Motley II v. Virginia State Bar

Present: 	Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, and Kinser,
JJ., and Compton and Stephenson, Senior Justices
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VICTOR ALAN MOTLEY
OPINION BY
v. 	Record No. 000417 	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO
September 15, 2000
VIRGINIA STATE BAR
FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD
In this appeal of right, we review an order of the
Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (the Disciplinary
Board) involving Victor Alan Motley (Motley), a Richmond
attorney. 	Dated November 5, 1999, the order imposed upon
Motley an eighteen-month license suspension for mishandling
a real estate transaction and mismanaging a trust account.
Finding no error in the order, we will affirm.
1. The Real Estate Transaction	19
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Background	21
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The real estate transaction in question involved an
oral contract for the sale and purchase of a house and lot
in the City of Richmond, entered into in February of 1996
between Evelyn J. Davis (Davis),1 the seller, and Rebecca
Gray (Gray), the purchaser. 	Motley’s conduct with respect
to the real estate transaction implicates DR 6-101 of the
Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, which was in
1 Evelyn Davis is also referred to in the record as Evelyn
Meade and Evelyn Steele. 	Because the Disciplinary Board in

effect at all times pertinent to this case.2 DR 6-101 dealt
with competence and promptness and a lawyer’s duty to keep
a client reasonably informed.
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Retained by a realtor to act as settlement attorney in
the transaction, Motley concedes he represented “both the
seller . . . and the buyer.” 	Before consulting with
Motley, Davis and Gray had agreed that Davis would sell the
property to Gray for $35,000. 	Gray agreed to pay $4,000 in
cash at closing and assume an existing deed of trust held
by Suncoast Savings and Loan Association, FSA (Suncoast)
for the balance.
Motley undertook the drafting of the necessary
documents and the closing of the transaction. 	Closing was
scheduled for February 15, 1996. 	Shortly before that date,
Gray announced that she could pay only $2,000 at closing.
Davis agreed to accept the $2,000, provided that Gray
execute a deed of trust and note in favor of Davis to
secure payment of the remaining $2,000 by May 15, 1996.
its order referred to her as Davis, we will use the same
name in this opinion.
2 Effective January 1, 2000, the Virginia Code of
Professional Responsibility was replaced by the Virginia
Rules of Professional Conduct.
3 The subjects of competence, promptness, and a duty to
inform are now contained in Rules 1.1, 1.3(a), and
1.4(a),(b), and (c) of the new Rules of Professional
Conduct, respectively.
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On February 15, Motley, Davis, and Gray met to close
the transaction. 	Gray had no funds with her but stated she
would pay $1,000 the next day and make another payment of
$1,000 in a few days. 	The parties signed the closing
papers, but agreed that the deed would not be recorded
until the first payment of $1,000 was made. 	Davis gave
Gray the keys to the house and agreed she could move in.
On February 17, Gray gave Motley a non-certified check
for $1,000 drawn on the account of a third party in an out-
of-state bank. 	Motley told Davis the check was not
certified, but she agreed that the deed could be recorded.
Motley deposited the $1,000 check in his personal
account, and the bank returned the check for “[n]ot
sufficient funds.” 	Motley deposited in his trust account
the proceeds of a personal loan in the amount of $3,026.27.
He wrote trust account checks payable to his own order for
a total of $2,300, leaving a balance of $726.27 of personal
funds in the trust account. 	In addition, he wrote three
trust account checks totaling $550 relative to the Davis-
Gray transaction, including a check to Davis for $319.80,
representing what Motley said was her part of the $1,000
check that was returned for insufficient funds. 	These
checks were not paid from funds provided by Gray but from
Motley’s personal funds.
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Gray took possession of the property in late February
or early March of 1996. 	In May 1996, Motley informed Davis
that he had received from Gray a certified check for
$1,500. 	Motley also told Davis that she owed him an
additional $200 because Gray had only made good to the
extent of $800 on the $1,000 check that was returned for
“[n]ot sufficient funds.” 	After consulting another
attorney, Davis agreed to accept the check, but she refused
Motley’s demand that she pay him the extra $200. 	Although
Davis should have received a total of $3,373.23 in cash
from the sale of her property, she received only $1,819.80.
