Anderson v. Lt. Gov. Bell

2010 UT 47
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
Farley Anderson; Helen No. 20100237
Anderson; Steven G. Maxfield;
and Steven K. Maxfield,
Petitioners,
v.
Lt. Governor Gregg Bell;
Mark Thomas; Paul Neuenschwander; F I L E D
Spencer Hadley; and John Does 1-10,
Respondents. June 22, 2010
---
Original proceeding in this court
Attorneys: Brent V. Manning, Tyson B. Snow, Karen McCreary,
Marina Baginsky Lowe, Salt Lake City, Joann S.
Secrist, St. George, Utah, for petitioners
Steven G. Maxfield, Kanosh, Utah, Pro Se
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Thom D. Roberts,
Asst. Att’y Gen., Lohra L. Miller, Jason Rose,
Salt Lake City, David L. Patterson, Brock R. Belnap,
St. George, Utah, for respondents
David R. Irvine, Alan L. Smith, Salt Lake City,
for intervenor
---
DURHAM, Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 This petition for extraordinary writ asks us to resolve
whether a candidate may use electronic signatures to satisfy the
signature requirement that the Utah Code imposes on those who
wish to run for statewide office but do not affiliate with a
registered political party. In other words, does an electronic
signature count toward a “signed” nomination certificate under
section 20A-9-502 of the Utah Code.

1 Mr. Anderson filed his petition with this court pursuant
to rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. By doing
so, Mr. Anderson bypassed a review of the Lt. Governor’s action
by the district court under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 19 allows the Utah Supreme Court “to entertain
writ proceedings under rule 65B in appropriate circumstances.”
Walker v. Weber County, 973 P.2d 927, 929 (Utah 1998) (holding
extraordinary writ procedures may be invoked when it is
“practically impossible” for the petitioner to first proceed in
the district court because of the county’s late adoption of a
ballot title (emphasis added)).
In this situation, we employ an appropriate-circumstances
test because a petitioner’s decision to seek relief through rule
19 without first petitioning the district court has an influence
on our analysis. Most notable of these impacts is that an
adjudication of the facts by the district court has not occurred.
Thus, the facts referenced in this opinion are unproven
allegations by Mr. Anderson. In certain circumstances, this
procedural posture may prevent us from deciding the petition for
(continued...)
No. 20100237 2
¶2 Petitioner Farley Anderson wishes to run for governor
without affiliating with a registered political party. As an
unaffiliated candidate, Mr. Anderson must, among other
requirements of Title 20A, collect the signatures of 1,000
registered voters before his name may be placed on the statewide
ballot. Mr. Anderson collected the necessary signatures in two
forms: hand-signed signatures, and electronic signatures entered
through a computer website advocating his candidacy. Mr.
Anderson then followed the statutory procedure that requires him
to first submit the signatures to county clerks throughout the
state for verification that each signor is a registered voter and
has not signed the petition of any other unaffiliated candidate.
Clerks in seven counties apparently certified that 1,055 of the
signatures submitted by Mr. Anderson were valid. Upon county-
clerk verification, unaffiliated candidates must submit their
signatures and a completed certificate of nomination to the Lt.
Governor by a statutorily defined date.
¶3 On March 19, 2010, Mr. Anderson submitted his petition
and the supporting signatures to the Lieutenant Governor’s
Office. The Lt. Governor, however, excised the electronic
signatures from Mr. Anderson’s nomination, taking the position
that electronic signatures do not constitute signatures under the
Utah Election Code. Without those signatures, Mr. Anderson’s
nomination fell short of the mandatory 1,000 signatures and the
Lt. Governor rejected him as a candidate for the forthcoming
gubernatorial election.1

