Jeffrey Kirkwood, Appellant V. Matthew Engelbrecht, Respondent

Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
JEFFREY ROBERT KIRKWOOD,
Appellant,
v.
MATTHEW PAUL ENGELBRECHT,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 81375-7-I
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ANDRUS, A.C.J. – Jeffrey Kirkwood accused his ex-wife’s husband, Matthew
Engelbrecht, of molesting his pre-teen daughter, J.K. Jeffrey1 filed a petition for a
domestic violence protection order to preclude Matthew from having any contact
with J.K. or Jeffrey’s other two minor children. The court, after conducting a multi-
day evidentiary hearing, denied the petition, finding insufficient credible evidence
to establish that the alleged domestic violence occurred. Jeffrey appeals the denial
order.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jeffrey’s
request to call J.K. to testify in person. 	We further conclude the court’s written
findings of fact were sufficient to meet the requirements of RCW 26.50.060. As to
Jeffrey’s remaining arguments, we cannot or will not address them because he
1 For clarity, we will refer to the parties by their first names. No disrespect is intended.

No. 81375-7-I/2
- 2 -
failed to provide us with the complete record on which the trial court relied or asks
us to overturn credibility determinations. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Jeffrey has three children with Katrina Engelbrecht, J.K., and two younger
sons, D.K. and A.K.2 	Jeffrey and Katrina divorced in 2013, and Jeffrey has had
custody of the three children since sometime in 2017. 	Katrina married Matthew,
with whom she shares an infant son, O.E. 	Matthew also has a young son, T.E.,
from a prior relationship.
Jeffrey contends that on May 6, 2018, J.K. called him while on a weekend
trip to Leavenworth with Katrina, Matthew, and the four other children. 	J.K.
allegedly told Jeffrey that Matthew “would not keep his hands off her.” 	J.K. also
allegedly reported to her father that she and Matthew shared a bed on the trip and
that Matthew put his legs over her in bed and massaged her back, all the way down
to her tailbone, asking her if she liked it. J.K. also told Jeffrey that she had been
in the hotel hot tub the previous evening with Matthew and that, the next morning,
she had allegedly received a note from another hotel occupant, who had seen J.K.
and Matthew together in the hot tub. 	The note, which Jeffrey attached to his
petition, instructed J.K. to seek help from an adult if she felt uncomfortable.
On May 8, 2018, J.K. went to an appointment with her counselor, Mya
Adams. 	According to Adams’s treatment notes, J.K. reported feeling “very
uncomfortable” with Matthew, describing situations where he touched her hair,
rubbed her back, had her sit in his lap, and told her she was “so pretty.” 	When
2 At the time of the alleged incident, J.K. was 12 years old, D.K. was 9, and A.K. was 7.

No. 81375-7-I/3
- 3 -
Adams met with J.K. and Jeffrey, he expressed concerns to her that Matthew was
“groom[ing]” J.K. Adams reported J.K.’s statements to CPS.
CPS referred the matter to the Providence St. Peter Sexual Assault Clinic
and Child Maltreatment Center. On May 23, 2018, J.K. was evaluated by Heather
McLeod, an advanced registered nurse practitioner at the clinic.3 	According to
McLeod’s report, J.K. reported that she had slept in the same bed as Matthew,
during which he had touched her sexually and told her she was gorgeous. 	J.K.
also told McLeod that when in the hotel hot tub, Matthew had pulled her onto his
lap, leading a stranger to advise her to find someone to talk to if his touching made
her uncomfortable. 	McLeod recommended that J.K. and her siblings have no
contact with Engelbrecht while the investigation of J.K.’s sexual abuse allegations
was underway.
On May 21, 2018, Jeffrey filed the petition for a domestic violence protection
order against Katrina and Matthew. 	A commissioner entered a temporary
protection order against Matthew as to all three of Jeffrey and Katrina’s children
but denied it as against Katrina. 	The court renewed the temporary order on
multiple occasions pending a full hearing.
We do not have the full transcript of the evidentiary hearing conducted by
the court or a complete set of exhibits the court admitted during the hearing. What
Jeffrey chose to provide us indicates that the court heard testimony from McLeod
on September 19, 2018, and from Matthew and from Katrina’s mother, Christine
3 This report was originally filed under the cause number for the divorce matter between Katrina
and Jeffrey.