Two documents Motley prepared and had Davis sign at
the closing formed part of the basis for the Disciplinary
Board’s finding that Motley had violated DR 6-101. 	The two
documents were a promissory note dated February 15, 1996,
and made payable to Gray for $3,366.78 and a deed of trust
purportedly securing payment of the note. 	According to
Motley, these documents were ostensibly designed to give
Gray “security” for a debt in the sum of $3,366.78 Davis
owed to a finance company for windows she had installed in
the house at some point in time prior to the closing.
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4 The deed of trust that was to provide this “security” is
not part of the record, but the evidence shows it did not
describe any property that was to stand as security for
payment of the promissory note Davis signed in favor of
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Also forming part of the basis for the Disciplinary
Board’s finding of a violation of DR 6-101 was Motley’s
alleged failure to comply promptly with instructions of
Suncoast to forward documentation necessary to complete
Gray’s assumption of the existing deed of trust on the
property. 	As late as March 21, 1996, Motley had not sent
Suncoast “Proof of Insurance coverage and paid receipt.”
Apparently, Motley never did send the information, but Gray
did.
10 	2. Trust Account Problems
Background	11
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Motley’s questionable handling of his trust account in
the Davis-Gray transaction led to a broader investigation
into his management of the account. 	Motley’s conduct with
respect to the trust account implicates former DR 9-102,
which dealt with preserving the identity of funds and
property of a client, and DR 9-103, which prescribed
record-keeping requirements.5
Lacy O. Campbell, a State Bar investigator, made an
analysis of Motley’s records for the period July 1, 1995,
Gray. 	Apparently, it was Motley’s intent that property
Davis obtained at some time in the future would later on be
included in the deed of trust.
5 The subjects of preserving identity and keeping records
are now contained in Rule 1.15 of the new Rules of
Professional Conduct.
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through June 30, 1996. 	The analysis revealed numerous
deficiencies in Motley’s record-keeping and accounting
practices. 	We will detail the results of the analysis
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On June 5, 1996, Davis filed with the Virginia State
Bar a complaint against Motley for his handling of the real
estate transaction. 	On June 25, 1999, the Third District
Subcommittee, Section Two, certified to the Disciplinary
Board charges of misconduct against Motley relating both to
his handling of the Davis-Gray real estate transaction and
the management of his trust account. 	On July 8, 1999, the
State Bar served Motley with the Subcommittee’s
certification. 	On September 24, 1999, the Disciplinary
Board held a hearing in the matter, and by order dated
November 5, 1999, suspended Motley’s license to practice
law for eighteen months.
17 	3. Issues on Appeal
18 	A. Motions to Dismiss
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1. Delayed Notice
Motley argues that the Disciplinary Board erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him on
the ground the charges were before the Disciplinary Board
in violation of Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13
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(B)(5)(c)(ii)(c) and Subsection (12) of the Rules of this
Court. 	Subsection (12) contains the pertinent language:
If the Subcommittee has elected to certify the
Complaint . . . to the Board, it will promptly mail to
the Clerk of the Disciplinary System a statement of
the certified charges which shall include sufficient
facts to reasonably notify Bar Counsel and the
Respondent of the basis for such certification and the
Disciplinary Rules alleged to have been violated.
Motley points out that the Third District Subcommittee
determined on July 17, 1998, to certify charges of
misconduct against him but did not send the certification
to the Clerk of the Disciplinary System until June 25,
1999, some eleven months later, and he was not served until
July 8, 1999. 	This delay, Motley says, “violated
procedural requirements under the [Rules] and prejudiced
[his] right to a fair and prompt hearing.”
Motley does not explain, however, what prejudice he
suffered as a result of the delay. 	In the absence of a
showing of prejudice resulting to Motley from the failure
to comply with the procedural requirement of prompt mailing
contained in Subsection (12), dismissal of the charges
against him would be inappropriate. 	See Jamborsky v.	24
Baskins, 247 Va. 506, 511, 442 S.E.2d 636, 638-39 (1994)
(delay of circuit court in complying with procedural
requirement in juvenile transfer statute does not divest
court of jurisdiction if no prejudice results);
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Horne v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 512, 518-19, 339 S.E.2d 186,
191 (1986) (delay in taking accused before magistrate not
ground for excluding evidence without resulting prejudice);
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Potter v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 113, 116, 390 S.E.2d
196, 198 (1990) (delay in filing habitual offender
information not ground for dismissal in absence of showing
of prejudice resulting from the delay).
