WCF v. State

2005 UT 52
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
Workers’ Compensation Fund, No. 20040504
a Utah quasi-public corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
State of Utah, a governmental F I L E D
entity,
Defendant and Appellant. August 23, 2005
---
Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
No. 030923118
Attorneys: David J. Jordan, Mark E. Hindley, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Thom D. Roberts, Asst.
Att’y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant
James R. Black, Salt Lake City, for amici curiae
Utah Manufacturers, Utah Trucking Association,
Utah Food Industry
---
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice:
¶1 In this appeal we are asked to address the nature of
the State of Utah’s relationship with the Workers’ Compensation
Fund. Specifically, the State challenges a district court ruling
which held that the “State of Utah has no ownership interest in
the Workers’ Compensation Fund or its assets other than as a
policyholder.” We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Utah’s statutorily mandated workers’ compensation
system has existed for nearly a century. The progenitor of the
present Workers’ Compensation Fund (“WCF”) came into being in
1917 and was named the State Insurance Fund (“SIF”). Act of July
1, 1917, ch. 100, § 35, 1917 Utah Laws 306, 316. Throughout its

No. 20040504 2
existence, the purpose of workers’ compensation in Utah has been
to “(i) insure Utah employers against liability for compensation
based on job-related accidental injuries . . . ; and (ii) assure
payment of this compensation to Utah employees who are entitled
to it.” Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-102(1)(b) (2003); cf. Ch. 100,
§ 35, 1917 Utah Laws at 316 (stating that SIF existed “for the
purpose of insuring employers against liability for compensation
under this Act, and of assuring to the persons entitled thereto
the compensation provided by this Act”). Utah employers
historically have been required by statute to provide such
insurance either through the SIF, now WCF, or through some other
insurer. Id. § 53, 1917 Utah Laws at 323; cf. Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-201 (Supp. 2004).
¶3 Notwithstanding this continuity in purpose, the
Legislature has periodically modified the State’s relationship
with the workers’ compensation system. While the State has
always insured through the WCF, Ch. 100, § 59, 1917 Utah Laws at
325; cf. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-203 (2001), its involvement in,
and authority over, the administration of workers’ compensation
insurance has evolved over time. As the latter aspect of this
relationship is particularly pertinent to this appeal, we briefly
recite the statutory history of workers’ compensation insurance
in Utah, focusing on the significant changes in its
administrative apparatus.
I. HISTORY OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INSURANCE IN UTAH
¶4 In 1917, the Legislature created the Industrial
Commission of Utah and endowed it with the power, among other
things, “[t]o administer and enforce all laws for the protection
of life, health, safety and welfare of employe[e]s.” Ch. 100, §
16(1), 1917 Utah Laws at 309. The SIF was created within the
Industrial Commission for the purpose of “insuring employers
against liability for compensation under this Act, and of
assuring to the persons entitled thereto the compensation
provided by this Act.” Id. § 35, 1917 Utah Laws at 316. The SIF
consisted of “all premiums and penalties received and paid into
the fund,” id., and the state treasurer was designated to be the
“custodian of the State insurance fund, and all disbursements
therefrom [were to] be paid by him,” id. § 46, 1917 Utah Laws at
320.
¶5 The SIF was to be “administered by the [Industrial]
[C]ommission without liability on the part of the State beyond
the amount of such fund.” Id. § 35, 1917 Utah Laws at 316. The
1917 statute further stated that it was the “duty of the
[Industrial] [C]ommission to conduct the business of the State

