Michael D. Labranche v Rene Joy Labranche

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Chief Judge Moon, Judge Bray and Senior Judge Duff
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
MICHAEL D. LABRANCHE
v. 	Record No. 2383-95-4 	MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
RENE JOY LABRANCHE 	JUNE 4, 1996
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Jack B. Stevens, Judge
Chanda L. Kinsey (Kinsey, Lynch & Filipour,
on brief), for appellant.
Paula Winchester Rank (Lawrence H. Bowen;
Byrd, Mische, Bevis, Bowen, Joseph &
O'Connor, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Michael D. Labranche (husband) challenges the decree of the
trial court ordering him to pay Rene J. Labranche (wife) spousal
support of $500 per month and certain "marital" debts. 	Finding
no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and we
recite only those facts necessary to a disposition of this
appeal. 	"Upon familiar principles, we review the evidence on
appeal in the light most favorable to wife, the party prevailing
below." 	Cook v. Cook, 18 Va. App. 726, 731, 446 S.E.2d 894, 896
(1994).
The parties married on July 6, 1987, separated June 17,
1993, and were divorced, in a bifurcated proceeding, by decree
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.

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dated July 1, 1994. 	The disputed orders resulted from the
court's subsequent adjudication of equitable distribution and
spousal support and attendant factual findings.
Spousal Support
"[W]hether a spouse is entitled to support, and if so how
much, is a matter within the discretion of the court . . . ."
Dukelow v. Dukelow, 2 Va. App. 21, 27, 341 S.E.2d 208, 211
(1986). 	An award "'based upon due consideration of the factors
enumerated in Code § 20-107.1, as shown by the evidence, . . .
"will not be disturbed except for a clear abuse of discretion."'"
Poliquin v. Poliquin, 12 Va. App. 676, 679, 406 S.E.2d 401, 403
(1991) (citations omitted); Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App. 558,
574, 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992). 	In addressing the relevant
statutory factors, the trial court is not required "to quantify
or elaborate exactly what weight or consideration it has given to
each . . . ." 	Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349
S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986). 	However, the "award must be based upon
the circumstances in existence at the time of the award. 	An
award 'premised upon the occurrence of an uncertain future
circumstance . . . ignores the design and defeats the purpose of
the statutory scheme.'" 	Payne v. Payne, 5 Va. App. 359, 363, 363
S.E.2d 428, 430 (1987) (citation omitted).
Here, in a letter opinion to counsel and attendant order,
the trial court noted its consideration of the statutory factors,
and detailed those factual findings deemed pertinent to the

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decision, all of which were well supported by the evidence.
Although the court acknowledged that wife anticipated a move to
California, her evidence included an "Income and Expense
Statement" that reflected existing economic circumstances, and
the record does not establish that the trial court improperly
fashioned an award based upon "speculative" future expenses. 	See
Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291
(1977). 	Similarly, the record also does not indicate that the
court required husband to pay wife's post-marital debt. 	Under
such circumstances, we decline to disturb the award.
Marital Debt
"[I]n reviewing an equitable distribution award, we rely
heavily on the trial judge's discretion in weighing the
particular circumstances of each case." 	Aster v. Gross, 7 Va.
App. 1, 8, 371 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1988). 	Accordingly, we defer to
the chancellor's resolution of the conflicting equities and will
upset an award only if unsupported by the evidence or the result
of an abuse of discretion or failure to follow statutory mandate.
Banagan v. Banagan, 17 Va. App. 321, 326, 437 S.E.2d 229, 231-32
(1993) (citations omitted). 	Like Code § 20-107.1, Code
§ 20-107.3 requires the court to consider numerous factors in
adjudicating the equities between the parties, but, likewise,
"[t]he court need not quantify or elaborate exactly what weight
was given to each of the factors," provided its findings are
based upon credible evidence. 	Taylor v. Taylor, 5 Va. App. 436,

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444, 364 S.E.2d 244, 249 (1988). 	Here, the court's findings and
conclusions clearly reflect appropriate consideration of the
requisite statutory factors and our review of the record
discloses no abuse of discretion in the allocation of the marital
debt in issue. 	See Code § 20-107.3(C),(E).
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.
Affirmed.