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2. General Investigation of Trust Account
Motley also moved for dismissal of the charges against
him on the ground the enlargement of the investigation of
misconduct from the original scope of the Davis-Gray real
estate closing to a general investigation of his trust
account “without due cause” violated his rights to due
process and equal protection of the law under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 	He was denied due process and equal
protection, Motley says, “in that Bar Counsel exercised
undue discretion by converting an investigation of a
complaint relating to a single real estate closing into a
general perusal of an attorney's trust account.”
Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13(B)(3) of the Rules of
this Court provides in pertinent part that the authority of
Bar Counsel to investigate and prosecute complaints
includes the authority to examine the financial books
and records maintained by an attorney . . . including,
without limitation, any and all trust accounts . . .
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maintained by the attorney . . . . 	Bar Counsel may
also examine an attorney’s trust account whenever Bar
Counsel reasonably believes that the trust account may
not be in compliance with the . . . Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Although Motley’s argument is not clear, he does not
appear to attack the facial validity of the Rule quoted
above. 	In any event, the Rule is presumed to be valid, see	9
Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs., Inc., 257 Va. 1, 9,
509 S.E.2d 307, 311 (1999), and Motley has not demonstrated
in what manner or to what extent it suffers from facial
invalidity. 	Accordingly, we will consider only the as-
applied aspect of Motley’s attack upon the Rule, consisting
of his argument that the investigation was transformed from
its original limited scope into a general investigation of
his trust account without due cause.
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In Seventh Dist. Comm. v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 183
S.E.2d 713 (1971), we said:
A proceeding to discipline an attorney is not a
criminal proceeding and the purpose is not to punish
him but to protect the public. 	It is a special
proceeding, civil and disciplinary in nature, and of a
summary character. . . . 	Being an informal proceeding
it is only necessary that the attorney be informed of
the nature of the charge preferred against him and is
given an opportunity to answer.
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Id. at 284, 183 S.E.2d at 717.
We are of opinion that Motley has failed to
demonstrate that he suffered a deprivation of due process
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or equal protection rights as a result of the broadened
investigation itself or from the admission into evidence of
certain exhibits obtained in the investigation.
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6 He was
fully informed of the nature of the charges stemming from
the broadened investigation, and he was given ample
opportunity to answer. 	Furthermore, Bar Counsel had due
cause from the investigation of Motley’s trust account in
connection with the Davis-Gray real estate transaction for
a reasonable belief that the account may not have been in
compliance with the Rules in other respects as well.
Bar Counsel would have learned from the investigation
into the Davis-Gray real estate transaction that Motley
deposited proceeds from a personal loan into his trust
account and deposited a check from a client (Gray) into his
personal account. 	Indeed, Motley conceded as much during
the proceedings below.7
Former DR 9-102(A), styled “Preserving Identity of
Funds and Property of a Client,” provided that all funds
received or held by a lawyer on behalf of a client residing
6 Motley contends that the Disciplinary Board erred in
admitting into evidence two exhibits over his objection
that they were obtained in violation of his rights of due
process and equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
7 Motley’s counsel conceded these facts in a letter dated
December 9, 1996, to Campbell, the investigator for the
State Bar.
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in this state shall be deposited in a trust account and no
funds belonging to the lawyer shall be deposited therein
except under circumstances not pertinent here.
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8 Given this
Rule and the information disclosed by the investigation
into the Davis-Gray real estate transaction, we find no
abuse of discretion in Bar Counsel’s broadening of the
scope of the investigation into Motley’s trust account.
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B. Continuance
Motley obtained a summons and had it served on Gray to
appear as a witness at the hearing before the Disciplinary
Board. 	Gray failed to appear, and Motley moved for a
continuance. 	The Board denied the motion, stating that
“the panel does not believe that Ms. Gray’s testimony would
be material.”
Motley argues that Gray’s testimony was material and
that it was reversible error for the Disciplinary Board to
refuse to continue the case when she failed to appear.
However, Motley’s counsel conceded during argument on the
motion for a continuance that he had “never spoken to Ms.
