State v. Santana-Ruiz

1 In the briefs and in the record, Mr. Santana-Ruiz is
referred to variously as Felipe Santana-Ruiz, Felipe Santana
Ruiz, and Felipe Ruiz Santana. Mr. Santana-Ruiz’s counsel uses
Felipe Santana-Ruiz in the appellate brief before us, and we do
the same.
2007 UT 59
AMENDED OPINION
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
State of Utah, No. 20050747
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
F I L E D
Felipe Santana-Ruiz,
Defendant and Appellant. August 10, 2007
---
Second District, Ogden Dep’t
The Honorable Ernest W. Jones
No. 011900435
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Jeanne B. Inouye,
Asst. Att’y Gen., Salt Lake City, L. Dean Saunders,
Ogden, for plaintiff
Sharon S. Sipes, Ogden, for defendant
---
NEHRING, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Felipe Santana-Ruiz1 was convicted of murdering Troy
Florez. Mr. Santana-Ruiz and Mr. Florez were quarreling at a
late-night party, and the argument devolved into an exchange of
blows. Mr. Santana-Ruiz, armed with a knife, ended matters when
he stabbed Mr. Florez multiple times, killing him. At trial,
Geoffrey Clark, Mr. Santana-Ruiz’s attorney, attempted to argue
that Mr. Santana-Ruiz was legally justified in using deadly force
against Mr. Florez because he was acting in self-defense.
Mr. Clark’s presentation of Mr. Santana-Ruiz’s defense was marked

No. 20050747 2
by conduct that violated ethical codes and breached courtroom
decorum.
¶2 The jury convicted Mr. Santana-Ruiz. He now argues
that Mr. Clark’s courtroom antics doomed his defense and
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree with
Mr. Santana-Ruiz that Mr. Clark’s behavior was inexcusable--
Mr. Clark deservedly received a jail commitment for contempt of
court--but his lack of courtroom decorum in this case did not
meet the legal standard, announced in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), required to sustain a showing of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Mr. Clark’s misconduct was offset by the
overwhelming nature of the quality and quantity of evidence
presented against Mr. Santana-Ruiz and diminished in its effect
because the trial court took great care not to censure Mr. Clark
before the jury.
BACKGROUND
¶3 On January 27, 2002, Mr. Santana-Ruiz and Mr. Florez
were both in Ogden, Utah, at a house party that had carried into
the early morning hours. The two men began bickering, and Teresa
Gallegos, the homeowner, asked Mr. Santana-Ruiz to leave the
house. The two men continued to quarrel, however, and their
argument escalated into a physical confrontation. They exchanged
approximately three blows each in a ten-second interval.
Mr. Santana-Ruiz’s blows proved lethal because the hand that
delivered them held a knife.
¶4 Mr. Geoffrey Clark represented Mr. Santana-Ruiz at his
four-day trial and made self-defense the focus of his defense
strategy. Mr. Clark injected into this strategy numerous serious
ethical violations that eventually led the trial judge to cite
him for criminal contempt of court and to order Mr. Clark to
serve thirty days in jail. This court affirmed the trial court’s
order of contempt and resulting sanction against Mr. Clark in
State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, ¶¶ 23, 39, 124 P.3d 235.
¶5 We recounted fully the sordid saga of Mr. Clark’s
misdeeds in his appeal of the contempt order. Id. ¶¶ 2-13. We
repeat many of those events here as they serve as the factual
backdrop to Mr. Santana-Ruiz’s claim that Mr. Clark’s antics
deprived him of a fair trial.
• Cocaine and the Toxicology Report
¶6 The state medical examiner prepared a toxicology report
based on his examination of Mr. Florez’s body. The report
revealed that Mr. Florez had trace amounts of cocaine metabolite

