* City Of Seattle, Respondent V. Wayne Evans, Petitioner

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
CITY OF SEATTLE, 	) 	NO. 67816-7-1
r—3 	i !'. ":•
Respondent,
) 	DIVISION ONE
£ 	' ' ''••'•	—,r- 	O "1 i _
v.
) 	PUBLISHED OPINION
WAYNE EVANS,
Petitioner. 	) 	FILED: 	June 30, 2014
Leach, 	J. 	— 	On 	this 	discretionary 	review 	of Wayne 	Evans's 	conviction 	for
unlawful 	use of weapons, we must decide the constitutionality of Seattle Ordinance
12A.14.080 under both article I, section 24 of the Washington State Constitution and the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. 	Evans contends that Seattle's
prohibition 	on 	carrying 	a 	fixed-blade 	knife in public 	violates 	his federal 	and 	state
constitutional right to bear arms. 	Our state Supreme Court's City of Seattle v. Montana1
decision, rejecting 	a similar challenge to the same ordinance under the Washington
Constitution, requires rejection of Evans's state constitutional claim. 	As a matter of first
impression, we hold that as applied in this case, Seattle's prohibition on carrying a fixed-
blade knife in public did not violate Evans's federal constitutional right to bear arms and
affirm his conviction.
129 Wn.2d 583, 919 P.2d 1218 (1996).
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

NO. 67816-7-1/2
FACTS
Seattle Police Officer Michael Conners discovered the knife at issue after a traffic
stop. 	Conners stopped Evans for speeding. 	The smell of marijuana, coupled with
furtive movements by Evans and his passenger, made Conners apprehensive about his
own safety. 	He directed Evans to get out of the vehicle and asked Evans if he had any
weapons on him.
Evans told Conners that he had a knife in his front right pants pocket. 	Conners
took from that pocket a fixed-blade kitchen knife in a plastic sheath. 	Conners arrested
Evans for possessing a fixed-blade knife. 	Evans said that he had been "jumped" before
in the same neighborhood and that he carried the knife for protection.
The city of Seattle (City) charged Evans under Seattle Municipal Code (SMC)
12A. 14.080, which makes it unlawful to carry a dangerous knife. 	Evans challenged the
constitutionality of this ordinance in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision
in 	District of Columbia v. 	Heller.2 	The trial 	court rejected 	this challenge. 	A jury
convicted Evans as charged. 	Evans appealed to the superior court, which affirmed his
conviction.
Evans petitioned this court for discretionary review. 	On October 10, 2012, we
granted Evans's motion for discretionary review of his conviction "to the extent that he
challenges the constitutionality of Seattle Municipal Code 12A. 14.080."
2554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008).
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NO. 67816-7-1/3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review constitutional issues de novo.3 	"This court will presume a legislative
enactment constitutional and, if possible, construe an enactment so as to render it
constitutional."4 	Because this case does not involve First Amendment freedoms, we
determine only if SMC 12A. 14.080 is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this
case.5
ANALYSIS
Evans claims that SMC 12A.14.080 unconstitutionally infringes upon his right to
bear arms under article I, section 24 of the Washington Constitution and the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 	This ordinance makes it unlawful for a
person 	knowingly to "[cjarry concealed 	or unconcealed 	on 	his 	or her 	person 	any
dangerous knife, or carry concealed on his or her person any deadly weapon other than
a firearm."6 	A "dangerous knife" is "any fixed-blade knife and any other knife having a
blade more than three and one-half inches (3 1/2") in length."7 	A "fixed-blade knife"
includes "any knife, regardless of blade length, with a blade which is permanently open
and does not fold, retract or slide into the handle of the knife, and includes any dagger,
sword, bayonet, bolo knife, hatchet, axe, straight-edged razor, or razor blade not in a
package, dispenser or shaving appliance."8
3 State v. Jorqenson, 179 Wn.2d 145, 150, 312 P.3d 960 (2013) (citing State v.
Sieves, 168 Wn.2d 276, 281, 225 P.3d 995 (2010)).
4 Jorqenson, 179 Wn.2d at 150 (citing Montana, 129 Wn.2d at 589-90).
5 State v. Carver, 113 Wn.2d 591, 599, 781 P.2d 1308 (1989) (citing State v.
Worrell, 111 Wn.2d 537, 541, 761 P.2d 56 (1988)).
6 SMC 12A.14.080(B).
7 SMC 12A.14.010(C).
8SMC12A.14.010(D).
