Peck v. State

2008 UT 39
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Thomas Peck, aka Thomas Joseph No. 20070117
Peck,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
F I L E D
State of Utah and the Utah
Highway Patrol, July 1, 2008
Defendants and Appellants.
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Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod
No. 040926474
Attorneys: Bart J. Johnsen, Chandler P. Thompson, Park City, for
plaintiff
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Peggy E. Stone, Asst.
Att’y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants
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PARRISH, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 This case requires us to determine whether the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act bars Thomas Peck’s negligence suit
against the State of Utah and the Utah Highway Patrol (“UHP”).
Peck alleges that a UHP trooper negligently allowed him to fall
on his face while the trooper was physically restraining him.
The incident occurred after Peck was arrested and handcuffed, but
before he was placed in a police cruiser to be transported to
jail. We hold that Peck’s claim is barred because there is a
causal connection between his injury and his incarceration in a
place of legal confinement such that his injury arose out of his
incarceration. Thus, his claim falls within the plain language
of Utah Code section 63-30-10(10) (1997) (the “incarceration

1 Because there are multiple versions of this statute, we
refer to the version in effect at the time of Peck’s injury. See
Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 3 n.2, 173 P.3d
166. On July 1, 2004, the legislature replaced the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38
(1997), with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63-30d-101 to -904 (2004). Under the current version of
the Act, the incarceration exception is found at Utah Code
section 63-30d-301(5)(j). Although some wording differs between
the two versions of the statute, the operative language is
virtually identical. Thus, case law interpreting section 63-30-
10(10) will likely apply to section 63-30d-310(5)(j). See
Johnson v. State Dep’t of Transp., 2006 UT 15, ¶ 12 n.6, 133 P.3d
402.
2 Hall v. State Dep’t of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 2, 24 P.3d
958.
3 Id.
No. 20070117 2
exception”),1 which retains governmental immunity for negligence
suits in which “the injury arises out of, in connection with, or
results from . . . the incarceration of any person in any state
prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal
confinement.”
FACTS
¶2 On appeal from a motion to dismiss, “we review the
facts only as they are alleged in the complaint.”2 We accept the
factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences
from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.3 We
recite the facts accordingly.
¶3 On September 17, 2002, two UHP troopers arrested Peck
for drunk driving. They approached him in the parking lot of a
gas station, placed him in handcuffs, and asked him to stand in
front of the police cruiser while they cleared a space in the
back seat in order to transport him to the county jail. Peck
stood in front of the cruiser, but refused to comply with the
troopers’ repeated requests that he turn and face the vehicle.
Instead, he shouted at the troopers. In response, one of the
troopers attempted to physically restrain Peck by forcing him to
the ground. Due to a recent rainstorm, the parking lot was wet
and slippery. The trooper slipped and lost physical control of
Peck as he was forcing him to the ground. Because Peck’s hands
were cuffed behind his back, he could not break his fall and

4 See State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17, ¶ 13, 133 P.3d 396
(internal quotation marks omitted).
5 The legislature renumbered Title 78 during the 2008
General Legislative Session. Because the language is identical,
we cite to the newly numbered statute.
3 No. 20070117
landed face first on the ground, resulting in trauma to his head
and injuries to his face.
¶4 Peck filed a complaint alleging that his injuries were
caused by the trooper’s negligence in allowing him to fall on his
face. In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss based on
governmental immunity. The State argued that Peck’s injuries are
covered by the incarceration exception to the statutory waiver of
governmental immunity because his injuries arose out of
incarceration in a place of legal confinement.
¶5 The district court denied the State’s motion, and the
State filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the
same theory. The district court issued a written decision
denying this motion as well because Peck’s injuries did not occur
in a “state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal
confinement” within the meaning of the incarceration exception.
The district court reasoned that a generic term following
specific terms should be interpreted “to embrace only objects
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding
specific words.”4 Accordingly, the district court held that the
incarceration exception covers only those injuries that occur
within “physical facilities owned and controlled by a state or
municipal government.” Because Peck was never confined in a
facility owned or controlled by the State, the district court
concluded that he was never incarcerated in a “place of legal
confinement”. Consequently, his claim was not barred by
governmental immunity.
¶6 We granted the State’s petition for interlocutory
appeal under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. We
have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code section
78A-3-102(3)(j) (2008).5 We reverse and remand.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 We review the district court’s denial of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings for correctness, granting no deference