3 No. 20050747
in his blood. The medical examiner testified at a preliminary
hearing, however, that it was unlikely that Mr. Florez was under
the influence of cocaine at the time of the stabbing because the
testing revealed only trace amounts of metabolite and no active
compound in Mr. Florez’s system.
¶7 The State filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude
the defense from making any reference to the toxicology report,
and the court granted the motion. Mr. Clark, however, was
determined to use the evidence and threatened, “[M]ark my words,
at the end of this trial the jury’s gonna know about his I.V.
drug use and he’s a violent criminal. Mark my words.”
¶8 Proving himself to be a man of his word, Mr. Clark
attempted to circumvent the order in limine. In his cross-
examination of the medical examiner at trial, Mr. Clark asked
where the paramedics inserted the intravenous catheters into
Mr. Florez’s veins. The State objected, recognizing Mr. Clark’s
less than subtle attempt to show that the paramedics inserted the
catheter into Mr. Florez’s neck because prior intravenous drug
use had ruined the veins in his arms. After a short sidebar
conference, the court sustained the State’s objection.
Undeterred by this ruling, Mr. Clark proceeded to ask the
examiner about the toxicology report and about what substances
the medical examiner found in Mr. Florez’s blood. The
prosecution again objected, and the court sustained the
objection.
¶9 Then, when a juror submitted a written question asking
about the toxicology report, Mr. Clark stated, “Great question.
I think it should be asked,” making it appear as though the
prosecution was hiding evidence. After the court reformulated
the juror’s question to the examiner to conform to the motion in
limine by asking what drugs the victim may have been given in the
hospital, Mr. Clark said, within the jury’s hearing, “Your Honor,
I don’t think that was specifically the question. I think the
question specifically was illegal drugs.” The trial judge
excused the jury and reprimanded Mr. Clark.
• Teresa Gallegos
¶10 Teresa Gallegos, the owner of the home where the
stabbing occurred, was a trial witness for the State. In an
effort to impeach her testimony on cross-examination, Mr. Clark
asked Ms. Gallegos if she had a problem with drinking and asked
her to explain a document that he handed to her. The prosecution
asked to see the document, which, upon inspection, appeared to
suggest that Ms. Gallegos had been convicted of a crime. The
State objected on the grounds that the document was not

No. 20050747 4
certified. The trial judge told Mr. Clark that he could ask
Ms. Gallegos only whether she had been convicted. Mr. Clark then
asked Ms. Gallegos if she had ever been “involved in a D.U.I. or
alcohol-related offense.” The court again corrected him, and he
moved on. In the contempt hearing that followed the jury trial,
the trial court found that “Mr. Clark wanted the jury to believe
the paper was an official document” and that “[t]his was an act
of deceit and dishonesty by Mr. Clark.”
• Reference to Threats of Violence
¶11 During the trial, the prosecution called
Mr. Santana-Ruiz’s half-brother Marcos Ruiz to the stand and
asked for his name and address. Mr. Clark objected, “I’m gonna
object at this time, your Honor. The court is well aware of the
threats of violence in this case . . . .” However, no evidence
had been introduced to suggest that any witness had been
threatened.
• Conferences at the Bench
¶12 Throughout the trial, the trial judge repeatedly called
the parties to conferences at the bench. On two separate
occasions, Mr. Clark walked away from the bench in the middle of
the conference. The trial judge called him back and reprimanded
him.
• Closing Argument
¶13 During his closing argument, Mr. Clark again raised the
specter of Mr. Florez’s cocaine use. Summarizing the night’s
events, he said, referring to Mr. Florez, “Boy, he’s got that
cocaine in his system, he’s got that alcohol in his system, and
he wants to fight.” Then, after elaborating further, he
explained, “And at the time [Mr. Santana-Ruiz is] being accosted
by this crowd, straight through the middle of the crowd comes a
man, flailing, wild, hopped up on coke, coming at him, bigger
than him.”
¶14 Finally, Mr. Clark tried to inject drama into his
closing argument by attempting to tear a piece of evidence. He
had argued that, at the party, Mr. Santana-Ruiz was being pushed
around by several other party-goers in the moments leading up to
his brief scuffle with Mr. Florez. Shortly after the incident,
Mr. Santana-Ruiz told police that his sweatshirt had been torn
during the fracas. The officer who inspected the sweatshirt at
trial, however, found no tears. Nevertheless, during his closing
argument, Mr. Clark brought the sweatshirt before the jury and

