Judy Ann Witt v Roanoke City Dept of Social Serv.

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
JUDY ANN WITT
v. 	Record No. 0917-95-3 	MEMORANDUM OPINION*
PER CURIAM
ROANOKE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 	NOVEMBER 7, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
Diane McQ. Strickland, Judge
(Allen T. Wilson, on brief), for appellant.
(Alice L. Ekirch, Assistant Commonwealth's
Attorney, on brief), for appellee.
Judy Ann Witt appeals the decision of the circuit court
terminating her residual parental rights to her son, Kriss. 	Witt
argues that the court did not apply the proper standard of law
under Code § 16.1-283(B) and that the evidence presented by the
Roanoke City Department of Social Services (Department) was
insufficient to support a termination of her parental rights.
Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude
that this appeal is without merit. 	Accordingly, we summarily
affirm the decision of the trial court. 	Rule 5A:27.
"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."
Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123,
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.

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128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). 	The trial court is vested with
broad discretion to make the decisions "'necessary to guard and
to foster a child's best interests.'" 	Id. (citation omitted).
When the trial court's decision is based upon evidence heard ore
tenus, that decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 	Id.
Standard under Code § 16.1-283(B)
Under Code § 16.1-283(B), clear and convincing evidence that
the parent has not "responded to or followed through with
appropriate, available and reasonable rehabilitative efforts
. . . designed to reduce, eliminate or prevent" the underlying
child neglect or abuse is prima facie evidence that the
conditions which led to a child's entrustment placement cannot be
substantially corrected within a reasonable period of time so as
to allow the return of a child to his parent. 	Kriss was four
months old when he was placed in foster care. 	He had a scratched
cornea, two infected eyes, and several abrasions on his face. 	He
also was very dirty. 	The Department's investigation disclosed
that Witt left Kriss in the care of her roommate, a prostitute,
while Witt served a jail sentence. 	The roommate then left Kriss
in the home of a third person, who turned Kriss over to the
Department.
The record establishes that Witt's lifestyle and method of
parenting had not improved following earlier intervention efforts
by the Department. 	Witt made virtually no effort to cooperate

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with the Department in its efforts to return Kriss to her
custody. 	The evidence shows the trial court did not apply an
incorrect standard of law and did not err in finding that the
mother's unwillingness or inability to comply with the
Department's offered services demonstrated that the conditions
which led to Kriss' placement could not be substantially
corrected within a reasonable period of time.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Witt argues that there was insufficient evidence to support
the trial court's decision to terminate her parental rights.
Witt specifically argues that the Department failed to offer
sufficient appropriate services to help her regain custody of
Kriss. 	However, the record demonstrates that the Department
offered Witt help in obtaining parenting classes, housing,
employment, and social security payments. 	The Department also
tried to impress upon Witt the need to establish stability in her
life. 	In addition, Witt previously had received parenting
training classes, residential assistance, job referrals, and
additional support in connection with her older children.
Despite the Department's attempts to assist Witt, she was
unwilling or unable to make any necessary changes. 	Witt
contacted the Department several times while she was
incarcerated. 	However, Witt waited a month following her release
before she notified the Department. 	Witt then missed the first
scheduled meeting with her year-old son, although she admitted

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she received notice of the visitation. 	In fact, Witt saw Kriss
only once after his placement with the Department, despite
Department efforts to coordinate biweekly visitation. 	Witt also
made no attempt to follow up on any of the Department's offers of
assistance, although she did apply for social security disability
benefits through her parole officer.
Clear and convincing evidence established that the
Department made appropriate and reasonable rehabilitative efforts
to assist Witt reduce or eliminate the neglect and abuse suffered
by Kriss, and that Witt was unwilling or unable to substantially
correct or eliminate that neglect or abuse.
The evidence indicated that Kriss was "at an optimum age for
adoption" and had been with the same foster parents since his
placement in foster care at age four months. 	Kriss will be
almost four years old before Witt could begin to establish a
stable home for him. 	"It is clearly not in the best interests of
a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out
when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his
responsibilities." 	Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Social
Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.