Jon-michael Smith, Appellant, V. Rachel Lamantia (fka Smith), Respondent

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
JON-MICHAEL PHILIP SMITH,
Appellant,
and
RACHEL LEE ANN SMITH,
Respondent.
No. 86500-5-I
DIVISION ONE
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION,
AND WITHDRAWING AND
SUBSTITUTING OPINION
Respondent, Rachel Lee Ann Smith, filed a motion for reconsideration of the
opinion filed on July 21, 2025. Appellant, Jon-Michael Philip Smith, filed an answer
to the motion. The court has determined that the motion for reconsideration should
be granted and the opinion filed on July 21, 2025 shall be withdrawn and a substitute
opinion be filed.
Now, therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is granted and the opinion filed
on July 21, 2025 is withdrawn and a substitute opinion shall be filed.
FOR THE COURT:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
JON-MICHAEL PHILIP SMITH,
Appellant,
and
RACHEL LEE ANN SMITH,
Respondent.
No. 86500-5-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DÍAZ, J. — Former spouses Jon-Michael Philip Smith and Rachel Lee Ann
Smith 	(LaMantia)1 	disagree 	about 	the 	scope 	of 	the 	trial 	court’s 	spousal
maintenance award. Smith claims he should not be obligated to transfer a portion
of a sales commission he received after the period of maintenance ended to
LaMantia. We disagree, affirm, and award respondent her attorney fees.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In 2018, Smith and LaMantia resolved their divorce via binding arbitration.
It was determined that Smith would pay spousal maintenance starting in June 2018
1 At the time of the dissolution, Respondent’s name was Rachel Lee Ann Smith.
Respondent is now known as Rachel Lee Ann LaMantia. 	Since recent court
documents refer to her by that name, we will do so in this opinion.

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and through December 2020, pursuant to the following formula: a monthly payment
of $1,000 to $2,500 each month and “25% of the net amount received/earned as
additional compensation in any manner or form whatsoever beyond the $140,000
base salary from his current or new employment during the period of maintenance
obligation.” (Emphasis added.)
In July 2020, Smith’s employer adopted a compensation plan under which
Smith received an approximately $285,000 sales commission in January 2021.
Two years later, LaMantia moved to hold Smith in contempt for failing to
pay her 25% of the commission he received in 2021. The court agreed additional
maintenance was due and Smith timely appeals.2
II. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Maintenance Period and the Commission
1. 	Standards of Review
Under RCW 26.09.090(1), a trial court may award maintenance “in such
amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems just.” Trial courts have
broad discretion to award maintenance and an award will not be overturned on
appeal absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion, i.e., when a decision is
manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. 	In re
Marriage of Wilcox, 3 Wn.3d 507, 517, 553 P.3d 614 (2024). A trial court’s findings
of fact in support of a maintenance award are reviewed for substantial evidence.
2 Smith appeals from three orders from the trial court: its (1) order on his February
2024 motion for reconsideration, its (2) February 2024 order awarding fees to
LaMantia, and its (3) order on LaMantia’s March 2024 motion for contempt
regarding, inter alia, maintenance.

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3
In re Marriage of Leaver, 20 Wn. App. 2d 228, 238, 499 P.3d 222 (2021).
Here, Smith does not challenge the court’s factual findings, which we may
treat as verities on appeal. 	In re Marriage of Brewer, 137 Wn.2d 756, 766, 976
P.2d 102 (1999). 	Rather, he disputes the legal conclusions flowing from them.
There too, however, we review how a court applied RCW 26.09.090 to those facts
for manifest abuse of discretion, a “very deferential” standard, where we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Leaver, 20 Wn. App. 2d at 238.
And we review a trial court’s decision in a contempt proceeding for an abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of Williams, 156 Wn. App. 22, 27, 232 P.3d 573 (2010).
We review de novo the language in a dissolution decree, applying the
general rules of construction that apply to statutes and contracts. 	In re Marriage
of Smith, 158 Wn. App. 248, 255-56, 241 P.3d 449 (2010). Likewise, we interpret
CR 2A separation agreements by applying normal contract principles. 	In re
Marriage of Pascale, 173 Wn. App. 836, 841, 295 P.3d 805 (2013).
2. 	Discussion
The trial court found that Smith “earned” the 2021 commission in 2020, i.e.,
during the maintenance period and, thus, LaMantia was entitled to a portion of it,
under the terms of the dissolution decree. We agree and begin by examining the
decree’s key terms.
The decree makes clear that “additional compensation” includes amounts
both “received” or “earned.” Wash. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Alsager, 165 Wn.
App. 10, 16, 266 P.3d 905 (2011) (holding that the forward slash symbol may
generally be construed as “or”). 	Thus, it is immaterial that Smith only “received”