3 No. 20040504
insurance fund,” id. § 36, 1917 Utah Laws at 317, and that the
commission “is hereby vested with full authority over the said
fund, and may do any and all things which are necessary or
convenient in the administration thereof, or in connection with
the insurance business to be carried on by it.” Id. Such
authority included the ability to sue and be sued on behalf of
the SIF, id. § 38, 1917 Utah Laws at 317, and to make contracts
of insurance, id. § 39, 1917 Utah Laws at 317.
¶6 In 1941, the Legislature transferred the administration
of the SIF to the Commission of Finance. Act of July 1, 1941,
ch. 16, sec. 1, § 42-2-3, 1941 Utah Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 46, 46.
The status of the SIF and its place within the Industrial
Commission statutes remained unchanged, except that the Finance
Commission assumed the responsibilities of the Industrial
Commission in administering the SIF. These duties included
“conduct[ing] all business thereto appertaining and belonging,”
and being “vested with full authority over said fund.” Id. With
this change, the Finance Commission also acquired the ability to
appoint, with the governor’s approval, managers, attorneys,
accountants, and “such other experts and assistants” as needed to
assist in administering the business of the SIF. Id.
¶7 The Finance Commission’s “full authority” over the SIF
persisted until 1986, when the Legislature repealed and reenacted
chapter three of title 35, entitled “Labor–Industrial
Commission.” See Insurance Recodification Amendments, ch. 204,
§ 279, 1986 Utah Laws 477, 626-28. Previously the statute
describing the SIF, the new chapter three renamed the fund the
“Workers’ Compensation Fund of Utah.” Id. sec. 279, § 35-3-2,
1986 Utah Laws at 626. While the fund still existed for the
purpose of providing workers’ compensation insurance and
consisted of “all assets acquired from premiums and penalties
which are paid into the fund,” id., authority over the fund
shifted significantly.
¶8 First, authority to “manage and conduct the business
and affairs of the fund” was transferred to the newly created
director of the WCF. Id. sec. 279, § 35-3-6, 1986 Utah Laws at
626. This individual was to be appointed by the executive
director of the Department of Administrative Services, and the
management of the fund by the former was subject to the approval
of the latter. Id. sec. 279, §§ 35-3-1, 35-3-6, 1986 Utah Laws
at 626. Among the director’s managerial powers were the ability
to enter into workers’ compensation insurance contracts, and,
with the approval of the executive director, to employ attorneys,
accountants, and other experts in managing the business of the
WCF. Id. sec. 279, § 35-3-7(1), (8), 1986 Utah Laws at 626-27.

No. 20040504 4
These privileges, which were previously held by the state agency
administering the fund, now belonged to the fund itself.
¶9 Furthermore, the State was explicitly prohibited from
“us[ing] any assets of the fund for any purpose other than the
operation of the fund.” Id. sec. 279, § 35-3-4, 1986 Utah Laws
at 626. However, the state treasurer was still the custodian
over the fund’s money and assets, id. sec. 279, § 35-3-13, 1986
Utah Laws at 627, and provided investment services for the fund
subject to the State Money Management Act of 1974, id., which
governs the investment of “public funds,” see Utah Code Ann.
§ 51-7-4 (1981) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 51-7-4
(2002)). Additionally, while the State was still shielded from
liability “for the expenses or debts of the fund,” Ch. 204, sec.
279, § 35-3-4, 1986 Utah Laws at 626, the fund, for the first
time, was described as a “legal entity [that] may sue and be sued
in its own name,” id. sec. 279, § 35-3-3, 1986 Utah Laws at 626.
¶10 In 1988, the Legislature again changed the
administrative structure of the WCF. It began by bifurcating the
organizational apparatus of the WCF from its assets. Workers’
Compensation Fund Amendments, ch. 56, sec. 5, § 35-3-2, 1988 Utah
Laws 374, 375. The purpose of the WCF remained the same, id.,
sec. 5, § 35-3-2(1), 1988 Utah Laws at 375, but a separate
enterprise fund, called the Injury Fund, was created, which
consisted of “all assets acquired from premiums and penalties
paid into the Injury Fund,” and was to be “maintained by the
Workers’ Compensation Fund,” id. sec. 5, § 35-3-2(2), 1988 Utah
Laws at 375. The State, under this dichotomous system, was still
protected from liability for any expenses or debts of the WCF and
was now prohibited from accessing the assets of the Injury Fund.
Id. sec. 7, § 35-3-4 (2), 1988 Utah Laws at 375.
¶11 The State’s relationship to the WCF was also modified
in other aspects. First, a board of directors was created,
consisting of the executive director of the Department of
Administrative Services and four other members appointed by the
governor. Id. sec. 8, § 35-3-5(1), 1988 Utah Laws at 375. The
duties of the board included the responsibility to “appoint a
chief executive officer to administer” the fund, to “serve as
investment trustees of the injury fund,” and to perform other
acts related to the policymaking and oversight of the WCF. Id.
sec. 9, § 35-3-6(1), (5), (13), 1988 Utah Laws at 376.
¶12 The chief executive officer, in turn, was charged with
“administer[ing] all operations of the [WCF] under the direction
of the board.” Id. sec. 10, § 35-3-7(1)(a), 1988 Utah Laws at
376. Among other things, this included entering into contracts
for workers’ compensation insurance, id. sec. 10, § 35-3-7(2)(a),