Gray,” and he even said “[s]he’s adverse.” 	Therefore,
8 The exceptions are that funds reasonably sufficient to pay
service or other charges of the financial institution may
be deposited in the trust account and that funds belonging
in part to a client and part to the lawyer must be
deposited in the account but the portion belonging to the
lawyer must be withdrawn promptly after it is due.
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Motley was hardly in a position to assert the materiality
of Gray’s testimony or to claim prejudice from her failure
to appear.
Even so, with the Disciplinary Board’s permission,
Motley’s counsel made a proffer of what Gray would say “if
[she] was here to testify.” 	Counsel said that Gray would
corroborate Davis that “both agreed . . . that [with
respect to the indebtedness Davis owed for the windows]
they were going to have this note and hold it in good faith
[and] that when it was over and there was no more risk to
[Gray] as being the new property owner, then it would be
torn up.”
However, assuming Gray would have testified in this
manner, the testimony would have been completely beside the
point. 	The crucial question is not whether Davis and Gray
agreed to have a note. 	The question is whether Motley was
incompetent in fashioning the arrangement between the
parties in the manner that he did. 	We will deal with that
question shortly, but it suffices to say at this point
that, even had Gray testified as Motley says she would, the
outcome of the inquiry into Motley’s competence would be
the same. 	Hence, Gray’s testimony would not have been
material.
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Motley’s counsel also proffered that Gray would
corroborate Motley “about insurance being kept in place
that [Davis] had on the property.” 	This related to
Motley’s alleged failure, noted
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supra, promptly to furnish
“Proof of Insurance coverage and paid receipt” to Suncoast
in connection with Gray’s assumption of the existing deed
of trust on the property. 	Motley seeks to excuse his
failure by saying that Gray and Davis “agreed that Davis’
existing hazard insurance would remain in force and[,]
therefore, it would not be necessary to send a new hazard
insurance policy to the lender.” 	But the fact that the
parties agreed a new policy would not be obtained does not
excuse Motley’s failure to furnish proof to Suncoast that
the existing policy would remain in force and that the
premium was current. 	Hence, Gray’s testimony would not
have been material on this point either.
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Motley acknowledges that whether a continuance should
have been granted was a matter for the exercise of
discretion on the part of the Disciplinary Board. 	Under
the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the
denial of Motley’s motion for a continuance.
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C. Recusal
Motley sought to have two members of the Disciplinary
Board recuse themselves from hearing the present proceeding
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because they had participated in a previous disciplinary
matter involving Motley that, at the time of the hearing,
was before this Court on appeal. 	Motley argued that the
two members became privy to information as a result of the
prior proceeding that was inadmissible in the present case
because the prior proceeding was on appeal and thus not
final. 	The two members refused to step down, stating they
felt “very strongly” that the “facts . . . raised” by
Motley would not affect their impartiality and fairness in
the present case.
Motley makes the same argument on appeal that he made
before the Disciplinary Board. 	In addition, he says that
“[i]t was highly prejudicial to have two panel members who
had personal involvement with past disciplinary matters
relating to [him]” and that “[i]t constituted error to deny
[his] motion for [recusal].”
We disagree. 	In the first place, we think a member of
the Disciplinary Board is subject to the same rules
regarding recusal as are applicable to a trial judge, and
Motley tacitly concedes this point. 	The fact that a trial
judge is “‘familiar with a party and his legal difficulties
through prior judicial hearings . . . does not
automatically or inferentially raise the issue of bias.’”
Deahl v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 224 Va. 664, 672-	24
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73, 299 S.E.2d 863, 867 (1983) (quoting Barry v. Sigler,
373 F.2d 835, 836 (8th Cir. 1967)).
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involves the exercise of discretion. 	Deahl, 224 Va. at
672, 299 S.E.2d at 867. 	Nothing in this record indicates
that the two members of the Disciplinary Board abused their
discretion in refusing to recuse themselves.
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v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 141, 314 S.E.2d 371, 382
(1984) (no abuse of discretion for trial judge to refuse to
recuse himself because he had presided over previous trial
in which defendant cursed him).
12 	D. Sufficiency of Evidence
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1. The Real Estate Transaction
Motley’s conduct in the real estate transaction
implicates former DR 6-101, which was styled “Competence
and Promptness.” 	DR 6-101(A) provided that a lawyer “shall
undertake representation only in matters in which [he or
she] can act with competence.” 	DR 6-101(B) required that a
lawyer “shall attend promptly to matters undertaken for a
client,” and DR 6-101(C) required a lawyer to “keep a
client reasonably informed about matters in which the
lawyer’s services are being rendered.”
