Snyder General Corp et al v Judith Lynn Fridley

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Elder, Frank and Humphreys
Argued at Salem, Virginia
SNYDER GENERAL CORPORATION AND
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE COMPANY
MEMORANDUM OPINION* 	BY
v. 	Record No. 1268-00-3 	JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
DECEMBER 12, 2000
JUDITH LYNN FRIDLEY
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Monica L. Taylor (Dale W. Webb; Gentry,
Locke, Rakes & Moore, on brief), for
appellants.
Thomas W. Dixon, Jr. (Nelson, McPherson,
Summers & Santos, L.C., on brief), for
appellee.
Snyder General Corporation and Transportation Insurance
Company appeal from a decision of the Virginia Workers'
Compensation Commission awarding medical benefits to Judith Lynn
Fridley. 	Specifically, Snyder argues that the commission erred
in finding that Fridley proved a causal relationship between her
1990 injury and her recent medical treatment.
Fridley was hired by Snyder in January of 1989 as a general
assembler. 	By October of 1990, Fridley was working on the paint
line. 	Her duties required her to stand and hang panels on hooks
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.

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attached to a conveyor line, which took the panels to a paint
booth.
On October 4, 1990, Fridley was hanging a panel on the
line, with her right hand above her shoulder and her left hand
on the panel. 	Her right hand slipped, causing the panel to fall
forward and jerk her body forward. 	She immediately felt pain in
her low back. 	She continued to work until October 9, 1990 when
she sought medical treatment and was taken off work by her
physician until December 17, 1990.
Fridley filed her claim for benefits in February of 1991,
and the injury was accepted as compensable by Snyder. 	Fridley
alleges that she still suffers from the 1990 injury and
requested a hearing in 1998 to demand continuation of benefits
for that injury.
During the hearing, Snyder argued that Fridley could not
establish the necessary causation between her 1990 accident and
the back pain she was currently suffering. 	Specifically, Snyder
argued that Fridley failed to inform several of her treating
physicians of her history of back injury prior to 1990. 	Prior
to the 1990 injury, Fridley had presented to physicians as a
result of at least four separate instances of pain/injury to her
back. 	These instances included injuries to her lower back.
Because of this misinformation, some of Fridley's physicians
opined that her injury in 1990 was caused by the 1990 accident,
while others did not.

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Snyder also presented evidence that Fridley had incurred
several injuries to her back in the years following the 1990
accident. 	Snyder argued that these injuries interrupted the
chain of causation between the 1990 injury and Fridley's current
problems.
Fridley underwent an independent medical examination on
January 5, 1999. 	The examination was performed by Dr. George
Godette. 	After examining Fridley and reviewing all of her
pertinent medical history,1 Dr. Godette diagnosed Fridley with a
left SI joint dsyfunction and stated the following with regard
to causation:
If it is assumed that the patient had no
pre-existing disease, then certainly the
mechanism of the injury of the accident of
October 9, 1990 could trigger symptoms such
as the patient presently exhibits.2 Usually,
an SI problem with appropriate treatment
resolves in three to four months (six months
at the longest). . . . [The injuries Fridley
suffered since 1990] could certainly have
extended the period of time that the patient
would have SI joint symptoms . . . . 	For
this reason, it is my medical opinion that
it is very unlikely to a degree of medical
certainty, any causality between the injury
of October 9, 1990 [sic] and the patient's
1 Fridley told Dr. Godette during the exam that she had no
history of back injury prior to the 1990 incident. 	However,
before issuing his final report, Dr. Godette was able to review
all of Fridley's pertinent medical records, including those
pertaining to her back injuries prior to 1990.
2 Fridley's initial paperwork established the date of the
accident as October 9, 1990, the date that she first sought
medical treatment. 	However, the accident actually occurred on
October 4, 1990.

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present symptoms could be firmly
established.
(Footnote added).
In response, Dr. Bart W. Balint, a physician with the
Shenandoah Valley Pain Clinic where Fridley had been seeking
treatment since 1994, wrote a letter disagreeing with Dr.
Godette's diagnosis of SI joint dysfunction. 	Dr. Balint had
also examined Fridley and reviewed her medical history. 	He
stated the following:
While Ms. Fridley has pain to palpitation
over the superior part of the posterior
pelvis and near the SI joint, the pain is
coming from the superior gluteal neuralgia,
not from a source in the SI joint.
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
In conclusion, Ms. Fridley has been a
patient in my practice for several years.
She continues to work 40+ hours per week in
a medium to heavy duty job despite having
chronic neuralgia from her work related
accident in 1990.
Based on this evidence, the deputy commissioner denied
Fridley's application for benefits finding that Fridley had
failed to meet her burden of proving a causal relationship.
However, the full commission reversed the deputy's decision
finding that Fridley "established that her treatment for
left-sided hip pain and lower back pain with Dr. Balint and his
associates was caused by the October 9, 1990 accident [sic]."
"A question raised by conflicting medical
opinion is a question of fact." 	On review
by this Court, a determination of legal

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causation by the commission is "a factual
finding that will not be disturbed on appeal
if there is credible evidence to support
[it]." 	"The fact that there is contrary
evidence in the record is of no consequence
if there is credible evidence to support the
commission's finding."
City of Norfolk v. Lillard, 15 Va. App. 424, 429-30, 424 S.E.2d
243, 246 (1992) (citations omitted).
"In determining whether credible evidence
exists, the appellate court does not retry
the facts, reweigh the preponderance of the
evidence, or make its own determination of
the credibility of the witnesses." 	"Matters
of weight and preponderance of the evidence,
and the resolution of conflicting inferences
fairly deducible from the evidence, are
within the prerogative of the commission,
and are conclusive and binding on the Court
of Appeals."
City of Richmond Fire Dep't v. Dean, 30 Va. App. 306, 311-12,
516 S.E.2d 709, 711-12 (1999) (citations omitted).
Thus, considering the evidence in the light we must, we
find that there was credible evidence to support the
commission's factual finding with respect to causation.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the commission.
Affirmed.