* Valve Corporation, Respondent V. Bucher Law, Pllc Et Ano, Appellants

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
VALVE CORPORATION,
Respondent,
v.
BUCHER LAW PLLC and AFN LAW,
PLLC, and JOHN DOE CORPORATION,
Appellants.
No. 86585-4-I
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
FELDMAN, J. — It has long been recognized “that lawyers are officers of the
court who perform a fundamental role in the administration of justice.” Spevack v.
Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 524, 87 S. Ct. 625, 17 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1967). 	The litigation
privilege recognizes this fundamental role by affording attorneys immunity from
civil liability for communications that “have some relation to” a judicial proceeding
or a party to the proceeding. 	Deatherage v. Examining Bd. of Psychology, 134
Wn.2d 131, 135, 948 P.2d 828 (1997) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 588
(A M. L AW I NST. 1977)). 	The Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, chapter
4.105 RCW 	(UPEPA), augments this protection by providing “an expedited
process 	for 	dismissing 	lawsuits 	that 	target 	activities 	protected 	by 	the 	First
Amendment, 	such 	as 	freedom 	of 	speech, 	press, 	assembly, 	petition, 	and
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No. 86585-4-I
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association on matters of public concern.” 	M.G. v. Bainbridge Island Sch. Dist.
#303, __ Wn. 3d ___, 566 P.3d 132, 144 (2025).
Contrary to these bedrock legal principles, Valve Corporation asserted
tortious interference and abuse of process claims against Bucher Law PLLC and
AFN Law PLLC (the Bucher Defendants) arising out of communications and
related conduct in the course of the law firms’ representation of thousands of Valve
customers who allege that its anticompetitive practices have raised prices for
computer games on its “Steam” platform and kept them at artificially high prices.
Because the litigation privilege indisputably protects the Bucher Defendants’
conduct, Valve’s claims fail as a matter of law and the trial court erred in denying
the Bucher Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims under UPEPA. Accordingly,
we reverse and remand for entry of an order dismissing Valve’s claims against the
Bucher Defendants with prejudice.
I
Valve operates an online service known as “Steam.” 	Steam is a platform
through which video game developers sell and distribute games and Steam users
may purchase, download, and play those games.
Steam users agree to the Steam Subscriber Agreement (SSA), which
includes dispute resolution provisions. 	Addressing that issue, the SSA states, “If
Valve is unable to resolve your concerns and a dispute remains between you and
Valve . . . YOU AND VALVE AGREE TO RESOLVE ALL DISPUTES AND CLAIMS
BETWEEN US IN INDIVIDUAL BINDING ARBITRATION.” The SSA continues:
Try to Resolve Dispute Informally First . . . You and Valve agree to
make reasonable, good faith efforts to informally resolve any dispute
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No. 86585-4-I
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before initiating arbitration. 	A party who intends to seek arbitration
must first send the other a written notice that describes the nature
and basis of the claim or dispute and sets forth the relief sought. If
you and Valve do not reach an agreement to resolve that claim or
dispute within thirty (30) calendar days after the notice is received,
you or Valve may commence an arbitration. Written notice to Valve
must be sent via postal mail . . . .
Thus, if a Steam user has a concern, claim, or dispute that the parties are unable
to resolve informally within thirty days, the user may commence an arbitration. The
SSA further states:
If you seek $10,000 or less, Valve agrees to promptly reimburse your
filing fee and your share if any of AAA’s arbitration costs, including
arbitrator compensation, unless the arbitrator determines your claims
are frivolous or were filed for harassment. Valve agrees not to seek
its attorneys’ fees or costs unless the arbitrator determines your
claims are frivolous or were filed for harassment.
Critical here, the SSA prohibits Steam users from bringing or participating in a
class, collective, or representative arbitration and mandates “individual binding
arbitration only.”
