Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove

2007 UT 84
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Daniel Grappendorf and Heidi No. 20060461
Grappendorf, individually and
as parents and heirs of Daniel
Austin Grappendorf, Phil
Thompson, and Jenny Thompson,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Pleasant Grove City and American
Sports International, Ltd., aka F I L E D
American Athletics, Inc., et al.,
Defendants and Appellee. October 26, 2007
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Fourth District, Provo Dep’t
The Honorable George E. Ballif
No. 030404102
Attorneys: Edward P. Moriarity, Shandar S. Badaruddin,
Bradley L. Booke, Robert D. Strieper, Salt Lake City,
for appellants
Peter Stirba, Gary R. Guelker, Meb W. Anderson, Salt
Lake City, for appellee
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PARRISH, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 This case requires us to construe the natural condition
exception to the State of Utah’s waiver of governmental immunity.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(11) (1997). The Grappendorfs brought
this action against Pleasant Grove City after their young son was
killed by a moveable pitching mound that was projected through
the air by a violent gust of wind. The district court granted
summary judgment to Pleasant Grove, holding that the City was
immune from suit because the tragic occurrence was the result of
a natural condition on public land. We reverse the summary
judgment, holding that atmospheric conditions, like gusts of
wind, do not fall under the natural condition exception.

1 The Grappendorfs filed separate claims against various
parties associated with the manufacture of the pitching mound.
2 The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was reenacted as the
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah in Utah Code sections
63-30d-101 to -904 on July 1, 2004. Throughout this opinion, we
refer to the former enactment because it was the statute in
effect at the time of Daniel’s injury. The pertinent language
from the two acts, however, is identical.
No. 20060461 2
BACKGROUND
¶2 On June 21, 2002, the Grappendorf family attended a
softball game at a ballpark owned and operated by Pleasant Grove.
The City had purchased a moveable pitching mound for the ballpark
to provide a suitable field for both softball and baseball games.
(Baseball players pitch from an elevated mound, while softball
players pitch from the ground.) On the day of the Grappendorfs’
visit to the park, the mound, which was approximately twelve feet
by eight feet and weighed several hundred pounds, had been
chained through one of its four nylon handles to a chainlink
fence by a city employee in order to prevent children from using
it as a bike jump. As the family walked together, a “forceful
wind gust” lifted the mound, ripping it away from the chained
nylon strap. It flew through the air and struck thirteen-year-
old Daniel Austin Grappendorf, who died “as the consequence of
massive brain injuries . . . due to blunt trauma to the head.”
¶3 Daniel’s family filed suit against Pleasant Grove,
asserting that the City’s negligence directly and proximately
caused Daniel’s death and plaintiffs’ severe emotional distress.1
Pleasant Grove moved for summary judgment under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act (the “Act”), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1
to -38 (1997) (repealed 2004),2 claiming immunity under the
natural condition exception to the waiver of governmental
immunity for negligence. Id. § 63-30-10(11). The district court
granted Pleasant Grove’s motion and entered summary judgment in
its favor.
¶4 The Grappendorfs filed this appeal. They argue that
the natural condition exception to the Act’s waiver of immunity
does not apply when a negligent governmental action creates a
danger that precedes the existence of the natural condition.
They also argue that the Act violates the open courts clause, the
wrongful death cause of action guarantee, and the petitions
clause of the Utah Constitution. We have jurisdiction to hear
this appeal under Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(j).

3 Because we ultimately find that Pleasant Grove is not
eligible for governmental immunity under the natural condition
exception, we need not address the constitutionality of the Act.
3 No. 20060461
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5 Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Crestwood Cove Apts. Bus. Trust
v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, ¶ 10, 164 P.3d 1247. When reviewing a
summary judgment on appeal, we accord no deference to the trial
court’s legal conclusions and therefore review them for
correctness. Blackner v. State Dep’t of Transp., 2002 UT 44,
¶ 8, 48 P.3d 949. Whether the district court accurately
interpreted the Act is a legal question. Id. We therefore
construe the Act and then apply it to the facts of this case,
viewing the facts and any reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Grappendorfs.
Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., Ltd., 2005 UT 82, ¶ 2, 128 P.3d 1151.
ANALYSIS
¶6 This case turns on Pleasant Grove’s claimed immunity
from liability under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.3 A
government entity is immune from suit under the Act if it can
establish that (1) the activity giving rise to the plaintiff’s
claim served a governmental function; (2) governmental immunity
is not waived for the particular activity; or (3) if immunity is
waived for a particular activity, the activity falls under an
applicable exception to that waiver. Blackner v. State Dep’t of
Transp., 2002 UT 44, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 949.
¶7 We may briefly dispose of the first two prongs of this
analysis, as they are uncontested by the parties. Neither party
disputes that Pleasant Grove is a government entity and that the
maintenance and operation of a baseball park serves a
governmental function. With regard to the second prong, the Act
provides that “[i]mmunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or
omission of an employee committed within the scope of
employment.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1997). Because we draw
all factual inferences in favor of the Grappendorfs, we assume
for purposes of this appeal that Pleasant Grove was negligent.
¶8 Resolution of this case, therefore, turns on the third
prong of the test. The Act provides a number of exceptions to
its waiver of immunity for negligent acts. See id.

