Haas v. Lee

Present: 	All the Justices
MICHAEL HAAS
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. 	Record No. 010310 	March 1, 2002
JACK LEE, WARDEN, KEEN MOUNTAIN
CORRECTIONAL CENTER
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POWHATAN COUNTY
Thomas V. Warren, Judge
The sole issue that we consider in this appeal is whether
the circuit court properly dismissed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus because it was not filed timely pursuant to Code
§ 8.01-654(A)(2). 	This statute, which became effective July
1, 1998, states:
"A petition for writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum, other than a petition challenging a
criminal conviction or sentence, shall be brought
within one year after the cause of action accrues.
A habeas corpus petition attacking a criminal
conviction or sentence, except as provided in
§ 8.01-654.1 for cases in which a death sentence has
been imposed, shall be filed within two years from
the date of final judgment in the trial court or
within one year from either final disposition of the
direct appeal in state court or the time for filing
such appeal has expired, whichever is later."
Michael Haas is incarcerated by the Virginia Department
of Corrections and detained at the Keen Mountain Correctional
Center. 	He was convicted in 1994 of two counts of sodomy
against his two sons. 	His punishment was fixed at two terms
of life imprisonment.

On June 30, 2000, Haas filed his petition for writ of
habeas corpus against Jack Lee, Warden of the Keen Mountain
Correctional Center. 	He alleged, among other things, that his
due process rights were violated, that his trial counsel was
ineffective, and that the Commonwealth's Attorney purportedly
committed acts of misconduct.
The Warden filed a motion to dismiss and asserted that
because Haas was convicted before the enactment of Code
§ 8.01-654(A)(2) and more than two years had passed from the
date of the final judgment in the circuit court, he was
required to file his habeas corpus petition, pursuant to
orders entered by this Court, within one year from the
effective date of Code § 8.01-654(A)(2). 	The Warden contended
that Haas' petition must be dismissed because he was required
to file it on or before June 30, 1999, but he did not do so.
The circuit court agreed with the Warden and entered a final
order dismissing the petition. 	Haas appeals.
Before the enactment of Code § 8.01-654(A)(2), a prisoner
could file a habeas corpus petition at any time provided that
the Commonwealth was not prejudiced in its ability to respond
because of the prisoner's delay in filing. 	See Walker v.
Mitchell, Warden, 224 Va. 568, 575-77, 299 S.E.2d 698, 702-03
(1983). 	After the enactment of this statute, a prisoner who
had not been sentenced to death was required to file his
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petition within two years from the date of final judgment in
the circuit court or one year from either final disposition of
the direct appeal in the state court or the time for filing
such appeal has expired, whichever is later. 	The statute is
silent, however, regarding the filing period for prisoners who
were convicted before the enactment of Code § 8.01-654(A)(2).
We have stated the following principles that are
pertinent here:
"The generally accepted rule is that statutes
of limitation, or remedial statutes, are not
retrospective in their application in the absence of
clear legislative intent. 	However, it is the
settled law of this State that the legislature may
declare a new or an amended statute dealing solely
with matters of remedy and procedure, or one not
affecting vested interests and contractual rights,
to have a retrospective operation. 	Ferguson v.
Ferguson, 169 Va. 77, 87, 192 S.E. 774, 777
[(1937)]; Gloucester Realty Corp. v. Guthrie, 182
Va. 869, 873, 30 S.E.2d 686, 688 [(1944)] . . . .
Vested interests and contractual rights may not be
impaired or destroyed, but mere matters of procedure
and remedy for their enforcement or preservation may
be altered, curtailed or repealed at the will of the
legislature so long as reasonable opportunity and
time are afforded to enforce and protect such
interests and rights."