No. 81375-7-I/4
- 4 -
Del Buono, on October 18, 2018. Although the court noted that both Katrina and
Jeffrey testified, we do not have transcripts of their testimony.
McLeod testified she interviewed J.K. and conducted a sexual assault
assessment. J.K. told McLeod she had traveled with her mother and stepfather to
Leavenworth, that the family had shared a single hotel room, and that she had
slept in the same bed as Matthew because there were so many people in the room.
J.K. recounted that on the second night in the hotel room, Matthew gave her a
neck and back massage and touched her under her underwear. 	J.K. drew a
diagram for McLeod on an anatomical diagram of a female child indicating the
areas Matthew had touched, including her shoulders, back, buttocks, and legs.
J.K. also told McLeod that Matthew had touched her under her t-shirt, under her
bra, and on her buttocks and the front of her thighs over her shorts.
J.K. reported that Matthew had repeatedly pulled her back toward his lap
and wrapped his legs around the bottom half of her body while they were in the
bed together. And McLeod described J.K.’s statements that Matthew “repeatedly
told her she was beautiful and played with her hair.” 	J.K. told McLeod that she
thought Matthew had tried to kiss her head or neck but she moved away from him
to prevent it from happening. 	McLeod opined that the behaviors J.K. described
were consistent with “grooming,” conduct intended to normalize sexual touching.
McLeod also testified that J.K. described being in the hotel hot tub with
Matthew during that same weekend. J.K. told McLeod that while sitting in the hot
tub, Matthew pulled her in front of him onto his lap so that her hips and buttocks
were in his groin area. 	McLeod also described J.K.’s report of receiving a note

No. 81375-7-I/5
- 5 -
from a hotel guest advising J.K. to tell someone if she was being touched
inappropriately.
When McLeod asked why J.K. did not report Matthew’s behavior to her
mother, J.K. said she was afraid her mother would believe she was “just trying to
cause trouble.” McLeod opined that J.K. provided “very clear and consistent detail
about not only the environment that she was in but the way that she felt and the
issues that had occurred.” 	J.K. had, in her opinion, the vocabulary sufficient to
express what she was thinking and what had happened to her. 	McLeod saw no
“red flags” to suggest Jeffrey or anyone else was coaching J.K. in responding to
her questions. Based on her assessment, McLeod testified that prolonged contact
between J.K. and Matthew would be deleterious to J.K.’s health and safety.
On cross examination by Matthew’s attorney, McLeod stated she was
aware that Child Protective Services (CPS) had issued a “founded” finding for
physical abuse of J.K. and her brother by Matthew. She was not aware, however,
that Jeffrey had previously used that report to seek a protection order, which the
trial court had denied. Nor was McLeod aware of a domestic violence evaluation
Jeffrey had undergone that documented a “long-standing pattern of abusive
behavior” toward Katrina. 	She also was unaware that the domestic violence
evaluator had expressed concerns that Jeffrey’s contempt for his former wife would
impact the emotional and psychosocial development of the children.
Matthew testified that he and Katrina planned the trip to Leavenworth with
the five children after the court denied Jeffrey’s prior petition for a protection order
and allowed them to resume unsupervised visits with Katrina and Jeffrey’s three

No. 81375-7-I/6
- 6 -
children. The plan was for Matthew to sleep in one of the room’s two beds with his
son, T.E., for Katrina to sleep in the other bed with her boys, for J.K. to sleep on a
rollaway bed, and for the youngest child, O.E., to sleep in his playpen. 	But J.K.
allegedly complained that the rollaway bed was uncomfortable, and she asked to
sleep in the bed with Matthew and T.E. Katrina assented to J.K.’s request.
According to Matthew, both he and Katrina were with the children at all
times J.K. claimed Matthew had touched her. 	The only time Katrina was not
present was Sunday morning when he took the kids to the pool while Katrina
packed. But, he stated, Katrina watched them play in the pool from the hotel room
window. 	Matthew denied ever touching J.K.’s breasts or ever touching her
inappropriately. 	He also denied pulling J.K. onto his lap or toward his groin area
or wrapping his legs around her while in bed.
Matthew confirmed that the family spent time together in the hotel pool and
hot tub. He testified that he and the children ran back and forth between the pool
and the hot tub and that he had “wrestled” with the kids in the tub. 	But he had
learned from Jeffrey’s counsel, after-the-fact, that the hotel had surveillance videos
capturing his and the children’s activities in the pool and hot tub. He watched the
video, and the video showed that nothing inappropriate occurred between him and
J.K. 	While he was in the hot tub Saturday evening, J.K. came toward him, in a
playful manner, but two of the other children jumped in at the same time. 	As a
result, he had one son holding him by the neck and another son grabbing his right
arm when J.K. was in the hot tub with him. From his review of the video footage,
that interaction was the only time he actually touched J.K. in the tub.

