State Of Washington, Respondent V. Baudelio David Rojas, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
BAUDELIO DAVID ROJAS,
Appellant.
No. 78717-9-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
L EACH, J. — A jury convicted Baudelio David Rojas of three counts of
domestic violence misdemeanor violation of a no contact order. 	On appeal,
Rojas challenges his conviction claiming he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. 	We agree that his counsel was ineffective. 	But, Rojas did not suffer
prejudice, so we affirm his conviction.
BACKGROUND
In May 2015, Baudelio David Rojas met Alejandra Quintero-Gonzalez and
entered into an “on again/off again relationship.” 	They dated and lived together
for more than one year.
In March 2016, King County Superior Court entered a no contact order
prohibiting Rojas from contacting Quintero-Gonzalez until 2021. 	In October
2016, King County Superior Court entered a second no contact order also
prohibiting Rojas from contacting Quintero-Gonzalez until 2021. 	The orders

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prohibited Rojas from contacting Quintero-Gonzalez “directly, indirectly, in person
or through others, by phone, mail, or electronic means.” The orders included the
following warning:
VIOLATION OF THE ORDER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE UNDER
CHAPTER 26.50 RCW AND WILL SUBJECT A VIOLATOR TO
ARREST; 	ANY 	ASSAULT, 	DRIVE-BY 	SHOOTING, 	OR
RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT THAT IS A VIOLATION OF THIS
ORDER IS A FELONY. You can be arrested even if the person
protected by this order invites or allows you to violate the order’s
prohibitions.
Rojas acknowledged receipt of the no contact orders by signing them.
On September 6, 2017, Quintero-Gonzalez hosted a backyard barbeque
for her brother, sister-in-law, and friends. Around 11:30 p.m., her friends left.
Quintero-Gonzalez, her brother, and her sister-in-law remained in the backyard.
Rojas appeared uninvited and told Quintero-Gonzalez that he needed to talk to
her. Quintero-Gonzalez said that she did not want to talk with him and asked him
to leave. 	She was concerned that Rojas would upset her brother, so she
directed her brother and sister-in-law to go inside the house.
When Quintero-Gonzalez and Rojas were alone in the backyard, she
attempted to go inside the house. 	Then, Rojas grabbed her blouse and pushed
her, causing her to break a fingernail and rip her blouse. 	Rojas threw his cell
phone, breaking a piece of glass on Quintero-Gonzalez’s door. 	When she was
inside, Quintero-Gonzalez called 911. Rojas fled before the police arrived.
The State charged Rojas with domestic violence felony violation of a court
order. 	The police arrested him and placed him in jail. 	While in jail, Rojas and
Quintero-Gonzalez reconciled and began speaking by phone almost daily. From

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September 	to 	November 	2017, 	Rojas 	placed 	approximately 	200 	calls 	to
Quintero-Gonzalez. 	The 	jail 	phone 	system 	recorded 	Rojas 	and 	Quintero-
Gonzalez’s calls. 	During one conversation, Rojas asked Quintero-Gonzalez to
lie about her identity. He told her to pose as a recipient of the phone calls named
“Christina Gonzalez” to defense counsel, and to the court, in order to make it
seem like he had not violated the no contact order.
The 	phone 	calls 	continued 	until 	the 	jail 	blocked 	Rojas 	from 	calling
Quintero-Gonzalez 	in 	November 	2017. 	Then 	Rojas 	communicated 	with
Quintero-Gonzalez through his friend named “Snakes.” 	Snakes told Quintero-
Gonzalez to pretend to be a person named “Christina” and not to show up to
court proceedings.
Based on their September 26, October 3, and October 18 calls, the State
amended the information and charged Rojas with one count of domestic violence
felony 	violation 	of 	a 	no 	contact 	order, 	three 	counts 	of 	domestic 	violence
misdemeanor violation of a no contact order, and one count of tampering with a
witness.
At trial, the court admitted recordings and transcripts of the three phone
calls. 	Sergeant Jennifer Schneider testified the calls were placed using Rojas’s
personal account number and from his assigned housing location. 	Quintero-
Gonzalez testified that she and Rojas were the individuals conversing on the
recordings and she recognized the phone number recorded as hers. 	She also
explained she answered Rojas’s calls because she had feelings for him. 	Each
call contained affectionate language. On September 26, she answered the phone