(...continued)
extraordinary writ under rule 19. We are, however, satisfied
that the general allegation--that Mr. Anderson’s certificate for
nomination had more than 1,000 verified signatures when he
presented it to the Lt. Governor but less than 1,000 signatures
after the Lt. Governor excised the electronic ones--is concrete
enough to permit us to entertain Mr. Anderson’s petition for
extraordinary writ. Indeed, the Lt. Governor’s response to Mr.
Anderson’s petition for extraordinary writ does not refute this
general allegation.
Moreover, we are satisfied that this petition presents an
“appropriate circumstance” under rule 19. The primary election
will be held on June 22. At this primary election, registered
political parties will select their candidates. Those candidates
will then take their campaigns to the voters of the state. Any
legal dispute over the propriety of Mr. Anderson’s inclusion on
the November ballot that continues after the primary election
will negatively impact Mr. Anderson’s ability to campaign against
the other recognized candidates seeking Utah’s gubernatorial
seat; it is “practically impossible” for Mr. Anderson to proceed
first in the district court and still have any reasonable
opportunity to make his campaign effective.
2 The Utahns for Ethical Government (UEG) filed a memorandum
supporting Mr. Anderson’s Petition for Extraordinary Writ as an
amicus curiae. In its memorandum, however, UEG argues that we
should determine that an electronic signature satisfies the
signature requirement of a voter initiative under Title 20A,
chapter 7. We decline to address this issue in this petition for
extraordinary writ.
3 No. 20100237
¶4 Mr. Anderson responded to the Lt. Governor’s decision
by filing this petition for extraordinary writ under rule 19 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5 Because rule 19 authorizes this court to entertain
petitions for extraordinary writ under rule 65B of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, the standards enumerated in the latter rule
dictate our standard of review. Walker v. Weber County, 973 P.2d
927, 929-30 (Utah 1998). Given that Mr. Anderson’s argument is
founded on a theory that the Lt. Governor lacks authority to
remove signatures from a certificate of nomination under Utah
Code section 20A-9-502 (Supp. 2009), the petition is best
articulated as falling within subpart c of rule 65B; a party may

No. 20100237 4
seek relief where an individual “unlawfully . . . exercises a
public office.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(c)(2)(A). We review whether
a government actor has “‘unlawfully’ exercised the authority of
their office” through an “abuse of discretion standard.” Walker,
973 P.2d at 929 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(c))(“[W]e determine
only whether the officials have so exercised their discretion
that it can be said that they have failed to do what the statute
requires, or have done something which the statute does not
permit.”).
ANALYSIS
¶6 Mr. Anderson’s petition for extraordinary writ presents
two primary arguments supporting his position that he is entitled
to have his name placed on the forthcoming ballot for the
governor’s seat. First, he argues electronic signatures plainly
satisfy the requirements of Utah Code section 20A-9-502 (Supp.
2009). A corollary to this argument is a theory that the
statutory scheme does not give the Lt. Governor the authority to
define what constitutes to a valid signature. Alternatively, Mr.
Anderson makes a number of constitutional arguments. The most
notable of these is a claim that the Election Code’s early
statutory deadline imposed upon unaffiliated candidates to file a
certificate of nomination violates the protections of the United
States and Utah Constitutions.
¶7 Given our ultimate holding that an electronic signature
satisfies the signature mandate imposed on unaffiliated
candidates, we decline to address Mr. Anderson’s constitutional
claims. See State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 5, 165 P.3d 1206
(stating that we need not address “‘constitutional issues unless
required to do so’” and resolving an appeal on statutory grounds
while not addressing the parties’ constitutional arguments
(quoting Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ¶ 10, 5 P.3d 616)).
Additionally, we can strike Mr. Anderson’s early-deadline
argument because it was not in his original petition for
extraordinary writ and first surfaced at oral argument and in his
supplemental briefing. See Utah R. App. P. 19(b)(7) (requiring
petitioners to file a memorandum with “points and authorities in
support of the petition”); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)
(requiring appellants to provide “contentions and reasons . . .
with respect to the issues presented”).
I. THE SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 20A-9-502 MAY BE
SATISFIED WITH AN ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE
¶8 Mr. Anderson’s petition for extraordinary writ can be
resolved by answering a single, distinctive question: what is a
“signature” under section 20A-9-502? Or more specifically, does