6 See Mountain Am. Credit Union v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 590,
591 (Utah 1993).
7 See Blackner v. Dep’t of Transp., 2002 UT 44, ¶ 8, 48 P.3d
949; Hall v. State Dep’t of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 11, 24 P.3d 958.
8 Blackner v. Dep’t of Transp., 2002 UT 44, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d
949.
9 Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978).
10 Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1971); Pace v.
St. George City Police Dep’t, 2006 UT App 494, ¶ 6, 153 P.3d 789.
11 Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (1997).
No. 20070117 4
to the district court’s ruling.6 Additionally, determining the
scope of an exception to the waiver of governmental immunity is a
question of statutory interpretation that we also review for
correctness.7
ANALYSIS
¶8 We apply a three-part test to determine whether a
governmental entity is immune from suit under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. The test “assesses (1) whether the
activity undertaken is a governmental function; (2) whether
governmental immunity was waived for the particular activity; and
(3) whether there is an exception to that waiver.”8 In this
case, there is no dispute that the UHP troopers were undertaking
a governmental function for which the government has waived
immunity. There is also no dispute that Peck was “incarcerated”
at the time of the injury. He was arrested, handcuffed, and told
to stand in front of the police cruiser. Clearly, he was “under
the control of the State”9 and unable to “be released without
some kind of permission.”10
¶9 Thus, the only issue before us is the scope of
governmental immunity retained by the incarceration exception,
which preserves immunity for any injury that “arises out of, in
connection with, or results from . . . the incarceration of any
person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place
of legal confinement.”11
¶10 The first step in any statutory interpretation is to
examine the plain meaning of the statute. “[O]ur goal is to give

12 Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 9, 173
P.3d 166.
13 Hall v. State Dep’t of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d
958.
14 Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah
1996).
15 Id. (quoting Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. W.
Cas. & Sur. Co., 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978)).
16 Hall, 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15.
5 No. 20070117
effect to the legislature’s intent and purpose.”12 Accordingly,
we begin with the plain language of the incarceration exception,
considering the literal meaning of each term and avoiding
“interpretations that will render portions of a statute
superfluous or inoperative.”13
¶11 The phrase “arising out of” is very broad, general, and
comprehensive.14 In ordinary usage, it imports “a concept of
causation” and is “‘ordinarily understood to mean originating
from, incident to, or connected with the item in question.’”15
The other phrases in the exception--“in connection with” and
“results from”--similarly connote a causal link between the
injury and the government activity for which sovereign immunity
has not been waived. Thus, any injury that is caused by or
originates from incarceration in a place of legal confinement
falls within the incarceration exception.
¶12 In their briefs before this court, both parties focused
on the spatial scope of the incarceration exception. To this
end, they concentrated their arguments on whether the verbally
defined patch of concrete where the troopers told Peck to stand
was a “place of legal confinement.” In so focusing their
arguments, the parties have missed the forest for the trees. By
concentrating on the meaning of the phrase “place of legal
confinement,” the parties failed to consider the broad
introductory phrase that retains governmental immunity for all
injuries “aris[ing] out of, in connection with, or result[ing]
from” incarceration in a place of legal confinement. This
oversight conflicts with the principle of statutory
interpretation that requires us to avoid “interpretations that
will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.”16

