Lydda Myers v James T. Brolin, a/k/a, etc

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Benton, Coleman and Fitzpatrick
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
LYDDA MYERS
v. 	Record No. 1737-94-4 	MEMORANDUM OPINION*
BY JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
JAMES T. BROLIN, A/K/A 	JULY 5, 1995
JAMES VERNON MARSH, JR.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Jack B. Stevens, Judge
Emilia Castillo (Arlene Lyles Pripeton, P.C.,
on brief), for appellant.
Andrew H. Goodman (Robert L. Vaughn, Jr.;
Glennon, Goodman & Lubeley, on brief),
for appellee.
This appeal is from a judgment order declaring James T.
Brolin to be the father of Lydda Myers' illegitimate child and
awarding her custody of the child. 	The sole issue on appeal is
whether Lydda Myers, in addition to the declaration of paternity
and custody she sought and obtained, is entitled to have the
trial court require that James Brolin verify his identity and his
employment. 	Because the true identity of a party became a
substantial issue in this case, we hold that the trial court
erred in refusing to require Brolin to verify two relevant and
material facts, his identity and his employment.
Lydda Myers filed a petition in the juvenile and domestic
relations district court against James T. Brolin, seeking to have
* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.

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him declared the father of her child and to award her custody of
the child. 	James Brolin appeared at the hearing on the petition.
At that hearing, evidence was introduced of a DNA test result
that showed a 99.9 percent probability of his paternity. 	He
acknowledged that he is the child's father. 	By order, the judge
of the juvenile court found that the father used the name James
T. Brolin when his DNA was tested, that James T. Brolin and James
Vernon Marsh, Jr., are the same person, that James Vernon Marsh,
Jr., is the child's father, and that the mother was entitled to
custody. 	The juvenile and domestic relations district court and
the circuit court, on appeal, denied Myers' request that Brolin
be required to provide verification of his true identity, his
employment, and other personal information, including his address
and his lineage. 	Myers appeals from the circuit court's ruling
holding that it has no authority to require Brolin to provide her
and the court that information.
A party appealing to a circuit court has the right to a de
novo trial on appeal from "any final order or judgment of the
juvenile court affecting the rights or interests of any person
coming within its jurisdiction." 	Code §§ 16.1-296, 16.1-136.
See also Walker v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 223 Va. 557, 562-63,
290 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1982). 	The circuit court's order "affirmed
verbatim" the juvenile and domestic relations district court's
order. 	Because Brolin appeared at the de novo hearing and
conceded the issues of paternity, custody, and support, the trial

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court summarily held that Myers was entitled to and was receiving
all the relief she sought by her petition. 	Thus, the trial court
entered an order to that effect and ruled that because she was
receiving the requested relief, no further hearing was required,
nor was Brolin required to provide verification of his identity
or employment.
Code § 20-49.8 provides that an order establishing parentage
"may include any provision directed against the appropriate party
to the proceeding, concerning the duty of support . . . or any
other matter in the best interest of the child." 	The juvenile
order manifests that a substantial question was raised as to the
identity of the child's father. 	Presumably, the child's father
is James Vernon Marsh, Jr., as he informed the trial court.
However, determining the true identity of the father as an
"appropriate party" is basic to a paternity and ancillary support
proceeding. 	Thus, to determine who is an "appropriate party" for
purposes of paternity and support, the child or mother on the
child's behalf is entitled to require that the father verify his
identity when a substantial question arises concerning the
identity, as is the situation here. 	Moreover, Code § 20-49.8
provides that when the court determines paternity, a certified
copy of the order "shall" be transmitted to the State Registrar
of Vital Records and "shall set forth the full name and date and
place of birth of the person whose parentage has been determined,
the full names of both parents."

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In order for the court to comply with this legislative
mandate, the court was required to have the parties verify their
identities, including the foregoing information. 	Furthermore,
Code § 20-79.1 authorizes a trial court in a support enforcement
proceeding, in its discretion, to order the employer of a support
obligor to deduct and withhold from earnings the amount of court
ordered child support. 	While this proceeding was not one to
enforce the father's support obligation, a determination of the
father's employer is a relevant fact to the duty to support which
flows from the paternity determination. 	Identifying the father's
employer is a fact which the trial court may, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, determine under Code § 20-49.8 as "any
other matter in the best interest of the child."
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's ruling that it was
without authority to require Brolin to verify his identity and
employer. 	We remand the case to the trial court for such further
proceedings as are necessary consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.