Archuleta v. Galetka

2008 UT 76
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Michael Anthony Archuleta, 	No. 20070228
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
Hank Galetka, Warden of the 	F I L E D
Utah State Prison,
Respondent and Appellant. 	November 7, 2008
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Fourth District, Fillmore
The Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Jr.
No. 940401006
Attorneys: 	Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Thomas B. Brunker,
Erin Riley, Christopher D. Ballard, Asst. Att’ys
Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellant
Richard P. Mauro, Mark R. Moffat, Ann Taliaferro,
Salt Lake City, for Lynn C. Donaldson
Edward K. Brass, Salt Lake City, pro se
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WILKINS, Justice:
¶1 	We have been asked to determine whether the district
court erred in denying Respondent’s motion for sanctions under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 	We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	This case comes in the wake of Michael Anthony
Archuleta’s capital murder conviction, the underlying facts of
which make no difference here and have previously been described
in detail. 	See State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1236-37 (Utah
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 979 (1993). 	This court
subsequently affirmed Archuleta’s conviction and sentence. 	Id.
at 1235. 	Counsel for Archuleta then filed a Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus and/or Postconviction Relief on August 11, 1994.
Since that time, this case has followed a meandering path of
challenges, delays, and changes in counsel that have, to date,
consumed more than 14 years.

No. 20070228 	2
¶3 	In June 2002, Archuleta filed his Second Amended
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Postconviction Relief
with the assistance of counsel Edward K. Brass and Lynn
Donaldson. 	The second amended petition was about fifty pages in
length, excluding attachments, and raised approximately 120
claims, many of which were repetitions of claims raised in the
first amended petition eight years earlier.
¶4 	The second amended petition spurred the State to file a
motion for rule 11 sanctions against the attorneys who had
prepared and filed it. 	The State alleged that the second amended
petition violated rule 11 by: (1) raising claims that were
foreclosed or unsupported by existing law; (2) raising claims
that were not supported by the evidence; (3) citing an arguably
inapplicable subsection of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure with
the presumed intention of misleading the trial court as to the
subsection’s applicability; and (4) misstating the law regarding
the constitutionality of Utah’s death penalty statutes.
¶5 	The trial court held a hearing on the motion in which
it received evidence and heard oral arguments. 	Ultimately, the
trial court concluded that the attorneys’ conduct in this case,
although somewhat “unwarranted and unjustifiable,” did not rise
to a level sufficient to justify rule 11 sanctions. 	The State
now appeals that ruling.
ANALYSIS
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 	In reviewing a trial court’s determination of whether a
rule 11 violation has occurred, we apply different standards of
review to different aspects of that determination. 	Findings of
fact are reviewed under a clear error standard, while conclusions
of law are reviewed for correctness. 	See Griffith v. Griffith,
1999 UT 78, ¶ 10, 985 P.2d 255. 	The trial court’s determination
regarding the type and amount of sanctions to be imposed is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. 	Id. 	We apply this three-part
approach because it “accords appropriate discretion to the trial
judge in making the difficult judgment as to what an appropriate
sanction may be, [and] upholds findings of fact unless contrary
to the clear weight of the evidence . . . .” 	Barnard v. Sutliff,
846 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1992).
¶7 	Decisions regarding rule 11 sanctions are best left in
the hands of the trial court. 	We therefore accord reasonable
discretion to the trial court to determine when sanctions are

