Shohreh Ghasem v Fairfax Co. DSS

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judge Annunziata, Senior Judge Duff and Judge Clements*
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
SHOHREH GHASEM
MEMORANDUM OPINION** BY
v. 	Record No. 2537-99-4 	JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF
MAY 9, 2000
FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
FAMILY SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Arthur B. Vieregg, Jr., Judge
(Charles J. Swedish, on brief), for
appellant. 	Appellant submitting on brief.
Thomas P. Sotelo, Substitute Assistant County
Attorney (Keegan & Sotelo, PLC, on brief),
for appellee.
(W. Kip Wood, on brief), Guardian ad litem
for Saman Ghasem, an infant.
* Judge Jean Harrison Clements took part in the
consideration of this case by designation pursuant to Code
§ 17.1-400, recodifying Code § 17-116.01.
** Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Shohreh Ghasem ("appellant") appeals the decision terminating
her parental rights to Saman Ghasem ("Saman"). 	The issue on
appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to meet the clear
and convincing standard required for termination of parental
rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). 	We find that the evidence was
sufficient and affirm the trial judge's ruling.

FACTS
Saman was born on December 11, 1989. 	In September of 1995,
the Fairfax County Department of Family Services ("the
Department") removed Saman, then four years old, from appellant's
care because appellant left Saman unsupervised and locked out of
their hotel room for seven hours. 	Saman was returned to
appellant's care, but removed again on July 29, 1996 because
appellant violated a preliminary protective order which prohibited
her having contact with a friend who had physically abused
appellant's other son. 	The Department later returned Saman to
appellant.
On December 11, 1997, appellant signed a service agreement
with the Department stating Saman would not be left alone or
unsupervised at any time or for any reason. 	The Department
explained to appellant that Saman suffered from mild mental
retardation and had special needs. 	Appellant's therapist also
explained the agreement to her. 	On that same day, a social worker
for the Department telephoned the Ghasem home and found Saman was
there alone. 	The Department removed him from appellant's care
again on December 11, 1997.
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Appellant signed additional service agreements with the
Department on December 24, 1997, and January 9, 1998, stating she
would not leave Saman alone or unsupervised for any amount of time
or for any reason. 	Since 1995, the Department provided the family
with various services, interventions and financial assistance,

including: 	protective supervision of Saman and his brother;
coordination with the mental health center and Multicultural
Clinical Center for individual and home based therapy; and
coordination with Saman's school and health clinics. 	The Center
for Multicultural Human Services had worked with the family
"intensively" since April of 1997, providing individual therapy,
parental education, nutritional education, and social skills
training for appellant two times per week. 	Despite the repeated
attempts to educate appellant concerning Saman's special needs,
and despite attending parenting classes, appellant continued to
deny Saman had any problems. 	Evidence was presented that
appellant suffers from depression and a brain dysfunction.
Appellant again left Saman alone for about one hour and
fifteen minutes on January 29, 1998 when she was late returning
from a doctor's appointment. 	The Department removed Saman from
her care and initiated proceedings to terminate her residual
parental rights to Saman.
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On July 28, 1999, a hearing was held in circuit court
concerning the termination of appellant's parental rights. 	At the
hearing, the deposition of Dr. Ronald Federici, a clinical
neuropsychologist, was admitted into evidence. 	Dr. Federici
conducted a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation of Saman
dated January 21, 1999. 	He testified Saman, who at the time of
the evaluation was nine years old, suffers from profound cognitive
and learning disabilities, speech, language and hearing

deficiencies, mild mental retardation, brain dysfunction and
various mental and emotional disorders. 	He is physically small
for his age, and his mental development is equivalent to that of a
five year old. 	Saman also suffers from a reactive attachment
disorder and fear of abandonment. 	Dr. Federici stated that Saman
will likely require adult supervision and a controlled environment
into adulthood. 	Saman's prospect for future development is very
poor. 	Dr. Federici further opined that if Saman is to reach his
developmental potential, he requires a parental figure with
significant dedication and intelligence to address his needs.
On September 27, 1999, the trial judge entered an order
terminating appellant's residual parental rights. 	The trial judge
found that it was in the best interest of Saman to "live in a
controlled environment with adults who understand and can meet his
special needs." 	He also found the Department clearly and
convincingly proved the requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C)(2),
stating that, despite attending parenting classes and receiving a
"host of other services," appellant's "inherent disabilities
demonstrate that she is unable to remedy the conditions which led
to Saman's placement in foster care." 	Appellant appeals that
order.
ANALYSIS
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"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."

Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128,
409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). 	Where the trial judge hears the
evidence ore tenus, his decision is entitled to great weight and
will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it. 	See Lowe v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 231
Va. 277, 282, 343 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1986).
Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides that the parental rights of a
child placed in foster care may be terminated if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests
of the child and that
[t]he parent . . ., without good cause,
[has] been unwilling or unable within a
reasonable period of time not to exceed
twelve months from the date the child was
placed in foster care to remedy
substantially the conditions which led to or
required continuation of the child's foster
care placement, notwithstanding the
reasonable and appropriate efforts of
social, medical, mental health or other
rehabilitative agencies to such end. 	Proof
that the parent . . . without good cause,
[has] failed or been unable to make
substantial progress towards elimination of
the conditions which led to or required
continuation of the child's foster care
placement in accordance with [the parent's]
obligations under and within the time limits
or goals set forth in a foster care plan
filed with the court . . . shall constitute
prima facie evidence of this condition.
"'[T]he rights of parents may not be lightly severed but are
to be respected if at all consonant with the best interests of the
child.'" 	Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120, 1124, 253 S.E.2d 658, 661
(1979) (citation omitted). 	The termination of parental rights is
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a grave, drastic, and irreversible action. 	"When a court orders
termination of parental rights, the ties between the parent and
child are severed forever and the parent becomes 'a legal stranger
to the child.'" 	Lowe, 231 Va. at 280, 343 S.E.2d at 72 (citation
omitted).
Appellant contends that she was first diagnosed as mildly
mentally retarded after Saman was removed from her home on January
29, 1998. 	She asserts that this condition led to the child's
foster care placement and that, after January 29, 1998, the
Department has offered her no services in an effort to remedy this
condition or any other condition which led to Saman's foster care
placement. 	However, the record indicates that appellant's
psychological condition had been an issue throughout the
Department's period of involvement with the family, not just on or
after January 29, 1998. 	Moreover, appellant's diagnosis of mild
mental retardation was not the sole condition which led to Saman's
placement in a foster home. 	The evidence proved that Saman had
numerous physical, mental, and emotional special needs that were
not being met under appellant's care. 	Furthermore, appellant
repeatedly left the child alone and unsupervised despite the
Department's continuing attempts to advise her of his special
needs.
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In addition, the Department worked with the family and
offered numerous counseling and medical services to the family
since 1995, but noted little progress or improvement in

appellant's parenting skills. 	For example, appellant received a
psychological examination in January 1997, parental/child
interaction assessments in March 1997 and February 1998, and
parenting classes. 	The December 14, 1998 Foster Care Service Plan
states that appellant received psychiatric medication from October
1995 to December 14, 1998. 	The plan also states that despite
"intensive services and interventions" appellant did not make
"much progress and continually engages in the behavior that
resulted in Saman going into the custody of the Department in
September 1995."
In addition, appellant received a neuropsychological
evaluation in February 1998. 	The Foster Care Service Plan dated
March 3, 1998 indicates that appellant was diagnosed as suffering
from "an emotional condition" and "brain dysfunction." 	Her
emotional development was diagnosed as that of a child and
characteristic of Borderline Personality Disorder. 	The report
further stated she "displays significant cognitive weaknesses
which represent impairment of several brain areas which are
generally impervious to change." 	At the time of the report, and
as stated above, appellant had received "intensive home-based
services" for over two years, but she continued to leave Saman
unsupervised, and she continued to deny that he had any special
developmental, cognitive, mental or physical needs or problems.
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Thus, the record indicates that the Department was aware from
the time it first became involved with the family that appellant's

mental health status was an issue in the matter. 	Moreover, the
Department was also aware of and concerned for the mental,
physical, and emotional well being of Saman, a child with numerous
special needs. 	The record is replete with instances of
"reasonable and appropriate efforts" made by the Department and
other agencies over a period of several years in an attempt to
work with appellant and remedy the numerous conditions which led
to the foster care placement of Saman. 	However, the record also
indicates that appellant made very little, if any, progress in
remedying these conditions, notwithstanding the efforts of the
Department and other agencies.
Therefore, the record supports the trial judge's finding that
the termination of appellant's residual parental rights was in
Saman's best interest and his finding that the Department
presented clear and convincing evidence to meet the requirements
of Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). 	Accordingly, we affirm the decision.1
Affirmed.
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1 Because we decide the evidence was sufficient to support
the trial judge's holding, the point raised by appellee
regarding Code § 16.1-283(B) is moot.