5 No. 20040504
1988 Utah Laws at 377, and employing attorneys, accountants, and
other specialists to assist in administering the fund, id. sec.
10, § 35-3-7(1)(m), 1988 Utah Laws at 376.
¶13 The chief executive was also responsible for investing
the assets of the Injury Fund. Id. sec. 10, § 35-3-7(1)(f), 1988
Utah Laws at 376. Although these investments were to be
conducted under the guidance of the board of directors, id.,
unlike the state treasurer, who had previously been charged with
investing the fund’s assets in accordance with the Money
Management Act, Ch. 204, sec. 279, § 35-3-13, 1986 Utah Laws at
627, the chief executive was now required to invest the fund’s
assets according to chapter 18 of Utah’s Insurance Code, Ch. 56,
sec. 10, § 35-3-7(f), 1988 Utah Laws at 376, which governs all
insurers doing business in the State. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
18-101 (1986) (current version at Utah Code Ann. 31A-18-101
(2003)).
¶14 In addition, the 1988 enactment defined the legal
nature of the WCF. It stated that the WCF was
a nonprofit, self-supporting, quasi-public
corporation. It is an independent state
agency and a body politic and corporate. It
is a legal entity and may sue and be sued in
its own name. All of its business and
affairs shall be conducted in the name of the
Workers’ Compensation Fund of Utah.
Ch. 56, sec. 6, § 35-3-3, 1988 Utah Laws at 375. However, this
language was modified two years later, when, in 1990, the
Legislature deleted the language “an independent state agency and
a body politic and corporate.” Workers’ Compensation Fund
Amendments, ch. 24, sec. 3, § 35-3-3(1)(a), 1990 Utah Laws 132,
132.
¶15 Finally, the last decade has seen some significant
changes in the State’s relationship with the WCF. First, in
1996, the Legislature relocated the WCF from its historical
position in title 35, entitled “Labor--Industrial Commission,” to
its present place in title 31A, entitled “Insurance Code.” Act
of Feb. 27, 1996, ch. 240, §§ 20-37, 1996 Utah Laws 893, 910-14.
Second, a 2002 enactment defined the extent of the State’s
authority over the WCF that stemmed from the governor’s ability
to appoint its board of directors:
(19) The requirement that the governor,
with the consent of the Senate, appoint the

No. 20040504 6
directors of the Workers’ Compensation Fund .
. . does not:
(a) remove from the board of directors
the managerial, financial, or
operational control of the Workers’
Compensation Fund; [or]
(b) give to the state or the governor
managerial, financial, or operational
control of the Workers’ Compensation
Fund[.]
Workers’ Compensation Insurance Related Amendments, ch. 186, sec.
2, § 31A–33-106(19), 2002 Utah Laws 675, 677.
II. THE PRESENT DISPUTE
¶16 The dispute before us now covers the present nature of
the WCF in its relationship with the State. It arose in October
2003, when the WCF filed suit in district court seeking a
declaration that “the State has no ownership interest in the WCF
or its assets other than as a policyholder.” After the State
filed its answer, WCF moved for summary judgment, and the State
then moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for a judgment on
the pleadings. After hearing arguments on the motions, the
district court granted WCF’s motion and denied those of the
State.
¶17 In its decision, the district court held that “the
State has no ownership in the WCF or its assets other than as a
policyholder.” The State now appeals, arguing that “[s]ince WCF
was created by the State, the State exercises all the incidents
of ownership over it, and there are no vested or ownership rights
of the policyholders, the State owns and controls the WCF.” For
the reasons expressed below, we find the State’s arguments
unpersuasive and affirm the district court’s grant of WCF’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.
ANALYSIS
¶18 When a district court grants summary judgment to a
party, it decides that the party is entitled to a favorable
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). On appeal,
therefore, we must determine whether the district court erred in
its legal analysis, granting no deference to its conclusions and
reviewing its holding for correctness. Kouris v. Utah Highway
Patrol, 2003 UT 19, ¶ 5, 70 P.3d 72.