No. 81375-7-I/7
- 7 -
Matthew further testified that J.K. was not upset when they drove home on
Sunday afternoon. 	When the family got home, J.K. was outside taking pictures
while he mowed the lawn. 	And, he stated, since the sexual assault allegations
arose, 	he 	had 	not 	been 	contacted 	or 	interviewed 	by 	either 	CPS 	or 	law
enforcement. 	He retained a criminal defense attorney and agreed to undergo a
polygraph examination regarding J.K.’s accusations.
Del Buono, Katrina’s mother, testified in support of Jeffrey’s petition. 	Del
Buono, a social worker and mandatory reporter, testified that after she learned of
J.K.’s accusations from Jeffrey, J.K. disclosed more details of the Leavenworth trip
to her. 	Del Buono testified J.K. told her that Matthew had touched her breasts
under her bra, that he had touched her stomach, and he had put his hands down
the front of her pants under the waistband. 	J.K. also said that when Matthew
wrapped his legs around her, he said “this is how I touch your mother.” 	J.K. told
her grandmother she had not disclosed these details to any investigator because
she was too embarrassed to talk about it and did not want to make her mother
angry.
The court issued an oral ruling denying Jeffrey’s domestic violence petition
on January 3, 2019. 	The court indicated it had considered the testimony of
McLeod, Matthew, Del Buono, Katrina, and Jeffrey. 	It also considered Adams’s
counseling notes from the May 8, 2018 session, McLeod’s written report of her
May 23, 2018 assessment, the diagram J.K. prepared depicting where Matthew
allegedly touched her, CPS’s “founded” abuse finding against Matthew from a

No. 81375-7-I/8
- 8 -
2017 investigation and a declaration that Del Buono had signed on August 18,
2018 describing her conversation with J.K.
The court also considered, and admitted into evidence, several other
exhibits, but Jeffrey has not provided us with any of these exhibits. These exhibits
include 	a 	forensic 	psychological 	evaluation 	of 	Jeffrey, 	a 	domestic 	violence
screening report of Jeffrey, his 2018 petition for an order for protection that the
court previously denied, a thumb drive, and text messages. Because Jeffrey has
not provided a transcript of his testimony or that of Katrina or provided us with
these exhibits, we do not know their contents.
The 	court 	excluded 	the 	note 	that 	J.K. 	allegedly 	received 	from 	the
anonymous stranger at the Leavenworth hotel as unauthenticated hearsay.
In 	denying 	Jeffrey’s 	petition, 	the 	court 	made 	several 	credibility
determinations. It found neither Jeffrey nor Del Buono credible. The court deemed
Del Buono’s credibility suspect because she had had a falling out with Katrina, who
refused to allow Del Buono to visit her grandchildren, and she was evasive in
answering questions on cross examination. 	The court similarly deemed Jeffrey
not credible because of the timing of J.K.’s disclosures, the nature of the
conversations he had with J.K., and the unprompted disclosures that allegedly
occurred. While the court did not find that Jeffrey had coached J.K., the totality of
the circumstances—including the history of the parties, the alleged incidents,
Jeffrey’s testimony about the interactions, and J.K.’s purported subsequent and
more detailed disclosures to Del Buono—all raised concerns that J.K.’s disclosures
were not “organic.”

No. 81375-7-I/9
- 9 -
And while the court noted that it found McLeod to be credible, it refused to
base its decision on her testimony and written report because:
. . . the court has to dig deeper as to whether or not, given the
circumstances, that information as a whole supports a finding that
more likely than not an act or acts occurred; the reason being is, Ms.
McCloud [sic] doesn’t have the benefit of hearing from the parties,
from 	the 	additional 	witnesses, 	et 	cetera, 	doesn’t 	have 	the
background, doesn’t have all of that information. And so while I
believe what she was saying is accurate and credible, that's not
where the testimony ends.
Conversely, while acknowledging that Katrina had admitted falsely testifying
in a prior case against Jeffrey, the court nevertheless found Katrina’s testimony
regarding the Leavenworth trip, and her interactions with J.K. during the trip to be
credible. He also found the way in which Katrina handled a telephone conversation
with J.K. after allegations against Matthew arose to be appropriate and that she
had conducted herself in a manner not to influence J.K.
The court also deemed Matthew’s testimony, particularly his recounting of
events in the hot tub, to be “very credible.” 	Had J.K.’s version of events been
supported by the surveillance video, the court would have expected Jeffrey to
present it. Matthew’s testimony regarding the events captured by the surveillance
cameras was “virtually unchallenged” by Jeffrey. This fact “bolster[ed] [Matthew’s]
credibility as to all of the other issues he testified to.”
The court concluded:
Because I find that Mr. Engelbrecht is credible, I find that Mr.
Kirkwood is not credible, as well as my findings of credibility as to the
other witnesses, in conjunction with the evidence. The court is going
to sign an order denying the petition. I'm going to find that a
preponderance of the evidence is not established that the petition
should be granted.

