Bluffdale Mountain Homes v. Bluffdale City

2007 UT 57
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
Bluffdale Mountain Homes, No. 20060295
LC, and South Farm LLC,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
F I L E D
Bluffdale City,
Defendant and Appellant. July 20, 2007
---
Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn
No. 040909930
Attorneys: Bruce R. Baird, Walter T. Keane, Salt Lake City, for
Bluffdale Mountain Homes
Hollis S. Hunt, Draper, for South Farm
Douglas J. Parry, Todd D. Weiler, Craig R. Kleinman,
Salt Lake City, for Bluffdale City
---
DURRANT, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Several property owners, including the plaintiffs in
this case, filed a request for disconnection with Bluffdale City
(“Bluffdale” or “the City”). Bluffdale denied this request, and
thereafter the property owners filed a disconnection petition
with the Third District Court. After a four-day trial, the
district court determined that the property owners had met their
burden of proving the statutory requirements for disconnection.
Bluffdale now appeals this decision.
¶2 Upon review of the district court’s factual findings
and legal conclusions, we affirm the district court’s decision
granting the disconnection.

No. 20060295 2
BACKGROUND
¶3 This disconnection dispute involves a long and complex
factual and procedural history. We note that the district
court’s opinion in this case was particularly thorough and well
reasoned; therefore, we incorporate herein, largely verbatim,
those facts from the district court’s recitation of the facts
that are most relevant to our disposition of the case.
I. HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE
¶4 In the 1980s, the entity now known as South Farm LLC
(“South Farm”) purchased a large, contiguous tract of property
for investment and development; one-half of the property was
located in unincorporated Salt Lake County (“the County”) and
one-half was located in Bluffdale City. South Farm originally
sought to have this entire property annexed into Riverton City so
that it could be developed as a consistent whole. But Bluffdale
objected and ultimately denied the annexation.
¶5 South Farm applied to the County to begin development
of the unincorporated portion of its property located outside of
Bluffdale. This process included public meetings with
neighboring communities. In August 1999, over Bluffdale’s
objections, the County approved a general plan of development for
the property. The property was ultimately incorporated into the
City of Herriman, however. Since then, the property has been
largely developed and is currently known as “Rosecrest,” which
includes approximately eighteen subdivisions and two thousand
residential units. By all accounts, the Rosecrest development
has been an attractive and successful mixed-use development,
representing high standards of land-use planning.
¶6 The Bluffdale portion of the South Farm property has
not proceeded as smoothly toward development. In October 1997,
Don Wallace, a managing member of South Farm, appeared at a
public meeting to answer questions regarding South Farm’s plans
for its property in Bluffdale. South Farm desired a similar
mixed-use development to the one it had established in
neighboring Rosecrest. Bluffdale had long sought, however, to
limit residential and mixed-use density, preferring lot sizes of
one to five acres for residential homes. Indeed, many Bluffdale
citizens opposed South Farm’s plans, both during and after the
meeting, and up until May 2002, Bluffdale officials dissuaded
South Farm from presenting any development plans with respect to
its property.
¶7 Nevertheless, Bluffdale also recognized the need for
long-range planning, given the inevitable development pressure it

3 No. 20060295
would face from the growth in the southern area of the County.
Bluffdale prepared capital improvement plans, transportation
plans, water plans, drainage plans, and other plans to establish
the future look of the City. Bluffdale desired to have its
future planning in order before it invested the necessary
resources to consider a project of the scale intended by South
Farm.
¶8 Given Bluffdale’s limited resources, the planning
process was time consuming. From South Farm’s perspective,
progress was excruciatingly slow. Indeed, many of Bluffdale’s
plans remained either unfinished or unadopted up to the time of
trial. Bluffdale persuaded South Farm to hold off on filing any
applications for an amendment to the City’s General Plan that
would allow development of the property. Bluffdale was working
toward completion of its planning process; however, there were
clearly elements within the City that were hostile to Rosecrest-
like developments. The district court made note of “the
reasonable inference that some foot-dragging was taking place–-
whether intentionally or as a result of the natural human
tendency to defer consideration of issues that are likely to be
contentious.”
¶9 During this slow planning process, Bluffdale encouraged
South Farm to produce a Quality Growth Plan. In preparing this
plan, South Farm held numerous public meetings with
representatives of the City and other stakeholders. In September
2001, South Farm produced a draft of a Quality Growth Plan, and
although never formally adopted by Bluffdale, it gave South Farm
hope that a Rosecrest-like development was within reach. For
example, the Quality Growth Plan approved recommended densities
as high as 2.5 residences per acre throughout the South Farm
property, provided that a thirty-five percent open space
requirement was met. But the Quality Growth Plan was by no means
an unequivocal endorsement of a Rosecrest-like development; the
plan acknowledged Bluffdale’s commitment to a “rural-like
atmosphere” and a strong preference for developments with minimum
lot sizes of one acre.
¶10 In the fall of 2001, Shane Jones, the City’s engineer,
approached Wallace for an easement across South Farm’s property
for a twelve-foot water line needed to service newly developed
portions of the City. Before those discussions were complete, a
contractor hired by the City trespassed on South Farm’s property
to begin work on the water line. Bluffdale urgently needed the
water line to address water pressure and fire protection issues
in Gardner Estates and other new developments in the northern
section of the City. In order to obtain the needed easement and
resolve the trespass issue, Bluffdale and South Farm discussed a

No. 20060295 4
trade of the easement for the adoption of planning policies that
would allow South Farm to develop its property consistent with
the existing Rosecrest development. In the context of those
discussions, during a Bluffdale City Council meeting, Greg
Curtis, the City’s attorney, advised the City Council that if
they were not comfortable with the mixed-use Rosecrest
development in Herriman, they should not vote for the proposed
resolution. Furthermore, Curtis stated that if the City did not
provide infrastructure for new development, property owners could
make a compelling argument to disconnect.
¶11 On January 8, 2002, the Bluffdale City Council
unanimously approved Resolution No. 2002-05, which resolved the
easement issue and provided the following statement of good
faith:
[South Farm] has agreed to provide the
requested easement without cost to the City,
but in turn has requested a declaration of
intent from the City as to the general
acceptability of [South Farm’s] future
development of [its] real property which lies
in the City. [South Farm] is in the process
of completing an existing master planned
project, a mixed-use real estate development
in the town of Herriman which is contiguous
and immediately adjacent to [its] real
property located in the City and is desirous
to continue the development of its Bluffdale
property with similar mixed uses, density,
and transportation elements as existed in its
existing master planned project in Herriman.
(b) Subject to the express continued
administration of its legislative and
regulatory authority over development of the
[South Farm] real property and without
waiving any of its future regulatory
authority, the City declares its intent
regarding the development of the [South Farm]
property as follows:
(1) That the best use of the [South
Farm] property in the City is to develop
the [South Farm] property with a mixture
of uses, density, commercial,
recreational, transportation and open
space elements compatible with the
Rosecrest property in the town of

