State Of Washington, Respondent V. Rylend Farris, Appellant

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FILED
10/7/2024
Court of Appeals
Division |
State of Washington

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

No. 85718-5-I
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DIVISION ONE
Respondent,
ORDER DENYING MOTION
V. FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
WITHDRAWING AND
RYLEND FARRIS, SUBSTITUTING OPINION
Appellant.

Appellant Rylend Farris filed a motion to reconsider a portion of the opinion
filed on July 15, 2024, in the above case. The panel has determined that the motion
for reconsideration should be denied. The panel has also determined that the
opinion in the above-entitled case filed on July 15, 2024 should be withdrawn and a
substitute unpublished opinion be filed.

Now, therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that the opinion filed on July 15, 2024 is withdrawn and a

substitute unpublished opinion shall be filed.

FOR THE COURT:

No. 85718-5-I/2
Díaz, J.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
RYLEND FARRIS,
Appellant.
No. 85718-5-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHUNG, J. — Rylend Farris challenges his sentence on his conviction for
residential burglary. Farris’s offender score, which was used to determine his
sentence, included two juvenile adjudications. On appeal, Farris claims the
juvenile adjudications should have been excluded, arguing that because a
statutory amendment removing juvenile dispositions from a person’s offender
score went into effect in July 2023, before his sentencing in August 2023, the
amendment applies to his sentence. Under RCW 9.94A.345 and the savings
clause, RCW 10.01.040, the law that applies to sentencing is the law in effect at
the time of the offense. The plain language of the 2023 amendment conveys no
legislative intent that it applies retroactively, and the amendment does not alter
the calculation of his offender score. We therefore affirm Farris’s sentence.
FACTS
Farris pleaded guilty to one count of residential burglary committed while
on community custody. In his statement on plea of guilty, Farris wrote, “On

No. 85718-5-I/2
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January 5, 2023 in Snohomish County, WA I did unlawfully enter and remain in a
dwelling. . . and did commit a theft of clothing from the dwelling.” The State
calculated an offender score of seven, including two juvenile offenses, theft in the
first degree and promoting prostitution in the first degree. At his May 4, 2023
hearing on the guilty plea, Farris acknowledged this offender score and the
parties agreed to a sentencing recommendation of 43 months of incarceration.
The court accepted the guilty plea and set sentencing for June 1, 2023. The court
subsequently granted a motion to continue the sentencing to August 3, 2023.
Between the court’s acceptance of Farris’s guilty plea and the August
2023 sentencing, a new amendment to RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b), part of the
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), went into effect. See L AWS OF 2023, ch. 415 (H.B.
1324). Effective July 23, 2023, the amendment removes the majority of prior
juvenile convictions from the calculation of offender scores. In his sentencing
memorandum and at his sentencing hearing, Farris argued the amendment
should apply prospectively to reduce his offender score and standard range
sentence. The trial court disagreed and counted the juvenile offenses for an
offender score of seven with a standard range of 43-57 months. The court
sentenced Farris to the originally agreed recommendation of 43 months of
incarceration, the low end of the standard range.
Farris appeals.
DISCUSSION
Farris challenges his sentence, arguing the court wrongly included his
juvenile convictions in his offender score calculation. According to Farris, the

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plain language of RCW 9.94A.525(1) mandates that the court calculate the
offender score by counting prior convictions as of the date of sentencing and,
therefore, the court has no authority to include most juvenile convictions in
sentencings occurring after July 23, 2023. We disagree.
Farris’s claim requires us to engage in statutory construction, which is a
question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 346, 68 P.3d
282 (2003). We “give effect to the intent of the legislature, and where the
language of a statute is clear, legislative intent is derived from the language of
the statute alone.” Id. We discern the plain meaning of a statutory provision from
the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute, related
provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572,
578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009). If unambiguous, a statute’s plain language “provides
the beginning and the end of the analysis.” State v. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d 708, 714,
487 P.3d 482 (2021). A statute is unambiguous when not susceptible to more
than one interpretation. Id.
RCW 9.9A.525 establishes the guidelines for calculation of the offender
score. For the purposes of the offender score, “[a] prior conviction is a conviction
which exists before the date of sentencing for the offense for which the offender
score is being computed.” RCW 9.9A.525(1)(a). Farris reads this to mandate that
the version of this statute that applies to his sentence is the version in effect on
the date of sentencing, rather than the date of the offense—i.e., the amended
version of RCW 9.9A.525(1)(b) that excludes his prior juvenile adjudications from
the calculation of his offender score.