No. 86500-5-I/4
4
the compensation in 2021. And to “earn” is defined as “to come to be duly worthy
of 	or 	entitled 	or 	suited 	to.” 	MERRIAM-W EBSTER 	O NLINE 	DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/earn 	(last 	visited 	Jun. 	30, 	2025)
(emphasis added); Seattle Tunnel Partners v. Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC,
18 Wn. App. 2d 600, 611, 492 P.3d 843 (2021) (holding that courts may turn to the
dictionary definition of an undefined contract term to assess its meaning). 	We
hold that, under this “ordinary, usual, and popular meaning,” Smith became
“entitled to” the commission received in 2021 for the work he performed in 2020,
and thus “earned” said commission in 2020. Condon v. Condon, 177 Wn.2d 150,
162-63, 298 P.3d 86 (2013).
In addition, the decree specifies that Smith must pay maintenance on
additional compensation earned “in any manner or form whatsoever." 	State v.
Durrett, 150 Wn. App. 402, 410, 208 P.3d 1174 (2009) (noting that a broad
meaning is accorded the term “any” in Washington). Thus, the exact contractual,
administrative, or financial vehicle of the compensation is also irrelevant.
Finally, the decree makes clear it covers such earnings “during the period
of maintenance obligation.” There is no dispute that the period of the maintenance
obligation lasted until the end of 2020, and Smith provides no authority for the
proposition that income contingent on a future event may not be awarded. 	See,
e.g., Marriage of Estes, 84 Wn. App. 586, 590-91, 929 P.2d 500 (1997) (holding to
the contrary).
Therefore, the trial court did not legally err in concluding that the plain
language of the decree establishes that it applies broadly to the specified

No. 86500-5-I/5
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compensation in the covered period, which Smith became “entitled to,” or abuse
its considerable discretion by awarding additional maintenance.
In response, Smith first points to alternate provisions of the decree.
Specifically, he argues the commission was outside his maintenance obligations
because the decree: (1) states that Smith’s spousal support obligation “expire[d]”
in December 2020, (2) states that he must make payments the “1st day of each
month,” so his last maintenance payment was on December 1, 2020, and (3) only
required Smith to provide copies of his federal tax returns from 2018 through 2020,
not 2021.
Smith’s reliance on these provisions flies in the face of basic principles of
contractual interpretation. It is axiomatic that we must review the agreement as a
whole, seek to give meaning to each provision, and seek to harmonize contract
terms which may appear to conflict. Nishikawa v. U.S. Eagle High, LLC, 138 Wn.
App. 841, 849, 158 P.3d 1265 (2007). 	Smith’s interpretation would render
meaningless the maintenance provisions reviewed above. 	Moreover, we give
greater weight to specific terms, rather than general terms. 	Adler v. Fred Lind
Manor, 153 Wn.2d 331, 354, 103 P.3d 773 (2004). 	Thus, the maintenance
provisions reviewed above should and do guide our analysis.3
3 For similar reasons, we reject Smith’s reliance on his understanding of the terms
of his company’s contract. In relevant part, Smith’s company’s compensation plan
specifies, “[c]ommissions based on [sales] do not become earned for a transaction
until the Company receives full customer payment on the transaction; however,
recoverable Commission advances may be payable.” (Emphasis added.) It also
states, “[c]ommission advances will become earned only when customer payment
on the underlying transaction is made in full; partial customer payment will result
only in pro-rated earning of the applicable Commission advance. Unearned
Commission advances are recoverable by the Company . . . [.]” 	(Emphasis

No. 86500-5-I/6
6
Finally, Smith argues that the trial court’s maintenance award violates
federal and state tax law. 	But he provides no legal authority for the proposition
that federal tax law binds a court’s interpretation of a dissolution decree. And if we
were to import the federal definition of certain terms into the decree, we would be
“[a]dding terms to the contract,” which “amount[s] to writing a new contract,” which
we are not permitted to do. In re Marriage of Mudgett, 41 Wn. App. 337, 341, 704
P.2d 169 (1985).
Moreover, the authority Smith cites is distinguishable. For example, unlike
in this case, the divorce decree in Prescott v. Prescott, 52 Wn.2d 769, 772, 329
P.2d 200 (1958), expressly tied maintenance payments to federal income tax laws.
Here, the decree did not.
For all of these reasons, Smith’s arguments do not succeed, and we hold
that the court correctly based its maintenance award on tenable grounds, under
the plain meaning of the decree. Pascale, 173 Wn. App. at 841. The award was
not an abuse of discretion.4
B. 	Smith’s Pro Se “Supplemental” Briefing
added.) Smith’s argument also fails because he provides no legal authority for the
proposition that the language of an employer or third party contract may define the
terms of a court order. DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126,
372 P.2d 193 (1962) (“Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition,
the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel,
after diligent search, has found none.”). 	Instead, we look at a document’s intent
by analyzing its “objective manifestations” rather than the “unexpressed subjective
intent” of a given party. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d
493, 503, 115 P.3d 262 (2005).
4 We do not reach the other assignments of error in Smith’s opening brief—as to
the court’s attorney fee award to LaMantia or its denial of Smith’s motion for
reconsideration—as he provides no substantive argument for either. 	Cowiche
Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).