The Bucher Defendants represent thousands of individual Steam users
seeking 	resolution 	in 	arbitration 	of 	disputes 	relating 	to 	Valve’s 	alleged
anticompetitive practices under federal antitrust and state consumer protection
laws. 	In accordance with the SSA, the Bucher Defendants initiated the dispute
resolution process by sending a letter on behalf of their clients relating to Valve’s
alleged anticompetitive practices and proposing settlement terms pursuant to the
informal dispute resolution process.
Valve responded that the notice lacked important customer identifying
information, was not particularized to individual customers, and “was not sent in
good faith.” 	The Bucher Defendants replied by sending Valve individual e-mails
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No. 86585-4-I
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on behalf of each of their clients following Valve’s request for individual complaints.
After the parties failed to resolve their disputes within the thirty-day window
established 	in 	the 	SSA, 	the 	Bucher 	Defendants 	filed 	their 	clients’ 	claims
individually in arbitration.
Following the initiation of the individual arbitration claims, Valve filed tortious
interference and abuse of process claims alleging that the Bucher Defendants had
attempted to “weaponize the terms of Valve’s dispute resolution agreement with
Steam users to line their own pockets” and that the Bucher Defendants “have
abused 	the 	legal 	process 	and 	interfered with 	Valve’s 	relationships 	with 	its
customers.” 	The Bucher Defendants then filed a dispositive motion, seeking
dismissal under UPEPA, CR 12, and CR 56.
The trial court denied the Bucher Defendants’ motion, holding (a) Valve has
alleged sufficient facts to establish plausible claims for tortious interference and
abuse of process, (b) the Bucher Defendants had failed to establish the litigation
privilege precluded Valve’s claims, and (c) “a statutory exception to UPEPA”
applied to the Bucher Defendants’ actions. Lastly, the court denied Valve’s request
for an award of attorney fees and costs under RCW 4.105.090 because the Bucher
Defendants had not filed their UPEPA motion with intent to delay the proceeding
and there was “at least some justification” for filing the motion. This timely appeal
followed.
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No. 86585-4-I
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II
A
Preliminarily, Valve argues the trial court’s UPEPA order is not appealable
as of right. We disagree.
RAP 2.2(a) limits appeals as of right to specified categories “[u]nless
otherwise . . . provided by statute . . . .” 	Here, UPEPA provides that a “moving
party may appeal as a matter of right from an order denying” a UPEPA motion.
RCW 4.105.080. 	Our Supreme Court recently confirmed, “A moving party may
appeal as a matter of right from an order denying a motion under RCW 4.105.020.”
Thurman v. Cowles Co., 4 Wn. 3d 291, 299, 562 P.3d 777 (2025). Based on these
legal authorities, we reject Valve’s argument that the trial court’s UPEPA order is
not appealable as of right.1
B
Turning to the merits of the appeal, the Bucher Defendants argue the trial
court erred in denying their UPEPA motion. We agree.
As noted previously, the Washington legislature enacted UPEPA “to provide
an expedited process for dismissing lawsuits that target activities protected by the
First Amendment, such as freedom of speech, press, assembly, petition, and
association on matters of public concern.” M.G., 566 P.3d at 145. UPEPA is an
“anti-SLAPP” law, where SLAPP refers to a “strategic lawsuit against public
participation.” Jha v. Khan, 24 Wn. App. 2d 377, 386, 520 P.3d 470 (2022). Such
1 Because we do not reach the Bucher Defendants’ alternative grounds for dismissal under CR 12
and CR 56 (see section II.B.3 below), we need not determine whether the trial court’s rulings as to
those issues are also appealable at this time.
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No. 86585-4-I
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proceedings are sometimes described as lawsuits “that masquerade as ordinary
lawsuits but are intended to deter ordinary people from exercising their political or
legal rights or to punish them for doing so.” 	Planet Aid, Inc. v. Reveal, 44 F.4th
918, 923 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 261
(9th Cir. 2013)).
