Pil Chin Yun, Appellant V. St. Francis Hospital, Et Ano, Respondents

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
PIL CHIN YUN,
Appellant,
v.
ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL,
EMERGENCY ROOM, PROGRESSIVE
CARE UNIT,
Respondent,
ERIC NUSSBAUM,
Defendant.
No. 81695-1-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
APPELWICK, J. — Yun appeals the summary dismissal of his medical
negligence and wrongful death claims against his mother’s healthcare providers.
He failed to provide any expert medical testimony to support his claims. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 9, 2016, Phil Yun’s 93 year old mother entered the emergency
department of St. Francis Hospital in a critically ill and unstable condition. On
August 12, 2016, she passed away due to septic shock and multiorgan system
failure.
In August 2019, Yun filed this wrongful death action claiming that the
medical negligence of St. Francis and emergency room physician Dr. Eric

No. 81695-1-I/2
2
Nussbaum caused his mother’s death.1 During discovery, St. Francis requested
the identification of the expert witnesses Yun intended to have testify at trial. It
also sought the subject matter on which Yun’s experts were expected to testify, a
summary of the grounds for each such opinion, and the production of all reports,
declarations, or other documents those experts generated relating to this case.
Yun did not identify any experts or produce any expert opinions in his discovery
responses.
St. Francis moved for summary judgment, arguing that Yun had no experts
to support his medical negligence claims and lacked standing as a real party in
interest to bring this lawsuit because he was not the personal representative of his
mother’s estate. The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed the
case. Yun moved for reconsideration, which the court denied.
Yun appeals.2
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review summary judgment orders de novo. Hadley v. Maxwell, 144
Wn.2d 306, 310-11, 27 P.3d 600 (2001). Summary judgment is proper when the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material
1 St. Francis did not employ Nussbaum. The record does not indicate if Yun
ever served Nussbaum with the summons and complaint. Nevertheless,
Nussbaum is not a party to this appeal.
2 We note that Yun, who appeared pro se before the trial court, maintains
this appeal with the assistance of an attorney. In Washington, courts “hold pro se
parties to the same standards to which it holds attorneys.” Edwards v. Le Duc,
157 Wn. App. 455, 460, 238 P.3d 1187 (2010).

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fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c);
Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 154 Wn.2d 16, 26, 109 P.3d 805
(2005). We consider all facts and reasonable inferences from them in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. But, we consider only the issues and
evidence the parties called to the trial court’s attention on the motion for summary
judgment. RAP 9.12.
II. Dismissal of Medical Negligence Claim
Chapter 7.70 RCW governs all civil actions based on tort, contract, or
otherwise arising from health care. RCW 7.70.010; Berger v. Sonneland, 144
Wn.2d 91, 109, 26 P.3d 257 (2001). The plaintiff in a medical negligence action
has the burden of proving that an “injury resulted from the failure of a health care
provider to follow the accepted standard of care.” RCW 7.70.030(1). To satisfy
this burden, RCW 7.70.040 requires the plaintiff to prove the following elements:
(1) The health care provider failed to exercise that degree of
care, skill, and learning expected of a reasonably prudent health care
provider at that time in the profession or class to which he or she
belongs, in the state of Washington, acting in the same or similar
circumstances;
(2) Such failure was a proximate cause of the injury
complained of
Moreover, the applicable standard of care as well as proximate cause must
be established by expert testimony, except in those cases where medical facts are
“observable by laypersons and describable without medical training.” Berger, 144
Wn.2d at 110-11. But, a layperson generally cannot observe or describe whether
a particular medical practice is reasonably prudent. See Harris v. Robert C. Groth,
MD, Inc., 99 Wn.2d 438, 449, 663 P.2d 113 (1983).

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Here, Yun concedes that he “did not provide a declaration from an expert”
and does not dispute that he failed to produce any expert testimony to establish
the applicable standard of care or proximate cause to support his claims against
St. Francis. Yun opposed summary judgment on the notion that “expert testimony
might not be a requirement in Washington if the medical malpratice [sic] lawsuit
hinges on ‘Routine’ treatment issues that are within the jury’s common knowledge.”
However, he failed to identify any routine treatment that was observable or
describable to laypersons without medical training. Consequently, Yun needed to
support his claims with expert testimony.
Because Yun did not present any expert testimony, the trial court properly
dismissed this action with prejudice against all defendants. There was no error.
We affirm.3
WE CONCUR:
3 Given our disposition of this matter, we do not address Yun’s remaining
arguments involving the personal representative of his mother’s estate and
standing.