1 Although capital cases, including postconviction
proceedings, are clearly criminal in nature, Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 81(e) provides that the rules of civil procedure “shall
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is
(continued...)
3 	No. 20070228
useful and appropriate. 	When applying the appropriate standards
of review, we grant considerable deference to the trial court’s
factual findings and some deference to the trial court’s
application of the facts when reaching its legal conclusion of
whether rule 11 has been violated. 	We also afford substantial
deference to the trial court’s ultimate determination of when,
and to what extent, sanctions are a useful tool in controlling
abuses of the judicial process.
¶8 	In this case, the trial court held a lengthy hearing on
the State’s motion for rule 11 sanctions, at which both parties
had an opportunity to present evidence and argue their respective
positions. 	After thorough consideration, the trial court issued
a seventeen-page, well-reasoned ruling in which it held that
“none of the actions by counsel for Petitioner raised in
Respondent’s motion for sanctions were so egregious as to
constitute a violation of rule 11.” 	We find no error in the
trial court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. 	On that
basis, we also see no need to revise the trial court’s ultimate
determination regarding the usefulness of sanctions in this
situation, and therefore affirm the trial court’s conclusions.
II. 	APPLICATION OF RULE 11 IN CAPITAL CASES
¶9 	Counsel for the lawyers against whom the sanctions were
sought in this matter argues that death penalty cases are
different enough to require a modified application of rule 11.
Citing the somewhat conflicting requirements of the guidelines
suggested by the American Bar Association for counsel in capital
cases, as well as the differing process of reviewing death
penalty cases followed in the federal courts, counsel urged us to
relax the clear requirements of our rules that impose on counsel
obligations of honesty, integrity, thoroughness, and candor with
the court. 	While we agree that death penalty cases are different
from all other criminal and civil cases, relaxing the minimum
standards of professional competence and integrity required of
counsel is an unacceptable method of compensating for those
differences.
¶10 	Rule 11 applies in its entirety to capital cases. 1

1(...continued)
no other applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so
applied does not conflict with any statutory or constitutional
requirement.” 	Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e). 	As there is no statute or
rule indicating to the contrary, there is no exception to rule
11’s applicability in capital cases. 	The standard application of
rule 11 therefore applies.
No. 20070228 	4
This is true regardless of whether the case was undertaken on a
paid or pro bono basis. 	It is likewise applicable regardless of
considerations of time, limited resources, and complexity of the
issues. 	In other words, a capital case does not create any
special exception for bad behavior or bad lawyering, nor any
justification for the relaxation of rule 11.
¶11 	Nevertheless, we are concerned by the possibilities of
increased delay, expense, and complexity which may be occasioned
by the raising of a motion for rule 11 sanctions during the
pendency of an underlying capital case. 	The moment allegations
of a personal violation are filed against capital defense
counsel, the interests of attorney and client diverge. 	The
attorney is required to invest time and resources in his or her
own defense in the rule 11 matter. 	An attorney’s rule 11 defense
may also require disclosure of strategy or communications that
constitute a possible breach of the confidentiality between
attorney and client. In noncapital matters, where defense counsel
may easily be replaced or assisted by other competent counsel,
the challenge to the behavior of defense counsel has a less
dramatic impact.
¶12 	Consequently, motions for rule 11 sanctions brought
against opposing counsel in capital cases require different
treatment by trial courts. 	Hereafter, rule 11 motions should be
deferred by the trial court until the conclusion of the
underlying proceedings. 	Opposing counsel should give notice of
the basis prompting the filing of a rule 11 motion as now
provided, triggering the twenty-one day safe harbor period in
which to cure the alleged violation, see Utah R. Civ. P.
11(c)(1)(A) (2008), but further proceedings on the motion must be
stayed until the conclusion of the pending action in order to
minimize the delay and interference resulting from the defense of
the motion. Failure to do so prior to the release of this opinion
is not grounds for additional review of prior matters. 	This
direction to trial courts is prospective only.

