* State Of Washington, Respondent V. Kevin Lars Lundstrom, Appellant

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
KEVIN LARS LUNDSTROM,
Appellant.
No. 86537-4-I
PUBLISHED OPINION
BOWMAN, A.C.J. — Kevin Lars Lundstrom appeals his criminal sentence
for violating a domestic violence protection order (DVPO). He argues a
community custody condition ordering he remain within geographical boundaries
as set forth by the community corrections officer (CCO) is unconstitutionally
vague. We affirm.
FACTS
Lundstrom and A.A. met in 2020. They later began an intimate
relationship and had a child together. The relationship ended around May 2022.
On August 2, 2022, A.A. obtained a DVPO prohibiting Lundstrom from contacting
her or coming within 1,000 feet of her residence. On the evening of October 28,
2023, Lundstrom violated the order by going to A.A.’s home and knocking on her
door. A.A. told Lundstrom to leave, and when he refused, she called the police.
On November 1, 2023, the State charged Lundstrom with felony violation
of the DVPO. A jury convicted Lundstrom as charged. The trial court sentenced
him to 22 months’ imprisonment and 12 months of community custody. In
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No. 86537-4-I/2
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“Appendix H” to the judgment and sentence, the court ordered that Lundstrom
comply with several community custody conditions. Community custody
condition 8 (condition 8) requires that Lundstrom “[r]emain within geographic
boundaries, as set forth in writing by the [CCO] or as set forth with SODA[1]
order.”
Lundstrom appeals.
ANALYSIS
Lundstrom argues that condition 8 mandating his compliance with CCO-
imposed geographical limitations is unconstitutionally vague. We disagree.
We review community custody conditions for abuse of discretion and will
reverse only if they are manifestly unreasonable. State v. Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d
671, 678, 425 P.3d 847 (2018). “A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if it
imposes an unconstitutional community custody condition, and we review
constitutional questions de novo.” State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d 234, 238, 449
P.3d 619 (2019).
Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution, citizens must have fair
warning of proscribed conduct. Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 678. A community
custody condition is unconstitutionally vague if “(1) it does not sufficiently define
the proscribed conduct so an ordinary person can understand the prohibition or
(2) it does not provide sufficiently ascertainable standards to protect against
arbitrary enforcement.” State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d 672, 677, 416 P.3d 712
1 Stay out of drug area.
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No. 86537-4-I/3
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(2018). But a condition “ ‘is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a
person cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point at which his actions
would be classified as prohibited conduct.’ ” Id.2 (quoting State v. Sanchez
Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 793, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010)).
In determining whether a challenged condition “is sufficiently definite so as
to provide fair warning of proscribed conduct,” we do not consider its language in
a vacuum, but in the context in which it is used. See City of Spokane v.
Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 180, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). If persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what the law proscribes, apart from some possible
areas of disagreement, the law is sufficiently definite. State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d
739, 754, 193 P.3d 678 (2008).
Both the sentencing court and the Department of Corrections (DOC) “have
the authority to impose community custody provisions, but the authority arises
from separate statutes.” State v. Ortega, 21 Wn. App. 2d 488, 497, 506 P.3d
1287 (2022); compare RCW 9.94A.703 (providing sentencing court’s authority),
with RCW 9.94A.704 (providing DOC’s authority). Under RCW 9.94A.703(1)(b),
the sentencing court must order that the offender “comply with any conditions
imposed by [DOC] under RCW 9.94A.704.” And under RCW 9.94A.704(3)(b),
DOC must instruct an offender to “[r]emain within prescribed geographical
boundaries.”
Here, the sentencing court complied with that statutory mandate. It
ordered Lundstrom to “[r]emain within geographic boundaries, as set forth in
2 Internal quotation marks omitted.
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No. 86537-4-I/4
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writing by the [CCO] or as set forth with SODA order.” And a person of ordinary
intelligence can understand what the condition proscribes. Its plain language
requires that Lundstrom adhere to any geographic restrictions that a CCO or
SODA order “set[s] forth in writing.”
Lundstrom contends condition 8 is unconstitutionally vague because it
gives a CCO “unfettered discretion to arbitrarily” set geographical boundaries.
He is incorrect. The statutory framework authorizes a CCO to establish and
modify conditions of community custody. RCW 9.94A.704(2)(a). But it limits that
authority to conditions “reasonably related to . . . [t]he crime of conviction, the
offender’s risk of reoffending, or the safety of the community.” See RCW
9.94A.704(7)(b). So, any CCO-imposed geographical limitation must be
reasonably related to one of those categories. And if an offender disagrees with
the validity of a CCO-imposed geographical condition, they may, within a
specified time, “request an administrative review” of the condition. RCW
9.94A.704(7)(b). Those sufficiently ascertainable standards protect against
arbitrary enforcement.
Finally, citing several unpublished cases, Lundstrom argues condition 8
unconstitutionally delegates the court’s discretion to the CCO. See In re Pers.
Restraint of Alaniz, No. 39631-2-III (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2024)
(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/396312_unp.pdf; In re
Pers. Restraint of Bratcher, No. 39758-1-III (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2024)
(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/397581_unp.pdf; State v.
Weeden, No. 85648-1-I (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2025) (unpublished),
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No. 86537-4-I/5
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https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/856481.pdf. But we decline to follow
those cases for two principal reasons.