Under UPEPA, a defendant “may file a special motion for expedited relief
to dismiss the cause of action” within 60 days of being served with a complaint.
RCW 4.105.020(2). 	In ruling on such a motion, “the court shall dismiss with
prejudice a cause of action” if three requirements are met: 	(1) the defendant
“establishes under RCW 4.105.010(2) that [UPEPA] applies”; (2) the plaintiff “fails
to establish under RCW 4.105.010(3) that [UPEPA] does not apply”; and (3) the
plaintiff “fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of the
cause of action” or “failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be
granted” or “[t]here is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the [defendant]
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	RCW 4.105.060(1). 	We review the
denial of a UPEPA motion to dismiss de novo. Jha, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 387.
1
Regarding the first requirement to grant dismissal under UPEPA, RCW
4.105.010(2) states in relevant part as follows:
[T]his chapter applies to a cause of action asserted in a civil action
against a person based on the person’s:
(a) 	Communication 	in 	a 	legislative, 	executive, 	judicial,
administrative, or other governmental proceeding;
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No. 86585-4-I
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(b) Communication on an issue under consideration or review
in 	a 	legislative, 	executive, 	judicial, 	administrative, 	or 	other
governmental proceeding;
(c) Exercise of the right of freedom of speech or of the press,
the 	right 	to 	assemble 	or 	petition, 	or 	the 	right 	of 	association,
guaranteed by the United States Constitution or Washington state
Constitution, on a matter of public concern.
The Bucher Defendants argue UPEPA applies here under subsections (b) and (c).
Both arguments are persuasive.2
Starting with subsection (b), the Bucher Defendants’ communications and
corresponding conduct at issue here pertain to “an issue under consideration or
review in a . . . judicial . . . proceeding.” RCW 4.105.010(2)(b). In Wolfire Games,
LLC v. Valve Corp., No. C21-0563-JCC, 2021 WL 4952220, at *1 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 25, 2021), the plaintiffs alleged that Valve “utilizes anticompetitive practices
and its monopoly powers to inflate prices on games sold and distributed through
[its] Steam Store and Steam Gaming Platform.” The court granted Valve’s motion
to compel arbitration of the claims asserted by Steam users and denied its motion
to stay the claims asserted by a software developer, holding the SSA required
arbitration of the former and there was no proper basis to stay the latter. Id. at *3.
Citing Wolfire, Valve alleges in its complaint that the Bucher Defendants seek to
“‘copycat’ a legal theory developed by another law firm in another lawsuit that had
already been sent to arbitration.” 	Thus, as alleged by Valve, the Bucher
Defendants’ communications pertain to an issue under consideration in a judicial
proceeding as required by RCW 4.105.010(2)(b).
2 The trial court did not expressly address the applicability of UPEPA under RCW 4.105.010(2),
ruling instead that Valve had established that UPEPA does not apply based on RCW
4.105.010(3)(a)(ii), which we discuss in section II.B.2 below.
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No. 86585-4-I
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Regarding subsection (c), the Bucher Defendants’ representation of their
clients is protected by the guarantee of freedom of speech, association, and
petition under the United States Constitution. 	The “‘right to hire and consult an
attorney is protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech,
association and petition.’” 	Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410 F.3d
602, 611 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir.
2000)). Courts in other states have likewise applied First Amendment protections
to attorneys representing clients in bringing suit.3
Much the same is true with regard to the Washington State Constitution.