5 No. 20100237
an electronic signature qualify as a valid signature under this
statutory subsection?
¶9 Our goal when confronted with questions of statutory
interpretation “is to evince the true intent and purpose of the
Legislature.” Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, ¶ 16, 158 P.3d 540
(internal quotation marks omitted); Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561,
562-63 (Utah 1996). It is axiomatic that the best evidence of
legislative intent is “the plain language of the statute itself.”
Duke, 2007 UT 31, ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). But
our plain language analysis is not so limited that we only
inquire into individual words and subsections in isolation; our
interpretation of a statute requires that each part or section be
“‘construed in connection with every other part or section so as
to produce a harmonious whole.’” Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ¶ 7,
162 P.3d 1099 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Maestas, 2002 UT
123, ¶ 54, 63 P.3d 621); State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ¶ 8, 63
P.3d 667. Moreover, “the purpose of the statute” has an
influence on the plain meaning of a statute. R&R Indus. Park,
L.L.C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 2008 UT 80, ¶¶ 23,
36, 199 P.3d 917.
¶10 The statute we are called upon to interpret to resolve
Mr. Anderson’s petition is section 20A-9-502. In subpart one of
this statute, individuals must circulate a certificate of
nomination and obtain “the required number of signatures of
registered voters required by law.” Utah Code Ann. § 20A-9-
502(1) (Supp. 2009) (emphasis added) (providing a certificate of
nomination form). Subpart two of this section describes the
procedures the prospective candidate must follow to gain access
to the ballot. It states:
(a) The candidate shall circulate the
nomination petition and submit it to the
county clerk for certification when the
petition has been completed by: (i) at least
1,000 registered voters residing within the
state . . . .
(b) In reviewing the petition, the
county clerk shall count and certify only
those persons who signed the petition who:
(i) are registered voters . . . ; and
(ii) did not sign any other certificate of
nomination for that office.
Id. § 20A-9-502(2) (emphasis added). The legislature, however,
did not define what the terms “signature,” “signed,” or
“completed” mean within this subsection. Moreover, the parties

No. 20100237 6
have alerted us to no other provision within Title 20A that
provides a definition of these terms. See generally id. § 20A-1-
102 (providing definitions governing Title 20A but not including
the terms “signature,” “sign,” or “complete” within the list).
A. We Must Liberally Construe the Statutory Framework Covering
Unaffiliated Candidates to Give Them Every Reasonable
Opportunity to Make Their Candidacy Effective
¶11 The legislature has provided us with specific guidance
when considering the statutory framework controlling nomination
petitions of unaffiliated candidates. The legislature directed
that “[t]he courts shall construe this part liberally so as to
give unaffiliated candidates for public office every reasonable
opportunity to make their candidacy effective.” Id. § 20A-9-
501(3) (2007) (emphasis added). As we stated previously, the
legislative purpose underlying a statute influences the plain
language employed by the legislature. R&R Indus. Park, 2008 UT
80, ¶ 36. The language directing courts to “liberally” construe
part 5 of chapter 9 reveals a legislative purpose that favors
unaffiliated candidates’ access to the ballot. Section 20A-9-
501(3) plainly directs us to liberally construe part 5 to give
this category of candidate every reasonable opportunity to get on
the ballot and campaign for political office. Moreover, the
directive to liberally construe the statutory framework appears
in only one other place in the Election Code. Part 4 of chapter
9 opens with the mandate that the statutory scheme governing
primary elections “be construed liberally so as to ensure full
opportunity for persons to become candidates . . . .” Id. § 20A-
9-401(1). This section, like its unaffiliated-candidate
counterpart, extends a liberal-construction directive to the
statutes governing candidate names appearing on election ballots
in general. Compare id. § 20A-9-501 with § 20A-9-401(1).
¶12 We find significance in the fact that the legislature
assigned a liberal-construction mandate only to the Election
Code’s provisions governing candidate access to the ballot. The
directives found in parts four and five of chapter 9 thus make
legislative intent plain and unambiguous: when it comes to
potential candidate access to the ballot, regardless of whether
they are affiliated with a political party or not, courts must
liberally construe the governing statutes to afford them a full
and reasonable opportunity to become a candidate. This is not to
say that the court can disregard the statutory requirements
created by the Election Code. We cannot waive the 1,000-
signature requirement. But we also cannot ignore the
legislature’s unequivocal directive to construe the provisions at
stake here liberally to give Mr. Anderson “every reasonable
opportunity to make” his candidacy effective.

