Angilau v. Winder

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2011 UT 13
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF U TAH
____________
R ICKY ANGILAU ,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
SHERIFF J AMES M. WINDER,
Respondent and Appellee.
No. 20090677
Filed March 1, 2011
Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Vernice Trease
No. 090903982
Attorneys:
Ronald J. Yengich, Earl G. Xaiz, Elizabeth Hunt, Salt Lake City, for
petitioner
Lohra L. Miller, David A. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for respondent
Susan Eisenman, Salt Lake City, for amicus curiae The Division of
Juvenile Justice Services
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 	At the age of sixteen, Appellant, Ricky Angilau, was charged
as an adult in the district court with several crimes, including

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Opinion of the Court
murder. Immediately following his arrest, Mr. Angilau was detained
in a juvenile detention facility. After three months in the juvenile
facility, he was transferred to an adult detention center where he has
remained awaiting trial. In this appeal, Mr. Angilau argues that
incarcerating him as a child in the adult detention center violated
both the Utah Code and the state and federal constitutions.
¶2 	Following oral argument in this case, but before this opinion
was 	issued, 	the 	Utah 	Legislature 	amended 	relevant 	statutes
regarding the pretrial incarceration of children in adult facilities. 1
Additionally, since oral argument Mr. Angilau has turned eighteen
years of age and has become an adult under Utah law.
¶3 	As a result of these changes, Mr. Winder contends that all of
the issues raised by Mr. Angilau in this appeal are moot. In contrast,
Mr. Angilau argues that his claims are not moot and that resolution
of the issues he has raised may still affect his rights. He also argues,
in the alternative, that even if some of his claims are moot, we
should determine whether his incarceration violated the Utah Code
or the unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution under the
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
¶4 	First, we hold that all of the issues presented by Mr. Angilau
are moot because even if we were to resolve the issues he has raised
in his favor, we could not grant the relief he has requested. Second,
we decline to address his statutory and unnecessary rigor claims
under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, because
we hold that the statutory claims are unlikely to recur and that the
unnecessary rigor claim is inadequately briefed.
BACKGROUND
¶5 At the age of sixteen, Mr. Angilau was charged as an adult with
murder, obstruction of justice, carrying a concealed weapon, and
possessing a firearm on school premises. Because section 78A-6-701
of the Utah Code (the “Automatic Waiver” statute) provides that
“[t]he district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all
persons 16 years of age or older charged with . . . an offense which
1 See 2010 Utah Laws 38.
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Opinion of the Court
would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an adult,”2
the charges against Mr. Angilau were filed in the district court.
¶6 	Immediately after his arrest, Mr. Angilau was briefly held in a
juvenile detention center. From there he was transferred to the Adult
Detention Center (the “ADC”), a jail for adults operated by the Salt
Lake County Sheriff.
¶7 	Upon arriving at the ADC, Mr. Angilau was housed with the
general population. During his time in the general population, he
had several adult cellmates and spent eight hours per day with
approximately sixty other adult inmates, some of whom were in jail
on aggravated felony charges. While Mr. Angilau was in the general
population, there was not constant visual monitoring in the cells or
common areas of the ADC. Additionally, although the cells did have
intercoms, there was only periodic guard supervision.
¶8 	After approximately three months in the ADC’s general
population, Mr. Angilau was transferred to the maximum security
unit where he spent, on average, twenty-three hours per day in a cell
with his cellmate. Like in the general population, inmates detained
in the maximum security unit of the ADC are not under constant
video surveillance.
¶9 	In March 2009, Mr. Angilau filed a Petition for Extraordinary
Relief and Request for Immediate Temporary Relief in which he
claimed that his incarceration in an adult jail was illegal and
demanded his immediate release. The Third District Court denied
Mr. Angilau’s petition based on its interpretation of relevant laws in
the juvenile justice statutory scheme.
¶10 	Mr. Angilau appealed the denial on statutory and constitu-
tional grounds, and we accepted the appeal. On appeal, he contends
that his incarceration in an adult facility violated the Utah Code and
the state and federal constitutions. Specifically, in his initial briefing,
2 Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(1) (a) (Supp. 2010). Because changes
to this statute since the time of Mr. Angilau’s arrest have merely
been clarifying, we refer to the present version throughout this
opinion.