7 No. 20040504
¶19 As stated above, the current Utah Code describes the
WCF as “a nonprofit, quasi-public corporation,” Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-33-102(1) (2003), charged with “maintain[ing]” the Injury
Fund, which consists of “the premiums, reserves, investment
income, and any other funds administered by the [WCF],” id.
§ 31A-33-101(5). Section 31A-33-105 explains that “the state:
(a) is not liable for the expenses, liabilities, or debts of
. . . the Workers’ Compensation Fund; . . . and (b) may not use
any assets of the Injury Fund for any purpose.” Id. § 31A-33-
105(2). Furthermore, section 31A-33-106, entitled “Board of
Directors--Status of the fund in relationship to the state,”
clarifies that the governor’s ability to appoint the board of
directors does not “give the state or the governor managerial,
financial, or operational control” over the WCF. Id. § 31A-33-
106(19).
¶20 Notwithstanding this statutory language, the State
maintains that it “exercises all the incidents of ownership over
[the WCF]” and that it “owns and controls the WCF.” It supports
this assertion with three arguments. First, it contends that the
WCF is a “state governmental entity” because an earlier version
of the WCF statute described it as an independent state agency,
and to be otherwise would make it unconstitutional. Second, it
asserts that the Injury Fund, an entity separate from the WCF, is
a “public fund” and therefore owned by the State. Finally, the
State contends that the WCF policyholders have no ownership
interest in the WCF and the right to “control, use, lease, or to
otherwise dispose of the assets” of the WCF can only be exercised
by the State. Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn.
I. THE WCF IS NOT A STATE AGENCY
¶21 The State claims that the WCF is a “state and
governmental entity” for several reasons. First, the State makes
much of earlier workers’ compensation insurance statutes that are
no longer in force. It argues that the WCF is the modern
equivalent of the Industrial Commission of Utah, a state agency
established in 1917 and charged with the responsibility, among
other things, “to conduct the business of the State insurance
fund.” Act of July 1, 1917, ch. 100, § 36, 1917 Utah Laws 306,
317. According to the State, since a state agency “conduct[ed]
the business” of the insurance fund for much of its history, any
apparatus established for conducting the State’s workers’
compensation business, under whatever title, must be a state
agency, subject to the State’s control like any other agency. As
such, the State contends that the “independent state agency”
description of the WCF, enacted in 1988 and deleted in 1990, not

No. 20040504 8
only reflected the true historical nature of the WCF but also
projected its future status.
¶22 However, arguing for the present validity of statutory
language that has been deleted by the Legislature demonstrates a
misunderstanding of the fundamental nature of the legislative
process. As the creator of laws, a legislature constantly gives
life to myriad legal requirements and concepts, but subsequent
legislation may also take it away. Neither this court, nor any
party, has the power to resurrect statutory language that has
been repealed or significantly changed through proper amendment
by the legislature.
¶23 As recounted above, the history of the WCF clearly
demonstrates the Legislature’s authority to decide that the level
of the State’s involvement in administering workers’ compensation
insurance that existed yesterday is not the same level desired
today. In 1917, the Legislature vested a state agency, the
Industrial Commission, with “full authority” to “conduct the
business” of the then-SIF. Id. § 36, 1917 Utah Laws at 317.
Now, however, the Legislature has seen fit to decide that, even
though the State is involved in the creation of the board of
directors to administer the WCF, this involvement does not give
the State “managerial, financial, or operational control of [the
WCF].” Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-106(19)(b).
¶24 Second, the State contends that the WCF could not have
been created as a private corporation or a privately-owned
corporation without violating the Utah Constitution. Article
XII, section 1 of the Constitution states that “[c]orporations
may be formed under general laws but may not be created by
special acts.” Utah Const. art. XII, § 1. The State argues that
since the WCF was created as a corporation by a special act, and
since we have held that the constitutional prohibition against
corporations created by such acts only “concerns private
corporations and not public corporations created by the
legislature to serve public purposes,” Utah Tech. Fin. Corp. v.
Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 415 (Utah 1986), the WCF, to exist
legally, must be a public corporation, created for a public
purpose.
¶25 However, the State is only partially correct. The
Legislature, within the bounds of article XII, section 1 of the
Utah Constitution, may create a corporation that serves a public
purpose while being private in ownership. In fact, such is the
nature of quasi-public corporations in general and the WCF as a
quasi-public corporation in particular. As defined by the
Legislature, a quasi-public corporation is “an artificial person,