3 Statutory interpretation presumes a legislative process
that “‘use[s] each word advisedly and give[s] effect to each term
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.’” State v.
Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ¶ 19, 214 P.3d 104 (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 23, 192 P.3d 867).
4 We note that the legislature amended section 68-3-12
during the 2010 legislative session to divide the rules of
construction and the general definitions governing the Utah Code
into two separate sections. Even if these amendments applied to
this case, they would not affect the outcome of Mr. Anderson’s
petition because they did not alter the provisions at issue here.
7 No. 20100237
B. The Utah Code Defines a “Signature” to
Include Electronic Signatures
¶13 It cannot be disputed that when the legislature used
the terms “signature” and “sign,” it contemplated that a
handwritten name would satisfy the requirement.3 See The
American Heritage Dictionary 1139 (2d ed. 1985) (defining
“signature,” in part, as the “name of a person as written by
himself” (emphasis added)); Blacks Law Dictionary 1415 (8th ed.
2004) (defining “signature,” in part, as a “person’s name or mark
written by that person or at the person’s direction” (emphasis
added)). But there also are strong statutory indicators that the
legislature did not intend that a signature placed by hand is the
only valid and legally recognizable form of a signature.
1. Section 68-3-12 Contemplates Electronic Signatures
¶14 Most notable of these statutory indications is section
68-3-12.4 Before discussing this subsection, we note that
section 68-3-12 is of critical weight to our analysis. This
section imposes “[r]ules of construction” upon the courts and
directs that “the definitions listed in [section 68-3-12(2)]
shall be observed, unless the definition would be inconsistent
with the manifest intent of the Legislature, or repugnant to the
context of the statute.” Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2) (2008).
Section 68-3-12 is the set of default definitions that the
legislature imposed upon the entire Utah Code. In enacting this
section, the legislature unequivocally laid out statutory
definitions that govern our interpretation of the Utah Code so
long as the terms of section 68-3-12 do not contradict the
“manifest” legislative intent of the specific statute or become
“repugnant to the context of the statute.” We would be
neglectful in our interpretation if we were to ignore terms
clearly defined in section 68-3-12 but left undefined in section

5 It is a fundamental principle that while the legislature
has the authority to abrogate the common law, every instance that
a statutory scheme and the common law converge does not
necessarily mean the legislature has abolished the common law.
See C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ¶ 33, 977 P.2d 479 (Zimmerman,
J., dissenting) (“The fact that a statute contains a partial
codification of a particular rule or principle of the common law
does not necessarily abrogate the remainder of the common law.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). In this instance we believe
the legislature’s enactment of section 68-3-12, and to a lesser
extent the UETA, was an adoption of the common law definition of
signature. As such it is appropriate to reference the common law
as we interpret the plain meaning of a statutory scheme.
No. 20100237 8
20A-9-502. Indeed, the very purpose of section 68-3-12 was to
fill in the gaps of other statutory sections.
¶15 Section 68-3-12 defines “signature” to include a “name,
mark, or sign written with the intent to authenticate any
instrument or writing.” Id. § 68-3-12(2)(w). The legislature
added further clarification to the meaning of signature by
defining “writing” as including “printing,” “handwriting,” and
“information stored in an electronic or other medium if the
information is retrievable in a perceivable format.” Id. § 68-3-
12(2)(cc). Section 68-3-12 explicitly contemplates electronic
signatures. A signature includes any “name, mark, or sign
written “with an” intent to authenticate” “information stored in
an electronic . . . medium.” Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(w) & -
12(2)(cc). Additionally, it appears the legislature’s definition
of a signature here is more concerned with the intent of the
signor than the form of the signature. The legislature plainly
stated that a signature is any sign made with an “intent to
authenticate.” Id. § 68-3-12(w). Further evidence of the
significance of the signor’s intent is found in the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act (UETA). The UETA, which will be
discussed more thoroughly below, defines an “electronic
signature” as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process . . .
executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the
record.” Utah Code Ann. § 46-4-102(8) (2005) (emphasis added).
¶16 Moreover, the importance of the intent of the signor,
as opposed to form of the signature, has been identified in the
common law of this state.5 For instance, in Salt Lake City v.
Hanson we stated, “it is the intent rather than the form of the
act that is important.” 425 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1967). While
our definition of a signature found in Hanson has greater detail,
our common law definition mirrors the definition enacted by the
legislature. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(w) (2008)

9 No. 20100237
(defining a legally recognized signature as any “name, mark, or
sign written with the intent to authenticate”) with Hanson, 425
P.2d at 774 (stating the intent to sign, not the form, matters).
In section 68-3-12, the legislature did not limit a signature to
handwriting only and neither have our cases.
While one’s signature is usually made by
writing his name, the same purpose can be
accomplished by placing any writing, indicia
or symbol which the signer chooses to adopt
and use as his signature and by which it may
be proved: e.g., by finger or thumb prints,
by a cross or other mark, or by any type of
mechanically reproduced or stamped facsimile
of his signature, as effectively as by his
own handwriting.
Hanson, 425 P.2d at 774 (emphasis added); see also State v.
Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah 1983) (finding an imprinted
name of a judge made by a court clerk a signature); 17A Am. Jur.
2d. Contracts §176 (2004) (“[A] signature is whatever mark,
symbol, or device one may choose to employ to represent oneself,
and may include fingerprints. . . . ‘Electronic’ signatures are
valid, and legislation has been enacted specifically to authorize
them.”) (footnotes omitted); Blacks Law Dictionary 1415 (defining
a signature as “[a]ny name, mark, or writing used with the
intention of authenticating a document”).
¶17 Thus, with the foregoing discussion of section 68-3-12,
the UETA, the common law articulation that mirrors these
statutory provisions, and the legislature’s liberal-construction
mandate in mind, we conclude that the plain language of section
20A-9-502 is not limited to handwritten signatures. It is true
that the legislature designed the Election Code with a paper-
format in mind; an electronic format would not have been
available at the time the scheme was designed. But the
legislature also left open the possibility that a signor may lend
his name to a certificate for nomination in a way other than by
putting pen to paper when it enacted section 68-3-12(2) and the
UETA. Indeed, the legislature focused in those provisions on the
intent of the signor, not the form of the signature. We cannot
see how the manner the signor elects to place his name on an
unaffiliated candidate’s petition for nomination has any impact
on the signor’s intent to support the petitioner’s candidacy.
Moreover, we cannot see how section 68-3-12(2) can be viewed as
contradicting the legislative intent of section 20A-9-502, when
the legislature itself demands that we liberally construe the
provisions governing unaffiliated candidates to give them “every
reasonable opportunity to make their candidac[ies] effective.”