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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Angilau first argued that his incarceration violated the Utah
Code because the code did not expressly authorize the detention of
children charged under the Automatic Waiver statute in adult
facilities. He also argued that his incarceration violated the code
because the ADC did not comply with the safety standards adopted
by the Board of Juvenile Justice Services (the “Board”), as was
required by statute. Additionally, Mr. Angilau argued that the
Automatic Waiver statute violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, and the
uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah Constitution. These
issues are addressed in our opinion in a companion case issued prior
to this opinion. 3 Finally, Mr. Angilau contended that the incarcera-
tion of juveniles in adult facilities without the safety standards
adopted by the Board violated the unnecessary rigor clause of the
Utah Constitution.
¶11 	After oral argument, but before this opinion was issued, the
Utah Legislature significantly revised the statutory scheme govern-
ing the incarceration of children in adult facilities. 4 Prior to the
amendment, section 62A-7-201 of the Utah Code provided that
“[c]hildren under 18 years of age . . . [could] not be confined in jails,
lockups, or cells used for persons 18 years of age or older who are
charged with crime . . . except as provided by specific statute and in
conformance with standards approved by the [B]oard.”5 Addition-
ally, although section 201 did not provide authorization to detain
children charged under the Automatic Waiver statute in adult jails,
it did provide that “[c]hildren charged by information or indictment
with crimes as a serious youth offender . . . or certified to stand trial
as an adult . . . [could] be detained in a jail or other place of detention
used for adults.”6
3 See State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, 245 P.3d 745.
4 See 2010 Utah Laws 38.
5 Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(1) (Supp. 2008) (emphases added).
6 Id. § 201(2)(a).
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Opinion of the Court
¶12 	Following the 2010 amendment, section 62A-7-201 now
provides that “[c]hildren under 18 years of age . . . may not be
confined in jails, lockups, or cells used for persons 18 years of age or
older who are charged with crime . . . except as provided in . . .
specific statute or, in conformance with standards approved by the
[B]oard.” 7 Additionally, the amended section now specifies that
“[c]hildren charged with crimes under [the Automatic Waiver
statute] . . . shall be detained in a jail or other place of detention used
for adults.”8
¶13 	On November 27, 2010, Mr. Angilau turned eighteen years of
age. Mr. Winder contends that the statutory amendments and Mr.
Angilau’s new status as an adult have mooted all of the issues raised
in this appeal. In contrast, Mr. Angilau contends that his claims are
not moot. Additionally, he argues that even if the issues he has
raised are moot, we should still address them under the public
interest exception to the mootness doctrine. We have jurisdiction to
hear this appeal under section 78A-3-102(3)(i) of the Utah Code.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14 	The determination of whether we will reach the merits of a
mooted issue in any particular case rests within the discretion of this
court. 9
ANALYSIS
I. THE ISSUES RAISED BY MR. ANGILAU ARE MOOT
¶15 	The issues presented by Mr. Angilau in this appeal are moot.
“‘An appeal is moot if during the pendency of the appeal circum-
stances change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby
7 Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(1) (Supp. 2010) (emphases added).
8 Id. § 201(2)(a).
9 See Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ¶ 26, 16 P.3d 1233 (“Because
mootness is a matter of judicial policy, the ultimate determination of
whether to address an issue that is technically moot rests in the
discretion of this court.”).
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Opinion of the Court
rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect.’”10
¶16 In the instant case, Mr. Angilau contends that his incarceration
as a child in the ADC violated the Utah Code and the state and
federal constitutions. All of the arguments advanced by Mr. Angilau
in support of these claims rest entirely on his former status as a
child. And significantly, the only relief Mr. Angilau has sought in
this case is that we order his immediate release from the ADC.
¶17 	Because Mr. Angilau is now eighteen years of age, even if we
were to resolve the issues he has raised in his favor, we could not
grant the relief he has requested. This is so because, as even Mr.
Angilau concedes, the fact that he is “now eighteen years of age,
[means that] he is eligible to be housed in the [ADC].”11 Thus, even
if we were to find that his incarceration in the ADC as a child
violated the Utah Code or the state or federal constitutions, we could
not grant the relief he has requested by ordering his immediate
release because he is now an adult and is appropriately detained in
the ADC. We are therefore convinced that Mr. Angilau’s claims are
moot.
¶18 	Mr. Angilau’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.
Specifically, Mr. Angilau contends that his claims are not moot
because, in his view, “a decision . . . recognizing the unlawfulness of
his incarceration might still affect his rights, as he may be entitled to
restitution as a victim of the Sheriff’s and District Attorney’s crimes
against him.” 12 In support of this argument, Mr. Angilau notes that
the preamendment version of section 62A-7-201—the section of the
code 	regulating 	the 	incarceration 	of 	children 	in 	adult 	facili-
ties—provided that “[w]illful failure to comply with any of the
10 Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 2009 UT 71, ¶ 33, 222 P.3d 55
(quoting Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 720 (Utah 1996)).
