Deborah Lynn Inskeep v. Roanoke City Department of Social Services

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judge McClanahan, Senior Judges Coleman and Annunziata
DEBORAH LYNN INSKEEP
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. 	Record No. 1736-04-3 	PER CURIAM
FEBRUARY 8, 2005
ROANOKE CITY DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
Charles N. Dorsey, Judge
(Thomas E. Wray, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on
brief.
(William M. Hackworth, City Attorney; Heather P. Ferguson,
Assistant City Attorney, on brief), for appellee. Appellee
submitting on brief.
(Joseph F. Vannoy, Guardian ad litem for the minor child,
on brief). Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.
Deborah Lynn Inskeep, mother, appeals the trial court’s decision terminating her parental
rights to her son. Inskeep’s “Question Presented” states: “Whether the Circuit Court for Roanoke
City erred in granting the Roanoke City Department of Social Services petition for termination of
the parental rights of Deborah Inskeep.” 1 We affirm the decision of the trial court.
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case and because this
memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, a recitation of the facts is not necessary for the
parties’ understanding of the disposition of this appeal.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1 Appellant does not raise the issue of whether the trial court applied the correct standard
or statutory test. Therefore, we do not reach this issue. See 5A:18.

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When considering the termination of a parent’s right to a child, “the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human
Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). On review, “[a] trial court is presumed to
have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its
determination based on the child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387
S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). “The trial court’s judgment, when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will
not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Logan, 13
Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463.
Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the
termination is in the best interests of the child, (2) “reasonable and appropriate” services have been
offered to help the parent “substantially remedy the conditions which led to or required continuation
of the child’s foster care placement,” and (3) despite those services, the parent has failed, “without
good cause,” to remedy those conditions “within a reasonable amount of time not to exceed twelve
months from the date the child was placed in foster care.” The record contains evidence that clearly
and convincingly proved that Inskeep failed to “substantially remedy” the conditions “which led to
or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement” within the statutory time period.
The record supports the trial court’s finding that the best interests of the child would be
served by terminating Inskeep’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). We will not
disturb the trial court’s finding because it was neither plainly wrong nor without evidence to support
it. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Affirmed.