Smith v. Utah Labor Commission

2009 UT 19
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
Dale T. Smith & Sons and 	No. 20070848
Workers Compensation Fund,
Petitioners,
v.
Utah Labor Commission and 	F I L E D
Jeffrey D. Smith,
Respondents. 	April 7, 2009
---
Original Proceeding in the Court of Appeals
Attorneys: 	Floyd W Holm, Murray, for petitioners
Alan L. Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for respondent,
Utah Labor Commission
Phillip B. Shell, Murray, for respondent, Smith
---
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
WILKINS, Justice:
¶1 	We are asked, on certiorari, to determine whether the
court of appeals correctly construed the term “compensation” in
the context of Utah Code section 34A-3-110 of the Utah
Occupational Disease Act. 	We disagree with the court of appeals’
conclusion and reverse. 	We conclude that for the purpose of
section 34A-3-110, “compensation” includes medical expenses.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	Jeffrey D. Smith developed a lower back condition
during the course of his more than twenty years of employment as
a meat packer. 	Seeking coverage for this condition under the
Utah Occupational Disease Act, he filed an application for
hearing with the Utah Labor Commission. 	The Commission held an
evidentiary hearing in which medical evidence showed that
approximately thirty-five percent of Mr. Smith’s condition was
attributable to his employment. 	The Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) did not send the case to a medical panel for a more exact

1 The Commission’s decision was upheld by the court of
appeals in Ameritech Library Serv. v. Labor Comm’n, 2007 UT App
305, 169 P.3d 784, which is also before us on certiorari.
No. 20070848 	2
determination of the percentage of the condition attributable to
the employment, but instead awarded Mr. Smith full payment of all
reasonable and necessary medical expenses related to his lower
back condition. 	In awarding payment to Mr. Smith, the ALJ relied
on the Labor Commission Appeals Board Order on Motion for Review
in Edmonds, Case No. 02-0969 (Labor Comm’n App. Bd. Aug. 29,
2006), which held that the term “compensation” as used in Utah
Code section 34A-3-110 did not include medical expenses, and
medical expenses, therefore, were not apportionable. 1 	The ALJ’s
award was affirmed by the Labor Commission Appeals Board and by
the court of appeals. 	See Dale T. Smith & Sons v. Labor Comm’n,
2007 UT App 306 (2007), 2007 Utah App. Lexis 314.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶3 	We review the court of appeals’ interpretation of Utah
Code section 34A-3-110 for correctness. 	See Thomas v. Color
Country Mgmt., 2004 UT 12, ¶ 9, 84 P.3d 1201.
ANALYSIS
¶4 	The specific question raised on certiorari is whether
the Legislature intended medical expenses to be included within
the term “compensation” as used in section 34A-3-110 of the Utah
Occupational Disease Act. 	That section reads:
The compensation payable under this chapter
shall be reduced and limited to the
proportion of the compensation that would be
payable if the occupational disease were the
sole cause of disability or death, as the
occupational disease as a causative factor
bears to all the causes of the disability or
death when the occupational disease, or any
part of the disease:
(1) is causally related to employment
with a non-Utah employer not subject to
commission jurisdiction;
(2) is of a character to which the
employee may have had substantial exposure
outside of employment or to which the general
public is commonly exposed;

2 “Subject to the limitations provided in this chapter and,
unless otherwise noted, all provisions of Chapter 2, Workers’
Compensation Act, and Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment
Act, are incorporated into this chapter and shall be applied to
occupational disease claims.” 	Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-102(2)
(2005).
3 Utah Code section 34A-2-102(1)(c) (Supp. 2008), formerly
section 34A-2-102(3) (Supp. 2007), was renumbered in 2008. 	As
there has been no change to the substantive language of the
statute, we use the new numbering throughout this opinion.
3 	No. 20040848
(3) is aggravated by any other disease
or infirmity not itself compensable; or
(4) when disability or death from any
other cause not itself compensable is
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any
way contributed to by an occupational
disease.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 (2005).
¶5 	The Utah Occupational Disease Act provides the
exclusive remedy for employees who suffer disability or death as
a result of a disease or illness contracted in the course of
their employment. 	See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-102(3) (2005). 	The
companion Workers’ Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for
employees who suffer a disability or death as a result of an
accident or injury sustained in the workplace. 	See id. § 34A-2-
105(1) (Supp. 2008). 	Both acts are similar in many regards, and
are contained within the same title of the Utah Code. 	Many of
the definitions and general provisions apply to both.
¶6 	The Utah Occupational Disease Act itself does not
contain a definition of “compensation.” 	Instead, it incorporates
the definition used in the Workers’ Compensation Act. 2 	Utah Code
section 34A-2-102(1)(c) defines “compensation” as “the payments
and benefits provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act.” 	Id. § 34A-2-102(1)(c) (Supp. 2008). 3
¶7 	When determining the meaning of a statute we first look
to the words used by the Legislature, the statute’s plain
language. 	Aris Vision Inst., Inc. v. Wasatch Prop. Mgmt., Inc.,
2006 UT 45, ¶ 9, 143 P.3d 278. 	Additionally, we try to read the
plain language of a statute as a whole, with due consideration of
the other provisions and in an effort to interpret them in
harmony with each other and “with other statutes under the same
and related chapters.” 	State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ¶ 8, 63

4 We leave for another day the question of apportionment of
compensation under Utah Code section 34A-3-110.
No. 20070848 	4
P.3d 667 (internal quotation marks omitted). 	We restrict
ourselves to the plain language unless we are faced with an
ambiguity in that language. 	See State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56,
¶ 25, 4 P.3d 795.
¶8 	We find no ambiguity in the plain language used by the
Legislature here. 	Compensation means “the payments and benefits
provided for in [the] . . . Utah Occupational Disease Act.” 	Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-102(1)(c) (Supp. 2008). 	Respondents would have
us interpret “compensation” in the context of section 34A-3-110
to exclude medical benefits, essentially limiting it to lost
wages. 	We decline to do so. 	The phrase “payments and benefits
provided for in this chapter,” id., clearly contemplates all
payments and benefits, not just some of them.
¶9 	Reimbursement or direct payment of medical expenses is
a payment or benefit specifically provided for in the Utah
Occupational Disease Act. 	Section 104 of the Act states, in
relevant part, “Every employer is liable for the payment of
disability and medical benefits to every employee who becomes
disabled . . . .” 	Id. § 34A-3-104(1) (2005) (emphasis added).
The term “compensation,” as defined by the Legislature, must be
read consistently throughout the statute; medical benefits
resulting from an occupational disease are defined as part of the
compensation employers are required to pay under section 34A-3-
104. 4
¶10 	Petitioners direct our attention to our decisions in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875
(Utah 1979) and Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d
755 (Utah 1982). 	In those cases, in dicta, we may have left the
impression that we considered compensation and medical benefits
to be mutually exclusive. 	To the degree we did so, we disavow
that suggestion. 	Both cases dealt with statutes of limitations
issues, and did not address, in any way, the definitions of
“compensation” or of “medical benefits” for purposes of coverage
under either the Workers’ Compensation Act or the Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
CONCLUSION
¶11 	We hold that “compensation” as used in section 34A-3-
110 of the Utah Occupational Disease Act includes the payment
of medical benefits.

5 	No. 20040848
¶12 	We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
---
¶13 	Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Wilkins’
opinion.