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Farris is incorrect. RCW 9.9A.525(1) defines “prior conviction” for the
purposes of calculating the offender score. This definition pertains to which
convictions factor into the offender score, not what law applies to the calculation.
RCW 9.94A.345 governs which version of the SRA applies to determine a
sentence and explicitly states: “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any
sentence imposed under this chapter shall be determined in accordance with the
law in effect when the current offense was committed.” As our Supreme Court
held in Jenks, “RCW 9.94A.345 clearly commands that sentences imposed under
‘this chapter’—the SRA—be imposed under the law in effect at the time of the
crime.” 197 Wn.2d at 715. Thus, RCW 9.94A.345 requires Farris to be sentenced
under the statute in effect when he committed the crime in January 2023.
In addition to the unambiguous language of RCW 9.94A.345, the savings
clause statute prevents application of the amended sentencing statute to Farris’s
sentencing. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 719; State v. Troutman, 30 Wn. App. 2d 592,
594, 546 P.3d 458 (2024). The savings clause states:
Whenever any criminal or penal statute shall be amended or
repealed, all offenses committed or penalties or forfeitures incurred
while it was in force shall be punished or enforced as if it were in
force, notwithstanding such amendment or repeal, unless a
contrary intention is expressly declared in the amendatory or
repealing act, and every such amendatory or repealing statute shall
be so construed as to save all criminal and penal proceedings, and
proceedings to recover forfeitures, pending at the time of its
enactment, unless a contrary intention is expressly declared
therein.
RCW 10.01.040. This savings clause is read into every repealing or amending
penal statute. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 719; State v. Ross, 152 Wn.2d 220, 237, 95
P.3d 1225 (2004); RCW 10.01.040. Under the terms of this statute, the

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sentencing court was required to sentence Farris under the law in effect at the
time he committed the offense unless a contrary intent was indicated by the
legislature. The legislature is not required to explicitly state its intent for an
amendment to apply retroactively to pending prosecutions. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at
720. Intent need only be expressed in words that “fairly convey that intention.”
Ross, 152 Wn.2d at 238 (quoting State v. Kane, 101 Wn. App. 607, 612, 5 P.3d
741 (2000)).
Farris argues the statutory amendment’s statement of intent “uses strong
words that convey the legislature’s intent to eliminate sentencing standards that
automatically increase a person’s punishment based on their actions as a child.”
The intent section states:
The legislature intends to:
(1) Give real effect to the juvenile justice system’s express goals of
rehabilitation and reintegration;
(2) Bring Washington in line with the majority of states, which do
not consider prior juvenile offenses in sentencing range calculations
for adults;
(3) Recognize the expansive body of scientific research on brain
development, which shows that adolescent’s perception, judgment,
and decision making differs significantly from that of adults;
(4) Facilitate the provision of due process by granting the
procedural protections of a criminal proceeding in any adjudication
which may be used to determine the severity of a criminal
sentence; and
(5) Recognize how grave disproportionality within the juvenile legal
system may subsequently impact sentencing ranges in adult court.
L AWS OF 2023, ch. 415, § 1. But as we observed in Troutman, the plain language
of this section “says nothing about retroactivity.” 30 Wn. App. 2d at 599.
Therefore, the savings clause applies to Farris’s sentence.1
1 Farris also claims the savings clause does not change his analysis because “the offender
score statute required the court to calculate the offender score at the time of sentencing, even

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Finally, Farris contends the statutory amendment applies prospectively to
his pending case because it is remedial. Remedial statutes relate to practice,
procedure, or remedies, and do not affect a substantive right. State v. Pillatos,
159 Wn.2d 459, 473, 150 P.3d 1130 (2007). However, our Supreme Court has
“repeatedly made clear that changes to criminal punishments are substantive,
not procedural.” Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 721 (citing State v. Smith, 144 Wn.2d 665,
674, 30 P.3d 1245 (2001) (changing the meaning of the term “criminal history” in
the SRA was a substantive change)). Moreover, “even a remedial amendment
will be applied prospectively only if it contradicts a previous interpretation of the
amended statute by this court,” Pillatos¸159 Wn.2d at 473, and Farris makes no
argument to satisfy this requirement.
The law that governs Farris’s sentence is the law in effect at the time he
committed his offense. The statutory amendment restricting inclusion of juvenile
offenses in the offender score was enacted after Farris committed his offense
and does not govern the calculation of his offender score. At the time of his
sentencing, Farris had two juvenile and five adult felony prior convictions,
amounting to an offender score of seven. The trial court properly calculated the
offender score for purposes of sentencing Farris.
Affirmed.
before the legislature amended it” such that “[t]he amendment did not change the date of
calculation; it only removed certain offenses from that calculation.” Farris is correct that the
amendment does not change the requirement in RCW 9.94A.525(1) that the offender score is
calculated as of the date of sentencing. Farris also argues that HB 1324 should apply to his
sentence because it is pending on appeal, and the “triggering event” for the offender score statute
is sentencing. However, as discussed above, RCW 9.94A.345 of the SRA and the savings clause,
RCW 10.01.040, together unambiguously mandate that the date of the offense determines the law
that the sentencing court must apply at the time of sentencing. Therefore, Farris’s arguments are
unavailing.

No. 85718-5-I/7
Chung, J.
WE CONCUR:
Díaz, J.
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