5 No. 20050747
pulled on it. The prosecution objected. The court inquired
about Mr. Clark’s intent. The following exchange ensued:
The Court: Well, you’re--well, you’re not
going to tear it, are you?
[Lead Prosecutor]: Yes, he just did, your
Honor.
[2nd Prosecutor]: He just did. He just did.
Mr. Clark: Did I tear it? Did I tear it?
The Court: Okay. Well, don’t--don’t tamper
with the evidence or alter the evidence.
[2nd Prosecutor]: He’s already done that,
your Honor.
Mr. Clark: Look at the threads. Look at the
threads. It is wholly possible that he heard
a rip. Wholly possible.
The Court: So did you just tear the sweater?
Mr. Clark: No sir.
[Lead Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I heard--
[2nd Prosecutor]: I heard it tear.
Mr. Clark: Did you hear it rip, Ladies and
Gentlemen of the jury?
The Court: No, no, no, no. Don’t--don’t
talk to the jury that way. I want to know if
you altered the evidence just now.
Mr. Clark: No, not at all.
The Court: Okay. So there’s no--there’s no
tearing?
Mr. Clark: No tearing at all.
The Court: All right.

2 Mr. Santana-Ruiz moved for resentencing under State v.
Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981). Under Johnson, we provided a
procedure whereby appellants who were prevented from bringing a
timely appeal through no fault of their own could restore their
rights to appeal by filing a motion for resentencing in the trial
court. In Manning v. State, however, we overruled Johnson,
explaining that certain evolutions in Utah’s statutory law and
procedural rules rendered Johnson “no longer functional.” 2005
UT 61, ¶ 11, 122 P.3d 628. We then “outline[d] a new procedure
to restore the right to appeal for a defendant who proves . . .
that he has not knowingly or voluntarily waived” the right to
appeal. Id.
No. 20050747 6
[Lead Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I heard a
sound that would indicate some tearing.
Whether it’s visible or not--
The Court: All right. Well, we’ll check it
out later. I--go ahead.
¶15 At the conclusion of the trial, one that the trial
judge characterized as an “adventure,” Mr. Santana-Ruiz was
convicted as charged. Mr. Santana-Ruiz later moved for and was
granted a remand pursuant to rule 23B of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure to address counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness
for failure to convey a plea offer and for advising
Mr. Santana-Ruiz to discharge his Spanish language interpreter.
¶16 The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the
motion and determined that Mr. Clark had, in fact, conveyed the
plea offer to Mr. Santana-Ruiz and did not commit ineffective
assistance of counsel in that respect. The trial court also
found that Mr. Santana-Ruiz understood the trial proceedings in
English and that it was not ineffective assistance to dismiss the
court interpreter.
¶17 Mr. Santana-Ruiz then filed an untimely appeal that was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Santana-Ruiz responded
by moving to be resentenced under the protocol then in place for
preserving appeals based on claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel that would be otherwise time-barred.2 The court of
appeals granted the motion. Mr. Santana-Ruiz was resentenced, a
new judgment was entered, and his time for appeal was refreshed.
Mr. Santana-Ruiz now comes before us on direct appeal from this
reentered judgment.

