State Of Washington, Respondent, V Francis E. Hickman, Petitioner

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59189-8-II
Respondent,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FRANCIS E. HICKMAN,
Petitioner.
CHE, J. ⎯ Francis Elliott Hickman filed a motion to remit legal financial obligations
(LFOs) from his 1999 judgment and sentence, including the crime victim penalty assessment
(VPA), court costs, court appointed attorney/investigator costs, restitution, and interest on
restitution. The trial court only expressly addressed Hickman’s request regarding the interest on
restitution when it denied Hickman’s motion. Hickman sought discretionary review of the trial
court’s order denying his motion to remit the LFOs. This court granted discretionary review of
issues regarding court costs and the VPA but denied review of any issue regarding restitution.
Hickman argues the trial court abused its discretion in deciding his motion with regard to
nonrestitution LFOs. The State concedes that remand to the trial court for consideration of
nonrestitution LFOs is warranted.
We accept the State’s concession and remand to the trial court to determine whether
waiver or remittance of Hickman’s nonrestitution LFOs is warranted.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
October 28, 2025

No. 59189-8-II
2
FACTS
In 1999, a jury found Hickman guilty of first degree robbery, first degree attempted
assault, second degree kidnapping, two counts of third degree assault, and attempted residential
burglary. The trial court sentenced Hickman to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
The trial court also imposed $24,668.50 in LFOs. The LFOs included $23,358.50 in
restitution, a $500 VPA, $210 in court costs (consisting of $110 court filing fee and $100 jury
demand fee), and $600 in fees for a court appointed attorney/investigator.
In 2023, Hickman filed a motion with the trial court to remit “all Legal Financial
Obligations.”1 CP at 12. Hickman requested remittance pursuant to a list of statutes, including
RCW 7.68.035 and RCW 10.01.160(4). Hickman argued that he was indigent as defined in
RCW 10.101.010(3).2 He also argued that, regarding restitution and its related interest amount,
the record did not include a request for restitution by the victim. Hickman requested that the trial
court order the State to produce “a certified copy of the victim’s request, a certified copy of the
1 Hickman filed two motions with the trial court on the same day: a Motion to Remit [LFOS] and
Interest and a Motion to Strike Court Costs, Restitution and Interest. CP at 10-12, 13-14. The
State and the trial court appear to have considered both motions as one motion. Substantively,
both of Hickman’s motions contain the same contents relevant to this appeal.
2 RCW 10.101.010(3) provides:
(3) “Indigent” means a person who, at any stage of a court proceeding, is:
(a) Receiving [certain] types of public assistance . . .; or
(b) Involuntarily committed to a public mental health facility; or
(c) Receiving an annual income, after taxes, of one hundred twenty-five
percent or less of the current federally established poverty level; or
(d) Unable to pay the anticipated cost of counsel for the matter before the
court because his or her available funds are insufficient to pay any amount for the
retention of counsel.

No. 59189-8-II
3
victim’s assessment, a copy of the order imposing restitution based on the findings of the
assessment, or strike the restitution, and the interest.” CP at 13-14 (capitalization omitted).
In response, the State opposed terminating the nonrestitution principal LFOs, but agreed
to terminate any interest on the nonrestitution LFOs. Regarding restitution LFOs, the State
opposed terminating the principal or reducing any interest.
The trial court denied Hickman’s motion but only addressed Hickman’s request regarding
the restitution interest. Ord. re: Legal Fin. Obligations (Dec. 22, 2023). CP at 19-21. The trial
court denied Hickman’s request because it found that Hickman had not paid the restitution
principal in full.
Hickman sought discretionary review of the trial court’s order denying his motion,
requesting review of the trial court’s decision to deny striking all LFOs.3 Mot. for Discr.
Rev. (Mar. 14, 2024). Our commissioner granted discretionary review only to the issues of
court costs and the VPA but denied review of the restitution issue. Am. Ruling Den. Rev. in
Part, & Grant. Rev. in Part (Aug. 16, 2024).
ANALYSIS
Hickman argues that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding Hickman’s motion to
remit the LFOs.4 Specifically, Hickman asserts that the trial court erred by not finding him
3 Hickman originally filed a notice of appeal of the decision, but this court considered his notice
to have the same effect as a notice for discretionary review pursuant to RAP 5.1(c). Letter from
Derek M. Byrne, Clerk of Ct., to Ryan P. Jurvakainen, Cowlitz County Prosecuting Att’y, and
Francis E. Hickman (Feb. 29, 2024).
4 Hickman also asks us to amend our court’s order denying discretionary review of the trial
court’s decision regarding restitution. However, Hickman did not move for modification of our
commissioner’s ruling. We decline to revisit our court’s decision to deny review of the
restitution issue.

No. 59189-8-II
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indigent and not considering the applicable law or his arguments fairly. The State concedes that,
for the purposes of appeal, Hickman is indigent. The State also agrees with Hickman that the
trial court below failed to address whether it should grant remittance of all court costs and/or
waiver of the VPA. Accordingly, the State concedes that remand to the trial court for
consideration of Hickman’s requests regarding nonrestitution LFOs is warranted here. We
accept the State’s concession.
Hickman moved the trial court to remit his LFOs and cited RCW 7.68.035 and RCW
10.01.160(4) as two bases for his request. Both statutes allowed Hickman to request waiver or
remittance of the VPA and court costs based on Hickman being indigent. RCW 7.68.035
governs VPAs and provides that, upon a defendant’s motion, “the court shall waive any crime
[VPA] imposed prior to July 1, 2023, if” the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the VPA’s
imposition or the defendant does not have the ability to pay the VPA, including if the defendant
is indigent. RCW 7.68.035(5).
RCW 10.01.160(4) allows a defendant, who has been ordered to pay costs and has not
willfully failed to pay, to petition the sentencing court for remission of the payment of costs or
any unpaid portion. The sentencing court may then remit all or part of the amount due, modify
the method of payment, or convert the unpaid costs to community restitution hours if the court is
satisfied that the payment amount due will impose a manifest hardship on the defendant or the
defendant’s immediate family. RCW 10.01.160(4).
Here, the trial court made no finding whether Hickman qualified for waiver or remittance
of nonrestitution LFOs. Accordingly, we accept the State’s concession that remand to the trial
court for consideration of Hickman’s requests regarding the nonrestitution LFOs is warranted.

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CONCLUSION
We remand to the trial court to determine whether waiver or remittance of Hickman’s
nonrestitution LFOs are warranted.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Che, J.
We concur:
Lee, P.J.
Glasgow, J.