9 No. 20040504
private in ownership, individually created as a corporation by
the state which has accepted from the state the grant of a
franchise or contract involving the performance of a public
purpose relating to the state or its citizens.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 63E-1-102(8) (2004).
¶26 Under the State’s interpretation, all quasi-public
corporations would violate article XII, section 1 of the Utah
Constitution, since quasi-public corporations are “private in
ownership,” even though they are created for the “performance of
a public purpose.” However, we cannot adopt the rule that quasi-
public corporations, because of their private ownership, violate
our Constitution. Rather, the existence of such corporations
coincides with our previous holding that the prohibition in
article XII, section 1 primarily concerns the purpose to be
served by the corporation created, not the notion of whether the
legal entity is publicly or privately owned. See Utah Farm
Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 564 P.2d 751, 755 n.10
(Utah 1977).
¶27 In Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co., we considered
whether the Utah Insurance Guaranty Association Act, which
created a legal entity designed to guarantee payment to the
insureds of insolvent insurers, Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-40-2, -6
(1974) (current version at Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-28-102, -106
(2003)), violated article XII, section 1 of the Utah
Constitution. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 564 P.2d at 753. To
answer the question, we examined how similar provisions from
other states’ constitutions had been interpreted, and we aligned
ourselves with the following rationale:
The purpose of the constitutional prohibition
against special legislation was to insure
legislation, which would promote the general
welfare and further statewide interest, as
opposed to private concerns. The
constitutional prohibition was not intended
to deny the legislature the authority to
grant limited corporate powers, to the
entities it created, to promote a public and
state purpose. If the challenged legislation
does not involve the promotion of private or
local interests (as condemned by the
constitution); but promotes a legitimate
governmental and statewide purpose, as
declared by the legislature, it is not
objectionable as either a special or private
law.

No. 20040504 10
Id. at 755 n.10 (citing State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 208
N.W.2d 780, 812-13 (Wis. 1973)).
¶28 Clearly the WCF has promoted “a legitimate governmental
and statewide purpose,” id., by providing workers’ compensation
insurance to citizens of Utah. This purpose has not changed in
its nearly ninety years of existence. Consequently, we hold that
the WCF, as a quasi-public corporation, does not violate article
XII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, in spite of the fact
that, as such a corporation, it is “private in ownership,” Utah
Code Ann. § 63E-1-102(8).
¶29 The State contends that the statutory definition of a
quasi-public corporation as “private in ownership” does not apply
to the WCF because the Independent Entities Act, which created
that definition in 2001, was enacted after the WCF was defined as
a quasi-public corporation in 1988. For the Independent Entities
Act definition of a quasi-public corporation to apply to the WCF,
the State argues, the “Legislature must undertake a specific
review and make various findings” about the WCF according to Utah
Code section 63E-2-103, which provides guidelines for the
Legislature in creating independent corporations. The State
insists that since the Legislature has not performed this review
of the WCF, the WCF is not a quasi-public corporation as
understood by the Independent Entities Act definition, i.e., it
is not “private in ownership,” id.
¶30 However, the State’s argument fails to account for the
fact that in enacting the Independent Entities Act, the
Legislature recognized the WCF among the list of independent
entities already in existence. Id. § 63E-1-102(4)(b)(vi). As
such, it is clear that the Legislature intended for the Act’s
definition of a quasi-public corporation as being private in
ownership to apply to the WCF. In fact, there is no other
category within the statute for the WCF to exist. As the WCF
points out, according to the statutory classifications,
independent entities exist as either independent state agencies
or independent corporations, id. § 63E-1-102(4)(a), and
independent corporations exist as either public corporations or
quasi-public corporations, id. § 63E-2-106(1) (2004).
Consequently, as a quasi-public corporation, the WCF cannot be
classified properly as either a public corporation or an
independent state agency, as the State suggests.
¶31 We hold that the WCF is “private in ownership”
according to the definition of quasi-public corporation in the
Independent Entities Act, id. § 63E-1-102(8), and that the State

