Wayne Thomas Pulliam v Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Benton, Humphreys and Retired Judge Kulp*
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
WAYNE THOMAS PULLIAM
MEMORANDUM OPINION** BY
v. 	Record No. 1770-98-2 	JUDGE JAMES E. KULP
JULY 25, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
John F. Daffron, Jr., Judge
R. Donald Ford, Jr., for appellant.
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
* Retired Judge James E. Kulp took part in the consideration
of this case by designation pursuant to Code § 17.1-400,
recodifying Code § 17-116.01.
** Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Wayne Thomas Pulliam (appellant) appeals from a judgment of
the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County (trial court) convicting
him of driving after having been declared an habitual offender,
second or subsequent offense. 	He contends the evidence was
insufficient to prove that he operated an automobile on the date
in question. 	We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
"On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable

inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" 	Archer v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997)
(citation omitted).
Officer Vincent testified that just before 11:00 p.m. on
March 26, 1998, he was dispatched to investigate a single vehicle
automobile accident. 	Upon arriving at the accident scene, he
discovered a car that had struck a tree head on. 	The car, which
was registered to appellant's estranged wife, Nicole Pulliam
(Nicole), was unoccupied. 	The car's hood was still warm,
indicating to Vincent that the vehicle had been operated recently,
and there was no key in the car's ignition.
Seven minutes later, after receiving a call from Officer
Thornton, Vincent proceeded seven-tenths of a mile to the entrance
of a Reynolds Metals facility. 	Thornton was waiting for him there
with appellant. 	Appellant had fresh mud on his boots and pants,
and scratches on his arms.
Appellant initially denied any knowledge of the accident.
When asked about the mud and his scratches, appellant explained
that he worked at Reynolds and had taken a shortcut through the
woods to get to work. 	Vincent noted that the shortest distance
between the accident scene and Reynolds was through some nearby
woods.
Appellant said a friend ordinarily drove him part of the way
to work, but appellant was unable to provide a name, address, or
any other information regarding this "friend." 	Appellant did not
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dispute Vincent's suggestion that the car might be stolen, but
expressed little interest in filing a stolen vehicle report.
Upon learning that appellant was an habitual offender,
Vincent arrested appellant. 	While searching appellant incident to
arrest, Vincent recovered a key chain that contained a key to
Nicole's car. 	Appellant did not know whether any other keys to
the car existed.
Appellant subsequently stated that a friend of his named
"Crack" had been driving Nicole's car. 	When Vincent questioned
appellant further, appellant only said that he, appellant, had not
been driving. 	Vincent testified that he saw no one else in the
vicinity of the accident scene.
Nicole testified that she saw appellant, Jowansa Green, and
a friend of appellant's in her car around 4:00 p.m. on March 26,
1998. 	She said that Green was driving.
"The fact finder . . . may rely solely upon circumstantial
evidence to prove an offense, provided the circumstances point
unerringly to prove the necessary elements of the offense." 	Doss
v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 679, 685, 479 S.E.2d 92, 95 (1996).
"The Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of
innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from
the imagination of the defendant." 	Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16
Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993). 	"The inferences to
be drawn from proven facts, so long as they are reasonable, are
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within the province of the trier of fact." 	Hancock v.
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 774, 782, 407 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1991).
When Vincent arrived at the accident scene, he could tell
Nicole's car had been driven recently. 	Seven minutes later and
less than a mile away, Vincent found appellant, who possessed a
key to the vehicle. 	Appellant provided Vincent with conflicting
and suspect statements regarding the car and how he got to
Reynolds that night. 	From this evidence, the trial court could
infer beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had been driving
the car. 	The Commonwealth's evidence was competent, was not
inherently incredible, and was sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of second offense
habitual offender.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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