Washington’s right of access to the courts is grounded in article I, section 10, which
states, “Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary
delay.” In Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center, P.S., 166 Wn.2d 974, 216
P.3d 374 (2009), our Supreme Court declared, “The people have a right of access
to courts; indeed, it is the bedrock foundation upon which rest all the people’s rights
and obligations.” 	Id. at 978 (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Our courts have
“generally applied the open courts clause [of article I, section 10] [in the context of]
. . . the right to a remedy for a wrong suffered.” King v. King, 162 Wn.2d 378, 388,
174 P.3d 659 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in representing their
clients, the Bucher Defendants were exercising their constitutional rights under the
3 See Schimmel v. McGregor, 438 S.W.3d 847, 858 (Tex. App. 2014) (recognizing attorney right to
petition on behalf of clients and also attorney right to freedom of speech on behalf of clients in
applying Texas anti-SLAPP law); Thornton v. Breland, 441 So. 2d 1348, 1350 (Miss. 1983) (“We
regard the lawyer’s right and responsibility of zealous advocacy on behalf of his client among the
most precious forms of speech.”).
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No. 86585-4-I
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Washington State Constitution, in addition to the United States Constitution, as
RCW 4.105.010(2)(c) requires.
RCW 4.105.010(2)(c) also requires that the protected conduct relate to “a
matter of public concern.” 	Whether speech is on a matter of public concern is a
question of law, which courts determine “‘by the content, form, and context of a
given statement, as revealed by the whole record.’” 	Jha, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 389
(quoting Billings v. Town of Steilacoom, 2 Wn. App. 2d 1, 31, 408 P.3d 1123
(2017)). 	“Speech involves ‘matters of public concern when it can be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community.’” Spratt v. Toft, 180 Wn. App. 620, 632, 324 P.3d 707 (2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453, 131 S. Ct.
1207, 179 L. Ed. 2d 172 (2011)).
Here, the Bucher Defendants’ statements and conduct representing their
clients’ interests are on matters of public concern. The arbitration claims at issue
were based on alleged violations of federal antitrust and state consumer protection
laws. 	Antitrust and consumer protection actions are matters of public concern:
“the purpose of [Washington’s Consumer Protection Act] is to complement the
body of federal law governing restraints of trade, unfair competition and unfair,
deceptive, and fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the public and foster
fair and honest competition.” 	RCW 19.86.920. Not all conduct by an attorney is
protected; the “petitioning activity must actually give rise to and be the basis for the
asserted liability.” 	Dillon v. Seattle Deposition Reporters, LLC, 179 Wn. App. 41,
82, 	316 	P.3d 	1119 	(2014). 	But 	the 	Bucher 	Defendants’ 	conduct 	here 	in
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No. 86585-4-I
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representing their clients is the basis of Valve’s assertion of liability. 	Thus, the
Bucher Defendants have established, as a matter of law, that UPEPA applies to
their communications and associated conduct under both RCW 4.105.010(2)(b)
and (c).
2
Addressing the second requirement to grant dismissal under UPEPA, the
trial court ruled in relevant part as follows:
The Court finds a statutory exception to UPEPA in this matter,
as the plain language of RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)(iii) does not apply the
statute to a claim brought “against a person . . . selling . . . services
if the cause of action arises out of a communication related to the
person’s sale . . . of the . . . . services.” 	Such is the context of the
[Bucher] Defendants’ actions addressed by this suit.
Applying de novo review (as indicated above), we conclude that the trial court
misapplied RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)(iii) and reached an erroneous holding.
“Rules of statutory construction provide that a statute which is clear on its
face is not subject to judicial interpretation.” 	Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130
Wn.2d 97, 107, 922 P.2d 43 (1996). “Statutory construction begins by reading the
text of the statute or statues involved. If the language is unambiguous, a reviewing
court is to rely solely on the statutory language.” State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d
614, 621, 106 P.3d 196 (2005). Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de
novo. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2 of Pac. County v. Comcast of Wash. IV, Inc., 8 Wn.
App. 2d 418, 449, 438 P.3d 1212 (2019).