11 No. 20040504
has no “managerial, financial, or operational control of [the
WCF],” in spite of the governor’s ability to appoint its board of
directors, id. § 31A-33-106(19)(b), and in spite of the State’s
historical involvement in the WCF. Nevertheless, our decision
does not prevent the Legislature from modifying the structure and
management of the WCF or adjusting the level of the State’s
influence thereupon, as it sees fit. The historical precedent
for such change is evident. We merely rule on the present nature
of the relationship between the WCF and the State, and declare
that the State has no ownership interest in the WCF.
II. THE STATE DOES NOT OWN THE WCF’S ASSETS
¶32 The State next argues that the Injury Fund, which
consists of “the premiums, reserves, investment income, and any
other funds administered by the [WCF],” Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-
101(5) (2003), is a public fund, not owned by the WCF
policyholders, but controlled by the State. However, such an
assertion clearly contradicts current statutes and precedents
from this court. Section 31A-33-105(b) of the WCF statute states
that “[t]he state . . . may not use any assets of the Injury Fund
for any purpose.” Id. § 31A-33-105(b) (2003). As telling as
this statute is on the limited nature of the State’s authority
over the assets of the WCF, our prior pronouncements on the
matter are even more precise on the issue of ownership of those
assets.
¶33 Indeed, the assets of the fund have always belonged to
the contributing employers and not to the State. In Chez v.
Industrial Commission, we addressed whether a debt owing to the
then-SIF was considered a debt owing to the State. 62 P.2d 549,
549-50 (Utah 1936). To answer the question, it was necessary to
“examine the nature of the State Insurance Fund and see what it
really is.” Id. at 550. We defined the State’s involvement in
the fund by “conclud[ing] that the State Insurance Fund, while a
public fund in the sense of being administered by a public body,
is not public money in the sense that it is money of the state to
be used for and on behalf of the state for a state expenditure.”
Id. at 551. Consequently, we held that “[t]he fund is publicly
administered, but its debtors are not debtors to the state. It
belongs, not to the state, but to the contributing employers for
their mutual benefit. It constitutes a pooling of risks under
the auspices of the state.” Id.
¶34 We have since affirmed Chez’s holding that the assets
of the WCF are owned by its policyholders and not by the State.
See Hansen v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1341 (Utah
1982) (“The State Insurance Fund operates essentially as a
private insurance company; it receives no public moneys and pays

No. 20040504 12
its own administrative expenses from the premiums received. The
moneys paid into the Fund do not belong to the State but in
effect to the contributing employers.”). We have also held that
an appropriation of the WCF’s assets by the State would
constitute a taking, for which due compensation ought to be made.
Gronning v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690, 692 (Utah 1997). Accordingly,
we conclude that these cases and the statute prohibiting the
State’s use of the fund’s assets are sufficient authority to
justify upholding the district court’s decision that the State
has no ownership interest in the WCF’s assets.
III. THE STATE HAS NO CONTROL OVER THE WCF OR ITS ASSETS
¶35 Finally, it is perhaps in tacit recognition of the
clarity of the foregoing precedent that the State attempts to
persuade us by arguing that the WCF policyholders “have no
control or ownership interest in [the] WCF.” However, this
approach is flawed. The issue before us on appeal is the
district court’s ruling that the State has no ownership interest
in the WCF or its assets other than as a policyholder. The State
cannot establish its right to own the WCF or its assets merely by
attempting to disprove the ownership rights of the WCF’s
policyholders. From the beginning, the State was faced with
demonstrating to this court its right to own the WCF and its
assets; but, as has been demonstrated above, there is no legal
leg on which its position can properly stand.
CONCLUSION
¶36 We affirm the district court’s decision that the “State
of Utah has no ownership interest in the Workers’ Compensation
Fund or its assets other than as a policyholder.” As a quasi-
public corporation, the WCF exists to serve an essential public
purpose, providing workers’ compensation insurance, all the while
being private in ownership. Furthermore, apart from the
Legislature’s ability to modify its governing statutes, the State
has no managerial, financial, or operational control of the WCF.
The same is true for the WCF’s assets, the Injury Fund; and we
reaffirm our prior decisions, which have held that those assets
belong to the WCF policyholders and not to the State.
---
¶37 Chief Justice Durham, Justice Parrish, Justice Nehring,
and Judge Eyre concur in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins’
opinion.

13 No. 20040504
¶38 Having disqualified himself, Justice Durrant does not
participate herein; District Judge Donald J. Eyre, Jr., sat.