lyons v student transp

Termont 	Superior 	Court
Filed 	10/02/26
Orange 	Unit
VERMONT 	SUPERIOR 	COURT
Orange 	Unit
5 	Court 	Street
Chelsea 	VT 	05038
802-685-4610
www.vermontjudiciary.org
CIVIL 	DIVISION
Case 	No. 	26-CV-02756
Matthew 	Lyons, 	et 	al 	v. 	Student 	Transportation 	of 	Vermont 	LLC
ENTRY 	REGARDING 	MOTION
Title: 	Motion 	for 	Preliminary 	Injunction 	(Motion: 	3)
Filer: 	Matthew 	Lyons
Filed 	Date: 	September 	18, 	2026
I. 	Procedural 	Posture 	& 	Background
Plaintiffs 	seek 	injunctive 	relief, 	stated 	as 	"restraining 	Defendant 	Student 	Transportation 	of
Vermont, 	Inc. 	("STV") 	and 	only 	STV, 	its 	officers, 	employees, 	drivers, 	agents, 	and 	those
acting 	in 	concert 	with 	it 	in 	its 	corporate 	capacity 	from 	operating, 	staging, 	storing, 	or 	otherwise
using 	any 	STV 	vehicle 	or 	equipment 	on 	the 	private 	road 	known 	as 	Makala's 	Way, 	pending 	final
judgment." 	See 	Mot. 	for 	Preliminary 	Injunction 	[hereinafter, 	P/. 	Mot.], 	filed 	Sep. 	18, 	2026.
Defendant 	filed 	a 	memorandum 	in 	opposition, 	highlighting 	that 	its 	employee, 	Christopher 	Luce,
has 	voluntarily 	ceased operation 	of the 	school 	bus 	on 	Makala's Way. 	Defendant 	asserts 	that
Plaintiffs 	have 	failed 	to 	satisfy 	their 	burden 	under 	V.R.C.P. 	65(b) 	and 	that 	voluntary 	abatement
has 	rendered 	the 	controversy 	moot. 	A 	reply 	was 	filed 	by 	Plaintiffs, 	largely 	reiterating 	the
arguments 	made 	previously 	and 	commenting 	on 	the 	assertions 	made 	by 	Defendant 	in 	the
memorandum 	in 	opposition.
To 	summarize 	the 	controversy, 	the 	litigants 	own 	neighboring 	properties 	on 	Makala's 	Way, 	a
private 	road 	in 	East 	Thetford, 	Vermont. 	Makala's 	Way 	is 	a 	dead-end 	road 	that 	runs 	west 	from
Latham 	Road. 	The 	properties 	served 	are 	adjacent 	to 	Interstate 	91's 	northbound 	lane. 	The 	general
facts 	relevant 	to 	the 	issue 	of a 	preliminary 	injunction 	are 	effectively 	undisputed.
Mr. 	Luce, 	like 	Plaintiffs, 	has 	a 	deeded 	right 	of way 	to 	access 	his 	property. 	Mr. 	Luce 	is 	a 	bus
driver 	and 	due to 	his 	medical 	condition 	and 	age 	has 	on 	multiple 	occasions 	parked 	the 	bus
overnight 	at 	his 	residence 	instead 	of returning 	it 	to 	a 	depot 	in 	White 	River 	Junction, 	Vermont.
Plaintiffs' 	primary 	complaint 	is 	the 	noise 	associated 	with 	the 	bus 	backing 	up 	the 	right 	of way 	to
Mr. 	Luce's 	residence 	and 	the 	disruption 	this 	causes 	to 	their 	peace 	and 	quiet.
Defendant 	asserts, 	as 	supported 	by 	affidavit, 	that 	Mr. 	Luce 	has 	medical 	issues 	that 	lead 	him 	to
take 	the 	bus 	to 	his 	home 	instead 	of to 	the 	depot 	following 	afterschool 	activities 	or 	school 	sports
Entry 	Regarding 	Motion 	Page 	1 	of 	5
26-CV-02756 	Matthew 	Lyons, 	et 	al 	v. 	Student 	Transportation 	of Vermont 	LLC

