Medtech Health Care Training v VA Bd. of Nursing

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bray and Annunziata
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
MEDTECH HEALTH CARE TRAINING
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 2762-99-4 	JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
MAY 23, 2000
VIRGINIA BOARD OF NURSING
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Leslie M. Alden, Judge
Richard E. Gardiner for appellant.
Howard M. Casway, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Ashley L.
Taylor, Jr., Deputy Attorney General;
Jane D. Hickey, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Medtech Health Care Training ("Medtech") appeals from a
judgment of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, affirming
certain findings of the Virginia Board of Nursing ("Board").
Medtech contends the Board's findings were not based upon
substantial evidence in the record and that the circuit court
erred in failing to rule on Medtech's contention that one of the
Board's factual findings resulted from a misinterpretation of
the pertinent regulation. 	We dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND
Medtech was granted provisional approval to operate a
practical nursing program in March, 1995. 	Provisional approval
authorizes the admission of students based upon a determination
that the training program has sufficient faculty and is
developing a tentative curriculum. 	Following the graduation of
its first class in June, 1996, a survey visit was conducted by
the Board to determine whether to grant final approval to
Medtech's application. 	During the visit a number of
deficiencies were noted, but no action was taken at that time
because the Board's regulations then in effect required that
Medtech be accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges
and Schools before the Board could take further action, and
Medtech was not yet accredited. 	In March, 1998, on the
recommendation of its Education Committee, the Board advised
Medtech that it had six months to obtain the required
accreditation. 	On October 7, 1998, following a hearing, an
order was entered which continued Medtech's provisional
approval, subject to an unannounced survey visit and the
submission of quarterly reports by Medtech. 	The continued
provisional approval and conditions were due to on-going
uncorrected deficiencies in Medtech's training program.
On February 17 and 18, 1999, the Board sent reviewers to
conduct the unannounced survey visit as required by the October
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7, 1998 order. 	The Board's Education Special Conference
Committee recommended denial of final approval and withdrawal of
provisional approval because of continuing deficiencies noted on
this visit.
After a hearing was held on July 19, 1999, the Board
entered a final order withdrawing Medtech's provisional approval
for its practical nursing education program. 	The decision was
based on the Board's determination that Medtech had failed to
comply with the regulatory requirements for continued approval
of its program, noted in eleven specific failures. 	Upon
Medtech's appeal to the circuit court, seven of these findings
of fact were affirmed.1 The court suspended the Board's order
and remanded the matter to the Board "for further proceedings as
the Board deems necessary." 	This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Medtech contends the court erred in affirming the seven
factual findings under consideration in this appeal because they
were not based on substantial evidence in the record. 	Medtech
also contends that finding 2(j) misconstrued 18 VAC
90-20-130(A), and the circuit court erred in failing to rule on
1 The Board's findings of fact affirmed by the circuit court
are those designated 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 2(i), and
2(j) in the Board's order of July 19, 1999. 	The remaining four
factual findings were reversed by the circuit court as not being
adequately noticed, and are not under consideration in this
appeal.
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this question. 	For the reasons that follow, we lack
jurisdiction to decide this appeal.
Code § 17.1-405(1) grants "[t]his Court . . . appellate
jurisdiction over any final decision of a circuit court on
appeal from a decision of an administrative agency." 	Hoyle v.
Virginia Employment Comm'n, 24 Va. App. 533, 537, 484 S.E.2d
132, 133 (1997) (internal quotation omitted). 	The Board is an
administrative agency. 	See Code §§ 2.1-1.6; 9-6.25:2. 	"A final
decision is one 'which disposes of the whole subject, gives all
the relief that is contemplated and leaves nothing to be done by
the court.'" 	Wells v. Wells, 29 Va. App. 82, 85-86, 509 S.E.2d
549, 551 (1999) (quoting Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389,
390, 451 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1994)). 	"[U]nless [an interlocutory
order] constitutes an . . . order that 'adjudicates the
principles of a cause,' we do not have jurisdiction to consider
an appeal." 	Id. at 86, 509 S.E.2d at 551.
An interlocutory decree adjudicates the
principles of a cause where "the rules or
methods by which the rights of the parties
are to be finally worked out have been so
far determined that it is only necessary to
apply those rules or methods to the facts of
the case in order to ascertain the relative
rights of the parties, with regard to the
subject matter of the suit."
Id. (quoting Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 227, 231, 481 S.E.2d
482, 485 (1997)) (additional citations omitted); see Canova
Elec. Contracting, Inc. v. LMI Ins. Co., 22 Va. App. 595, 600,
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471 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1996) ("[A]n order adjudicates the
principles of a cause only if it determines the rights of the
parties and affects the final order in the case."). 	Thus,
unless the circuit court's order remanding the matter before us
to the Board "adjudicates the principles of the cause," we lack
jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
In the present case, the circuit court's order remanding
the matter to the Board "for further proceedings as the Board
deems necessary" is an interlocutory order that does not
adjudicate the principles of the cause. 	Consequently, we lack
jurisdiction to address the matter, and dismiss the appeal.
Dismissed.
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