5 No. 20060295
Herriman that is adjacent and contiguous
to the [South Farm] property in the City
of Bluffdale.
¶12 On December 21, 2001, before this resolution passed,
Bruce Parker, the City’s planner, wrote to Wallace to again
dissuade South Farm from proposing a General Plan Amendment until
the City’s internal planning was complete. In essence, the
letter provided two options: (1) wait until the City is ready or
(2) propose a development consistent with the current zoning
scheme. South Farm waited an additional six months and observed
no significant progress toward completion of Bluffdale’s internal
planning.
¶13 On May 6, 2002, South Farm formally submitted its
General Plan Amendment. The amendment was patterned on the
principles of the Quality Growth Plan–-although clearly beyond
the letter of that plan–-and consistent with the principles
recognized by the City in the adoption of Resolution 2002-05.
Bluffdale began immediate consideration of the amendment through
its planning staff. Once again, because of the size of the
project and the limited resources of the City, progress was slow.
¶14 On November 12, 2002, Bluffdale adopted a series of
land use planning principles for Planning District No. 4, which
included the same area as South Farm’s property. Those
principles included the following:
Planning District No. 4 should generally
provide opportunities for low density
residential uses, with residential density of
one (1) dwelling unit to one (1) acre and one
(1) dwelling unit per five (5) acres being
provided.
Only in those areas located immediately
adjacent to an existing and neighboring
municipality, and only in order to recognize
adjacent land uses and to provide the desired
land use transitioning and compatibility,
shall commercial, professional office, public
uses and residential uses with densities
greater than recommended by Policy No. 1 be
considered by the City
(emphasis added).
¶15 The meaning of “immediately adjacent” became an
important area of contention. If that phrase was read narrowly

1 At trial, South Hills Development LLC claimed to be the
successor in interest to Bluffdale Mountain Homes. We refer to
Bluffdale Mountain Homes herein because that name was used in the
proceedings below and on appeal.
No. 20060295 6
to include only the narrow strip bordering on the existing
Rosecrest development, it was significantly more restrictive than
the recommendations of the Quality Growth Plan and a repudiation
of Resolution 2002-05. On the other hand, if the entire South
Farm property was considered “immediately adjacent,” a Rosecrest-
like development was still possible in Bluffdale.
¶16 The following year, South Farm and Bluffdale discussed
the General Plan Amendment during dozens, if not hundreds, of
meetings, without any discernible progress toward amending the
City’s General Plan. Because of this apparent lack of progress,
South Farm proposed outsourcing review of the General Plan
Amendment. Bluffdale accepted this proposal and hired J-U-B
Engineers, Inc. (“J-U-B”) and Tischler & Associates, Inc.
(“Tischler”) to act as the City’s consultants in reviewing the
amendment. South Farm agreed to advance the cost of their work.
The consultants completed their report on or about July 7, 2003.
Dozens of meetings were held to address the concerns raised in
the J-U-B/Tischler report.
¶17 By the time the General Plan Amendment was ready for
consideration by the Bluffdale City Council, South Farm had
invested almost one million dollars and thousands of hours in the
planning process. On December 9, 2003, the City Council finally
considered the General Plan Amendment. The City’s planning
commission recommended adoption of the amendment. The
consultants, J-U-B and Tischler, also recommended adoption of the
amendment. But the City Council voted to reject the General Plan
Amendment based upon a narrow reading of the planning principles
that had been adopted for Planning District No. 4.
¶18 Many property owners in the area proposed for
disconnection wanted to develop their property in a manner
comparable to that of South Farm and had watched or participated
with interest in Bluffdale’s planning and development process.
On February 12, 2004, fifty-two property owners, including South
Farm, petitioned Bluffdale City to voluntarily adjust its
boundary with the City of Herriman in order to move the
disconnection property from Bluffdale to Herriman or, in the
alternative, requested to disconnect the entire property from the
City. The City rejected both requests. Thereafter, two of the
property owners, Bluffdale Mountain Homes LC1 and South Farm
(“the Developers”), filed a petition in the Third District Court,

2 We note that on June 27, 2006, the City Council passed
Resolution 2006-28, certifying the referendum results, which were
in favor of the City’s special development zone.
3 Camp Williams is not a municipality, but a military
installation.
7 No. 20060295
seeking disconnection of the property pursuant to Utah Code
section 10-2-502.5.
¶19 Notably, throughout 2005 and during discovery leading
up to trial, the property owners and Bluffdale attempted to
resolve their differences and come up with a land use plan that
would satisfy both parties. On May 24, 2005, the Bluffdale City
Council approved a Memorandum of Understanding that set a
framework for development of the disconnection property. On
August 23, 2005, the City Council approved a Special Development
Plan District Ordinance that was a necessary prerequisite to
implementing the Memorandum of Understanding and would create a
special development zone. But Bluffdale citizens opposing the
development applied for a referendum to overturn the City
Council’s decision to create the special development zone.2 In
order to avoid the delay that would be caused by the referendum,
the property owners and Bluffdale worked out a development plan
agreement that would be implemented by a Consent Decree. The
City Council approved the proposed Consent Decree, but once again
Bluffdale citizens applied for a referendum to overturn the City
Council’s approval. On November 10, 2005, the district court
rejected the proposed Consent Decree, viewing the decree as a
political remedy outside the scope of the pleadings and its
review of the grounds for disconnection.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE DISCONNECTION AREA
¶20 The area proposed to be disconnected (“the
Disconnection Area”) is a triangle-shaped parcel of approximately
3,971 acres in the southwest corner of Bluffdale City. The
Disconnection Area is bounded by Bluffdale on the east, Riverton
on the north, Herriman on the west, and Camp Williams on the
south.3 The total acreage represents approximately thirty-eight
percent of Bluffdale’s land area. The Disconnection Area is
almost completely undeveloped. With the exception of some water
conservancy district facilities on the eastern border of the
property and one dwelling, there are no structures on the
property.
¶21 The Disconnection Area is separated from the rest of
Bluffdale City by a substantial manmade barrier, a thirty-five-

4 The district court incorrectly stated that the
Welby/Jacobs Canal and Redwood Road formed the “western border”
of the Disconnection Area.
No. 20060295 8
foot-wide canal known as the “Welby/Jacobs Canal.” The easement
associated with the canal is wider than the canal itself. The
canal forms the eastern border of the Disconnection Area for the
majority of its length. The balance of the eastern border is
Redwood Road.4 There are no public roads within the
Disconnection Area, and no public bridges cross the Welby/Jacobs
Canal.
¶22 The only Bluffdale-owned facilities that exist within
the Disconnection Area are a twelve-inch water pipe and
associated meters and pressure reduction facilities that run
parallel to the Welby/Jacobs Canal. The water line does not
currently serve the Disconnection Area, but was installed
primarily to provide additional water pressure and fire
protection for Gardner Estates and other new developments in the
northern section of the City east of the Welby/Jacobs Canal.
Although this water line has some additional capacity that could
be directed toward the Disconnection Area, serving this property
was not the primary motivation for its installation.
¶23 Bluffdale City has provided the Disconnection Area with
minimal police and fire protection services. There is evidence
that the police have made calls to the property approximately
twice a year to investigate trespass or other minor criminal
conduct, and there have been seven to eight fire calls per year.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S DISCONNECTION DECISION
¶24 Before the district court, Bluffdale moved to dismiss
the Developers’ disconnection petition, arguing, among other
things, that the petition was facially defective because less
than fifty percent of the owners of real property within the
Disconnection Area filed the petition with the court and
therefore the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The
district court dismissed the Developers’ initial petition but
granted them thirty days’ leave to file an amended petition
containing the names of more than fifty percent of the real
property owners. The Developers promptly filed an amended
petition with the names of more than fifty percent of the real
property owners. Bluffdale sought permission to file an

5 When an appellate court declines to address subject matter
jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal, the parties may appeal a
decision as to subject matter jurisdiction once a final judgment
is entered. See Houghton v. Dep’t of Health, 2005 UT 63, ¶ 16,
125 P.3d 860.
6 Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.5(5) (2003).
9 No. 20060295
interlocutory appeal of the court’s jurisdictional ruling on this
matter, but the court of appeals denied such permission.5
¶25 After a four-day bench trial, the district court held
that the petitioners had “met their burden of proving the
statutory prerequisites to disconnection” and granted their
disconnection petition. Bluffdale now appeals this decision, and
we have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(j).
ANALYSIS
¶26 As a general matter, we review the district court’s
decision for correctness. But some determinations under the
disconnection statute are questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law subject to substantial deference. We review them
accordingly.
¶27 Our review of the disconnection statute, the district
court’s decision, and the record in this case leads us to affirm
the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows:
(1) The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
disconnection petition, (2) the disconnection is viable, (3) the
disconnection will not materially increase the cost of
Bluffdale’s municipal services, (4) the disconnection will not
make it unfeasible for Bluffdale to function as a municipality,
(5) justice and equity require the disconnection, (6) the
disconnection does not leave or create a prohibited peninsula,
and (7) disconnection is an appropriate remedy. We will discuss
each of these issues in turn.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
¶28 “Petitioners,” as defined by statute, must file a
disconnection petition with the district court for the court to
have subject matter jurisdiction to review the petition.6 Once
jurisdiction is thereby obtained, the district court has
discretion to allow an amendment of the petition to satisfy other
statutory requirements.

7 See South Jordan City v. Sandy City, 870 P.2d 273 (Utah
1994).
8 State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, ¶ 11, 144 P.3d 1152.
9 Bd. of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, ¶ 9, 94 P.3d
234 (internal quotation marks omitted).
No. 20060295 10
A. Bluffdale Mountain Homes and South Farm Qualified as
“Petitioners” Under the Disconnection Statute
¶29 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction by
virtue of the filing of a petition with the court by Bluffdale
Mountain Homes and South Farm challenging Bluffdale City’s
decision to deny disconnection. Thus, the district court acted
well within its discretion in allowing an amendment of the
petition. Furthermore, even if we assume that the district court
erred in allowing an amendment rather than dismissing the
petition without prejudice, the error was harmless. The
Developers could have simply filed another petition with the
court meeting all of the proper statutory requirements.
¶30 The disconnection statute at issue, comprising Utah
Code sections 10-2-501 to -510, has been extensively modified
since we last reviewed a disconnection case;7 thus, our review of
the statute as presently constituted is one of first impression.
“Our objective in interpreting a statute is to effectuate
legislative intent, and that intent is most readily ascertainable
by looking to the plain language of the statute.”8 In doing so,
“[w]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and
interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the
same chapter or related chapters.”9
¶31 Utah Code section 10-2-501(2) provides as follows:
(a) Petitioners proposing to disconnect
an area within and lying on the borders of a
municipality shall file with that
municipality’s legislative body a request for
disconnection.
(b) Each request for disconnection
shall:
(i) contain the names, addresses,
and signatures of the owners of more
than 50% of the real property in the
area proposed for disconnection;

10 Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.5(5) (emphasis added).
11 No. 20060295
(ii) give the reasons for the
proposed disconnection;
(iii) include a map or plat of the
territory proposed for disconnection;
and
(iv) designate between one and
five persons with authority to act on
the petitioners’ behalf in the
proceedings.
Both parties agree that these initial requirements were met. The
request for disconnection filed with Bluffdale City (1) contained
the names, addresses, and signatures of fifty-two property owners
who owned more than fifty percent of the real property in the
area proposed for disconnection; (2) gave the reasons for the
proposed disconnection; (3) included a map or plat of the
territory proposed for disconnection; and (4) designated three
individuals with authority to act on the property owners’ behalf
in the proceedings.
¶32 The statute further provides that when a municipality
denies a request for disconnection, “petitioners” may file a
petition with the district court challenging the municipality’s
decision. Section 10-2-502.5(5) states as follows:
(a) A petition against the municipality
challenging the municipal legislative body’s
determination under Subsection (4) may be
filed in district court by:
(i) petitioners; or
(ii) the county in which the area
proposed for disconnection is located.
(b) Each petition under Subsection
(5)(a) shall include a copy of the request
for disconnection.10
¶33 Bluffdale argues that the “petitioners” filing a
petition with the district court must be all of the same
“petitioners” that filed a request for disconnection with the
municipality and that these petitioners must consist of more than
fifty percent of the real property owners in the Disconnection
Area. The petitioners in the action filed with the district
court consisted of only two property owners out of the original
fifty-two that brought the request for disconnection, and those

No. 20060295 12
two owned only thirty-one percent of the Disconnection Area. The
district court agreed with this interpretation of the statute and
dismissed the Developers’ initial petition, granting thirty days’
leave to file an amended petition containing the names of more
than fifty percent of the real property owners. We hold that the
district court erred in imposing the requirement that all of the
same petitioners that filed a request for disconnection with the
municipality must also file the disconnection petition with the
district court.
¶34 Section 10-2-501(1) defines “petitioners” as follows:
As used in this part “petitioners” means
persons who:
(a) own title to real property within
the area proposed for disconnection; and
(b) have signed a request for
disconnection proposing to disconnect that
area from the municipality.
Thus, according to the disconnection statute, “petitioners” are
persons who own title within the area proposed for disconnection
and have signed a request for disconnection with the
municipality. Section 10-2-502.5(5)(a)(i) states that such
“petitioners” may file a petition before the district court.
Accordingly, a petition in district court may be filed by
“petitioners” who (1) own title to real property within the area
proposed for disconnection and (2) have signed a request for
disconnection with the municipality. Both Bluffdale Mountain
Homes and South Farm clearly qualify as “petitioners” under this
definition and therefore properly filed a petition with the
district court.
¶35 Significantly, the disconnection statute does not say
that all of the petitioners who filed the request for
disconnection with the municipality must also file the subsequent
petition with the district court. Moreover, although the statute
requires the fifty percent threshold as to a request for
disconnection with the municipality, it makes no reference to
such a threshold in order to file a petition with the district
court. Those who file with the district court must simply
qualify as “petitioners” as that term is defined in the statute.
Accordingly, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction
because Bluffdale Mountain Homes and South Farm owned title to
real property within the area proposed for disconnection and had
signed a request for disconnection with the municipality.