First, the opinions Lundstrom cites are contrary to the weight of authority.
Between 2012 and 2025, this court issued eight unpublished decisions upholding
community custody conditions meaningfully identical to Lundstrom’s condition.3
Second, the opinions cited by Lundstrom rely on Bahl and State v. Irwin, 191
Wn. App. 644, 364 P.3d 830 (2015).4 Both cases are inapposite here.
In Bahl, our Supreme Court determined a court-imposed community
custody condition ordering that an offender “ ‘not possess or access
pornographic materials, as directed by the supervising [CCO],’ ” was
3 See State v. Moore, No. 59282-7-II, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. July 1, 2025)
(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/59282-7.25.pdf (“ ‘Remain within
geographic boundaries, as set forth in writing by [DOC].’ ”); In re Pers. Restraint of
Strong, No. 59628-8-II, slip op. at 23 (Wash. Ct. App. May 6, 2025) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2059628-8-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion
.pdf (“ ‘[r]emain within geographic boundaries, as set forth in writing by the [DOC] Officer
or as set forth with SODA order’ ”) (alterations in original); In re Pers. Restraint of
Delacruz, No. 55496-8-II, slip op. at 3-4 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2021) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2055496-8-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion
.pdf (“geographical restrictions as ordered by CCO”); In re Pers. Restraint of Rowe, No.
52575-5-II, slip op. at 1, 3 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2020) (unpublished), https://www.
courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2052575-5-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf
(“ ‘Remain within geographic boundary, as set forth in writing by the [CCO].’ ”); State v.
Blake, No. 35601-9-III, slip op. at 8-9 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2019) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/356019_unp.pdf (“remain within prescribed
geographical boundaries as directed by . . . CCO”), reversed on other grounds, 197
Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021); State v. Davis, No. 76747-0-I, slip op. at 8-10 (Wash.
Ct. App. July 31, 2017) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/767470
.PDF (imposing restrictions on “ ‘a specified geographic boundary, to wit: per CCO’ ”);
State v. Landrum, No. 33812-6-III, slip op. at 22 (Wash. Ct. App. June 20, 2017)
(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/338126_unp.pdf (“ ‘Remain within
geographic boundary, as set forth in writing by the [CCO].’ ”); State v. Vanderveer, No.
42665-0-II, noted at 171 Wn. App. 1034, 2012 WL 5503563, at *1 n.4 (“remain within a
geographic boundary set by the CCO”).
4 See Alaniz, No. 39631-2-III, slip op. at 14-15; Bratcher, No. 39758-1-III, slip op.
at 4-6; Weeden, No. 85648-1-I, slip op. at 2-3.
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No. 86537-4-I/6
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unconstitutionally vague. 164 Wn.2d at 743, 758. It noted that several courts
have held sentencing conditions prohibiting access to or possession of
pornography to be unconstitutionally vague because “pornography” has “never
been given a precise legal definition” and is an “ ‘entirely subjective’ ” term. Id. at
754-55 (quoting United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002)).
And that because the term “pornography” was unavoidably vague, directing a
CCO to define it only made “the vagueness problem more apparent, since it
virtually acknowledges that on its face it does not provide ascertainable
standards for enforcement.” Id. at 758. In other words, the court could not cure
the condition’s vagueness by allowing a CCO to provide their own subjective
interpretation of the court’s prohibition.
Then, in Irwin, we applied Bahl to a community custody condition that
states, “ ‘Do not frequent areas where minor children are known to congregate,
as defined by the supervising . . . CCO.’ ” 191 Wn. App. at 649. We described
the prohibition in Bahl as involving “the intractably undefinable term
‘pornography,’ ” and found a similar problem with the condition excluding the
defendant in Irwin from places where “ ‘children are known to congregate.’ ” Id.
at 654-55. We determined that it was “not immediately clear” to the defendant
what places were prohibited, and that “[w]ithout some clarifying language or an
illustrative list of prohibited locations,” the condition did not give ordinary people
sufficient notice to understand the conduct proscribed. Id. And, like in Bahl, we
said that deference to the CCO to define the court-imposed vague prohibition
would “leave the condition vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement.” Id. at 655.
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No. 86537-4-I/7
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This case is different from Bahl and Irwin. Here, the court did not impose
a vague geographical limitation on Lundstrom and then delegate to the CCO the
task of defining the limitation. Indeed, it imposed no geographical limitation.5
Instead, the court complied with its statutory obligation to order Lundstrom to
follow certain conditions that the legislature has authorized the CCO to impose.
See RCW 9.94A.703(1)(b). And one of the conditions the legislature has
determined a CCO must impose on an offender is an order to “[r]emain within
prescribed geographical boundaries.” RCW 9.94A.704(3)(b).
For these reasons, condition 8 is not unconstitutionally vague, and we
affirm.
WE CONCUR:
5 While RCW 9.94A.703(3)(A) gives the sentencing court discretion to impose its
own geographical restriction, the record shows that the court did not exercise that
discretion here. The portion of Appendix H ordering Lundstrom to comply with the
CCO’s geographical limitation is preprinted, and condition 8 is listed among several
other mandatory conditions the court must impose. Appendix H also provides a section
in which the court can impose its own “specified geographical boundary.” But the court
left that section blank.
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