Here, the statutory provision at issue is unambiguous. 	Under RCW
4.105.010(3)(a)(iii), UPEPA does not apply to causes of action against a person
selling services “if the cause of action arises out of a communication related to the
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No. 86585-4-I
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person’s sale . . . of the . . . services.” 	(Emphasis added.) 	Valve’s tortious
interference and abuse of process claims against the Bucher Defendants do not
arise out of communications related to the Bucher Defendants’ sale of their legal
services. They instead arise out of the Bucher Defendants’ communications with
Valve 	initiating 	arbitration 	proceedings, 	which 	communications 	and 	related
conduct are included within—not excluded from—the scope of UPEPA.
Valve argues a Texas court’s interpretation of that state’s anti-SLAPP
statute is persuasive, but the holding in that case is based on easily distinguishable
facts. In Kostura v. Judge, 627 S.W.3d 380, 383-84 (Tex. App. 2021), an attorney
asserted tort claims against a law firm that previously employed him. The attorney
alleged defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress because the firm sent a letter to numerous clients who had worked with
the attorney informing them that the attorney was no longer able to practice law
and thus the clients should seek new counsel. Id.
The firm responded by filing a motion to dismiss the claims under the Texas
Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), an anti-SLAPP statute. 	The Texas court held
the firm’s communication to clients “ar[ose] out of the sale” of legal services
between the clients and the firm regarding the firm’s provision of such services.
Id. at 388. It was thus subject to an exception to the TCPA which states that the
Act does not apply to “a legal action brought against a person primarily engaged
in the business of selling [ ] services, if the statement or conduct arises out of the
sale [ ] of . . . services, [ ] or a commercial transaction in which the intended
audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer.” Id. (emphasis added).
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No. 86585-4-I
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Kostura is inapposite because the statements at issue there arose from
communications related to the law firm’s ability to continue to sell legal services to
its clients and were thus subject to the foregoing exception to the TCPA. Here, in
contrast, the Bucher Defendants’ statements were sent to their clients’ adversary,
not to their clients or potential clients, and addressed an ongoing legal dispute with
that adversary. Instead of centering on the commercial relationship between a law
firm and its clients, as in Kostura, the Bucher Defendants’ communications were
acts of legal representation. 	Because RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)(iii) does not apply
here, Valve has “fail[ed] to establish under RCW 4.105.010(3) that [UPEPA] does
not apply,” RCW 4.105.060(1)(b), and the second requirement for dismissal under
UPEPA is satisfied.
3
Lastly, as to the third requirement to grant dismissal under UPEPA, the
Bucher Defendants principally argue Valve “failed to state a cause of action upon
which relief can be granted” under RCW 4.105.060(1)(c)(ii)(A). 	That is so, they
argue, for two reasons: 	first, their conduct is protected as a matter of law by the
litigation privilege; and second, Valve has not pleaded—and cannot properly
plead—various elements of its claims, such as a viable duty of non-interference,
as required to state a cause of action for tortious interference,4 and initiating legal
proceedings to “accomplish an end” outside of those proceedings, as required to
4 See, e.g., Pleas v. City of Seattle, 112 Wn.2d 794, 804, 774 P.2d 1158 (1989) (quoting Straube
v. Larson, 287 Or. 357, 361, 600 P.2d 371 (1979); Libera v. City of Port Angeles, 178 Wn. App.
669, 676-77, 316 P.3d 1064 (2013).
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No. 86585-4-I
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state a cause of action for abuse of process.5 We agree with the first argument
and therefore do not reach the second. Nor do we reach the Bucher Defendants’
other asserted grounds for dismissal under UPEPA, CR 12, and CR 56.
RCW 4.105.060(1)(c)(ii)(A), applicable here, imports CR 12’s requirement
for judgment on the pleadings. 	A motion to dismiss on such grounds, whether
asserted under CR 12(b)(6) or CR 12(c), is properly granted “where the plaintiff
cannot prove any set of facts consistent with the complaint that would entitle the
plaintiff to relief.” 	Jackson v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 186 Wn. App. 838, 843,
347 P.3d 487 (2015). 	“The plaintiff’s allegations and any reasonable inferences
are accepted as true.” Gorman v. City of Woodinville, 160 Wn. App. 759, 762, 249
P.3d 1040 (2011). However, the complaint’s legal conclusions are not required to
be accepted as true. Jackson, 186 Wn. App. at 843 (quoting Gorman v. Garlock,
155 Wn.2d 198, 215, 118 P.3d 311 (2005)). 	If a plaintiff’s claim is legally
insufficient even under the proffered hypothetical facts, dismissal is appropriate.
Id. at 843-44.
Turning to the merits of the Bucher Defendants’ immunity argument, the
litigation 	privilege 	is 	a 	judicially 	created 	privilege 	that 	protects 	participants,
including attorneys, against civil liability for statements they make in the course of
judicial proceedings. McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wn.2d 265, 267, 621 P.2d 1285 (1980).
“[A]ttorneys and law firms have absolute immunity from liability for acts arising out
of representing their clients.” 	Jeckle v. Crotty, 120 Wn. App. 374, 386, 85 P.3d
5 See, e.g., Sea-Pac Co., Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local Union 44, 103 Wn.2d
800, 806-07, 699 P.2d 217 (1985) (citing Batten v. Abrams, 28 Wn. App. 737, 748, 626 P.2d 984
(1981)).
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No. 86585-4-I
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931 (2004). 	Attorney conduct is “absolutely privileged” when it is “pertinent or
material to the redress or relief sought, whether or not the statements are legally
sufficient to obtain that relief.” McNeal, 95 Wn.2d at 267.
Extending the privilege to attorneys “is based upon a public policy of
securing to them as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to
secure justice for their clients.” 	Id. As this court recently explained, the litigation
privilege “protects participants from retaliatory, derivative lawsuits—regardless of
the merit of those suits—instead relying on checks by the trial court such as
sanctions to address false testimony.” Young v. Rayan, 27 Wn. App. 2d 500, 503,
533 P.3d 123 (2023). 	The privilege “recogniz[es] that our legal system depends
on reducing the threat that every statement or argument may lead to further
litigation.” Id.
While stated broadly, the litigation privilege is “limited to situations in which
authorities have the power to discipline as well as strike from the record statements
which exceed the bounds of permissible conduct.” Twelker v. Shannon & Wilson,
Inc., 88 Wn.2d 473, 476, 564 P.2d 1131 (1977). In this way, the “potential harms
of 	a 	broad 	application 	of 	litigation 	privilege 	. 	. 	. 	are 	blunted 	by 	forms 	of
accountability” such as sanctions and “professional disciplinary proceedings,
which may occur based on . . . behavior during litigation and which are therefore
an additional avenue to confront harm caused by privileged statements.” Young,
27 Wn. App. 2d at 510 (citing Wynn v. Earin, 163 Wn.2d 361, 378, 181 P.3d 806
(2008)). 	The privilege has been applied to a variety of claims against attorneys
representing their clients, including tortious interference claims. See, e.g., Young,
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No. 86585-4-I
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27 Wn. App. 2d at 515-25 (applying privilege to defamation, false light, and civil
conspiracy claims); Jeckle, 120 Wn. App. at 386 (applying privilege to tortious
interference with a business relationship claim, among others).
Here, the Bucher Defendants’ conduct was both “pertinent” and “material”
to the relief they sought for their clients, and thus insulated from suit by the litigation
privilege. 	The Bucher Defendants agreed to represent clients individually in
arbitration pursuant to Valve’s SSA and contacted Valve in accordance with its
prescribed 	dispute 	resolution 	process. 	When 	Valve 	indicated 	it 	required
individualized 	notices for 	each 	customer complaint, 	the 	Bucher 	Defendants
complied. 	The conduct Valve complains of—the filing of thousands of individual
arbitration requests—is a direct result of its own agreement barring class actions
and prohibiting collective or representative arbitration.6 Such conduct is part of a
legal practice and is directly related to representing clients, which is precisely the
kind of conduct the litigation privilege is designed to protect.