11 See S. Jordan City v. Sandy City, 870 P.2d 273, 275 (Utah
1994); Howard v. Town of North Salt Lake, 281 P.2d 216, 220 (Utah
1955); see also Mariemont Corp. v. White City Water Improvement
Dist., 958 P.2d 222, 227 (Utah 1998).
12 958 P.2d at 223.
13 Howard, 281 P.2d at 217.
14 Id.
13 No. 20060295
B. Our Precedent Is Not Inconsistent with the Conclusion that
the District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction
¶36 Under a prior statutory scheme, we held in a few cases
that when a disconnection or withdrawal petition is facially
insufficient, the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and has no choice but to dismiss the petition
without prejudice.11 In these cases, we stated that a petition
must be signed and filed by the required majority or be
dismissed; otherwise, permitting parties to make amendments to a
petition would frustrate issues of notice and leave uncertain
whether the court had jurisdiction. Bluffdale argues that, under
this precedent, the district court lacked jurisdiction and was
required to dismiss the Developers’ petition without prejudice
because it was not signed and filed by a majority of real
property owners in the Disconnection Area and therefore the court
erred when it granted the Developers leave to amend their
petition. We disagree.
¶37 While Bluffdale argues that Howard v. Town of North
Salt Lake, South Jordan v. Sandy City, and Mariemont Corp. v.
White City Water Improvement District govern the jurisdictional
issue before us now, it fails to take into account that the
current version of the disconnection statute has been extensively
modified since we decided those cases, most significantly with
respect to the role of the district court and the manner in which
notice is given. Furthermore, our Mariemont decision considers a
water district withdrawal statute that is not before us now.12
¶38 In Howard, the petitioners filed a request for
disconnection with the district court that “was not signed by the
required majority of real property owners.”13 On the day of the
hearing, several property owners filed motions with the court to
intervene and add their names to the request for disconnection.14
The district court allowed the property owners to intervene, thus

15 Id.
16 Id. at 220.
17 Id. at 219-20.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 870 P.2d 273, 275 (Utah 1994).
21 Id.
22 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 17A-2-334 to -335 (1991) (repealed
2002). Withdrawal requirements are now located in Utah Code
sections 17B-2-601 to -611 (2004).
No. 20060295 14
providing the request for disconnection with the requisite
majority of real property owners.15
¶39 We overturned the district court’s decision and held
that the request for disconnection must be initially signed and
filed by a majority of real property owners.16 We stated that
this was a statutory prerequisite for the court to have subject
matter jurisdiction over the petition and that because the
request for disconnection was not signed and filed by a majority
of real property owners, the district court had no jurisdiction
and no choice but to dismiss the petition without prejudice.17
We reasoned that the Legislature included this majority
requirement for purposes of notice--the need for residents to
know “who is seeking to divide the town and . . . to know what
counter-measures may be taken to preserve it intact.”18 If the
court allowed property owners to add their names after the
petition had been filed, the prerequisite and notice requirement
that it intended to serve would each be rendered meaningless.19
¶40 In South Jordan, while reviewing a different version of
the statute than in Howard, we held that a request for
disconnection must be signed and filed by a majority of
registered voters in the proposed disconnection area.20 We
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the petition, noting
that the petition was “facially defective.”21
¶41 In Mariemont, we followed Howard’s reasoning by
analogy, holding that, under the water district withdrawal
statute,22 a petition requesting withdrawal from a special
improvement district is insufficient without the signatures of a

23 958 P.2d 222, 226-27 (Utah 1998).
24 Id. at 227.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See Utah Code Ann. § 10-4-1 (1953) (current version at
id. § 10-2-501); id. § 10-2-501 (1986) (current version at id.
§ 10-2-501).
28 See id. § 10-4-1 (1953) (current version at id.
§ 10-2-501(3); id. § 10-2-501(3) (1986) (current version at id.
§ 10-2-501(3)).
29 The version of the statute at issue in South Jordan
required a majority of registered voters to sign and file the
petition. See id. § 10-2-502 (1986) (current version at id.
§ 10-2-501(2)(b)(i)).
30 See id. § 10-4-2 (1953) (current version at id.
§ 10-2-502.7(3)(b)); id. § 10-2-502 (1986) (current version at
(continued...)
15 No. 20060295
“majority of real property owners” and therefore does not confer
jurisdiction upon the court.23 We noted that after such a
petition is filed, signatures can be neither added to nor
subtracted from the petition.24 Further, we stated that
forbidding amendments to a petition is justified because courts
need to have a clear idea who is a party to a pending action.25
“To permit the parties to make amendments would be to invite
confusion as to who is a party to the withdrawal proceeding and
whether the district court is still vested with jurisdiction at
any given time.”26
¶42 As we noted above, in Mariemont we did not consider the
disconnection statute that is before us now. Furthermore, in
Howard and South Jordan, the then-applicable statutory scheme for
disconnection required the petitioners to first file a request
for disconnection with the district court, completely bypassing
independent review by the municipality.27 Under this scheme, the
district court served notice of the filing upon the municipality
and published the petitioners’ disconnection request.28 The
district court also determined whether the petition was signed by
the required majority of real property owners,29 whether the
allegations in the petition were true, and whether justice and
equity required the disconnection.30 Finally, under the former

30 (...continued)
id. § 10-2-502.7(3)(b)).
31 See id. § 10-4-2 (1953) (current version at id.
§ 10-2-507); id. § 10-2-502 (1986) (current version at id.
§ 10-2-507).
32 See id. § 10-2-501(2) (2003).
33 See id. § 10-2-501(3).
34 See id. § 10-2-502.5(5)(a).
35 See id. § 10-2-502.7.
36 See id. §§ 10-2-501(1), 10-2-502.5(5)(a).
No. 20060295 16
scheme, the district court appointed commissioners to determine
the ultimate terms of the disconnection.31
¶43 In contrast, the current version of the statute
requires that petitioners first file a request for disconnection
with the municipality, which is then responsible for determining
whether the petition includes the requisite number of real
property owners.32 And the petitioners, rather than the district
court, are subject to significant notice and public hearing
requirements designed to ensure that residents and other
interested parties are aware of the potential disconnection and
have the opportunity to comment before the municipality’s
legislative body.33 Under the current statute, parties may file
a petition with the district court only when a municipality
denies a request for disconnection.34 At that stage, notice
requirements have already been fulfilled at the municipality
level and interested parties have been given a fair opportunity
to address the disconnection. The district court reviews the
municipality’s decision and is primarily concerned with whether
the disconnection is viable, whether justice and equity require
the disconnection, and whether the disconnection will result in
various burdens on the municipality or the county.35 And as we
have discussed previously, jurisdiction is conferred on the
district court only when “petitioners,” defined as those who own
real property within the disconnection area and have already
filed a request for disconnection with the municipality, file a
petition with the court.36 Of course, the district court may
still review the required copy of the request for disconnection,
which must contain the names, addresses, and signatures of more
than fifty percent of the real property owners in the

