Nora Hamel v Beachside L C and Twin City Fire Ins.

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons
NORA HAMEL MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. 	Record No. 0832-98-1 	PER CURIAM
NOVEMBER 10, 1998
BEACHSIDE L C AND TWIN CITY
FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Nora Hamel, pro se, on brief).
(F. Nash Bilisoly; Kelly O. Stokes;
Vandeventer Black, on brief), for appellees.
Nora Hamel ("claimant") contends that the Workers'
Compensation Commission ("commission") erred in finding that she
failed to prove that (1) she was totally disabled beginning June
20, 1996 as a result of her compensable July 7, 1995 injury by
accident; and (2) she marketed her residual work capacity. 	Upon
reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude
that this appeal is without merit. 	Accordingly, we summarily
affirm the commission's decision. 	See Rule 5A:27.
On July 7, 1995, claimant sustained a compensable abdominal
injury arising out of and in the course of her employment as a
hostess for Beachside L C ("employer"). 	Employer accepted the
injury as compensable. 	Pursuant to the parties' Memorandum of
Agreement, the commission entered an award on November 15, 1995,
providing for temporary total disability benefits beginning
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.

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August 6, 1995. 	On August 8, 1996, employer filed an application
seeking termination and/or suspension of that award on the ground
that claimant returned to work on May 13, 1996.
Before the hearing on employer's August 8, 1996 application,
the parties stipulated that claimant returned to work with
Charles Barker Toyota on May 10, 1996 and worked full-time as a
salesperson through June 19, 1996, without informing employer.
Based upon that stipulation, the commission terminated claimant's
compensation benefits as of May 12, 1996, the last date employer
paid compensation to claimant. 	The commission then properly
placed the burden on claimant to prove her claim that she again
became totally disabled from work beginning June 20, 1996, as a
result of her compensable injury.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. 	See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990).
Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence
sustained her burden of proof, the commission's findings are
binding and conclusive upon us. 	See Tomko v. Michael's
Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970).
Dr. Nelson M. Karp, who treated claimant following her July
7, 1995 compensable abdominal injury, referred claimant to Dr.
Roy Oswaks, a general surgeon, on April 29, 1996. 	On May 2 and
3, 1996, Dr. Oswaks examined claimant. 	Dr. Oswaks evaluated
claimant's abdominal pain via pelvic and inguinal ultrasounds,

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but could not find any evidence of pathology in that area. 	Dr.
Oswaks referred claimant to Dr. Douglas Schreiber, an
orthopedist. 	Dr. Oswaks opined that claimant should not work
until a diagnosis was made.
On May 6, 1996, Dr. Schreiber examined claimant, but could
find nothing wrong with her. 	Dr. Schreiber diagnosed persistent
left groin pain of undetermined etiology. 	A subsequent lumbar
spine MRI and a whole body bone scan were both within normal
limits.
On May 29, 1996, Dr. Oswaks examined claimant, whose
symptoms remained unchanged from his previous examinations.
On June 7, 1996, claimant fell down a flight of stairs and
sought emergency room treatment at the Virginia Beach General
Hospital, complaining of neck and back pain. 	The clinical
examination revealed that her abdomen was "nontender." 	Claimant
was diagnosed with acute musculoskeletal pain, status post fall.
On June 18, 1996, Dr. John Everett examined claimant.
Claimant reported a history of a miscarriage and abdominal
symptoms. 	Dr. Everett also noted that claimant had suffered from
low back pain and lower abdominal pain since the June 7, 1996
slip and fall. 	Dr. Everett diagnosed low back pain/left lower
quadrant pain related to the June 7, 1996 slip and fall.
On June 22, 1996, claimant returned to the Virginia Beach
General Hospital emergency room. 	At that time, she reported a
history of abdominal pain and possible pregnancy. 	She also

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reported a miscarriage that had occurred several months before
and complained of left groin pain occasionally radiating into her
left abdomen which "[a]ctually started the other day, has been
worse when she sits." 	Claimant reported the June 7, 1996 slip
and fall to hospital personnel, but she did not report the July
7, 1995 injury.
On July 25, 1996, claimant returned to Dr. Schreiber,
complaining of severe pain in her left groin area. 	Dr. Schreiber
could find no objective cause for claimant's symptoms related to
her skeleton or joints. 	Thus, he did not place her on any
restrictions from work or other activities.
On August 29, 1996, claimant returned to Dr. Oswaks, with
continuing complaints of left groin pain. 	Dr. Oswaks opined that
he felt some weakness, "but no definite hernia." 	Dr. Oswaks
referred claimant to Dr. Tracy Wright, a gynecologist, for an
evaluation in order to rule out any possible gynecological
problem. 	Dr. Wright's examination did not reveal any
gynecological cause for claimant's symptoms.
Claimant did not return to Dr. Oswaks until April 3, 1997.
At that time, claimant again complained of pain in the left
femoral canal. 	Dr. Oswaks opined that claimant remained
disabled. 	When Dr. Oswaks examined claimant again on April 7,
1997, her pain was not as severe. 	Dr. Oswaks suspected that
claimant might have a left femoral hernia, but he refused to
commit to that opinion. 	Dr. Oswaks opined that claimant was

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disabled by her pain and might require surgery. 	On April 8,
1997, Dr. Oswaks opined that claimant was disabled as a direct
result of her 1995 accident. 	Dr. Oswaks recommended surgical
exploration to define the hernia and repair it.
In his April 24, 1997 deposition, Dr. Oswaks testified that
the physicians who had examined claimant could not find any
gynecological or orthopedic cause for claimant's symptoms. 	Dr.
Oswaks opined that as of May 3, 1996, "from a mechanical
standpoint," claimant could return to work, although her level of
pain may have prevented her from doing so. 	Dr. Oswaks was
"unclear" as to whether claimant returned to work in May 1996.
He also did not know whether claimant worked during June 1996.
In April 1997, claimant told Dr. Oswaks that she had performed
some work, but he was unaware of the exact dates. 	Claimant also
told Dr. Oswaks about the June 7, 1996 fall and emergency room
treatment. 	Dr. Oswaks stated that claimant told him the June 7,
1996 injury had something to do with her knee or extremity. 	Dr.
Oswaks denied that claimant told him she had exacerbated her
abdominal injury as a result of the June 1996 fall. 	Dr. Oswaks
never reviewed the Virginia Beach General Hospital records or Dr.
Everett's records related to the June 7, 1996 slip and fall.
Based upon this record, the commission concluded that "the
medical evidence fails to establish that the claimant suffers a
disability causally related to the 1995 incident beginning June
20, 1996." 	The commission rejected Dr. Oswaks's opinion.

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"Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive, but is
subject to the commission's consideration and weighing."
Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 11 Va. App. 675, 677, 401
S.E.2d 213, 215 (1991). 	As fact finder, the commission was
entitled to weigh the medical evidence and to reject Dr. Oswaks's
opinion, because the record established that his opinion was
based upon an inaccurate and incomplete medical history. 	See
Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Bowman, 229 Va. 249, 251-52, 329 S.E.2d
15, 16 (1985). 	Absent Dr. Oswaks's opinion, no evidence proved
that claimant's alleged disability beginning June 20, 1996 was
causally related to her compensable July 7, 1995 injury by
accident. 	Accordingly, we cannot find as a matter of law that
claimant's evidence sustained her burden of proof.
Because our holding on the causation issue is dispositive of
this appeal, we need not address the marketing issue.
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.