7 No. 20050747
ANALYSIS
I. MR. CLARK’S DISRESPECTFUL AND INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT DID NOT
AMOUNT TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
¶18 As we made clear in State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 124
P.3d 235, Mr. Clark’s courtroom antics deserved formal censure.
Outrageous misbehavior by counsel, however, does not, ipso facto,
mean that the client received ineffective assistance. Here, we
conclude that Mr. Clark’s brand of misconduct did not deprive
Mr. Santana-Ruiz of effective counsel because it visited no
prejudice upon Mr. Santana-Ruiz’s cause.
¶19 The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the
right to counsel, which the United States Supreme Court has
defined to include “the right to the effective assistance of
counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)
(citation omitted). To prevail on a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel, the defendant has the burden of proving
(1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) that “the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687.
Unless both elements are present, a conviction will stand. Id.
In fact, the United States Supreme Court instructed, “If it is
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be
followed.” Id. at 697. Following the Supreme Court’s direction,
we dispose of this case based on a lack of sufficient prejudice
alone.
A. Mr. Santana-Ruiz Failed to Demonstrate That His Case Was
Prejudiced by Mr. Clark’s Representation
¶20 Mr. Santana-Ruiz did not present sufficient evidence to
establish that the outcome of his case would have been different
without Mr. Clark’s representation. To show prejudice in the
ineffective assistance of counsel context, the defendant bears
the burden of proving that counsel’s errors “actually had an
adverse effect on the defense” and that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 693-
94.
¶21 Mr. Santana-Ruiz asks this court to exercise its
inherent supervisory authority and find ineffective assistance of
counsel in the interest of fairness, even if he falls short of
persuading us that Mr. Clark’s antics caused him prejudice. This
request is not as farfetched as it may appear at first glance. A
court “may presume prejudice in circumstances where it is
‘unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to

No. 20050747 8
weigh actual prejudice.’” Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523
n.6 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857, 859
(Utah 1992)). Mr. Santana-Ruiz, however, offers little analysis
on why we should call upon this power--one that we store in the
remote corner of the judicial arsenal--in this circumstance, and
we see no reason why prejudice should be presumed here. We can
discern no reason why, as a matter of principle or analysis, we
should assess the effectiveness of a contemptuous but otherwise
competent attorney differently than we would the effectiveness of
a well-mannered but incompetent one. We therefore decline to
relieve Mr. Santana-Ruiz of his burden of proving prejudice.
¶22 Despite the foregoing observation, we nevertheless
believe that it is possible for an attorney’s conduct at trial to
undermine our confidence in the adjudicative proceedings and to
prejudice the defendant to an extent that would satisfy the
second Strickland element. Whether trial counsel’s inappropriate
comportment at trial can be so prejudicial to the defendant as to
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel is a matter of first
impression for this court. We therefore take this opportunity to
articulate several factors that courts should consider in
determining whether an attorney’s ethical misconduct prejudiced a
criminal defendant.
¶23 In making a prejudice determination in this context, we
look primarily to whether the proceedings at trial compromised
the outcome of the case. Specifically, we examine whether and to
what extent the attorney’s conduct affected (1) the ability of
the finder of fact to comprehend the evidence, (2) the
impartiality of the trial judge, and (3) the ability of the
finder of fact to perform its duties. If it appears from a
consideration of these and other relevant facts that the overall
integrity of the trial was compromised by the attorney’s
misconduct, then a finding of prejudice will be appropriate.
1. Mr. Clark’s Misbehavior Did Not Make the State’s Evidence
Stronger, But Rather Improperly Bolstered Mr. Santana-Ruiz’s
Defense
¶24 We first consider how the attorney’s misconduct
affected the ability of the jury to comprehend the evidence. To
this end, we focus on whether the defendant would be in a better
position--i.e., more likely to receive a favorable jury verdict--
absent the attorney’s misconduct. Often, the purpose of an
attorney’s misconduct will be to communicate matters to the jury
that are favorable to the defendant but have been deemed
inadmissible. In such cases, the defendant is more likely than
not to benefit from the attorney’s misconduct because the jury
will have been exposed to more “evidence” favorable to the