Entry Regarding Motion Page 2 of 5
26-CV-02756 Matthew Lyons, et al v. Student Transportation of Vermont LLC
events. Based on recent events, Mr. Luce reports that he no longer brings the bus to his residence
on Makala’s Way and has made alternate arrangements.
II. Discussion
“An injunction is an extraordinary remedy that will not be routinely granted unless the right to
relief is clear.” Comm. to Save Bishop's House v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., 136 Vt. 213, 218
(1978); see also Vt. Div. of State Bldgs. v. Town of Castleton Bd. of Adjustment, 138 Vt. 250, 256
(1980).
Further, “‘A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.’”
Taylor v. Town of Cabot, 205 Vt. 586, 596 (2017) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). In considering the request under V.R.C.P. 65, “the court must
balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting
or withholding of the requested relief.” Taylor, 205 Vt. at 596. (quotation omitted). The moving
party has the burden of establishing the relevant factors, specifically, “(1) the threat of
irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the potential harm to the other parties; (3) the likelihood of
success on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” Id. (citing In re J.G., 160 Vt. 250, 255 n.2
(1993)).
The balancing test articulated by the Vermont Supreme Court is designed to be “sufficiently
flexible to allow for a preliminary injunction in cases in which the court cannot definitively
conclude that the movant is likely to prevail on the merits, but the balance of other factors tips
strongly in favor of an injunction.” Id. at 255 n.3. The court considers each of the factors below.
A. Likelihood of success
A party seeking a preliminary injunction is “not required to prove his case in full,” and the
court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law “are not binding at trial on the merits.” Univ. of
Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (citations omitted); see also Gardner v. Jefferys,
178 Vt. 594, 598 (2005) (trial court’s interpretation of restrictive covenant following limited
hearing on motion for temporary injunction does not bind court’s later interpretation when record
is fully developed).
Defendant’s answer has raised multiple colorable defenses to Plaintiffs’ complaint. Defendant is
correct that there is no private cause of action based on any alleged violations of Vermont’s
criminal statutes, i.e. 13 V.S.A. §§ 1022, 1026.1 Further, the complaint does not allege or cite to
any authority (statutory or local ordnance) regulating noise or vehicular traffic on private right of
ways, nor has any deed been presented showing that Mr. Luce’s use and access of the right of
way in a work vehicle owned by Defendant is impermissible.
1 Additionally, this court has previously concluded that 13 V.S.A. § 1022 was revoked by implication upon the
amendment of 13 V.S.A. § 1026 to add an “unreasonable noise” theory. See Entry Order, State of Vermont v. David
Sharron, Case No. 25-CR-00806, Thibault, Supr. J., dated Apr. 7, 2025.

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26-CV-02756 Matthew Lyons, et al v. Student Transportation of Vermont LLC
Any restrictions on the right of way or deeded rights relating to access of Mr. Luce’s property
will be assessed the language of such documents, however, no documents have been referenced
or are offered by Plaintiffs. Additionally,
Vermont law is clear that “a [dominant] estate must use a right-of-way in a
manner consistent with the use contemplated at the time of its creation, and it may
not use it in a way that materially increases the burden on the servient estate.”
Rowe v. Lavanway, 2006 VT 47, ¶ 22, 180 Vt. 505, 904 A.2d 78 (mem.).
However, “ ‘[t]he manner, frequency, and intensity of the use may change over
time to take advantage of developments in technology and to accommodate
normal development of the dominant estate or enterprise benefited by the
servitude.’ ” Id. ¶ 23 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes §
4.10).
Roy v. Woodstock Cmty. Tr., Inc., 195 Vt. 427, 457 (2014).
Here, the court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs’ complaint is sufficiently well developed to
conclude that there is a clear likelihood of success. Rather, the court views the defenses raised as
fairly compelling, especially when coupled with the absence of evidence to show any deed or
covenant that would preclude Mr. Luce from operating a vehicle owned by Defendant on the
right of way for his needs or convenience relative to his employment. Put another way, Plaintiffs
propose through injunctive relief to not only limit use of the shared right of way but to infringe
upon Mr. Luce’s use and enjoyment of his property. There is no indication that Defendant has a
policy or directive against an employee taking a work vehicle home when convenient versus
returning it to a designated depot.
B. Irreparable harm
“A preliminary injunction will usually be denied ‘if it appears that the applicant has an adequate
alternate remedy in the form of money damages or other relief.’” Taylor, 205 Vt. at 605 (quoting
C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1 (3d ed. 2017)). Some courts have
suggested that irreparable harm is the “single most important” factor when determining whether
a court should grant injunctive relief. See, e.g., Wool v. Vermont Department of Corrections,
No. 2:11-cv-188, 2011 WL 6740540, *3 (D. Vt. Nov. 15, 2011) (Conroy, Mag. J.) (citation
omitted), report and recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 6748991 (D. Vt. Dec. 22, 2011).
To establish irreparable harm, a plaintiff “must show that there is a continuing harm which
cannot be adequately redressed by final relief on the merits and for which money damages
cannot provide adequate compensation.” Further, a plaintiff must show that the harm is “actual
and imminent, not remote or speculative.” Kamerling v. Massanari, 295 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir.
2002) (quotation omitted). When “it appears that the applicant has an adequate alternate remedy
in the form of money damages or other relief” the request for a preliminary injunction will
ordinarily be denied. Taylor, supra (citing C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2948.1
(3d ed. 2017)). Additionally, as a predicate for injunctive relief a moving party must show “that
it exhausted its administrative remedies and that it has no adequate legal remedy.” In re
Investigation Into Gen. Ord. No. 45, 193 Vt. 676, 678 (2013) (citing Smith v. Highway Bd., 117