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with “Baby,” on October 3, she answered the phone with “My sweetie.” On
October 18, after Quintero-Gonzalez answered the phone, Rojas said, “What’s
up sweetie.”
The State offered the March and October 2016 no contact orders as
evidence. 	Defense counsel objected asserting the no contact orders contained
irrelevant and prejudicial information, and that only one of the no contact orders
was necessary for conviction. The court found that the admission of both orders
would not be unduly prejudicial. It admitted both orders finding them probative of
the elements of the crime (whether one or more court order existed and whether
there was a violation of one or more court order).
Later, defense counsel asked the court to redact the checkmark next to
the term “Post Conviction,” redact the term itself, and to redact Finding of Fact 6,
which stated, “[t]he court finds that the defendant’s relationship to a person
protected 	by 	this 	order 	is 	an 	intimate 	partner 	(…former/current 	dating; 	or
former/ 	current 	cohabitants).” 	The 	court 	agreed. 	The 	court 	“specifically
permitted, at defense request, the orders to be redacted to omit, for example,
prior findings by courts of acts of domestic violence.”
The jury hung on the count of domestic violence felony violation of a no
contact 	order, 	convicted 	Rojas 	of 	the 	three 	counts 	of 	domestic 	violence
misdemeanor violation of a no contact order, and acquitted Rojas of tampering
with a witness.
The State retried Rojas for domestic violence felony violation of a no
contact order. 	At the second trial, defense counsel requested redaction of the

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two portions of the no contact order the court redacted in the first trial. 	Defense
counsel also requested redaction of Finding of Fact 5, which stated, “Based upon
the record, both written and oral, the court finds that the defendant has been
charged with, arrested from or convicted of a domestic violence offense. . . and
the court issues this Domestic Violence No-Contact Order under Chapter 10.99
RCW to prevent possible reoccurrence of violence.” 	The court granted defense
counsel’s motion to redact. 	The jury received no contact orders with the term
“Post Conviction” and Finding of Facts 5 and 6 redacted. 	The jury convicted
Rojas of the lesser offense of misdemeanor violation of a court order and
affirmatively answered the domestic violence special verdict.
The court sentenced Rojas to a suspended sentence of zero days in jail
for the first violation of a court order and 364 days in jail on the remaining three
counts of domestic violence misdemeanor violation of a court order.
Shortly after his conviction, Rojas’s trial defense counsel realized that they
failed to request additional redactions in the first trial. 	Rojas claims this error
allowed jurors to consider unfairly prejudicial evidence.
Rojas appeals his conviction and sentence for three counts of domestic
violence misdemeanor violation of a court order from the first trial.
ANALYSIS
Rojas asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 	The Sixth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington
State Constitution guarantee effective assistance of counsel.1 	“The purpose of
1 State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 77, 917 P.2d 563 (1996).

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the requirement of effective assistance of counsel is to ensure a fair and impartial
trial.”2 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel present mixed questions of law
and fact that this court reviews de novo.3 	We examine the entire record to
decide whether the appellant received effective representation and a fair trial.4
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must
show (1) that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable
standard 	and 	(2) but 	for 	defense 	counsel’s 	errors, 	there 	is 	a 	reasonable
probability that the result of the trial would have been different.5 	The failure to
satisfy either part of the analysis defeats the claim.6
Rojas 	asserts 	his 	defense 	counsel’s 	conduct fell 	below an 	objective
standard of reasonable attorney conduct by failing to ask the court to redact
Finding of Fact 5 in the first trial and this “failure was not part of any legitimate
trial tactic.” We agree.
A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome “‘a
strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.’”7 	Counsel’s
2 State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 225, 743 P.2d 816 (1987).
3 State v. Jones, 183 Wn.2d 327, 338-39, 352 P.3d 776 (2015).
4 State v. Hicks, 163 Wn.2d 477, 486, 181 P.3d 831 (2008) (quoting State
v. Ciskie, 110 Wn.2d 263, 284, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988).
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.
2d 674 (1984).
6 State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009); State v.
Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 78, 917 P.2d 563 (1996).
7 State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2009) (quoting Kyllo,
166 Wn.2d at 862).