37 See id. § 10-2-502.5(5)(b).
17 No. 20060295
disconnection area,37 in order to ensure that previous statutory
requirements were met.
¶44 Ultimately, the current statutory scheme contemplates
different roles for both the district court and the municipality
than did the statutory scheme considered in our prior cases. The
concerns that we had as to notice and potential confusion that
drove our prior decisions are no longer relevant under the
current statutory scheme. Moreover, even if we assume that the
district court erred in allowing an amendment to the petition,
the error was harmless. The Developers simply could have filed
another petition with the district court meeting the statutory
requirements.
II. REVIEW OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S FACTUAL FINDINGS
AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
¶45 Under the disconnection statute, the district court
must determine whether the disconnection is viable, whether
justice and equity require the disconnection, and whether the
disconnection will result in various burdens on the municipality
or county. Utah Code section 10-2-502.7 provides as follows:
(1) After the filing of a petition under
Section 10-2-502.5 and a response to the
petition, the court shall, upon request of a
party or upon its own motion, conduct a court
hearing.
(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear
evidence regarding the viability of the
disconnection proposal.
(3) The burden of proof is on
petitioners who must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence:
(a) the viability of the
disconnection;
(b) that justice and equity require
that the territory be disconnected from
the municipality;
(c) that the proposed disconnection
will not:

No. 20060295 18
(i) leave the municipality
with an area within its boundaries
for which the cost, requirements,
or other burdens of providing
municipal services would materially
increase over previous years;
(ii) make it economically or
practically unfeasible for the
municipality to continue to
function as a municipality; or
(iii) leave or create one or
more islands or peninsulas of
unincorporated territory; and
(d) that the county in which the
area proposed for disconnection is
located is capable, in a cost-effective
manner and without materially increasing
the county’s costs of providing
municipal services, of providing to the
area the services that the municipality
will no longer provide to the area due
to the disconnection.
(4) In determining whether petitioners
have met their burden of proof with respect
to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the court
shall consider all relevant factors,
including the effect of the proposed
disconnection on:
(a) the municipality or community
as a whole;
(b) adjoining property owners;
(c) existing or projected streets
or public ways;
(d) water mains and water services;
(e) sewer mains and sewer services;
(f) law enforcement;
(g) zoning; and
(h) other municipal services.

38 Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7 (2003).
39 Id. § 10-2-502.7(3)(a).
40 State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, ¶ 18, 40 P.3d 611.
19 No. 20060295
(5) The court’s order either ordering or
rejecting disconnection shall be in writing
with findings and reasons.38
We now review the district court’s decision with respect to the
pertinent factual findings and legal conclusions required under
the disconnection statute.
A. The District Court’s Finding that the Disconnection Is Viable
Is Not Clearly Erroneous
¶46 Under the disconnection statute, the petitioners must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence “the viability of the
disconnection.”39 A determination of viability is a question of
fact; therefore, we grant broad deference to the district court’s
factual findings and will not reverse those findings unless
clearly erroneous.40
¶47 The district court found that the disconnection was
viable “whether the property remains undeveloped or is annexed
into Herriman and developed into a Rosecrest-like project.”
Viewing the Disconnection Area as undeveloped land within the
County, the court found that the cost of providing services will
not change immediately following the disconnection.
Additionally, the court found that the tax revenue generated from
the land will more than double and the land is therefore more
viable in the County than in Bluffdale.
¶48 The district court noted that whether the Disconnection
Area will remain viable once it is developed presented a more
complicated question. The parties agreed that annexation into
Herriman is inevitable and also agreed that residential
development, considered in isolation, is a net financial loss to
a municipality. But the court found that this loss would be more
than offset through sales taxes.
¶49 Bluffdale argues that the court’s factual finding is
clearly erroneous. Yet Bluffdale fails to show that the court’s
finding is unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence, let
alone that the court’s finding is clearly erroneous. Bluffdale
argues that when the Disconnection Area is annexed, Herriman’s
cost of providing services will dramatically increase and

41 Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(i).
42 Daniels, 2002 UT 2, ¶ 18.
No. 20060295 20
Herriman will not be able to service the property without using
development fees. The district court found, however, that
although a residential development, considered in isolation, is a
net financial loss for a municipality, the increase in
population, together with planned and existing commercial and
retail elements, will provide more than offsetting revenues
through sales taxes. Bluffdale provides little evidence to rebut
this finding by the court; therefore, we cannot say that the
court’s finding is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s finding as to the viability of the
disconnection.
B. Bluffdale Fails To Adequately Challenge the District Court’s
Factual Finding that the Disconnection Will Not Materially
Increase the Cost to Bluffdale of Providing Municipal Services
¶50 Under the disconnection statute, the petitioners must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence “that the proposed
disconnection will not . . . leave the municipality with an area
within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other
burdens of providing municipal services would materially increase
over previous years.”41 This is a question of fact, which we
will not reverse unless clearly erroneous.42
¶51 The district court found that the disconnection will
not materially increase Bluffdale’s cost of providing municipal
services. In making this finding, the district court viewed the
Disconnection Area as both raw and developed land. Specifically,
the court found that the cost to Bluffdale of providing municipal
services will not materially increase because (1) the
disconnection would not result in a significant increase in
traffic in Bluffdale, (2) the disconnection would not result in
an increase in surface run-off in Bluffdale, and (3) the
disconnection would not result in an increase in law enforcement,
zoning, and other municipal services in Bluffdale. The court
noted in its order that although both parties’ witnesses agreed
that traffic would increase on the streets of Bluffdale, the
petitioners’ traffic analyst, Steve Goeres, specifically
testified that the increase would be only 2.5 percent and that
Bluffdale had offered only unsupported testimony in rebuttal of
this testimony. Further, the district court noted, as to an
increase in surface run-off, even Bluffdale’s witness conceded
that run-off would be more efficiently channeled and controlled
with development.

43 See Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, ¶ 9, 144 P.3d 1147.
44 Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(ii).
45 Daniels, 2002 UT 2, ¶ 18.
21 No. 20060295
¶52 In challenging the court’s finding that the
disconnection will not materially increase Bluffdale’s cost of
providing municipal services, Bluffdale has failed to adequately
marshal the evidence. As we have stated many times before,
[W]hen appealing a highly fact dependent
issue, the appellant has a duty to marshal
the evidence. This duty requires an
appellant to marshal all of the facts used to
support the trial court’s finding and then
show that these facts cannot possibly support
the conclusion reached by the trial court,
even when viewed in the light most favorable
to the appellee. An appellant may not simply
cite to the evidence which supports his or
her position and hope to prevail.
Furthermore, failing to properly marshal is
sufficient ground for affirming the trial
court’s finding.43
Accordingly, we reject Bluffdale’s challenge to the factual
finding.
C. The District Court’s Finding that the Disconnection Will Not
Make It Unfeasible for Bluffdale to Function as a Municipality
Is Not Clearly Erroneous
¶53 Under the disconnection statute, the petitioners must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence “that the proposed
disconnection will not . . . make it economically or practically
unfeasible for the municipality to continue to function as a
municipality.”44 This is also a question of fact, which we will
not reverse unless clearly erroneous.45
¶54 The district court found that the disconnection will
not make it economically or practically unfeasible for Bluffdale
to continue as a municipality. The district court found that
“the loss of tax revenue is insignificant; there would be no
material impact from the proposed development; and Bluffdale
City’s proposed growth plan for the subject property would be
impractical.” This does not appear to be a point of dispute

46 Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(b).
47 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
48 2006 UT 50, 144 P.3d 1096.
49 See In re Disconnection of Certain Territory from
Highland City, 668 P.2d 544, 546 (Utah 1983) (“The determination
of what constitutes ‘justice and equity’ turns on the facts of
each individual case. Once the district court has ruled on a
petition for disconnection, its findings will not be disturbed
unless clearly erroneous.”); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v.
Farmington City, 599 P.2d 1242, 1247 (Utah 1979) (“The owners
urge that, this being a matter in equity, this Court should
undertake an independent evaluation of the findings of the trial
court. We are, as in the past, unwilling to pursue so radical an
approach. Where a trial court has ruled on the justice and
equity of disconnection of an area from a city, this Court will
not disturb the findings unless they are clearly erroneous.”).
No. 20060295 22
between the parties. Clearly, Bluffdale would continue to
function as a municipality even if the disconnection is granted.
D. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion in
Determining that “Justice and Equity” Require the Disconnection
¶55 Under the disconnection statute, the petitioners must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence “that justice and equity
require that the territory be disconnected from the
municipality.”46 Again, we note that the disconnection statute
has been extensively changed and modified over the years, and
therefore we consider the “justice and equity” standard in the
context of the current statute and standard of review.
1. Appropriate Standard of Review for “Justice and Equity”
Determination
¶56 Whether “justice and equity” require disconnection is a
mixed question of fact and law, so the appropriate standard of
review is dictated by the test that we set out in State v.
Pena,47 and recently modified in State v. Levin.48 All of our
prior cases applying the “justice and equity” standard were
decided before Pena, and they treat “justice and equity” as
essentially equivalent to a factual determination and apply the
clearly erroneous standard of review.49 But as we explained in
Levin, for mixed questions, we “select[] a standard of review
from along a spectrum of deference that runs from highly
deferential review under a ‘clearly erroneous’ standard on one

50 Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 19.
51 Id. ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alterations in original).
52 Id. ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23 No. 20060295
end to completely nondeferential review under a ‘correctness’
standard on the other end.”50
¶57 The appropriate standard of review is related to the
relative institutional competencies of the trial and appellate
courts. We stated in Levin as follows:
Because a trial court is in a better position
to judg[e] credibility and resolv[e]
evidentiary conflicts, an appellate court
reviews the trial court’s findings of fact
for clear error. Conversely, an appellate
court reviews a trial court’s conclusions of
law for correctness because a single trial
judge is in an inferior position to determine
what the legal content of [a legal concept]
should be [whereas] a panel of appellate
judges, with their collective experience and
their broader perspective, is better suited
to that task.51
We therefore consider the following three factors to determine
the appropriate standard of review:
(1) the degree of variety and complexity in
the facts to which the legal rule is to be
applied; (2) the degree to which a trial
court’s application of the legal rule relies
on “facts” observed by the trial judge . . .
relevant to the application of the law that
cannot be adequately reflected in the record
available to appellate courts; and (3) other
policy reasons that weigh for or against
granting discretion to trial courts.52
¶58 Applying these factors to the “justice and equity”
determination, it is clear from our prior decisions that the
facts implicating “justice and equity” can be varied and complex
and involve a fact-specific balancing of interests. These
factors weigh in favor of giving substantial deference to the
district court. Our deference will be limited somewhat, however,

53 In re Disconnection of Certain Territory from Highland
City, 668 P.2d 544, 546 (Utah 1983) (noting that although the
City testified it wanted to use the proposed disconnection area
as a park or cemetery, “no master plan had officially set it
aside for such uses”); In re Disconnection of Territory &
Restriction of Corporate Limits of City of Draper, 646 P.2d 699,
702 (Utah 1982) (focusing on the undeveloped nature of the
disconnection property); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. City of
(continued...)
No. 20060295 24
because there is a countervailing policy in favor of a uniform
application of the law. A review of our past cases reveals that
many of the same “justice and equity” factors appear again and
again in disconnection disputes such that we should ensure an
appropriate level of consistency. Accordingly, we will review a
trial court’s “justice and equity” determination as a mixed
question of fact and law subject to substantial deference, but
not so much deference that we will reverse such a determination
only if clearly erroneous.
2. The District Court’s Factual Findings Were Proper to Consider
Under the “Justice and Equity” Determination
¶59 The district court determined that “justice and equity”
favored disconnection. The court primarily made three factual
findings in support of its decision: “(1) Undeveloped land has
historically been found to be appropriate for disconnection”;
“(2) Bluffdale’s zoning and planning process as applied to South
Farm reflects unreasonable delay and arbitrarily changing
standards”; and “(3) Bluffdale’s current political environment
precludes an orderly development process.” Bluffdale argues that
these and other factors the district court considered were
inappropriate to determine whether “justice and equity” require
disconnection. We disagree.
¶60 The “justice and equity” requirement grants broad
discretion to the district court; therefore, the court may
properly consider a wide range of factors favoring or disfavoring
disconnection. The district court “received opinion from
virtually every witness that testified as to why justice and
equity either did or did not require disconnection in this case.”
Such extensive factfinding is contemplated under the statute’s
broad grant of discretion, and a review of our case law confirms
that we have always considered a long list of relevant factors in
disconnection disputes. Furthermore, our prior cases, although
weighing “justice and equity” under different versions of the
disconnection statute, have considered many of the same factors
as the district court did below.53

53 (...continued)
Bingham Canyon, 415 P.2d 209, 211 (Utah 1966) (considering
Kennecott’s argument that the necessary extension of its mining
operations into unoccupied, incorporated land “has been seriously
hampered because of various factors, including the City’s
requirements relating to zoning regulations and construction
purposes”).
54 Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) (2003).
25 No. 20060295
3. Bluffdale Fails to Adequately Challenge the Factual Findings
Supporting the District Court’s Determination that “Justice and
Equity” Require Disconnection
¶61 Bluffdale challenges the factual findings made by the
district court in support of its “justice and equity”
determination primarily on the ground that it was inappropriate
for the court even to consider such findings in assessing
“justice and equity.” While Bluffdale further argues that these
factual findings are clearly erroneous, it makes little effort to
marshal the evidence in the record supporting them. Moreover,
Bluffdale conceded at oral argument that it was not challenging
the court’s finding that the planning and zoning process was
characterized by unreasonable delay. Inasmuch as we have
determined that the district court appropriately considered these
factual findings, and in light of the substantial deference we
give to the district court’s “justice and equity” determination,
we cannot say that Bluffdale has met its burden under the
standard of review.
E. The Disconnection Does Not Leave or Create an
Unincorporated Island or Peninsula
¶62 Under the disconnection statute, petitioners must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence “that the proposed
disconnection will not . . . leave or create one or more islands
or peninsulas of unincorporated territory.”54 We conclude that
the district court erred in its interpretation of the statute as
to this question. However, we affirm the court’s ultimate
conclusion and hold that the disconnection in this case will not
leave or create an island or peninsula of unincorporated
territory.
1. Islands and Certain Peninsulas Are Prohibited Because They
Impair or Inhibit the Provision of Services