5 	No. 20070228
III. 	RE-RAISING RESOLVED CLAIMS IN CAPITAL CASES
¶13 	At the heart of the State’s concern is the widespread
practice of repeatedly raising previously decided issues in
subsequent challenges to a capital conviction. 	Counsel for the
defense lawyers argued, however, that failure to re-raise claims
is unacceptable practice for capital defense counsel, given the
ABA guidelines and the nature of state and federal capital case
review.
¶14 	Here, Archuleta’s second amended petition for
postconviction relief contained approximately 120 claims of error
in prior proceedings, some of which had been expressly rejected
by this court on direct appeal. 	The State argues that re-raising
these claims violated rule 11, while the defense lawyers argue
that it was necessary to re-raise these claims for preservation
purposes.
¶15 	We acknowledge the difficult situation in which counsel
on both sides of this question find themselves. 	We also
recognize that capital case review has become increasingly
complex due to the interaction of state and federal statutory
efforts to simplify and streamline the process, not to mention
the impact of decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of
our own courts interpreting the constitutional minimums
applicable to review in cases for which the life of the defendant
hangs in the balance. 	Death penalty cases truly are different
from other criminal cases handled by our courts. 	They demand
greater skill and more resources than any other criminal matter.
As a consequence, we cannot say with any real degree of certainty
that defense counsel’s claim that re-raising decided issues is
pointless. 	We can say with complete certainty, however, that
doing so in a nondiscriminatory manner, without the requisite
competence, candor, and thoroughness, will lead to sanctions in
the future.
¶16 	If counsel feel compelled to re-raise resolved or
arguably resolved claims solely for purposes of preservation,
they may do so, so long as those claims are properly identified
as such. 	Resolved claims must be grouped and labeled in such a
manner that they are evident as such to the trial court and to
opposing counsel, with the clear indication that they are raised
solely for the purpose of preservation. 	Further, previously
raised claims must still allege an existing change in the law, a
nonfrivolous argument for a change in the existing law, or some
other equally reasonable justification. 	See Utah R. Civ. P.
11(b)(1)-(4). 	Counsel’s belief that there is an obligation to

No. 20070228 	6
repeatedly re-raise resolved claims does not diminish the
obligation to do so competently.
IV. 	ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN CAPITAL CASES
¶17 	While we accept the trial court’s conclusion that the
attorney conduct at issue in this case did not rise to the level
demanding a rule 11 sanction, we also agree with the trial court
that much of what took place in regard to Archuleta’s second
amended petition was unwarranted and unjustifiable under our
rules and applicable law. 	The circumstances giving rise to this
pattern of behavior in capital cases include low levels of public
funding for capital cases, increasing delays in final resolution
of these cases, significantly diminishing numbers of qualified
counsel able and willing to represent capital defendants, and
changing legal and public attitudes to death penalty matters.
¶18 	In recent years we have become especially concerned
with the diminishing pool of competent counsel in capital cases.
There is no acceptable justification for this trend. 	Competent
defense and appellate counsel are guaranteed by our constitution.
We cannot allow a defendant’s life to be taken by the government
without an adequate review of the conviction. 	Our judicial oath
to support, protect, and defend the Constitution must, of
necessity, include the requirement that we take measures within
our authority and responsibility to see that the mandates of the
Constitution are observed.
¶19 	It is the duty of the legislative branch to provide for
adequate defense of capital defendants, including sufficient
resources to attract, train, compensate, and support legal
counsel. 	It is left to the legislative branch to determine how
best to accomplish this goal. 	However, it falls to us, as the
court of last resort in this state, to assure that no person is
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without the due–-and
competent--process of law. 	Without a sufficient defense, a
sentence of death cannot be constitutionally imposed. 	This basic
concept is bedrock upon which our constitutional government
stands.
¶20 	If, in the future, we find that the unavailability of
competent and willing counsel impedes prompt, constitutionally
sound resolution in capital cases, we may be forced to hold that
the lack of such counsel is sufficient grounds for outright
reversal of a capital sentence and remand for the imposition of a
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, for

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which the required degree of sophistication and skill reposed in
counsel is slightly less.
¶21 	Affirmed.
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¶22 	Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant,
Justice Parrish, and Judge Maughan concur in Justice Wilkins’
opinion.
¶23 	Having disqualified himself, Justice Nehring does not
participate herein; District Judge Paul G. Maughan sat.