9 No. 20050747
defendant than it otherwise would have. The defendant, in that
case, does not suffer prejudice.
¶25 In this case, Mr. Clark designed his inappropriate
courtroom behavior to allow the jury to hear matters that were
inadmissible but helpful to the defendant. Mr. Clark succeeded
in this undertaking. After a preliminary hearing where the
medical examiner testified that trace amounts of cocaine
metabolite were detected in Mr. Florez’s blood, the State
successfully moved, in limine, to prohibit Mr. Clark from making
reference to the report.
¶26 Despite this order, Mr. Clark made certain that the
jury knew of Mr. Florez’s cocaine use as part of an effort to
show that Mr. Florez, influenced by the cocaine, was the
aggressor and that Mr. Santana-Ruiz was acting in self-defense.
Mr. Clark asked the medical examiner on cross-examination where
the paramedics had inserted the intravenous catheters into
Mr. Florez’s veins, seeking to show that the paramedics had
inserted the catheter into Mr. Florez’s neck because his veins in
his arms had been ruined by drug use. The State objected, and
the trial court sustained the objection. Shrugging off the
ruling, Mr. Clark then asked about the toxicology report and
about what substances the medical examiner found in Mr. Florez’s
blood. Again, the State objected, and the court sustained the
objection. But Mr. Clark’s improper line of inquiry clearly
resonated with the jury, as one juror was moved to submit a
question to the judge about the toxicology report.
¶27 Narrowing the scope of the question, the court asked
the medical examiner about what drugs Mr. Florez had been given
at the hospital. In response, Mr. Clark said, within the jury’s
hearing, “Your Honor, I don’t think that was specifically the
question. I think the question specifically was illegal drugs.”
¶28 Refusing to abandon the point he was barred from making
before the trial began, Mr. Clark again referenced Mr. Florez’s
cocaine use in his closing argument. While summarizing the
events on the night of the fight, Mr. Clark said, “Boy, he’s got
that cocaine in his system, he’s got that alcohol in his system,
and he wants to fight.” Mr. Clark continued, “And at that time
[Mr. Santana-Ruiz is] being accosted by this crowd, straight
through the middle of the crowd comes a man, flailing, wild,
hopped up on coke, coming at him, bigger than him.” Mr. Clark’s
behavior was certainly inappropriate, but it was designed to
permit Mr. Clark to press what he clearly believed to be an
important element of his defense strategy. That he realized this
goal may have been contemptuous, but it was not prejudicial to
Mr. Santana-Ruiz.

No. 20050747 10
2. Mr. Clark’s Misconduct Did Not Affect the Trial Court’s
Impartiality
¶29 Next, we consider how trial counsel’s misbehavior
affected the trial court. Trial counsel’s misbehavior may
prejudice a defendant if counsel’s behavior evokes a reaction
from the trial judge that impairs his impartiality. We trust
trial judges to be able to maintain an unbiased approach to
conducting the trial, even in the face of preposterous and
disrespectful activities by an attorney. But it is not outside
the realm of possibility for a trial judge to become biased
against an attorney and for that bias to translate into prejudice
against the party represented by the offending attorney. We will
therefore review the record to see how the trial judge handled
the misbehaving attorney and whether there is any indication that
the trial judge allowed a dislike for the attorney to affect his
judgments.
¶30 We take this opportunity to remind attorneys of the
pitfalls that may accompany the pursuit of this argument.
Alleging that a trial judge allowed his dislike of trial counsel
to affect his judgment is a serious charge and should not be
undertaken lightly. Any allegation that a trial judge became
biased against a defendant should be supported by copious facts
and record evidence. And any such allegation should be made in a
reserved, respectful tone, shunning hyperbole and name-calling.
See generally Peters v. Pine Meadows Ranch Home Ass’n, 2007 UT 2,
151 P.3d 962 (striking appellant’s briefs for making
inappropriate and unsupported allegations regarding the court of
appeals panel that heard the case below).
¶31 In this case, the trial judge, the Honorable Ernest W.
Jones, managed his courtroom with impeccable decorum despite
Mr. Clark’s misbehavior. He showed great restraint and
impartiality in the face of repeated demonstrations of disrespect
by Mr. Clark. There is no suggestion that Mr. Clark’s behavior
made any dent in his armor of impartiality, and we see absolutely
no indication of it. Mr. Clark’s behavior, therefore, did not
prejudice Mr. Santana-Ruiz in this respect, either.
3. Mr. Clark’s Misconduct Did Not Affect the Jury’s Ability to
Perform its Duties
¶32 Finally, we examine the effect of trial counsel’s
actions on the jury’s ability to perform its duties. This is
really a catchall category, where any number of potential
prejudices could be considered. For example, under this prong,
we could consider how much of counsel’s antics the jury saw and

