State of Washington v. Sean Kyle Martin

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
SEAN KYLE MARTIN,
Appellant.
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No. 39429-8-III
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Sean Martin appeals his standard range sentence and
asks us to direct the trial court to strike various legal financial obligations (LFOs). We
conclude that Martin waived his right to appeal a standard range sentence, but remand for
the trial court to strike the challenged LFOs.
FACTS
In 2014, Sean Martin pleaded guilty to four counts of first degree robbery,
including three firearm enhancements. He committed the robberies when he was 22 to 23
years old. Martin completed a statement on plea of guilty that included a waiver of his
right to appeal his sentence if the trial court sentenced him within the standard range.
The sentencing judge, however, incorrectly stated that if Martin pleaded guilty he had no
right to appeal.
FILED
DECEMBER 5, 2024
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

No. 39429-8-III
State v. Martin
2
At sentencing, the State informed the trial court that the parties had reached a joint
recommendation for a low-end standard range sentence, which, after adding 60 months
for each of the three firearm enhancements, totaled 257 months. The State also
mentioned that Martin had confessed to “using a firearm in 17 different felonies, which
resulted in a minimum of 85 years just in weapons enhancements alone.” Rep. of Proc.
(May 21, 2014) (RP) at 12. Defense counsel, in asking for the court to accept the joint
recommendation, acknowledged that the 257-month (or 21-year, 5 month) sentence was
substantial, but emphasized that the plea allowed Martin to avoid the risk of a sentence
between 65 and 85 years. The trial court asked Martin if he had anything to say before it
imposed sentence. Martin said he “was hoping [he] could get maybe under ten years.”
RP at 38.
The trial court imposed the jointly recommended sentence of 257 months, and also
ordered Martin to pay a $500.00 victim penalty assessment (VPA), a $200.00 criminal
filing fee, a $100.00 DNA collection fee, and $11,072.61 in restitution.
In late 2022, Martin filed this appeal. Because the trial court had misinformed
Martin of his limited right to appeal, we enlarged the time so to consider this appeal.

No. 39429-8-III
State v. Martin
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ANALYSIS
Martin argues the trial court erred by failing to exercise its discretion to consider
an exceptional sentence below the standard range. The State responds that Martin waived
his right to appeal from a standard range sentence. We agree with the State.
Plea agreements are treated as contracts binding on both the State and the
defendant, with a “strong public interest in enforcing the terms of plea agreements which
are voluntarily and intelligently made.” In re Pers. Restraint of Breedlove, 138 Wn.2d
298, 309, 979 P.2d 417 (1999). Where a defendant agrees to plead guilty to avoid a
potentially more severe sentence, “[h]e must be held to his bargain, just as the State is
bound by the plea agreement.” State v. Hilyard, 63 Wn. App. 413, 420, 819 P.2d 809
(1991). “The benefits of plea bargains include finality, acceptance of responsibility,
preservation of resources, and the exercise of mercy.” State v. Westwood, 10 Wn. App.
2d 543, 549, 448 P.3d 771 (2019). A defendant who enters into a negotiated plea
agreement that specifically waives the right to appeal a standard range sentence cannot
raise nonjurisdictional challenges to the constitutionality of a standard range sentence.
State v. Moten, 95 Wn. App. 927, 929-34, 976 P.2d 1286 (1999).
Martin, citing State v. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d 47, 399 P.3d 1106 (2017), argues
that his waived right to appeal does not foreclose him from arguing that the trial court

No. 39429-8-III
State v. Martin
4
erred by failing to exercise its discretion to impose an exceptional sentence below the
standard range. We disagree.
In McFarland, the court held that RCW 9.94A.535(1)(g) gives sentencing courts
discretion to impose concurrent firearm-related sentences when multiple firearm-related
convictions result in a presumptive sentence that is clearly excessive in light of the
purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW. Id. at 55. The
court further held, even though RCW 9.94A.585(1) generally prohibits a defendant from
appealing a standard range sentence, a defendant may appeal such a sentence when a
“‘court has refused to exercise discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for
refusing to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range.’” Id. at 56 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. McGill, 112 Wn. App. 95, 100, 47 P.3d 173
(2002)).
McFarland is distinguishable. The defendant in McFarland did not waive his
right to appeal a standard range sentence.
As mentioned previously, plea bargains are contracts. In general, a waiver of
rights is enforceable. Here, in the plea agreement, Martin waived numerous rights—the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, the right to remain silent, the right
to hear and question witnesses, the right to testify, the right to be presumed innocent, and

No. 39429-8-III
State v. Martin
5
the right to appeal a finding of guilt. These rights are constitutionally based. These
constitutional rights are waivable. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709,
23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); State v. Branch, 129 Wn.2d 635, 642, 919 P.2d 1228 (1996).
Because constitutional rights are waivable in a plea agreement, it follows that statutory
rights are also waivable.
Here, Martin does not contest that his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
In exchange for his plea and waiver of right to appeal a standard range sentence, Martin
received a sentence of 21 years, 5 months, and avoided a sentence that could have been
several times longer. We conclude that Martin waived his right to appeal the standard
range sentence he received, and with it, any argument that his three firearm convictions
should have been sentenced concurrently rather than consecutively.
LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
Martin requests that we direct the trial court to strike three LFOs imposed in his
judgment—the criminal filing fee, the DNA collection fee, and the VPA.
In 2018, the legislature prohibited courts from imposing the criminal filing fee on
indigent defendants. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, § 17(2)(h). In 2023, the legislature
eliminated DNA collection fees and prohibited courts from imposing victim penalty
assessments on indigent defendants. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, §§ 1, 4.

No. 39429-8-111
State v. Martin
Statutory changes to cost statutes apply prospectively. State v. Ramirez, 191
Wn.2d 732, 748-49, 426 P.3d 714 (2018). A statute operates prospectively when the
precipitating event for its application occurs after the effective date of the statute. Id. at
749. The precipitating event of the statute is the termination of the case. Id. 	Because
Martin's case is on appeal, it has not yet terminated and the challenged LFOs must be
struck, subject to a showing that he is indigent.
The State asks, if we agree with Martin, that we remand without resentencing. We
agree with Martin, yet Martin's presence in court could be required for him to establish
his indigency. Rather than requiring the State to incur this expense, we simply direct the
trial court to find that Martin is indigent and strike the challenged LFOs.
Affirm sentence, but remand to strike criminal filing fee, DNA collection fee, and
VPA.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
l,. ....,"'"..Q:,...._.., 1, L~.Lawrence-Berrey, C.J. 	~ 	~
Cooney, J.
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