No. 20100237 10
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-9-501(3) (2009). Thus, we hold that the
signature requirement of section 20A-9-502 includes electronic
signatures.
2. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act Applies to the Utah
Election Code Governing Unaffiliated Candidates
¶18 We find additional support for our conclusion in the
Utah Code’s UETA. Utah Code Ann. §§ 46-4-101 to 503 (2005 &
Supp. 2009). The UETA “applies to electronic records and
electronic signatures relating to a transaction.” Id. § 46-4-
103(1) (Supp. 2009). In enacting the UETA, the legislature
specifically addressed what types of transactions could not be
authenticated with an electronic signature. The legislature
excluded only “wills, codicils, . . . testamentary trusts” and
transactions within the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code from
the provisions of the UETA. Id. § 46-4-103(2). This list
demonstrates that there were specific documents that the
legislature did not believe were appropriately authenticated
through electronic means. By contrast, the UETA is silent on the
topic of elections, campaigning, ballot access, or the Election
Code generally. We cannot of course construe the absence of this
subject matter from section 46-3-103 as a legislative
endorsement. Rather, we note the exclusionary list for the
purpose of showing that the requirements of the Election Code are
not specifically excluded from the UETA. Therefore, the UETA
will govern electronic signatures where its other requirements
can be satisfied.
¶19 Mr. Anderson argues that the UETA authorizes electronic
signatures to satisfy the signature requirement of section 20A-9-
502. Specifically, he points to section 46-4-201 for this
proposition. This section states: “If a law requires a
signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.” Id. § 46-
4-201(4) (2005). This language could not be more straight
forward; an electronic signature will satisfy any law that
demands a signature. And, as noted above, there are only four
situations where an electronic signature will not satisfy the
law--wills, codicils, testamentary trusts, and certain agreements
under the UCC. Mr. Anderson has thus done exactly what section
46-4-201 permits. He used electronic signatures to satisfy the
Election Code’s demand that unaffiliated candidates collect and
submit the signatures of 1,000 registered voters in order to get
his name onto the statewide ballot.
¶20 The Lt. Governor, however, does not acknowledge this
statutory language but points to other provisions of the UETA
that he contends require us to reject the application of the UETA
to the Election Code or at least to Mr. Anderson’s certificate of

6 Indeed, the other provisions of section 46-4-501 support a
reading that this section was designed to give state agencies the
(continued...)
11 No. 20100237
nomination. First, he argues these subsections allow government
agencies to reject the use of electronic signatures. Second, the
Lt. Governor argues that as a party to the transaction, he must
agree to conduct the transaction by electronic means before the
electronic signature is valid. We reject both arguments.
¶21 Turning first to the theory that the legislature has
granted state agencies broad discretion to refuse to conduct
business through electronic means. The Lt. Governor finds
support for this argument in section 46-4-501. This section
states:
A state governmental agency may, by
following the procedures and requirements of
Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act, make rules that: (a) identify
specific transactions that the agency is
willing to conduct by electronic means; [and]
(b) identify specific transactions that the
agency will never conduct by electronic means
. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 46-4-501(1) (Supp. 2009) (emphasis added). The
Lt. Governor argues that Mr. Anderson’s use of electronic
signatures to satisfy the signature requirement of the Election
Code is an attempt to force his office, in contravention of the
plain language of section 46-4-501, to permit the use of
electronic signatures. The Lt. Governor’s argument fails to
acknowledge that this subsection has a rulemaking component. The
language of section 46-4-501(1) plainly permits governmental
agencies to dictate what transactions they are willing to conduct
through electronic means and what transactions they are unwilling
to do via electronic means. Id. § 46-4-501(1)(a) & (b). But
this subsection also requires the state agency to make this
determination through the rulemaking procedures required by Title
63G. The Lt. Governor’s argument here asks us to interpret this
statute to find that when a government agency has not promulgated
rules that control electronic signatures and transactions, then
the agency will not conduct business through electronic means.
That is not what this statute says; subsection 46-4-501(1)
authorizes state agencies to “make rules” to manage electronic
transactions, and if the agency opts to exercise this power, it
can decide which records to accept in electronic form. This
subsection has no application when the agency has done nothing to
promulgate rules for electronic records under Title 63G.6