In discussing the Disciplinary Board’s finding that
his conduct in handling the Davis-Gray real estate
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transaction constituted incompetence, Motley reminds us
that a violation of disciplinary rules must be established
by clear proof,
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1062, 265 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1980), and he maintains that the
finding of incompetence against him is not supported by
such proof. 	Motley says “[t]he evidence is that Davis and
[Gray] agreed to the transaction and Motley was carrying
out their requests.”
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If, as is apparent, Motley is content to rest his
defense against the use of the disputed promissory note and
deed of trust upon the proposition that Davis and Gray
agreed to the transaction and Motley was merely carrying
out their requests, the defense simply will not suffice.
What Motley permitted Davis to sign does not even conform
to what he says the parties agreed to.
Motley says that “the parties agreed that Davis would
execute a deed of trust note in the amount of $3,366.78 to
protect [Gray] in the event a lien was placed on the
property due to Davis’ default on the debt” and that Gray
“would destroy the note when the debt for the windows was
satisfied.” 	But nothing in the note Davis signed makes its
payment conditional upon the placing of a lien on the
property nor does the note contain any provision requiring
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Gray to destroy it when the debt for the windows was
satisfied.
Rather, the note Motley permitted Davis to sign is a
fully negotiable instrument dated February 15, 1996,
containing an unconditional promise to pay the fixed sum of
$3,366.78 in monthly installments of $98 each beginning
March 1, 1996, with payment in full due June 1, 1998. 	The
note not only created an indebtedness requiring Davis to
pay Gray $3,366.78 when Davis owed Gray no money at all,
but it also subjected Davis to the danger of double
liability if the note found its way into the hands of a
holder in due course.
Furthermore, it is obvious from a reading of Davis’s
testimony that she had no idea what she was getting herself
into when she signed the note. 	She was asked by a member
of the Disciplinary Board why she “signed a note promising
to pay Ms. Gray money.” 	She replied, “I wasn’t paying Ms.
Gray money. 	I was continuing to pay that bill [to the
finance company].” 	Asked again why she signed the note,
she said “[b]ecause that was my bill. 	It was a bill that I
had created.” 	Asked if she understood that the note
“doesn’t say” that she “really didn’t have to pay Ms. Gray”
but she “had to pay somebody else,” she replied, “[n]o, I
didn’t.”
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It is also obvious that Motley himself neither
understood the nature of the situation he created for Davis
nor appreciated the potential harm she could have suffered.
A member of the Disciplinary Board asked Motley whether he
had any concerns “that the note might be negotiated with a
holder in due course,” and he replied, “I did, but you can
question anything, but can you win on it?”
Motley concedes Davis was his client. 	As a result of
that relationship, he owed her the duty to draft closing
papers that accurately reflected the conditional nature of
the liability she had agreed to undertake in favor of Gray.
He also owed her the duty, in any event, to explain to her
the true nature and potential consequences of what he
actually prepared for her to sign and to advise her against
signing anything to her prejudice. 	If this advice had
created a conflict of interest because of his dual role in
representing both Davis and Gray, then it would have been
his duty to withdraw from representation of both.
Motley’s failure to prepare papers conforming to the
conditional nature of the liability Davis had agreed to
undertake constituted a violation of his duty under DR 6-
101(A)(1) to “act with competence,” and his failure to
advise her of the true nature and potential consequences of
what he actually prepared is both incompetence under DR 6-
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101(A)(1) and a violation of his duty under DR 6-101(C) to
“keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which
the lawyer’s services are being rendered.” 	And we think
all these violations have been established by clear proof.
We also think the evidence clearly and convincingly
established that Motley violated DR 6-101(B) by failing to
“attend promptly” to the matter of forwarding to Suncoast
“Proof of Insurance coverage and paid receipt.” 	As noted
previously, Motley attempts to excuse this failure by
saying that, because Davis and Gray agreed to continue the
existing policy, there was no need to send the trust holder
a new policy. 	However, the trust holder did not require
proof of a new policy but only proof that there was
“Insurance coverage,” a requirement that could have been
satisfied easily with proof that the existing policy
remained in force. 	And Motley clearly did not furnish that
proof.