17 “Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or
omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment
except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or
results from . . . (10) the incarceration of any person in any
state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal
confinement.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10).
18 State v. Burgess-Benyon, 2004 UT App 312, ¶¶ 8-11, 99
P.3d 383 (holding that the phrase “other place of confinement,”
as used in Utah Code section 76-8-418 (2002), included the
backseat of a police cruiser because a police vehicle can act as
a temporary jail).
19 Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978) (holding
that the plain meaning of section 63-30-10(10) retained immunity
for “injuries occurring while the incarcerated person is in
prison and under control of the State”).
20 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976).
21 Id. at 244.
No. 20070117 6
¶13 As we step back and look at the entire incarceration
exception,17 it is clear that it covers Peck’s injury because
there is a clear causal link between his injury and his
incarceration in a place of legal confinement. Peck had been
arrested, handcuffed, and asked to stand in front of the cruiser
as he awaited imminent transportation to the county jail. In
fact, Peck was standing outside of the police cruiser only
because the arresting trooper needed to clear the back seat in
order to transport Peck to the county jail. Peck’s belligerence
as he waited was the reason the trooper physically restrained
him, and Peck’s injury resulted from the restraint. Whether we
refer to the police cruiser18 or the county jail19 as the place of
legal confinement, the causal link between Peck’s injury and his
incarceration in a place of legal confinement is clear.
¶14 Defining the boundaries of the incarceration exception
by focusing on the causal link between the injury and
incarceration in a place of legal confinement is consistent with
our precedent. For example, in Epting v. State, a prisoner
escaped from a work release program and killed a woman.20 Her
children brought a negligence claim against the State. We
concluded that their claim was barred by govermental immunity
because the woman’s death either arose out of the discretionary
choice of placing the inmate in the work release program or arose
out of his incarceration in the state prison.21 Thus, in
applying the term “arises out of . . . incarceration in a place

22 784 P.2d 1255 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
23 2006 UT App 494, 153 P.3d 789.
24 Kirk, 784 P.2d at 1256.
25 Id. at 1256-57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26 Pace, 2006 UT App. 494 ¶ 7 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30d-301(5)(j)).
7 No. 20070117
of legal confinement,” we focused on the causal connection
between the injury and incarceration in a place of legal
confinement, rather than focusing spatially on whether the actual
injury occurred within a “place of legal confinement.”
¶15 The court of appeals adopted a similar approach in both
Kirk v. State22 and Pace v. St. George City Police Department.23
In Kirk, a prison inmate escaped while being transported to the
Hall of Justice to attend court proceedings.24 In the course of
his escape, he shot an unarmed bailiff, who then brought a
negligence suit against the State for his injuries. Focusing on
the causal connection between the injury and incarceration in a
place of legal confinement, the court of appeals held that
governmental immunity applied because the “injury [was] caused by
an incarcerated person under the control of the State.”25
Similarly, in Pace, the court of appeals held that governmental
immunity applied to a suicide death that occurred in the police
department bathroom because the death occurred “‘in connection
with’” the individual’s incarceration in a “‘place of legal
confinement.’”26
¶16 Due to the clear causal link between Peck’s injury and
his imminent transportation in a police cruiser to the county
jail, we hold that his claim is barred by section 63-30-10(10)
because his injury arose out of, in connection with, or resulted
from incarceration in a place of legal confinement. We leave for
another day whether a trooper or a police officer may create a
place of legal confinement by verbally defining physical
boundaries and directing an individual to stand within those
boundaries.
CONCLUSION
¶17 Peck’s injury occurred after he had been arrested and
incarcerated and as he waited to be transported in a police
cruiser to the county jail. There is a clear causal link between
his injury and his incarceration in either the county jail or the
police cruiser. Accordingly, his injury arose out of his

No. 20070117 8
incarceration in a place of legal confinement, and Peck is barred
from pursuing his negligence claim against the State because his
injury is covered by the plain language of Utah Code section 63-
30-10(10), which retains governmental immunity for injuries that
“arise[] out of, in connection with, or result from . . .
incarceration . . . in any state prison, county or city jail, or
other place of legal confinement.” Reversed and remanded.
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¶18 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant,
Justice Wilkins, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish’s
opinion.