6 (...continued)
power to enact rules to manage electronic records. For instance,
subsection 46-4-501(1)(c) affords agencies the authority to
“specify the manner and format in which electronic records must
be created, generated, sent, communicated, received and stored.”
Utah Code Ann. § 46-4-501(1)(c) (Supp. 2009). Subsection 46-4-
501(2) requires state agencies that promulgate rules under the
UETA to give copies of those rules to the state’s chief
information officer and the Utah Technology Commission.
Subsection 46-4-501(3) permits the state’s chief information
officer to “prepare model rules and standards relating to
electronic transactions.” Id. § 46-4-501(3)(a). Finally, this
subsection requires state agencies to retain electronic records
in conformity with standards developed by the state’s Division of
Archives. Id. § 46-4-501(5)(a)
No. 20100237 12
¶22 The Lt. Governor also argues that subsection 46-4-
501(4) precludes Mr. Anderson from forcing his office to accept a
certificate of nomination supported by electronic signatures.
Indeed, subsection 46-4-501(4) states “nothing in this chapter
requires any state governmental agency to: (a) conduct
transactions by electronic means; or (b) use or permit the use of
electronic records or electronic signatures.” (emphasis added).
This language read in isolation renders the Lt. Governor’s
position plausible. The argument, however, loses its persuasive
effect when we harmonize this subsection with the rest of section
46-4-501, the remainder of the UETA, section 68-3-12, and the
Election Code. See Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ¶ 7, 162 P.3d 1099
(stating that part of this court’s attempt to determine the plain
language of a statute is to construe the statute at issue “‘with
every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole’”
(quoting State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ¶ 54, 63 P.3d 621));
State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ¶ 8, 63 P.3d 667 (“‘[T]he plain
language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its
provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the
same statute and with other statutes under the same and related
chapters.’” (quoting Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ¶ 17, 5 P.3d
616)).
¶23 As previously discussed, section 46-4-501 is a
rulemaking statute. It states that governmental agencies “may
. . . make rules” to govern electronic transactions and
electronic signatures. Read in the context of the statute as a
whole, subsection four is in place to ensure that state agencies
have broad discretion in setting up what types and classes of
transactions are appropriately conducted through electronic means
when they engage in rulemaking. The rulemaking requirement is
critical; the statute does not authorize government agencies to

7 The Lt. Governor argues that his office did not reject the
electronic signatures in Mr. Anderson’s certificate of nomination
on the sole basis that they were in electronic form. Rather, he
contends that electronic signatures attached to a certificate of
nomination lack “apparent authority” as genuine signatures. This
position is based on a theory that a holographic signature is
self-authenticating because the reviewing party may merely look
at the signature and see that someone put pen to paper to sign
their name. In contrast, an electronic signature lacks apparent
authority, because it appears as a typed list of names. The Lt.
Governor’s argument here, however, is really about fraud and the
ability to detect fraud. We are unpersuaded that an electronic
signature presents special concerns regarding candidate fraud; a
candidate could as easily handwrite or type fraudulent names onto
a certificate of nomination.
Moreover, electronic signatures may be a better deterrent to
candidate fraud because an electronic signature incorporates
readily verifiable personal, but not-public, information. For
instance, the signors of Mr. Anderson’s petition apparently had
to enter a security code that corresponds to the last four digits
of their driver license number before their signature would be
counted.
13 No. 20100237
make informal decisions on what type of transactions cannot be
supported by electronic signatures outside of the rulemaking
process of Title 63G. Moreover, the Lt. Governor’s argument is
in conflict with the UETA’s provision that expressly permits an
electronic signature to satisfy any law that requires a
signature. Utah Code Ann. § 46-4-201(4) (2005). It also
contradicts the UETA’s mandate that an electronic signature “may
not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is
in electronic form.” Id. § 46-4-201(1).7 Moreover, the Lt.
Governor’s argument is in conflict with section 46-4-106, which
directs the construction and application of the UETA. This
section demands that the UETA “be construed and applied: (1) to
facilitate electronic transactions . . . ; [and] (2) to be
consistent with reasonable practices concerning electronic
transactions and with the continued expansion of those
practices.” Id. § 46-4-106. To follow the Lt. Governor’s logic
would do the opposite; the Lt. Governor’s interpretation curbs
electronic transactions rather than facilitates them.
¶24 Going beyond the UETA, we cannot square the Lt.
Governor’s argument with a plain language reading of section 68-
3-12 (2008), which, as we previously stated, allows for
electronic signatures. Finally, the Lt. Governor’s position is
contradicted by the purpose underlying the Election Code. The
legislature directed courts to liberally construe the provisions