55 Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Farmington City, 599 P.2d
1242, 1247 (Utah 1979) (noting concern with an “asymmetrical city
layout” and avoidance of an “unincorporated island”); Howard v.
Town of North Salt Lake, 323 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1958) (stating
that the “disconnection will not destroy the symmetry of [the
town’s] boundaries”).
56 Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-503 (1999) (amended 2003).
57 Highland City, 668 P.2d at 546 (noting that “the district
court found that disconnection would create no islands or
peninsulas within the City’s boundaries that would make it more
expensive or difficult to provide municipal services to the area
remaining after disconnection”); City of Draper, 646 P.2d at 702-
03 (“The disconnection will not create islands or peninsulas
which would leave the municipality with a residual area that
would have the effect of increasing the cost of providing
municipal services to disproportionately high or unreasonable
levels.”).
No. 20060295 26
¶63 The disconnection statute does not define “island”;
however, an unincorporated island is presumably surrounded on all
sides by incorporated territory. Clearly, if the disconnection
creates an island of unincorporated territory, the disconnection
is impermissible. There are two primary reasons for this
prohibition. First, and least compelling, we have expressed in
prior cases a concern for symmetrical city boundaries.55 A
recent version of the statute included language, now stricken,
that considered “whether or not islands or unreasonably large or
varied-shaped peninsular land masses result within or project
into the boundaries of the municipality from which the territory
is to be disconnected.”56
¶64 Second, and more important, unincorporated islands
impair or inhibit the ability of the responsible county to
provide services; access to the unincorporated territory may be
difficult. We have noted this problem in prior cases.57 If the
county has to cross over incorporated land, with respect to
pipelines or other necessary services, the county would be
required to obtain easements or assume potentially difficult
negotiations with the cities involved. Such problems increase
the county’s cost of providing necessary services and may
ultimately render the provision of such services impractical.
¶65 Additionally, unincorporated islands may impair or
inhibit a city from providing services from one point in the city
to another point, for similar reasons as stated above. Thus,

58 We note that we have never applied this definition of
peninsula. Prior to the 2003 amendment of the disconnection
statute, we appear to have used common sense to determine whether
islands or peninsulas were created by the disconnection. See
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-503 (1999) (amended 2003); Highland City,
668 P.2d at 546; City of Draper, 646 P.2d at 702-03.
59 Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(6) (2003).
27 No. 20060295
under the disconnection statute, islands disrupt, impair, or
inhibit the provision of services and therefore are prohibited.
¶66 Unlike islands, some unincorporated peninsulas are
permitted. Utah Code section 10-1-104(6) defines “peninsula” as
follows:
“Peninsula,” when used to describe an
unincorporated area, means an area surrounded
on more than ½ of its boundary distance, but
not completely, by unincorporated territory
and situated so that the length of a line
drawn across the unincorporated area from an
incorporated area to an incorporated area on
the opposite side shall be less than 25% of
the total aggregate boundaries of the
unincorporated area.
This section attempts to define impermissible peninsulas. A
peninsula is prohibited only when it meets both tests under the
statute.58
¶67 As with all unincorporated islands, some unincorporated
peninsulas are prohibited because they impair or inhibit the
provision of services. Peninsulas that jut into incorporated
territory may leave only a narrow neck of land through which the
county or city must provide services. Put simply, some
peninsulas are too much like an island and therefore are
prohibited.
2. The Statutory Definition of Peninsula Is Ambiguous
¶68 The disconnection statute’s definition of peninsula
basically consists of a two-part test for determining whether a
disconnection creates a prohibited peninsula. To apply this
test, we must first determine the “boundary distance” around the
“unincorporated area” and whether more than fifty percent of that
boundary distance is surrounded by incorporated area.59 Second,
if more than fifty percent of the boundary distance is surrounded

60 Id.; see id. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii).
61 Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah
1990).
No. 20060295 28
by incorporated area, we must draw a line across the
unincorporated area from one incorporated area to another
incorporated area on the opposite side; if the length of this
line is less than twenty-five percent of the total boundary
distance of the unincorporated area, then a prohibited peninsula
has been created.60 We hold that this definition of peninsula is
ambiguous with respect to both parts of the statutory test.
a. Measuring the “Boundary Distance” of the “Unincorporated
Area”
¶69 The term “unincorporated area” as used in this statute
is ambiguous in that it is susceptible to two interpretations.
This is illustrated by the fact that the district court measured
the “boundary distance” of the “unincorporated area” as including
not only the Disconnection Area, but also the entire area of
unincorporated land that the Disconnection Area would be joining.
The court stated that “all contiguous unincorporated areas must
be considered in making the calculation.” Yet “unincorporated
area” may reference solely the area proposed for disconnection,
so that we measure only the boundary distance of the
Disconnection Area itself, apart from all of the contiguous,
unincorporated area that it would be joining. Because the term
“unincorporated area” is not defined by the statute and is
subject to these different interpretations, we hold that the term
“unincorporated area” is ambiguous.
¶70 “When interpreting an ambiguous statute, we first try
to discover the underlying intent of the legislature, guided by
the meaning and purpose of the statute as a whole and the
legislative history.”61 According to the district court’s
interpretation of the term “unincorporated area,” and given the
fact that there is a vast ocean of “unincorporated area” in most
cases, there would necessarily be far less than fifty percent of
the unincorporated area’s boundary distance surrounded by
incorporated territory. Thus, as the district court noted, the
statute read in this manner means that there will never be a
peninsula that satisfies even the first part of the test; as a
result, there will never be a prohibited peninsula. Clearly, the
Legislature intended to prohibit certain kinds of peninsulas.
Therefore, we must reject the district court’s interpretation of
“unincorporated area” and give meaning to what constitutes the
“boundary distance” to be measured.