11 No. 20050747
how the trial court and the prosecution handled counsel’s
misbehavior when the jury was present. If counsel’s misconduct
occurred largely outside the presence of the jury, then there is
little threat of prejudice. Similarly, if the trial judge and
the prosecutors were restrained in taking exception to counsel’s
conduct, at least until they were outside the presence of the
jury, then the danger of prejudice is minimized.
¶33 It would also be appropriate here to consider the
cumulative effect trial counsel’s misbehavior had on the jury.
There is a possibility that the jurors, observing counsel’s
misbehavior, will come to distrust and dislike the attorney and
will transfer that distrust and dislike to the defendant. If the
jury’s verdict was driven largely by a distrust and dislike of
trial counsel, then the defendant has been prejudiced. This is a
real threat, which may be explored by counsel in an action
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. A trial judge has
little ability to gauge the existence and extent of cumulative
prejudice caused by the improper conduct of counsel. Rule 606(b)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence prohibits virtually all inquiries
into the jury deliberation process. The restrictions imposed by
rule 606(b) are motivated by the concern that allowing the
penetration of the jury room to uncover and scrutinize the
deliberation process can only lead to mischief and compromise the
integrity of juries. It is, therefore, important that trial
judges remain vigilant for signs of misconduct by counsel and
take prompt corrective action when it surfaces.
¶34 In this case, Judge Jones and the prosecution showed
considerable restraint and waited until they were outside the
presence of the jury before discussing Mr. Clark’s misbehavior in
detail. This significantly reduced any potential prejudice to
Mr. Santana-Ruiz. The trial court, commendably, mitigated the
prejudice that Mr. Santana-Ruiz suffered from Mr. Clark’s
behavior by taking care not to reprimand Mr. Clark before the
jury. When the court did reprimand Mr. Clark, it did so
carefully, delaying extended censure until the jury was excused.
For example, when the prosecution asked the defendant’s half-
brother Marcos Ruiz to state his address and Mr. Clark objected,
referring to “threats of violence,” the trial court merely asked
the prosecution if it needed the address and instructed the
prosecution to go to the next question. The court waited until
the jury had withdrawn to reprimand Mr. Clark for his behavior.
The court demonstrated similarly admirable restraint throughout
the proceedings.
¶35 Moreover, the prosecution did not move for, and the
court did not address, the order for contempt until the jury had
retired to deliberate. The court did not even warn Mr. Clark of

No. 20050747 12
the threat of a contempt order in front of the jury. In sum,
where there was a threat of prejudice arising from Mr. Clark’s
conduct, the trial court contained the threat and preserved the
integrity of the jury. The trial court, therefore, appropriately
mitigated any prejudice that Mr. Santana-Ruiz might have suffered
as a result of Mr. Clark’s conduct.
¶36 In addition, although Mr. Santana-Ruiz asserts that the
jury became generally biased against him because of Mr. Clark’s
antics, he provides no support for his accusation. It is a bald
allegation lacking any evidentiary support. And based on our own
review of the record, we find no support for it. We find,
therefore, that Mr. Santana-Ruiz did not suffer from such a
prejudice.
CONCLUSION
¶37 Because we conclude that Mr. Clark’s actions did not
prejudice Mr. Santana-Ruiz, we hold that Mr. Santana-Ruiz did not
receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Santana-Ruiz’s
conviction is affirmed.
---
¶38 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Durrant, and Justice Parrish concur in Justice Nehring’s
opinion.