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

NO. 67816-7-1/4
The ordinance includes the following exemptions:
A. A licensed hunter or licensed fisherman actively engaged in hunting
and fishing activity including education and travel related thereto; or
B. Any person 	immediately engaged 	in an 	activity related to a 	lawful
occupation which commonly requires the use of such knife, provided
such knife is carried unconcealed; provided further that a dangerous
knife carried 	openly in a 	sheath suspended from the waist 	of the
person is not concealed within the meaning of this subsection;
C. Any person carrying such knife in a secure wrapper or in a tool box
while traveling from the place of purchase, from or to a place of repair,
or from or to such person's home or place of business, or in moving
from one (1) place of abode or business to another, or while in such
person's place of abode or fixed place of business.191
Article I, section 24 of the Washington Constitution provides, "The right of the
individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired,
but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations
to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men." 	The Second Amendment to
the United States Constitution states, "A well regulated militia being necessary to the
security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed."
"Where feasible, we 	resolve constitutional questions first under our own state
constitution before turning to federal law.10 	Evans invites us to apply recent United
States Supreme Court Second Amendment jurisprudence to reject the Washington
Supreme Court's interpretation of article I, section 24. 	This invitation ignores our state
9SMC12A.14.100.
10 Jorqenson, 179 Wn.2d at 152.
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NO. 67816-7-1/5
Supreme Court's binding determination "that the state and federal rights to bear arms
have different contours and mandate separate interpretation."11
In 	Montana, 	our Supreme 	Court 	addressed 	a 	similar 	challenge 	to 	SMC
12A. 14.080 under article 	I, 	section 24. 	The four justices signing the lead opinion
concluded that this ordinance does not violate the state constitution because it is a
"reasonable police regulation."12 	Two justices concurred in the result on the basis that
the defendants' "ordinary knives" were not "arms" for purposes of article I, section 24
and considered 	it 	unwise 	"to 	speculate about the boundaries of the 'reasonable
regulation' limit on the constitutional right to bear arms in self-defense."13 	Three other
justices 	agreed 	that the 	defendants' 	knives 	were 	not 	arms 	but 	believed 	that 	the
ordinance unreasonably restricted a citizen's state constitutional right to carry arms for
self-defense.14 	Montana did not involve a challenge under the Second Amendment.
When a divided court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of a majority, the narrowest ground upon which a majority agreed
represents 	the 	court's 	holding.15 	Applying 	this 	rule, 	the 	narrow decision 	that the
defendants' "ordinary knives" were not "arms" for purposes of article I, section 24,
represents Montana's holding. 	Evans offers no meaningful distinction between his knife
and 	those 	at issue 	in 	Montana. 	Although 	the 	City does not 	respond 	to 	Evans's
argument that his knife qualifies as "arms," this failure does not alter the precedential
11 Jorqenson, 179 Wn.2d at 152.
12 Montana, 129 Wn.2d at 599.
13 Montana, 129 Wn.2d at 599-600.
14 Montana, 129 Wn.2d at 600-01.
15 State v Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 775, 224 P.3d 751 (2009).
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

NO. 67816-7-1/6
authority of Montana. 	Therefore, Evans's knife was not "arms" for purposes of article I,
section 24 and was not afforded any protected status.
We 	next turn to 	Evans's Second Amendment challenge. 	Primarily, he 	relies
upon Heller, decided after our Supreme Court decided Montana. 	There, the United
States 	Supreme 	Court struck down 	a 	District 	of Columbia 	ordinance 	prohibiting
possession 	of handguns 	in 	the 	home, 	declaring 	that the 	Second 	Amendment
guarantees "the right of law-abiding, 	responsible citizens to use arms in defense of
hearth and home."16 	This right applies to states through the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.17
However, the Heller Court qualified its decision, emphasizing that "since this
case represents this Court's first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one
should not expect it to clarify the entire field."18 The Court also stated,
[Njothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications
on the commercial sale of arms.1191
Since the Supreme 	Court decided 	Heller, 	it 	has not defined 	the full 	scope of an
individual's Second Amendment right.
16 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
17 McDonald v. Citv of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050, 177 L. Ed.
2d 894 (2010); Sieves, 168 Wn.2d at 291 (Second Amendment protects an individual
right to 	bear arms from 	state 	interference through 	the due 	process 	clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
18 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
19 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

NO. 67816-7-1/7
As a result, state courts and lower federal courts have struggled to decide the
extent, if any, that Second Amendment rights extend beyond the home.20 	We assume,
for purposes of this opinion, that the Second Amendment right to bear arms includes
some right to bear arms outside of the home for purposes of self-defense.21 	We also
assume that Evans's knife qualifies as "arms" under the Second Amendment.
In 	Heller, 	the Supreme Court "declinfed] to establish a level of scrutiny for
evaluating Second Amendment restrictions."22 	It reasoned, "Under any of the standards
of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the
home 'the most preferred firearm in the nation to "keep" and use for protection of one's
home and family,' would fail constitutional muster."23 	The Court rejected a "rational
20 	The 	Second, 	Third, 	and 	Fourth 	Circuits 	have 	assumed 	the 	Second
Amendment has some application outside the home, without deciding the issue. 	See
Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalskv v. County of Westchester,
701 	F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir.
2013). 	Those courts concluded, however, that because Heller described the "core" of
the right to bear arms as the "right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in
defense of hearth and home," Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, any right of armed self-defense
outside the home would be outside the "core" of the Second Amendment. 	Drake, 724
F.3d at 430-31; Kachalskv, 701 F.3d at 93-94; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876. 	The Seventh
and 	Ninth Circuits have disagreed with that analysis. 	After reviewing the historical
record, those courts found that the "core" of the Second Amendment right extends to
armed self-defense outside the home. 	Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144,
1166 	(9th 	Cir. 	2014); 	Moore 	v. 	Madigan, 	702 	F.3d 	933, 	936-37 	(7th 	Cir. 	2012).
Accordingly, 	both 	courts 	concluded 	that 	the 	firearms 	regulations 	at 	issue 	were
unconstitutional without reference to a level of scrutiny. 	Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1175-76;
Moore, 702 F.3d at 941.
21 	See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1155 ("[Mjany of the same cases that the Heller
majority invoked as proof that the Second Amendment secures an individual right may
just as easily be cited for the proposition that the right to carry in case of confrontation
means nothing if not the general right to carry a common weapon outside the home for
self-defense.").
22 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.
23 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29 (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Parker v.
District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
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NO. 67816-7-1/8
basis 	scrutiny" 	as 	too 	low 	a 	standard24 	and 	also 	rejected 	an "interest-balancing"
approach.25
The level of scrutiny (if any) applicable to an arms restriction challenged under
the Second Amendment remains unsettled.26 Evans argues that we should apply strict
scrutiny, but he fails to cite any authority establishing this as the appropriate standard.
Following 	Heller, 	courts 	have 	generally 	applied 	intermediate 	scrutiny 	to evaluate
Second Amendment restrictions.27 	We apply intermediate scrutiny to evaluate SMC
12A.14.080 under the Second Amendment.28
24 Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 n.27.
25 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35. 	The court reasoned,
We 	know 	of 	no 	other 	enumerated 	constitutional 	right 	whose 	core
protection 	has been 	subjected 	to a freestanding 	"interest-balancing"
approach. 	The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of
government—even 	the Third 	Branch 	of Government—the 	power 	to
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting
upon. 	A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges' assessments
of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.
26 Jorqenson, 179 Wn.2d at 159.
27 See Jorqenson, 179 Wn.2d at 160-61 (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold
statute limiting person's right to possess arms when charged with a serious offense);
Drake, 724 F.3d at 436-40 (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold 	requirement of
"justifiable need" to carry handgun in public); Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989-
91 	(D.C. Cir. 2013) (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold prohibition 	on person
convicted 	of misdemeanor from 	possessing a firearm); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876
(applying 	intermediate 	scrutiny 	to 	uphold 	requirement 	of 	"good 	and 	substantial
reason" for a permit to carry, wear, or transport a handgun in public); Heller v. District
of 	Columbia, 	670 	F.3d 	1244, 	1256-57, 	1261-62 	(D.C. 	Cir. 	2011) 	(applying
intermediate 	scrutiny 	to statutes 	requiring 	registration 	of firearms 	and 	prohibiting
assault 	weapons); 	United States 	v. 	Booker, 644 	F.3d 	12, 	25-26 	(1st Cir. 	2011)
(applying 	intermediate 	scrutiny 	to law 	prohibiting 	domestic 	violence misdemeanor
offender from 	possessing 	a firearm), 	cert, denied, 132 S. Ct. 	1538 (2012); 	United
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Skoien,
614 F3d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2010) 	(same), 	cert, denied, 131 S. Ct. 	1674 (2011);
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to uphold statute prohibiting possession of handgun with an obliterated serial
number), cert, denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 ft>ni1V United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792,
802 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold law prohibiting possession
of firearm by person subject to domestic violence protection order), cert, denied, 131 S.
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NO. 67816-7-1/9
"A law survives intermediate scrutiny if it is substantially related to an important
government 	purpose."29 	Phrased 	differently, 	a 	Seattle 	ordinance 	burdening 	an
individual's Second Amendment rights "passes constitutional muster if it is substantially
related to the achievement of an important government interest."30
Evans 	contends 	that 	SMC 	12A. 14.080 	is 	unconstitutional 	even 	applying
intermediate scrutiny because this ordinance has no temporal limitation, Evans carried
the knife for self-defense purposes, and Evans was not "untrustworthy." 	But public
safety and crime prevention are compelling government interests.31 	In Montana, the
court determined,
SMC 	12A.14.080 furthers 	a 	substantial 	public interest in safety,
addressing the threat posed 	by knife-wielding 	individuals 	and those
disposed 	to 	brawls 	and quarrels, 	through 	reducing 	the 	number 	and
availability of fixed-blade knives in public places in Seattle. 	It addresses
the reality of life in our state's largest city, where at all hours residents
must step outside their homes and workplaces and mingle with numerous
Ct. 2476 (2011); United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1171-72 (W.D. Tenn.
2009) 	(applying 	intermediate 	scrutiny 	and 	upholding 	federal 	felon-in-possession
statute); People v. Mitchell, 209 Cal. App. 4th 1364, 1374, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 33 (2012)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold statute prohibiting carrying concealed dirk or
dagger) 	review denied (Jan. 23, 2013). 	But see United States v. Enqstrum, 	609 F.
Supp. 	2d 	1227, 	1231-35 (D. 	Utah 2009) (applying strict scrutiny to 	law prohibiting
domestic violence offenders from possessing firearms).
28 Jorqenson, 179 Wn.2d at 160-62. Although the court in Jorqenson applied this
standard on the basis that the firearm restriction at issue was limited in the scope of
affected persons and its duration, we conclude that the ordinance at issue here is a
limited restriction applying only to certain types of knives. 	Thus, intermediate scrutiny is
appropriate.
29 Jorqenson, 179 Wn.2d at 162 (citing Sieves, 168 Wn.2d at 294 n.18).
30 Kachalskv, 701 F.3d at 96.
31 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-50, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d
697(1987).
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

NO. 67816-7-1/10
strangers in public places. 	Unfortunately, street crime involving knives is a
daily risk.'32!
Evans relies upon Moore v. Madiqan.33 where the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit stated, "Heller repeatedly invokes a broader Second Amendment
right than the right to have a gun in one's home, as when it says that the amendment
'guarantee^] 	the 	individual 	right 	to 	possess 	and 	carry 	weapons 	in 	case 	of
confrontation.' 	Confrontations are not limited to the home." 	The court in Moore struck
down an Illinois law that prohibited carrying guns in public, with limited exceptions. 	The
court explained,
A blanket prohibition on carrying gun[s] in public prevents a person
from defending himself anywhere except inside his home .... Illinois has
lots of options for protecting its people from being shot without having to
eliminate all possibility of armed self-defense in public.
Remarkably, Illinois is the only state that maintains a flat ban on
carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home.'341
Here, SMC 12A. 14.080 does not "eliminate all possibility of armed self-defense in
public." 	It does not destroy the right to bear arms in public under the guise of regulating
it.35 	This ordinance prohibits carrying a concealed or unconcealed dangerous knife or
carrying a 	concealed deadly weapon. 	It does 	not 	ban all knives, 	nor does it ban
firearms. 	Therefore, Moore does not support Evans's position.
32 Montana, 129 Wn.2d at 592-93; see also State v. Spencer, 75 Wn. App. 118,
124, 876 P.2d 939 (1994) ("People have a strong interest in being able to use public
areas without fearing for their lives.").
33 702 F.3d 933, 935-36 (7th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 592).
34 Moore, 702 F.3d at 940 (citation omitted).
35 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29.
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NO. 67816-7-1/11
Because SMC 12A. 14.080 is substantially related to Seattle's important interest
in public safety, we hold that it survives intermediate scrutiny. 	This ordinance limits the
availability of fixed-blade knives in public places while including adequate exemptions to
limit its effect on innocent conduct.
CONCLUSION
Because Evans fails to show that prohibiting him from carrying a concealed fixed-
blade kitchen knife in public violates his right to bear arms under either article I, section
24 of the Washington State Constitution or the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution, we affirm his conviction.
WE CONCUR:
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-11-