No. 86500-5-I/7
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Smith’s appellate counsel withdrew after filing his opening brief, and Smith
then filed pro se a second brief before LaMantia filed her response. 	Beyond
reiterating the opening brief’s arguments, it additionally: (1) contends LaMantia’s
CPA report the court relied upon is fraudulent and violates ethical standards, and
(2) argues the court “failed to consider financial hardship.” LaMantia requests that
we strike his motion to allow this “supplemental” brief.
RAP 10.1(b) provides, “The following briefs may be filed in any review: (1)
a brief of appellant or petitioner. . .[,]” and its straightforward implication is that only
one such brief may be filed. (Emphasis added.) However, RAP 10.1(h) grants this
court discretion to permit the filing of briefs other than those listed in the rule.
While we deny the motion to strike, we decline to consider the merits of
Smith’s 	“supplemental” 	filing 	because 	he 	does 	not 	support 	his 	additional
arguments with any evidence in the record or relevant legal authority. 	We need
not consider arguments that a party does not support by references to the record,
meaningful analysis, or citation to pertinent authority. 	Norcon Builders, LLC v.
GMP Homes VG, LLC, 161 Wn. App. 474, 486, 254 P.3d 835 (2011).
Smith also filed a second pro se “supplemental brief” after LaMantia filed
her response, purportedly addressing issues raised in her brief. 	However, its
substantive content is primarily newfound argument, and we hold the RAPs do not
condone our consideration of this second “supplemental brief” he attempts to file.
RAP 1.2 allows a court to waive rules “to serve the ends of justice,” and we
“liberally interpret[ ]” the rules “to promote justice and facilitate the decision of
cases on the merits.” RAP 1.2(a), (c). However, RAP 10.3(c) directs that a reply

No. 86500-5-I/8
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brief must be “limited to a response to the issues in the brief to which the reply brief
is directed.” And in exercising our discretion over whether to use RAP 1.2 to reach
an appeal’s merits, we decline to do so when there is a compelling reason not to,
such as prejudice to the respondent. Bergerson v. Zurbano, 6 Wn. App. 2d 912,
926, 432 P.3d 850 (2018); 	see also 	RAP 	18.8 (allowing us 	to 	waive 	the
requirements of the rules of appellate procedure where we find it appropriate).
Here, LaMantia would be prejudiced if we reached Smith’s claims as she
has not been afforded the opportunity to reply to his new arguments. 	And Smith
does not persuade us that the ends of justice would be served by considering this
brief because he could have raised the issues in his earlier supplemental brief. In
addition, the filing includes argument regarding his separate criminal case which
we declined to consolidate with this matter. 	Therefore, we have considered the
merits of this filing only to the limited extent it replies to LaMantia’s response.
C. 	Fees
Finally, LaMantia asserts that several statutes entitle her to fees on appeal
under RAP 18.1(a), which permits this court to grant attorney fees on appeal “[i]f
applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable attorney fees or
expenses on review.”
Relevant here, RCW 26.18.160 provides: “In any action to enforce a support
or maintenance order under this chapter, the prevailing party is entitled to a
recovery of costs, including an award for reasonable attorney fees.” 	Because
LaMantia is the prevailing party herein, she may recover attorney fees on appeal

No. 86500-5-I/9
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under this statute.5 	And she may recover her attorney fees without showing
financial need. Matter of Marriage of Kaufman, 17 Wn. App. 2d 497, 521, 485 P.3d
991 (2021). We need not reach any other basis of her request for fees.6
III. 	CONCLUSION
We affirm and award LaMantia reasonable attorney fees on appeal subject
to compliance with RAP 18.1(d).
WE CONCUR:
5 RCW 26.18.160 further states that “[a]n obligor may not be considered a
prevailing party under this section unless the obligee has acted in bad faith in
connection with the proceeding in question.” However, as LaMantia is not the
obligor, but the obligee, this limitation does not apply here.
6 Smith’s arguments as to appellate fees appear in his second “supplemental brief,”
which we do not reach. But even if we did, he fails to provide any authority or
justification for fees as required by RAP 10.3(6), and we do not conclude LaMantia
presents baseless claims or engaged in bad-faith litigation tactics.