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(a) DR 9-102(A) and (B) — Preserving Identity of Funds
Motley argues there is no clear and convincing
evidence that he put client funds into his personal
account. 	However, as noted previously, Motley conceded
before the Disciplinary Board that he deposited the $1,000
check he received from Gray into his personal account. 	He
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says now that he “inadvertently” made this deposit. 	Also,
he argues that because the $1,000 check was subsequently
returned for insufficient funds and a check is not legal
tender, no client funds were actually deposited into his
personal account. 	This is an ingenious argument, but
lacking in merit. 	Furthermore, the argument ignores the
fact, also conceded by Motley, that he deposited $3,026.27
of personal funds into his trust account, which is likewise
prohibited by DR 9-102(A) except in circumstances not
pertinent here.
Motley also argues there is no clear and convincing
evidence that he failed to keep a record of client funds
coming into his possession, as required by DR 9-102(B)(3).
He says his records are incomplete but do indicate
“whenever [he] deposited client funds into his account.”
However, the record shows clearly that Motley failed to
maintain a subsidiary ledger card or an equivalent for the
Davis-Gray real estate transaction, as required by DR 9-
103(A).
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(b) DR 9-103 – Record-Keeping Requirements
The Disciplinary Board found that Motley had violated
DRs 9-102(A), -102(B)(3), -103(A)(1),(2), and (3), and -
103(B)(2),(3),(4),(5), and (6), all relating to record-
keeping and accounting procedures. 	Motley says that he had
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trust ledger cards, bank statements, and other records
“that were used to account for client funds deposited in
trust and disbursements” which, “[a]lthough . . .
incomplete,” did provide “a good faith attempt to account
for the deposit and disbursement of client funds held in
trust.”
However, the analysis made of Motley’s records by
Campbell, the State Bar investigator, for the period July
1, 1995, through June 30, 1996, disclosed numerous
instances of incompleteness in subsidiary ledgers and cash
disbursement journals. 	Similarly, cash receipts journals
or equivalent records failed to provide identification of
the sources of funds deposited. 	Also, Motley would deposit
one amount but “[h]is ledger denote[d] another amount.”
Campbell found that “Motley was out of trust, on
numerous occasions, on each of [numerous] clients.” 	A
“look at . . . the checks that were pending, and . . . how
much money was in the checking account [showed] there was
not enough money to cover the checks.” 	For example, with
respect to the handling of a settlement for one client,
there were insufficient funds in the trust account to cover
checks written on the settlement on thirty-two different
occasions between August 15, 1995, and November 13, 1995,
and, for another client, there were insufficient funds to
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cover checks written on the settlement on at least twenty-
seven separate occasions between October 19, 1995, and
March 25, 1996.
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F. Mitigating Circumstances and Excessiveness of Sanction
Motley argues that the eighteen-month license
suspension “imposed by the [Disciplinary] Board was
excessive and contrary to law because the Board failed to
consider mitigating evidence.” 	According to Motley, the
Disciplinary Board failed to consider evidence that he
engaged in no deliberate conduct; did not violate any court
order; did not steal any client funds or cause harm to any
client; no longer handles real estate matters; and
acknowledged the need for improvement in the handling of
his trust accounts, has instituted improved accounting
procedures, and is willing to make other necessary
improvements.
It is true, as Motley says, that neither in the
Disciplinary Board’s oral decision nor in its written order
is there any mention of mitigating evidence. 	However, we
are aware of no requirement that the Board state that it
considered mitigating evidence when announcing a decision
or issuing an order that disciplines an attorney. 	And a
failure to state that mitigating evidence was considered
does not mean that it was not considered.
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Furthermore, we are of opinion that the sanction
imposed by the Disciplinary Board was not excessive even in
light of the mitigating evidence. 	Motley’s mishandling of
the Davis-Gray real estate transaction and his
mismanagement of his trust account constitute serious
violations of the disciplinary rules, justifying, when
coupled with his disciplinary record,
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serious disciplinary treatment.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of
the Disciplinary Board.
11 	Affirmed.
9 In 1986, the Third District Committee dismissed a
complaint against Motley with terms; in 1991, the Committee
imposed a private reprimand upon Motley with terms; and in
1992, the Committee dismissed another complaint against
Motley with terms.
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