Daniel Soctt Piela v Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Coleman, Bray and Bumgardner
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
DANIEL SCOTT PIELA
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 0550-99-1 	JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
APRIL 4, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY
William H. Shaw, III, Judge
Andrea K. Amy-Pressey for appellant.
Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Daniel Scott Piela (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial
of obstructing justice in violation of Code § 18.2-460(A).1
Appealing to this Court, he challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the conviction. 	Finding no error, we affirm
the trial court.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
disposition of the appeal.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1 Although both the warrant and conviction order reference
Code § 18.2-460 generally, the warrant alleges conduct
proscribed by paragraph (A) of the statute and the briefs and
oral argument addressed only that provision.

I.
"On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" 	Archer v. Commonwealth,
26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted).
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight accorded testimony,
and the inferences drawn from the proven facts are matters to be
determined by the fact finder. 	See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.
App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). 	The judgment of the
trial court will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong or
unsupported by the evidence. 	See Code § 8.01-680.
On November 21, 1998, Gloucester County Sheriff's Deputy
Lawrence Stolk, a "watch commander" at the local jail, was on duty
when a "small riot" erupted in the "dayroom" of the "maximum
security cell block," then housing "10 to 12" inmates in four
cells. 	Stolk immediately initiated a "lockdown," which required
all inmates "to go back into their separate cells." 	After "[a]
lot of noise, . . . complaining, . . . and cursing," jail staff
"got them all back in," the cell doors were electronically closed
and locked, and Stolk departed the area.
Within minutes, Stolk "got a call to come back." 	Returning,
he observed defendant "standing in the doorway" of his cell,
"holding the door open." 	As Stolk watched, defendant "took one of
his plastic shoes and put it in the locking mechanism to stop the
door from closing," resulting in a "grinding sound." 	Uncertain
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"what kind of damage had been done" to the door, Stolk decided to
temporarily relocate defendant pending investigation. 	However,
when Stolk approached defendant, then inside his cell, and
requested him to "get . . . out of the bed," defendant "cursed"2
Stolk and repeatedly refused to cooperate. 	Finally, Stolk, aided
by two deputies, "put [defendant] up against the wall," applied "a
come-along hold," and removed him from the cell. 	Defendant
physically "resisted" and "curse[d] all the time," reminding Stolk
that "he wouldn't be in jail forever" and threatening to "take
care of" him when "he had the chance."
Defendant argues on appeal that such "conduct did not oppose,
impede or resist the officer's efforts to ensure a secure prison"
but only offended and insulted Stolk.
II.
Code § 18.2-460(A) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f
any person without just cause knowingly obstructs . . . any law
enforcement officer in the performance of his duties or refuses
without just cause to cease such obstruction when requested to do
so by such . . . law enforcement officer, he shall be guilty of a
Class 2 misdemeanor."
"'To constitute an obstruction of an officer
in the performance of his duty, it is not
necessary that there be an actual or
technical assault upon the officer, but
there must be acts clearly indicating an
2 The record reflects that defendant "called [Stolk] a big
ear son of a bitch."
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intention on the part of the accused to
prevent the officer from performing his
duty, as to obstruct ordinarily implies
opposition or resistance by direct action.
. . . It means to obstruct the officer
himself not merely to oppose or impede . . .
the officer . . . .'"
Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429, 505 S.E.2d 388, 389
(1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79, 126
S.E. 74, 77 (1925) (citation omitted)). 	Thus, "fail[ing] to
cooperate fully with an officer" or engaging in conduct which
"merely renders the officer's task more difficult" is not
proscribed by Code § 18.2-460(A). 	Id.
Here, defendant's conduct constituted direct action clearly
calculated to resist, oppose, impede and prevent Stolk from the
lawful discharge of his duties. 	After intentionally disabling the
cell door, which prevented a proper lockdown, defendant refused to
exit his cell on command, and physically resisted the efforts of
Stolk and other law enforcement officers to remove him, while
cursing and threatening Stolk. 	Such behavior did not simply
burden the task of a law enforcement officer, but necessitated
affirmative and violent intervention to allow the proper
performance of his duties, circumstances clearly contemplated by
Code § 18.2-460(A).
Accordingly, we find the evidence sufficient to prove the
conviction and affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
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