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26-CV-02756 Matthew Lyons, et al v. Student Transportation of Vermont LLC
Vt. 343, 349 (1952).
While the court declines to find that this controversy is moot based on the voluntary abatement
of the conduct by Defendant and/or its agent, Mr. Luce, this information weighs heavily against a
finding of irreparable or continuing harm. As the Supreme Court has noted:
Injunctions are designed to deter injurious conduct; thus relief will not be granted
if the conduct has been discontinued, i.e., if the case is moot. 11A Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Civil § 2942, at 47–48 (2d ed.1995) (citing cases). Because the court's inquiry in
the nuisance context is heavily fact-bound, courts must be cautious about issuing
injunctions where changes in the circumstances giving rise to the alleged nuisance
are likely to occur. See Trickett v. Ochs, 2003 VT 91, ¶ 37, 176 Vt. 89, 838 A.2d
66 (“In determining whether a land use of a lawful business constitutes a
nuisance, courts must consider both the extent of the interference and the
reasonableness of the challenged activities in light of the particular circumstances
of the case.”) (citation omitted); Winget v. Winn–Dixie Stores, Inc., 242 S.C. 152,
130 S.E.2d 363, 367 (S.C.1963) (“Whether a particular use of property is
reasonable and whether such use constitutes a nuisance depends largely upon the
facts and no definite rule can be laid down for the determination of the
question.”).
Wild v. Brooks, 177 Vt. 171, 175 (2004).
Initiation of this litigation and subsequent confrontations between at least one Plaintiff and Mr.
Luce have led to abatement of the allegedly offensive behavior. The voluntary cessation of
behavior does not, however, render the controversy moot:
In United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968),
the Supreme Court explained that “[m]ere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal
conduct does not moot a case; if it did, the courts would be compelled to leave
‘[t]he defendant free ... to return to his old ways.’ ” Id. at 203. The Court
continued, however, by noting that “[a] case might become moot if subsequent
events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur.” Id.; see also W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633,
73 S.Ct. at 897–98 (case moot if defendant meets heavy burden of showing there
is no reasonable expectation that wrong will be repeated).
All Cycle, Inc. v. Chittenden Solid Waste Dist., 164 Vt. 428, 432–33 (1995). The current
circumstances fall in a middle ground where the risk of irreparable harm is substantially
mitigated and would not support injunctive relief, while the controversy itself is not necessarily
resolved because there is insufficient information or evidence to show that it is not “absolutely
clear” the conduct will not resume. See also In re Durkee, 2017 VT 49, ¶ 12, 205 Vt. 11
(explaining exceptions to mootness doctrine).

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26-CV-02756 Matthew Lyons, et al v. Student Transportation of Vermont LLC
C. Potential harm to other parties / balance of equities
Plaintiffs have not provided any specific articulation of harm to third parties beyond those
alleged to themselves. As noted above, notwithstanding voluntary abatement, it is questionable
whether an adjoining land owner or shared owner of a private road/right of way may restrict
reasonable economic activity or access of another who is entitled to the use and benefit of the
right of way by deed. Further, while the back up sensor of a bus may be loud, the proximity of all
parties to a major interstate highway strongly suggests that this is a neighborhood impacted by
other sound pollution that is beyond any of the parties control and that vehicular noise at odd
hours is not an unusual event.
D. Public interest
Finally, the Court must consider both the “public interest,” and “the effect on each party of the
granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Taylor, supra (citation omitted). Other than
potential precedential value of any decision, there is minimal public interest or stakes involved
here.
III. Order of the Court
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.
So ordered.
Electronically signed on Thursday, October 1, 2026 pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)
____________________________
Rory T. Thibault
Superior Court Judge