Valve claims, and the trial court agreed, the litigation privilege does not
apply here because its scope is “limited to situations where some power to
discipline remains available.” 	Deatherage v. Examining Bd. of Psychology, 134
Wn.2d 131, 136, 948 P.2d 828 (1997). Although Valve “does not dispute . . . that
litigation 	privilege 	could 	extend, 	when 	appropriate, 	to 	lawyers 	appearing in
arbitration proceedings,” it does not identify any persuasive reason that the
arbitrators of these individual claims would be unable to discipline the Bucher
Defendants 	for 	any 	alleged 	improper 	conduct. 	In 	addition, 	professional
6 On this particular issue, Valve is hoist by its own contractual petard. Notably, Valve no longer
requires individual arbitration in its SSA.
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No. 86585-4-I
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responsibility disciplinary avenues are available to Valve to address its concerns.
Valve 	instead 	claims 	that 	because 	the 	arbitration 	demands 	of 	the 	Bucher
Defendants’ clients are asserted individually, as its own SSA requires, no single
arbitrator is “well situated” to remedy the alleged harm caused by the Bucher
Defendants’ actions. 	Contrary to Valve’s contention, “some power to discipline”
impermissible 	conduct 	is 	“available” 	through 	the 	individual 	arbitrations 	it
demanded, which is sufficient to show the “availab[ility]” of “some” power to
discipline, even though it is not the remedy Valve prefers. 	Deatherage, 134 Wn.
2d at 136.
Lastly, Valve argues the litigation privilege does not apply here based on
Mason v. Mason, 19 Wn. App. 2d 803, 835, 497 P.3d 431 (2021), which declined
to apply the privilege to an abuse of process claim. 	In Mason, an attorney was
alleged to have pursued a parenting plan modification for a client to intentionally
place the other parent’s immigration status at risk. Id. This conduct supported an
abuse of process claim, as the attorney “intentionally employed legal process for
an inappropriate and extrinsic end.” 	Id. 	Here, unlike in Mason, Valve has not
alleged the Bucher Defendants have an ultimate end that is unrelated to the legal
relief they are pursuing for their clients by following the terms of Valve’s SSA.
While Valve alleges that the Bucher Defendants will benefit financially from such
relief, that is only because, as Valve’s complaint confirms, the Bucher Defendants
“keep[] 40 percent of any amount recovered from Valve, plus reimbursement for
any upfront fees and costs.” 	Thus, the Bucher Defendants’ interests are aligned
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No. 86585-4-I
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with, and subsidiary to, their clients’ interests in recovering damages in the
arbitration proceedings. On this record, Mason is inapposite.
III
In sum, all three requirements for dismissal of Valve’s tortious interference
and abuse of process claims under UPEPA are satisfied here: 	the Bucher
Defendants have established that UPEPA applies to Valve’s claims; Valve has
failed to establish an exception to UPEPA’s applicability; and Valve has “failed to
state 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	upon 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted.” 	RCW
4.105.060(1)(c)(ii)(A). 	Because the trial court erred in denying the Bucher
Defendants’ UPEPA motion, we reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand for entry
of 	an order dismissing Valve’s claims against the Bucher Defendants with
prejudice in accordance with RCW 4.105.060(1)(ii)(A).7
WE CONCUR:
7 While UPEPA requires an award of prevailing party attorney fees, see RCW 4.105.090(1), the
Bucher Defendants specifically state they are “not appealing [the] denial of fees” by the trial court.
The Bucher Defendants also do not seek attorney fees on appeal. And with regard to attorney fees
on remand, the Bucher Defendants state that they “preserve all rights to seek fees under UPEPA
and otherwise on remand if further litigation is required,” (emphasis added), but as no further
litigation is required here, that issue is resolved as well.
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