62 See Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-503 (1999) (amended 2003);
Highland City, 668 P.2d at 546; City of Draper, 646 P.2d at 702-
03.
63 According to Bluffdale City’s engineer, the “boundary
distance” of the Disconnection Area is 90,399.91 feet. The
Disconnection Area is surrounded by 51,559 feet of incorporated
territory, which is more than fifty percent of the total boundary
distance.
64 Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(6).
65 Id.
29 No. 20060295
¶71 As noted, the term “unincorporated area” can also be
defined, in measuring “boundary distance,” as only the area
proposed for disconnection. This interpretation is in accord
with the statute’s purpose of prohibiting at least certain kinds
of unincorporated peninsulas. Thus, we measure the “boundary
distance” of the Disconnection Area, which is the “unincorporated
area” as that term was apparently intended to be defined by the
Legislature. This approach is also consistent with our prior
practice of looking at specific peninsula-shaped territories
jutting into the municipality as a result of the disconnection
and determining whether they are permissible.62 So in this case,
when we measure only the Disconnection Area, the first part of
the statutory test is satisfied; more than fifty percent of the
Disconnection Area’s boundary distance is surrounded by
incorporated territory.63 Accordingly, we now consider whether
the second part of the test is satisfied.
b. Drawing a Line Across the Unincorporated Area from an
Incorporated Area to an Incorporated Area on the Opposite Side
¶72 The second part of the test determines whether the
shape of the unincorporated peninsula is the kind that is
offensive to the statute. The statute states that we must draw a
line across the “unincorporated area,” which we have determined
is the Disconnection Area only.64 This line must be drawn from
“an incorporated area to an incorporated area on the opposite
side.”65 If the length of this line is less than twenty-five
percent of the total boundary distance of the Disconnection Area,
then a prohibited peninsula has been created and the
disconnection is impermissible. But the statute gives no
guidance as to where this line should be drawn. It is impossible
to determine where the line should start or where the line should
end. There are multiple places where a line could be drawn from

66 Bluffdale argues the shortest line that can be drawn
across the area proposed for disconnection is 3,936 feet long,
while the longest such line is 17,146 feet long, which renders
both lines less than twenty-five percent of the total boundary
distance of 90,399.91 feet. But the district court correctly
noted that “[i]n virtually any disconnection, it would be
possible to draw a line from incorporated territory to
incorporated territory on the opposite side that either does or
does not meet the test.”
No. 20060295 30
one side to the opposite side. Indeed, both parties have
suggested different line-drawing options, one that results in a
line less than twenty-five percent of the total boundary distance
and one that results in a line more than twenty-five percent of
the total boundary distance.66 As a result, the requirement that
a line be drawn to an “incorporated area on the opposite side” is
arbitrary and renders the second part of the statutory test
hopelessly ambiguous.
¶73 When faced with a statutory ambiguity, we seek to
ascertain the intent of the Legislature. Here, although the
Legislature failed to clearly describe the kinds of peninsulas
that are prohibited, it undoubtedly intended to prohibit certain
peninsulas. So while it is unclear what the precise contours of
prohibited peninsulas would be, the purpose of the Legislature is
clear--to guard against the impairment of the provision of
services. Thus, we are left to make a practical, common sense
assessment of the effect of the peninsula created by the
disconnection in this case.
¶74 We conclude that the Disconnection Area is not the kind
of peninsula the Legislature intended to prohibit. First,
allowing disconnection of the Disconnection Area would not leave
Bluffdale with an unreasonable, asymmetrical boundary. Second,
allowing disconnection would not impair the provision of
services. Bluffdale would face no impediment to providing
services from one point within its remaining boundaries to
another point within those boundaries. And the County would not
be significantly impaired in providing services to the
Disconnection Area even if it remained unincorporated. This fact
is of little consequence, however, in light of the fact that the
parties agree it is inevitable that the Disconnection Area will
be annexed by the City of Herriman.
¶75 In sum, the primary purpose of the ambiguous statutory
definition of peninsula is to guard against the impairment of
services. The Disconnection Area is not the kind of peninsula
that would significantly impair or inhibit the provision of

67 Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801 (Supp. 2005) (previously
numbered as section 10-9-1001).
68 Id. § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(ii) (“The courts shall . . .
determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or
regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.”).
31 No. 20060295
services. Accordingly, we hold that the shape of the
Disconnection Area in this case is permissible.
F. Disconnection Is an Appropriate Remedy
¶76 Bluffdale argues that disconnection is precluded
because the Plaintiffs’ only remedies lie either in an appeal of
the City’s land use decision or in the application of the
boundary adjustment statute. We disagree and affirm the district
court’s holding that disconnection is an appropriate remedy in
this case.
1. The Plaintiffs Are Not Limited to an Appeal of the Zoning
Decision
¶77 Utah Code section 10-9a-801 provides that any person
adversely affected by a municipality’s land use decision may file
an appeal with the district court.67 Bluffdale argues that the
Plaintiffs were required to seek this remedy but did not because
they would not have been able to meet the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard of review.68 Although it was the
Plaintiffs’ right to appeal Bluffdale’s December 9, 2003
rejection of the General Plan Amendment, the Plaintiffs were not
precluded from also filing a disconnection petition with the
district court pursuant to section 10-2-502.5. Indeed, the
Plaintiffs properly filed a request for disconnection with the
City, and only thereafter did they seek relief from the district
court as provided by statute.
¶78 Bluffdale further suggests that landowners will now
attempt to disconnect from a municipality every time they
disagree with a municipality’s land use decision. But as the
district court noted, “It is a rare circumstance that a landowner
affected by a planning and zoning decision could meet all the
tests required for a successful disconnection case.” Moreover,
if landowners do meet all of the tests under the statute, as in
this case, then, consistent with the legislative intent of the
statute, they should be granted disconnection.

69 Id. § 10-2-419(1) (2003).
70 See id. §§ 10-2-502.5, 10-9a-801.
No. 20060295 32
2. The Boundary Adjustment Statute Is a Remedy Solely for
Municipalities, While the Disconnection Statute Is a Remedy for
Private Property Owners
¶79 Bluffdale argues that section 10-2-419 provides the
exclusive remedy for any municipal boundary adjustment. This
argument is belied by the text of that statute, as well as by
section 10-2-510.
¶80 The plain language of section 10-2-419(1) limits the
boundary adjustment remedy to neighboring municipalities.
Section 10-2-419(1) states as follows: “The legislative bodies
of two or more municipalities having common boundaries may adjust
their common boundaries as provided in this section.”69 Only
municipalities “having common boundaries” may adjust their
boundaries under this section. Furthermore, Bluffdale ignores
the plain language of the disconnection statute, which explicitly
gives private property owners a means of adjusting municipal
boundaries. Indeed, every disconnection, by its very nature,
will adjust municipal boundaries.
¶81 While section 10-2-510 provides that the disconnection
statute “shall not be construed to abrogate, modify, or replace
the boundary adjustment procedure provided in Section 10-2-419,”
the fact that private property owners may use a disconnection
does not “abrogate, modify, or replace” the right of
municipalities to use the boundary adjustment procedure.
Neighboring municipalities are still free to adjust their
boundaries.
¶82 Accordingly, the Plaintiffs could have appealed
Bluffdale’s land use decision to the district court, but were not
precluded from filing a disconnection petition with the district
court after the City denied a request for disconnection.70
CONCLUSION
¶83 We affirm the district court’s determination that the
Plaintiffs met their burden of proving the statutory requirements
for disconnection. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
decision granting disconnection.
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33 No. 20060295
¶84 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Nehring, and Judge McHugh concur in Justice Durrant’s
opinion.
¶85 Having disqualified herself, Justice Parrish does not
participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge Carolyn B. McHugh sat.