8 The UETA defines a transaction as “an action or set of
actions occurring between two or more persons relating to the
conduct of business, commercial, or governmental affairs.” Utah
Code Ann. § 46-4-102(16) (2005).
No. 20100237 14
pertaining to unaffiliated candidates and their attempts to get
on the ballot. Id. § 20A-9-501(3) (2007).
¶25 Alternatively, the Lt. Governor argues that he is a
“party” to the signing transaction, and that as such he must
agree to conduct it via electronic means. The UETA “applies only
to transactions between parties each of which has agreed to
conduct transactions by electronic means.” Id. § 46-4-105(2)(a)
(2005). The Lt. Governor argues that the transaction at issue
here is between the prospective candidate and the Lt. Governor,
who is the chief election officer under section 20A-2-300.6
(2007). Again, the Lt. Governor’s argument fails to read the
statutory scheme in harmony with the Election Code. Under
section 20A-9-502(2)(a), the would-be candidate circulates a
petition for nomination to registered voters. The circulator
does not turn the petition for nomination over to the county
clerks for verification until after the petition is “completed
by” 1,000 registered voters. Id. § 20A-9-502(2)(a) (Supp. 2009).
We take the term “completed” to mean the transaction is closed.
Moreover, treating the transaction as between the circulating
nominee and the signor makes the most logical sense; it is an
authentication that the signee supports the circulator’s bid to
have his name on the ballot as a candidate for statewide office.
We fail to see how including the Lt. Governor as a party to this
agreement has an impact on this transaction and the
authentication of the signor’s support.8 Under the Election
Code, the Lt. Governor’s interest here is in ensuring that the
unaffiliated candidate has sufficient support to justify
including him or her on the statewide ballot. That interest is
not diminished because the unaffiliated candidate demonstrates
the necessary support through signatures recorded electronically.
¶26 We hold that electronic signatures may satisfy the
Election Code’s requirements under section 20A-9-502 regarding
unaffiliated candidates wishing to run for statewide office.
This holding is consistent with the rest of the Utah Code and
permits candidates who do not wish to join a registered political
party a reasonable opportunity to make their candidacy effective.
Thus, we conclude that the Lt. Governor exceeded the bounds of
his discretion when he excised the electronic signatures attached
to Mr. Anderson’s certificate of nomination.

15 No. 20100237
CONCLUSION
¶27 When the legislature adopted section 20A-9-502, it
required would-be candidates who wish to run for statewide office
but do not want to associate with a registered political party to
obtain the signatures of 1,000 registered voters. While
handwritten signatures clearly satisfy the signature requirement
of this statute, holographic signatures are not the only means to
sign a document. Indeed, the Utah Code expressly contemplates
electronic signatures under 68-3-12 and the UETA. Ultimately, we
are persuaded that a signature under section 20A-9-502 does not
require a signor to physically handle a piece of paper and sign
her name with a pen; an electronic signature is sufficient to
satisfy the Election Code.
¶28 We therefore hold that the Lt. Governor exceeded the
bounds of discretion granted to him as the state’s chief election
officer when he excised the electronic signatures attached to Mr.
Anderson’s certificate of nomination. We, therefore, grant Mr.
Anderson his writ of extraordinary relief and instruct the Lt.
Governor to recount the signatures submitted by Mr. Anderson on
March 19, 2010 to determine if he has satisfied the requirements
of section 20A-9-502.
---
¶29 Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish,
Justice Nehring, and Judge Dawson concur in Chief Justice
Durham’s opinion.
¶30 District Judge Glen R. Dawson sat.