No. 20060461 4
§ 63-30-10(1)-(19). The natural condition exception on which
Pleasant Grove relies provides that “if the injury arises out of,
in connection with, or results from . . . any natural condition
on publicly owned or controlled lands,” governmental immunity
remains intact. Id. § 63-30-10(11). The necessity for this
exception arises because “Utah’s vast public lands . . . are open
to the public for recreational uses [and] present all kinds of
hazards arising from their natural conditions. . . . The State
and other governmental entities cannot be expected to [protect
citizens against] every . . . potentially hazardous condition
located on public property.” Stuckman ex rel. Nelson v. Salt
Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996).
¶9 When interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect
to the legislature’s intent and purpose. State v. Ireland, 2006
UT 82, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 532. To that end, we begin with the
statute’s plain language. Blackner, 2002 UT 44, ¶ 12. In
conducting a textual analysis, we consider the literal meaning of
each term and “avoid interpretations that will render portions of
a statute superfluous or inoperative.” Hall v. State Dep’t of
Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 958. The plain language of any
specific provision should be read in harmony with other
provisions in the same statute. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19,
¶ 17, 5 P.3d 616; Roberts v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah
1993) (per curiam).
¶10 Having established this interpretive rubric, we
consider the plain language of the statute, which provides that
government entities are immune from suit for negligent actions
for any injury that arises from or in connection with or results
from “any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled
lands.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(11). A careful analysis of
the wording of this exception elucidates its limits. “Natural”
is defined as “[p]resent in or produced by nature.” Webster’s II
New College Dictionary 729 (1995). The word natural modifies
“condition,” which is generally understood as a “[m]ode or state
of being.” Id. at 234. Natural condition is then limited by the
prepositional phrase “on publicly owned or controlled lands.” In
this context, “on” is “[u]sed to indicate . . . [a] [p]osition
above and in contact with” or “[c]ontact with a surface,
regardless of position.” Id. at 764. From these definitions, it
follows that a natural condition “on” the land must be
topographical in nature, not merely atmospheric. The limiting
prepositional phrase requires that the natural condition be in
physical contact with the land, supported by the surface of the
land, or part of the land. An atmospheric condition, like wind,
heat from the sun, or fog, is transient by nature and therefore
does not exist on the land as required by the plain language of
the statute. Consequently, the gust of wind that arguably began

5 No. 20060461
the chain of events leading to Daniel Grappendorf’s tragic death
does not fall under the natural condition exception.
¶11 Considered broadly, natural conditions include laws of
physics, such as gravity, that necessarily contribute to any
accident or occurrence. Were we to ignore the statute’s
limitation that the natural condition be on the land, the natural
condition exception would necessarily swallow the Act’s waiver of
immunity for negligence. Cf. Johnson v. State Dep’t of Transp.,
2006 UT 15, ¶ 19, 133 P.3d 402. Giving real meaning to the
statutory requirement that the exception cover only those natural
conditions “on publicly owned or controlled lands” allows us to
avoid an interpretation that nullifies the Act’s waiver of
immunity and ensures that other exceptions to the waiver, which
deal more explicitly with natural occurrences, are not rendered
mere surplusage.
¶12 Section 63-30-10(11), which contains the natural
conditions exception, also provides governmental immunity for
conditions “existing in connection with an abandoned mine or
mining operation, or any activity authorized by the School and
Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(11).
Thus, the whole of subsection (11) is concerned with the
conditions and activities that occur on the surface of land, be
they naturally occurring conditions, man-made mines, or
governmental services.
¶13 In contrast, other subsections of the Act provide
immunity for governmental activities relating to atmospheric
conditions. Subsection (12) provides immunity for “research or
implementation of cloud management or seeding for the clearing of
fog”; subsection (13) provides immunity for the “management of
flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters”; and
subsection (14) provides immunity for activities relating to “the
construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems.”
Id. § 63-30-10(12)-(14). The requirement that our construction
of the statute imbue these subsections with independent meaning
requires us to avoid an overly broad interpretation of the
natural condition exception. Ignoring the limiting phrase “on
publicly owned or controlled lands” would require that we include
atmospheric conditions within the natural condition exception,
thereby rendering portions of subsections (12), (13), and (14)
superfluous.
¶14 The textual analysis that we elucidate here is also
consistent with previous decisions applying the natural condition
exception, all of which applied the exception to conditions
actually on the land. For example, in Blackner, a Department of

No. 20060461 6
Transportation officer stopped traffic in a known avalanche area
after an avalanche had partially buried the road in Little
Cottonwood Canyon. 2002 UT 44, ¶¶ 2-5. While traffic was
stopped, a second avalanche occurred and seriously injured
Blackner. Id. ¶ 6. We held that the avalanche and the snow pack
from which the avalanche originated were natural conditions on
public land and that the State was therefore immune from suits
arising from injuries caused by the second avalanche. Id. ¶ 14.
The snow that caused the injury was a natural condition in
physical contact with the land. Similarly, in Stuckman ex rel.
Nelson, we recognized that a river was a natural condition, but
ultimately held that the city was not immune from suit because it
undertook a duty to protect citizens from the river by building a
fence. 919 P.2d at 574-75. A river falls within the natural
condition exception because it flows directly above and in
contact with the land. In Apffel v. Huddleston, a federal
district court found public university officials immune from a
wrongful death action that arose when a student fell to his death
after climbing cliffs at a college party. 50 F. Supp. 2d 1129,
1130-31, 1140-41 & n.2 (D. Utah 1999). As an alternate basis for
its holding, the court noted that the cliffs were a natural
condition on the land and therefore immunity arose under the
natural condition exception. Id. at 1141.
CONCLUSION
¶15 We hold that Pleasant Grove is not immune from suit for
the death of Daniel Grappendorf under the natural condition
exception of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act found in Utah
Code section 63-30-10(11). Atmospheric conditions, like the gust
of wind that allegedly led to Daniel’s fatal injury, do not
constitute natural conditions on the land. We consequently
reverse the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
Pleasant Grove and remand this case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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¶16 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Durrant, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish’s
opinion.