State of Washington v. Haley K. Buckley

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Appellant,
v.
HALEY K. BUCKLEY,
Respondent.
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No. 37944-2-III
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LAWRENCE-BERREY, A.C.J. — The State appeals the trial court’s sua sponte order
vacating Haley Buckley’s conviction on a plea of guilty to possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver. We reverse.
FACTS
On July 31, 2017, Haley Buckley pleaded guilty in Asotin County to possession of
a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Ms. Buckley was represented by attorney
Robert Van Idour in the criminal proceedings, a lawyer licensed in Idaho but not in
Washington.
Because our record is limited, we include further details about Mr. Van Idour’s
practice of law in Asotin County as related by our Supreme Court in In re Personal
FILED
AUGUST 1, 2023
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

No. 37944-2-III
State v. Buckley
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Restraint of Lewis, which concerned other defendants who had been represented by Mr.
Van Idour in criminal proceedings:
Van Idour declares he was admitted to the Idaho bar in 1980 and had
practiced for over 30 years, including handling hundreds of criminal
defense cases. In 2017, Van Idour began representing clients as a contract
public defender in Asotin County under APR 8 and under the supervision of
attorney Neil P. Cox. Van Idour states that he was notified in 2017 that his
admission by motion requirements were met but that his admission under
APR 8 was not granted.
. . .Van Idour stipulated to the following facts in the Washington
State Bar Association (WSBA) disciplinary complaint: he was admitted to
practice in Idaho and he was never admitted to practice in Washington; he
told the Asotin County Board of Commissioners that he was in the process
of applying for admission in Washington when seeking the county’s
indigent defense contract; in 2017, he applied to WSBA by motion under
APR 3(c); and he was awarded the indigent defense contract, which he
signed on January 29, 2017, requiring him to be a member of WSBA
throughout the term of the contract (February 1, 2017 to January 31, 2018).
Van Idour further stipulated that he was not admitted to practice at
the time he executed the contract and did not gain admission during the
pendency of that contract, in which he represented over 100 clients. On
February 20, 2017, Van Idour applied for limited admission to WSBA
under APR 8(c), which was never approved. . . . On October 26, 2017,
Van Idour was notified that his application for admission under APR 3(c)
was approved and that he was required to take additional steps prior to
gaining admission. A little over a month later, Van Idour received notice
that his APR 8(c) application was denied because he did not meet the
criteria for limited admission under the rule.
Van Idour states that he believed he was authorized to practice in
Asotin County because he had applied for admission under APR 3(c)
and 8(c), and because the court appointed him as counsel in February 2017.
But, Van Idour agreed that neither the pending applications nor the court
appointment actually authorized him to practice and that he should have
confirmed his authorization with WSBA.

No. 37944-2-III
State v. Buckley
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Accordingly, Van Idour stipulated to violating the rules of
professional conduct by practicing law without authorization. WSBA noted
Van Idour’s lack of prior disciplinary record, his character and reputation,
and his remorse as mitigating factors, and noted his lengthy experience was
an aggravator. WSBA imposed the presumptive sanction of suspension.
This court approved and suspended Van Idour for 18 months, enjoining him
from seeking admission to WSBA during that time.
200 Wn.2d 848, 854-56, 523 P.3d 760 (2023).
Order to vacate
On December 28, 2020, Judge Gary Libey sua sponte entered an order vacating
Buckley’s judgment and sentence and ordered the State to refund legal financial
obligations. The order reads in relevant part:
THE COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION FINDS AND ORDERS AS
FOLLOWS;
. . . .
It is undisputed that Robert Van Idour was never a lawyer
admitted to practice in the State of Washington at all times relevant
hereto. As such Mr. Van Idour did not have legal standing to act as Ms.
Buckley’s attorney, and as a consequence she did not have counsel, let
alone effective competent counsel to represent her. This Court finds that
Ms. Buckley did not have counsel as guaranteed by the 6th Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Washington State
Constitution. . . . This Court finds the Judgment and Sentence in this case
to be a grave and manifest injustice to Ms. Buckley.
Pursuant to the inherent authority in the court to correct a substantial
miscarriage of justice, and also pursuant to CrR 7.8 . . . specifically [b] [1],
irregularity in obtaining a judgment and order [lack of counsel], [2] newly
discovered evidence [Ms. Buckley did not have legal counsel] which by due
diligence could not have been discovered by her, [3] misrepresentation by

No. 37944-2-III
State v. Buckley
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the appointment of Mr. Van Idour as her “attorney”, and [5] any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the Judgment and Sentence, ie
a prison sentence without the right to counsel afforded to Ms. Buckley.
Clerk’s Papers at 38-39 (alterations in original).
On January 5, 2021, the State appealed. We stayed the appeal pending the
outcome of Lewis. In Lewis, our Supreme Court concluded that representation by Mr.
Van Idour did not amount to a constitutional denial of counsel because he was a licensed
attorney, albeit an attorney licensed in another state. 200 Wn.2d at 852.
ANALYSIS
The State contends the trial court erred in sua sponte vacating Ms. Buckley’s
conviction. We agree.
In vacating Ms. Buckley’s conviction, the trial court relied on its inherent authority
to correct a substantial miscarriage of justice and on CrR 7.8. While we normally review
decisions to vacate a conviction for an abuse of discretion, we review a claim of
constitutional error underlying the decision de novo. State v. Buckman, 190 Wn.2d 51,
57, 409 P.3d 193 (2018).
On appeal, the State originally raised a number of alleged procedural errors
affecting the court’s order. Our Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis, however, makes
clear that the trial court abused its discretion because it based its decision on a nonexistent

No. 37944-2-111
State v. Buckley
denial of counsel. As with the petitioners in Lewis, when Mr. Van Idour represented Ms.
Buckley, "he was duly licensed to practice law in Idaho. He therefore qualifies as counsel
under the Sixth Amendment [to the United States Constitution]." Lewis, 200 Wn.2d at
871.
Reversed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Lawrence-Berrey, A.~}
WE CONCUR:
Pennell, J. 	Staab, J.
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