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performance is not deficient where it can be “‘characterized as legitimate trial
strategy or tactics.’”8
To prove a misdemeanor violation of a no contact order, the State was
required to establish that Rojas (1) knew the existence of a no contact order and
(2) knowingly violated the restraint provisions of the order that prohibited contact
with Quintero-Gonzalez. 	To prove the domestic violence enhancement, the
State 	was 	required 	to 	establish 	that 	Rojas 	and 	Quintero-Gonzalez 	were
“members of the same family or household.”
Defense counsel did not ask the court to redact Finding of Fact 5, which
states, “[t]he court finds that the defendant has been charged with, arrested for or
convicted of a domestic violence offense. . . and the court issues this Domestic
Violence 	No-Contact 	Order 	under 	Chapter 10.99 	RCW 	to 	prevent 	possible
reoccurrence of violence.” 	From Finding of Fact 5, the jury could easily infer a
court previously convicted Rojas of a domestic violence offense and issued a no
contact order, and that Rojas violated that no contract order. 	Defense counsel
should have requested redaction of Finding of Fact 5, or at a minimum, defense
counsel should have requested redaction of the terms “domestic violence” and
“domestic violence offense” from Finding of Fact 5. 	Because defense counsel
acknowledged their mistake and moved to redact Finding of Fact 5 during the
second trial, their failure to do so during the first trial was not a legitimate trial
tactic. 	Defense counsel’s deficient performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.
8 Grier, 171 Wn.2d at 33 (quoting Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 863); Thomas, 109
Wn.2d at 226.

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However, Rojas fails to establish that, but for defense counsel’s errors,
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been
different. A defendant establishes prejudice by showing a reasonable probability
the 	outcome 	of 	the 	proceedings 	would 	have 	been 	different 	had 	counsel’s
performance not been deficient.9 	“A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”10 	“Trial counsel does not
guarantee a successful verdict, and [the trial counsel’s] competency is not
measured by the result.”11
Rojas’s signatures on the no contact orders demonstrate that he knew of
their existence. 	Rojas called Quintero-Gonzalez from jail and contacted her
through Snakes. So, even without Finding of Fact 5, the State easily established
Rojas knowingly violated the no contact orders.
Quintero-Gonzalez’s testimony that she lived with Rojas for about one
year established that she and Rojas were “members of the same family or
household.” 	Quintero-Gonzalez’s 	testified 	that 	she 	answered 	Rojas’s 	calls
because she had feelings for him. Terms of affection were captured in the
telephone transcripts. 	Because this ample evidence supports the jury’s special
verdict 	finding 	without 	consideration 	of 	Finding 	of 	Fact 	5, 	Rojas 	does 	not
establish the outcome of the trial would have been different but for defense
counsel’s deficient performance.
9 State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 332, 337, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
10 Thomas, 109 Wn.2d at 226 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
11 Thomas, 109 Wn.2d at 228-29 (citing State v. Adams, 91 Wn.2d 86, 91,
586 P.2d 1168 (1978); State v. White, 81 Wn.2d 223, 225, 500 P.2d 1242 (1972).

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CONCLUSION
Rojas shows that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request
redaction of Finding of Fact 5 at the first trial. But, Rojas has not shown that but
for his counsel’s deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
trial would have been different. We affirm Rojas’s conviction.
WE CONCUR: