Firefly Demolition Approval Decision on Motions

Vermont 	Superior 	Court
Filed 	06/23/26	Environmental 	Division
VERMONT 	SUPERIOR 	COURT
Environmental 	Division
32 	Cherry 	St, 	2nd 	Floor, 	Suite 	303,
Burlington, 	VT 	05401
802-951-1740
www.vermontjudiciary.org
Docket 	No. 	26-ENV-00026
WE
Firefly 	Demolition 	Approval
ENTRY 	REGARDING 	MOTIONS
Title: 	Motion 	for 	Partial Summary Judgment 	(Motion: 	#5)
Filer: 	David 	R. 	Cooper, 	Esq., 	Attorney 	for 	557-575 	Depot 	Street, 	LLC
Filed 	Date: 	April 	14, 	2026
Opposition 	to 	Motion 	for 	Partial 	Summary Judgment,> 	filed 	April 	23, 	2026, 	by 	Robin 	M. 	Lane,
Terry 	Lindsey, 	and 	Kris 	Slethaug, 	pro 	se
Reply 	to 	Opposition 	to 	Motion 	for Partial Summary Judgment,> 	filed 	May 	7, 	2026
Motion 	to 	Allow 	Sur-Reply, 	filed 	May 	14, 	2026, 	by 	Robin 	Lane, 	Terry 	Lindsey, 	and 	Kris
Slethaug'
Motion 	to 	Strike 	Sur-Reply, 	filed 	May 	15, 	2026, 	by 	David 	Cooper
The 	motion 	for 	partial 	summary 	judgment 	is 	GRANTED.
This 	matter 	involves 	an 	appeal 	from 	the 	Town 	of 	Manchester 	(Town) 	Development 	Review
Board 	(DRB)'s 	approval 	of 	a 	permit for 	the 	demolition 	of 	a 	structure 	located 	at 	575 	Depot 	Street,
Manchester, 	Vermont, 	also 	called 	the 	"Firefly" 	building 	(the 	Property). 	Appellants 	Robin 	Lane, 	Terry
Lindsey, 	and 	Kris 	Slethaug 	(Appellants) 	have 	appeared 	pro 	se. 	Applicant 	557-575 	Depot 	Street, 	LLC
(Applicant) 	is 	represented 	by 	David 	R. 	Cooper, 	Esq., 	and 	Rodney 	E. 	McPhee, 	Esq.
On 	May 	14, 	2026, 	Applicant 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	partial 	summary 	judgment on 	Appellants'
Questions 	8 	and 	9 	of their 	Statement 	of Questions. 	Both 	questions 	concern 	the 	relationship 	between
this 	appeal 	and 	a 	related 	matter, 	Docket 	No. 	26-ENV-00019 	(hereinafter 	"the 	Valvoline 	appeal'?.'
' 	On 	May 	14, 	2026, 	Appellants 	filed 	a 	letter 	with 	the 	Court 	requesting 	the 	Court 	allow 	a 	sur-reply 	addressing, in
part, 	Applicant's 	reply 	briefing 	in 	support 	of its 	motion 	for 	partial 	summary 	judgment 	on 	Questions 	8 	and 	9, 	The 	Court
construes 	this 	letter 	as 	a 	motion 	to 	file 	a 	sur-reply 	as 	required 	by 	V.R.C.P. 	7(b)(4). 	The 	Court 	does 	not 	agree, 	however,
that 	Applicant 	raised 	any 	new 	issues 	in 	its 	reply 	to 	Appellants' 	opposition 	to partial 	summary 	judgment 	that 	would 	be
clarified 	by 	further 	argument. 	For 	this 	reason, 	Appellants' 	motion 	is 	DENIED, 	and 	Applicant's 	motion 	to 	strike 	is
MOOT.
2 	That 	case 	concerns 	557-575 	Depot 	Street 	LLC's 	appeal 	of the 	Town 	DRB's 	denial 	of a 	permit 	to 	construct 	a
Valvoline 	oil 	change 	and 	automobile 	service 	facility, 	which 	would 	require 	the 	demolition 	of two 	structures. 	The 	DRB
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Question 8 asks whether demolition of the Firefly building would be “premature” if it took place
before the Property’s future use has been determined under the Town Center District standards,
“including in the absence of an approved, conforming redevelopment proposal and in light of the
related Valvoline permit appeal (Docket No. 26-ENV-00019) concerning the same property.” In a
similar vein, Question 9 asks whether consideration of the demolition of the Firefly building in this
appeal represents an “improper segmentation of an integrated development proposal” given the
related Valvoline appeal.
With respect to Question 8, Applicant argues that nothing in the Manchester Land Use and
Development Ordinance (hereinafter “ordinance”) or Vermont statute requires this Court to render
a decision on the application for construction of the Valvoline project before deciding on the
demolition of the Firefly building. Applicant further argues that practical and logistical concerns also
run counter to Appellants’ request that the construction application be reviewed prior to the
demolition application. 	This is because reviewing the applications in that order could result in an
approval of the construction application and denial of the demolition application, leaving the
Applicant with an approved project without a viable location.
Regarding Question 9, Applicant asserts that Appellants have conceded that the two appeals
can proceed independently through their prior request to have the construction application heard first.
Applicant argues that if the two appeals were truly inseparable, neither could be heard before the
other. Applicant further argues that the DRB’s decision to hold separate hearings on the applications
provides further proof that they are not inseparable.
In response, Appellants argue that the questions of whether the appeals are inseparable and
which appeal should be heard first are not purely procedural. In their view, the question that underlies
both Questions 8 and 9 is “whether the ordinance can be properly applied to the property if demolition
proceeds before the Court determines how those same standards govern the site as a whole.”
Opposition at 1. They assert that §§4.3, 5.1.1., and 5.1.5 of the ordinance bear directly on the question
of whether a proposed project is compatible with the character of the area, and that the demolition at
issue must be reviewed under those standards. They also argue that disputes of material fact make
partial summary judgment inappropriate here.
Legal Standard
approved demolition of one of those structures, the Firefly building, in the subsequent application that is the subject of
this appeal.

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To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” V.R.C.P. 56(a), applicable here through V.R.E.C.P. 5(a)(2). In determining whether
there is a dispute over a material fact, “we accept as true allegations made in opposition to the motion
for summary judgment, so long as they are supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”
White v. Quechee Lakes Landowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 170 Vt. 25, 28 (1999) (citation omitted); V.R.C.P.
56(c)(1)(A). 	The party opposing a motion for summary judgment “cannot simply rely on mere
allegations in the pleadings to rebut credible documentary evidence or affidavits . . . but must respond
with specific facts that would justify submitting [their] claims to the factfinder.” Robertson v. Mylan
Labs., Inc., 2004 VT 15, ¶ 15, 176 Vt. 356. (citing Gore v. Green Mtn. Lakes, Inc., 140 Vt. 262, 266
(1981); V.R.C.P. 56(e); State v. G.S. Blodgett Co., 163 Vt. 175, 180 (1995)).
Discussion
As an initial matter, Appellants have failed to show that material facts are in dispute in this
case in a manner that would preclude a grant of summary judgment. “An issue of fact is material only
if it could affect the outcome of the case.” Civetti v. Turner, 2022 VT 64, ¶ 19 (quoting Gates v. Mack
Molding Co., 2022 VT 24, ¶ 14). Of the twelve assertedly material facts put forward by Applicant,
Appellants dispute four. Two of the disputed facts—numbers four and six—relate to: 1) Applicant’s
decision that it would pursue demolition regardless of whether the Valvoline appeal moved forward;
and 2) the fact that the Applicant elected to bifurcate its original application after the DRB denied the
Valvoline appeal. These facts concern the Applicant’s personal decisions and opinions on the best
course of action for a property it owns and the most efficient way to pursue its applications with the
Town. 	As such, neither statement is reasonably subject to dispute by Appellants. 	The remaining
facts—numbers five and eight—are either not material to the outcome of this case or simply an
objective fact. It makes no difference to the outcome of this appeal whether Applicant’s or Appellants’
characterizations of the Firefly building are correct. Finally, evidence provided by Applicant clearly
shows the two applications proceeded independently before the DRB, as Appellants concede. 	A
difference of opinion about whether the applications should have proceeded in a consolidated or
separate manner cannot create a dispute of material fact.
Questions 8 & 9
The Applicant has successfully demonstrated that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on these questions. 	Appellants point to no provision in the ordinance that requires this Court to

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determine how the Town Center District Standards (§4.3) or Design Review Standards (§ 5.1.1, 5.1.5)
“govern the site as a whole” before the Court renders a decision on the demolition application. To
the extent Appellants assert that the Valvoline appeal requires the Court to determine how the
ordinance applies to the property as a whole prior to rendering a decision in this appeal, they
misunderstand the scope of this Court’s review and improperly conflate the two matters. This appeal
concerns the DRB’s approval of Applicant’s application to demolish the Firefly building and only
relates to the demolition of that building.3 	See In re Snowstone LLC Stormwater Discharge
Authorization, 2021 VT 36, ¶ 29 (noting that any ruling on a permit application not presently before
the Court on appeal would be an advisory opinion).
Appellants contend that the separate review of the applications contravenes the language of
the ordinance. The Court interprets Appellants’ reference to analysis of “the character and context of
the site” to largely refer to the goals listed in the “purpose” sections of § 4.3 and § 5.1 of the ordinance.
While these statements can serve as helpful guides to a Town’s priorities and policy interests,
“municipal bylaw statements of purpose have ‘no direct regulatory effect.’” Down River Investments,
LLC CU, No. 139-12-18 Vtec, slip. op. at 4, (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. June 30, 2020) (Durkin, J.)
(quoting In re Meaker, 156 Vt. 182, 185 (1991)). Thus, requirements like those in § 4.3.1 to “[e]nsure
new buildings are compatible with the architectural framework of Manchester’s Town Core and
preserve a human scale” or “promote a . . . pedestrian-friendly environment” “do[] not constitute
enforceable regulatory language.” Id.
Moreover, any suggestion that the ordinance compels viewing both aspects of this project as
interconnected processes is undercut by the language of the ordinance itself. 	Section 3.9,
“Consolidated Review,” provides that when an application for a single project requires multiple forms
of review, the Town Zoning Administrator shall consolidate those reviews “unless the applicant
requests in writing that separate reviews be conducted.” See Manchester Land Use and Development
Ordinance, § 3.9.1. 	This provision demonstrates that the Town contemplated review of discrete
aspects of a project covered by different standards and specifically left to the applicant the choice of
whether to conduct those reviews together or separately. 	Like site plan and condition use review,
demolition is a process with its own set of review procedures that may be taken up as part of a larger
application or in isolation. As indicated in the ordinance, the Applicant here acted properly in electing
separate review for two aspects of a project: demolition of a preexisting structure and construction of
3 Even if the Court were to grant Appellants’ motion to coordinate appeals, it would not change this fact.

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a new structure. The ordinance is silent on the order of this review, and Appellants have provided no
evidence indicating otherwise.
For the above reasons, both Appellants’ Questions 8 and 9 can be answered in the negative.
Applicant’s motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED.
Electronically signed on June 23, 2026 pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d).
Joseph S. McLean
Superior Court Judge
Environmental Division