply only to a re-
quest for defense in a civil proceeding. Under the circumstances,
the timing requirements of Section 902 cannot extend naturally or
reasonably to a request for reimbursement in light of the text and
6 The conflict in the intent attributed by the parties to the legisla-
ture illustrates the peril of interpreting statutes in accordance with
presumed legislative purpose, particularly given that most sta-
tutes represent a compromise of purposes advanced by competing
interest groups, not an unmitigated attempt to stamp out a partic-
ular evil. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 93–
94 (2002) (noting this fact and explaining that the judiciary “must
respect and give effect to these sorts of compromises”).

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Opinion of the Court
13 	No. 20090831
structure of the statute, and the City’s speculation as to a contrary
legislative purpose cannot quash our construction of the plain
language.
III
¶24 We hold that the “manner” required for a request for reim-
bursement of fees and costs under the Reimbursement Statute is
simply a “written request to the governmental entity” as set forth
in Section 902. The timing provision of Section 902 applies only to
requests to defend against a civil claim and does not extend to re-
quests for reimbursement of fees and costs incurred in a criminal
action. For such requests (like Olsen’s), the time limit for filing is
provided elsewhere, in the three-year statute of limitations in
Utah Code section 78B-2-305(4) (Supp. 2010). Olsen filed his re-
quest for reimbursement after his acquittal in the manner required
by Section 202. We thus affirm the district court’s denial of the
City’s motion to dismiss.
___________
¶25 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Jus-
tice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Lee’s opinion.