11 See Mem. Supp. Suggestion of Mootness 2, April 5, 2010.
12 Id.
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provisions of this section is a class B misdemeanor.”13 Thus, it
appears that Mr. Angilau believes that a finding by this court that his
incarceration violated the provisions of this statute would equate to
a finding of criminal culpability for willfully violating the statute. But
this is incorrect. Contrary to Mr. Angilau’s assertions, any decision
by this court that his detention was statutorily unauthorized would
not equate to a finding of criminal wrongdoing or guilt by the Sheriff
or Attorney General. Indeed, Mr. Angilau has not even raised the
issue of whether any alleged violation of the preamendment statute
by any state actors was willful. Moreover, even if he had made such
claims, any finding by this court governing the willfulness of the
parties involved in Mr. Angilau’s incarceration would still not
equate to a finding of criminal culpability. Thus, if Mr. Angilau seeks
to pursue criminal charges against the Sheriff and District Attorney,
he has chosen the wrong forum and wrong procedure to do so.
¶19 	In sum, because a finding by this court that the incarceration
of children charged under the Automatic Waiver statute in an adult
facility violated either the preamendment version of the code or the
state or federal constitutions would have no effect on Mr. Angilau’s
rights, as he is now an adult, we hold that the issues presented by
Mr. Angilau are moot.
II. WE DECLINE TO ADDRESS MR. ANGILAU’S CLAIMS
UNDER THE PUBLIC INTEREST EXCEPTION TO THE
MOOTNESS DOCTRINE
¶20 	In some circumstances, we will “exercise our discretion and
address a moot issue if we find that it ‘falls within the public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine.’”14 We have explained that “[a]
matter falls within the public interest exception ‘when the case
presents an issue that affects the public interest, is likely to recur,
and because of the brief time that any one litigant is affected, is
13 Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(5) (Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).
14 McBride v. Utah State Bar, 2010 UT 60, ¶ 13, 242 P.3d 769 (quoting
Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ¶ 25, 16 P.3d 1233).
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capable of evading review.’”15 Although Mr. Angilau concedes that
“his birthday might be viewed as mooting his appeal,” he argues
that we should still address the statutory and constitutional claims
he has raised under the public interest exception. We disagree. First,
we hold that the statutory claims raised by Mr. Angilau are not
likely to recur and therefore do not fall within the public interest
exception. Second, although we recognize that the unnecessary rigor
claim advanced by Mr. Angilau may be likely to recur, we decline to
address it under the public interest exception because we find Mr.
Angilau’s briefing on this issue to be inadequate.
A. The Statutory Violations Alleged by Mr. Angilau Are Unlikely to
Recur
¶21 	To address an issue under the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine, we must find that the issue is likely to recur.16
Because we conclude that the statutory issues raised by Mr. Angilau
are not likely to recur, we decline to address them under the public
interest exception.
¶22 	Mr. Angilau argues that his incarceration in an adult jail
violated the Utah Code in two principal ways. First, he contends that
his transfer to and incarceration in the adult jail violated the code
because the code did not expressly authorize children charged under
the Automatic Waiver statute to be incarcerated in adult facilities.
Second, he contends that his incarceration violated the code because
the ADC did not comply with the safety standards adopted by the
Board, including a requirement that juveniles be under constant
video surveillance.
¶23 	Following oral argument in this case, but before the issuance
of this opinion, the Utah Legislature amended the sections of the
Utah Code regulating the pretrial incarceration of juvenile offenders
15 Id. (quoting Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989)).
16 See id.
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Opinion of the Court
in adult facilities.17 The amended statute now expressly provides that
“[c]hildren charged with crimes under [the Automatic Waiver
statute] . . . shall be detained in a jail or other place of detention used
for adults.”18 Thus, even if the preamendment version of the code
did not authorize the detention in adult jails of children charged
under the Automatic Waiver statute at the time of Mr. Angilau’s
incarceration as a child, it now does. The amended statute now also
provides that a child may be confined in an adult facility that does
not conform with the safety standards approved by the Board if the
child’s detention is authorized by statute. 19 Thus, even though adult
facilities may have been required to conform with the Board’s
standards at the time of Mr. Angilau’s incarceration as a child, they
are now exempted from these requirements by statute.