Phipps, Adm'r v. Sutherland, 201 Va. 448, 452, 111 S.E.2d 422,
425 (1959); accord Board of Supervisors v. FCS Building
Association, 254 Va. 464, 467, 492 S.E.2d 634, 636 (1997);
Harris v. DiMattina, 250 Va. 306, 311-12, 462 S.E.2d 338, 340
(1995); Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va. 115, 119, 319 S.E.2d 750,
753 (1984); Fletcher v. Tarasidis, 219 Va. 658, 661, 250
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S.E.2d 739, 740 (1979); Walke v. Dallas, 209 Va. 32, 36, 161
S.E.2d 722, 724 (1968). 	We also held in Duffy v. Hartsock,
187 Va. 406, 416, 46 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1948), that matters of
procedure, such as statutes of limitations, may be altered or
curtailed by the legislature if a reasonable opportunity and
time are afforded to enforce and protect any interests and
rights, provided vested interests and contractual rights are
neither impaired nor destroyed.
As the Warden correctly observes, this Court has
routinely considered petitions for writs of habeas corpus
filed within the statutorily prescribed one-year period. 	We
have also dismissed petitions as untimely that were filed by
prisoners who were convicted before the enactment of Code
§ 8.01-654(A)(2), but who filed their petitions more than one
year after the effective date of that statute. 	Implicit in
our prior practice is this Court's recognition that a period
of one year constitutes a reasonable time in which to permit a
prisoner who was convicted prior to the enactment of Code
§ 8.01-654(A)(2) to enforce and protect his rights.
Therefore, we hold that the statute of limitations contained
in Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) bars Haas' petition because he was
provided a reasonable opportunity to enforce and protect his
right to file his habeas corpus petition.
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We observe that our holding is consistent with the views
expressed by the United States Courts of Appeals. 	Prior to
the enactment of the statute of limitations contained in the
Federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
which amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), there was no federal
statute of limitations that prescribed the time available for
a prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition. 	See
Brown v. Angelone, 150 F.3d 370, 371 (4th Cir. 1998); Calderon
v. United States District Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 & n.1
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099, and cert. denied
sub nom. Beeler v. Calderon, 523 U.S. 1061 (1998). 	However,
Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts permitted a district court to
dismiss a petition "if it appears that the state . . . has
been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by
delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows that it is
based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by
the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances
prejudicial to the state occurred." 	The various United States
Courts of Appeals have held that a prisoner whose statutory
right to seek federal habeas corpus relief accrued before the
enactment of the one-year statute of limitations must receive
a reasonable period of time after the statute's effective date
to file a federal habeas corpus petition and that one year was
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reasonable. 	See Brown, 150 F.3d at 374-76; United States v.
Flores, 135 F.3d 1000, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1998); Burns v.
Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3rd Cir. 1998); Calderon, 128 F.3d
at 1286-87; United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 746 (10th
Cir. 1997).
We find no merit in Haas' contention that because Code
§ 8.01-654(A)(2) creates a two-year statute of limitations for
the filing of a habeas corpus petition, a period of two years
rather than one year must be deemed reasonable. 	The issue
that we must consider is what is a reasonable period of time
that should be accorded a habeas corpus petitioner whose right
to file a habeas corpus petition would have been barred
otherwise by the enactment of Code § 8.01-654(A)(2). 	In
deciding this issue, we are not bound by the time prescribed
in the statute of limitations.
Additionally, Haas argues that this Court should conclude
that a period of two years is reasonable because a habeas
corpus petitioner needs sufficient time to develop a factual
basis to support his claims. 	We find no merit in this
contention because petitioners, like Haas, had time before the
enactment of Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) in which to file their
claims, and they were accorded the additional benefit of the
one-year reasonable period of time after the effective date of
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the statute. 	In this instance, Haas had almost five years in
which to prepare and file his petition for habeas corpus.
Haas contends that the Suspension Clause contained in
Article I, § 9 of the Constitution of Virginia requires an
exception to the statute of limitations when a petitioner
could not have discovered the factual basis of his petition
before the expiration of the statute of limitations. 	We
cannot consider Haas' constitutional claim because, as he
admits in his brief, he failed to assert this claim in the
circuit court.
In view of our holdings, we need not consider Haas'
remaining contentions. 	Accordingly, the judgment of the
circuit court will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
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