Shantel Schrag v. Matthew Schrag

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
SHANTEL SCHRAG,
Petitioner,
v.
MATTHEW SCHRAG,
Respondent.
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No. 39940-1-III
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
STAAB, A.C.J. — Shantel Schrag appeals a sexual assault protection order (SAPO)
restraining her from contact with her 11-year-old daughter, E.S. Shantel1 proffers several
reasons for overturning the SAPO. We find two dispositive: (1) the petition does not
allege she committed the sexual assault against E.S. as required by RCW 7.105.100(1)(b),
and (2) the court’s sexual assault finding is not supported by substantial evidence. We
therefore reverse without need to address Shantel’s remaining arguments.
BACKGROUND
Shantel and Matthew Schrag are the separated parents of 11-year-old E.S. Under
the parties’ parenting plan, E.S. generally lives with Shantel during the school year and is
1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their first
names for clarity. No disrespect is intended.
FILED
OCTOBER 29, 2024
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

No. 39940-1-III
In re: Schrag v. Schrag
2
with Matthew over the summer. Shantel is also the mother of another child, O.C., who
was 17 years old at the time the litigation in this case commenced. O.C. occasionally
lived with Shantel and E.S.
In 2023, Matthew filed a petition in the Lincoln County Superior Court for a
SAPO on behalf of E.S. against Shantel.2 In his petition, Matthew alleged Shantel should
be restrained from contact with E.S. due to “severe emotional, mental and physical sexual
abuse.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 4. He attached a letter to his petition explaining the
reasons for his request.
Matthew’s letter stated E.S. had reported being sexually abused by O.C. since
2017. E.S. told Matthew she had informed Shantel about the abuse, but Shantel was
dismissive. According to Matthew, Shantel continued to leave E.S. alone with O.C.,
despite E.S.’s allegations. Matthew claimed that law enforcement told him that they had
developed probable cause to charge O.C. and that O.C. was being referred for
prosecution. Matthew provided no information suggesting Shantel was under criminal
investigation.
Several people filed responsive declarations on behalf of Shantel denying
Matthew’s allegations. According to Shantel, she has “been proactive about getting
2 Matthew also filed another petition for a SAPO on behalf of E.S. against O.C.
That SAPO is the subject of a separate appeal.

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3
[E.S.] treatment and help.” CP at 42. In addition, Shantel stated O.C. had decided to live
with her father and did not want to be in the same household as E.S.
The court held a hearing on Matthew’s petition, where it heard argument from
counsel.3 At the close of the hearing, the court ruled it would enter a one-year SAPO
restraining Shantel from contact with her daughter outside of two weekly visits supervised
by E.S.’s paternal grandmother.4 The court explained it was issuing the SAPO because of
evidence that Shantel was “not protecting” E.S. Rep. of Proc. at 26. The court’s written
order was issued on a standard SAPO form. On the form, the court checked boxes stating
it was issuing the SAPO based on the findings that Shantel “subjected [E.S.] to
nonconsensual sexual conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration” and that Shantel
“represents a credible threat to the physical safety of [E.S.].” CP at 94-95.
Shantel timely appeals. CP at 104.
ANALYSIS
We review a trial court’s decision to grant a protection order for abuse of
discretion. Rodriguez v. Zavala, 188 Wn.2d 586, 590, 398 P.3d 1071 (2017). Discretion
is abused if the trial court’s decision is grounded in unsupported facts or legal error.
State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003).
3 The court did not take testimony.
4 The court also stated it would enter a SAPO restraining O.C. from contact with
E.S.

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“A parent may petition for [a SAPO] on behalf of . . . [a] minor child.” RCW
7.105.100(b)(ii). But the petition “must allege the existence of nonconsensual sexual
conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration that was committed against the petitioner by
the respondent.” RCW 7.105.100(1)(b) (emphasis added). In addition, to issue a SAPO,
the trial court must find that the party to be protected has been “subjected to
nonconsensual sexual conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration by the respondent.”
RCW 7.105.225(1)(b) (emphasis added).
Matthew’s petition on behalf of E.S. did not allege Shantel committed
“nonconsensual sexual conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration” as required by
RCW 7.105.100(1)(b). Rather, he alleged Shantel showed “unwillingness to protect
E.S.;” “justified” O.C.’s sexual abuse; and engaged in “mental abuse” of E.S. CP at 15,
7. These allegations are concerning. But they are not sufficient to qualify for a SAPO
under RCW 7.105.100(1)(b).
Nor was the trial court presented with sufficient facts to conclude Shantel had
“subjected” E.S. to nonconsensual sexual conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration as
required by RCW 7.105.225(1)(b). The verb “subject” means “to cause to undergo or

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5
submit to.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2275 (1993).5 There
is no evidence in the record that Shantel caused O.C. to sexually abuse E.S. As
previously noted, Matthew’s allegations were that Shantel failed to protect E.S. from
O.C.’s abuse. This is insufficient to justify a SAPO under RCW 7.105.225(1)(b).
The allegations in Matthew’s petition and the evidence presented to the court were
insufficient to justify a SAPO against Shantel. The trial court therefore abused its
discretion in issuing the order.
Reversed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
_________________________________
Staab, A.C.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________________
Pennell, J.
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Cooney, J.
5 Because the applicable statute does not define the term “subjected,” we may
consult a dictionary definition. See State v. Mitchell, 169 Wn.2d 437, 444, 237 P.3d 282
(2010).