¶24 	Because these statutory amendments expressly authorize the
conditions that Mr. Angilau contends violated the preamendment
version of the code, and thereby render these conditions nonviolatio-
ns under the amended statute, the violations alleged by Mr. Angilau
are not likely to recur. 20 We therefore decline to address the statutory
issues raised by Mr. Angilau under the public interest exception.
B. Mr. Angilau’s Unnecessary Rigor Claim Is Inadequately Briefed
¶25 	The final issue we must resolve is whether to address Mr.
Angilau’s claim that his incarceration as a child in the ADC violated
the unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution under the
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Application of the
public interest exception is an issue within the sound discretion of
17 2010 Utah Laws 38.
18 Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(2)(a) (Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
19 Id. § 201(1) (emphasis added).
20 This is particularly true given the small number of children who
may have been incarcerated under the preamendment version of the
statute.
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Opinion of the Court
this court. 21 Thus, even if we find an issue to be of public importance,
likely to recur, and capable of evading review, we will address the
issue only if we feel it is appropriate to do so in a particular case.22
¶26 	We readily acknowledge that the incarceration of children in
adult facilities without the safety measures mandated by the Board
may be an issue of public concern. We also recognize that because
the amended version of the code authorizes such conditions, the
incarceration of children in adult facilities failing to implement these
measures is likely to recur. And because of the short time that
juveniles may have to challenge their incarceration in adult facilities
before becoming adults, we also acknowledge that this issue may be
capable of evading review. But even though the question of whether
Mr. Angilau’s confinement—or the general confinement of any child
in an adult facility without the safety measures mandated by the
Board—might otherwise qualify for application of the public interest
exception, we decline to address Mr. Angilau’s unnecessary rigor
claim because we feel it has been inadequately briefed.
¶27 	We have previously explained that our adequate briefing
standard “require[s] ‘not just bald citation to authority but develop-
ment of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that author-
ity.’”23 We may therefore disregard a party’s argument if it fails to
meet this standard.24
¶28 	Mr. Angilau’s briefing of the unnecessary rigor issue has
failed to satisfy our adequate briefing requirements. Indeed, instead
of presenting and developing our existing unnecessary rigor case
21 See McBride, 2010 UT 60, ¶ 13; see also Ellis, 2000 UT 101, ¶ 26
(“Because mootness is a matter of judicial policy, the ultimate
determination of whether to address an issue that is technically moot
rests in the discretion of this court.”).
22 See McBride, 2010 UT 60, ¶ 13.
23 Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79, ¶ 25, 149 P.3d 352 (emphasis
added) (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)).
24 Id.
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law, Mr. Angilau has spent most of the two pages of his unnecessary
rigor claim simply setting forth selected facts from his case. More-
over, rather than applying our unnecessary rigor case law to these
facts and offering reasoned analysis as to why these conditions
might 	be 	unnecessarily 	rigorous, 	Mr. 	Angilau’s 	brief 	simply
proceeds by making conclusory statements and demanding that we
find that the conditions of his incarceration were unnecessarily
rigorous.
¶29 	Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that Mr. Angilau
had adequately briefed his unnecessary rigor claim based on the
specific conditions of his incarceration, we would still decline to
apply the public interest exception and address the broader question
raised by Mr. Angilau as to whether the pretrial confinement of all
juveniles in all adult facilities in the state of Utah that do not comply
with the standards adopted by the Board always violates the
unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution. This is because
we feel that the briefing and record before us are simply inadequate
to make such a categorical determination, particularly because our
unnecessary rigor analysis requires a fact-intensive inquiry. 25
¶30 	For these reasons, we decline to address Mr. Angilau’s
unnecessary rigor claim under the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine. We therefore leave the issue to be addressed and
resolved in a more appropriate case.
CONCLUSION
¶31 	As a result of Mr. Angilau’s status as an adult, we hold that
the issues he raises on this appeal are moot. We also decline to
address his statutory and unnecessary rigor claims under the public
interest exception to the mootness doctrine, because we hold that the
statutory claims are unlikely to recur and that the unnecessary rigor
claim is inadequately briefed. We therefore deny Mr. Angilau’s
Petition for Extraordinary Relief.
25 See Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶¶ 17–18, 184 P.3d 592.
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¶32 	Chief Justice Durham, Justice Parrish, Justice Nehring, and
Judge Hadley concur in Associate Chief Justice Durrant’s opinion.
¶33 	Due to his retirement, Justice Wilkins does not participate
herein; District Judge Scott M. Hadley sat.
¶34 	Justice Thomas R. Lee became a member of the Court on July
19, 2010, after oral argument in this matter, and accordingly did not
participate.
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