No. 81375-7-I/10
- 10 -
. . .
It's not that I don't believe [J.K.]. It's that I don't believe Mr. Kirkwood
and I do believe Mr. Engelbrecht. And because of that, I'm going to
sign the denial order.
The written denial order found that “A preponderance of the evidence has not
established that there is domestic violence.”
After the court issued its oral ruling, Jeffrey asked that the denial order
reflect the fact that the court had denied his request to call J.K. to testify. The court
denied this request, adding that if Jeffrey wanted to present written findings and
conclusions, the court would review them. But it noted for the record that the court
understood it had the discretion to decide whether to hear from a minor. The court
emphasized its concern with having a minor testify in domestic violence cases.
And given the high level of conflict between J.K.’s parents, the court deemed it
“highly inappropriate” for J.K. to be brought to court to testify. The court indicated
a willingness to review and sign any additional findings “as necessary.”
Jeffrey appeals the court’s denial of the protection order.
ANALYSIS
Jeffrey contends on appeal that the court erred in denying Jeffrey’s request
to call J.K. to testify in person and that the court’s factual findings were inadequate.
The rest of Jeffrey’s arguments are either merely challenges to the court’s
credibility determinations, which we will not review on appeal, or raise issues we
cannot address because we lack a sufficient record to do so.4
4 Matthew has not filed a responsive brief. However, the lack of a response does not require us to
reverse the trial court's denial order. See Adams v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 128 Wn.2d 224, 229,
905 P.2d 1220 (1995) (“A respondent who elects not to file a brief allows his or her opponent to put
unanswered arguments before the court, and the court is entitled to make its decision based on the

No. 81375-7-I/11
- 11 -
Excluding J.K.’s Testimony
Jeffrey contends the court erred in refusing to permit J.K. to testify. 	He
argues the court’s decision was based on a misunderstanding of Aiken v. Aiken,
187 Wn.2d 491, 387 P.3d 680 (2017). Jeffrey further argues that under Aiken, the
court violated J.K.’s due process rights by not allowing her to testify. 	We reject
both arguments.
Our Supreme Court has made it clear that the decision to allow in-person
testimony 	and 	cross-examination 	of 	child 	witnesses 	in 	domestic 	violence
protection order hearings is within the sound discretion of the commissioner or
judge conducting the hearing. Aiken, 187 Wn.2d at 497. We will not disturb such
an exercise of discretion absent a clear showing that the court abused its
discretion. Hecker v. Cortinas, 110 Wn. App. 865, 869, 43 P.3d 50 (2002).
In Aiken, the court adopted this court’s reasoning from In re Gourley, 124
Wn. App. 52, 58, 98 P.3d 816 (2004), to conclude that “chapter 26.50 RCW does
not require a trial judge to allow live testimony or cross-examination in every
protective order proceeding.” 	Id. at 499; see also Gourley, 124 Wn. App. at 58
(concluding that there is no statutory provision in chapter 26.50 RCW requiring oral
testimony). 	Although the court has expressed a preference for live testimony,
there is no requirement that alleged child victims testify in person. 	Aiken, 187
Wn.2d at 508.
Here, the court denied Jeffrey’s request for J.K. to testify, reasoning that:
I’m also just going to note that under Aiken, it’s this court’s belief that
this court has that discretion to determine whether or not to hear from
argument and record before it. . . . The quantity or quality of briefing should not affect the standard
of review used by the court.”).

No. 81375-7-I/12
- 12 -
a minor. 	And I’m going to reemphasize my concern with the
emphasis on having a minor testify in these circumstances. 	Given
the high level of conflict, I think that would have been highly
inappropriate, and that is why I declined to do so. And I think that’s
consistent with how this court typically approaches these types of
cases.
This decision is supported by the limited record Jeffrey has provided us. 	There
was a history of domestic violence between Jeffrey and Katrina. 	The court had
reviewed domestic violence assessments that were likely unfavorable to Jeffrey.
And Jeffrey had previously and unsuccessfully sought a protection order to
preclude Matthew from having any contact with his three minor children. 	Given
this level of conflict between Jeffrey, Katrina and Matthew, we cannot say the
court’s decision not to have J.K. testify in person was an abuse of discretion.
Jeffrey argues the court’s reading of Aiken was erroneous. 	We disagree.
The court correctly concluded that under Aiken, it had the discretion to allow or
refuse to hear live testimony from a minor alleged to be a victim of sexual violence.
The court had counseling records, CPS reports and medical records, as well as
testimony from McLeod, Jeffrey, and Del Buono as to the content of J.K.’s
allegations.
Jeffrey argues the court found J.K.’s allegations to be credible. 	But this
argument mischaracterizes the court’s oral ruling. 	During his closing argument,
Jeffrey’s counsel apparently stated that if the court denied the petition, Jeffrey
would have to tell J.K. that the court did not believe her. 	In response to this
argument, the court made it clear that its ruling was based on the evidence
presented to it, not on a credibility assessment of J.K. It noted that

No. 81375-7-I/13
- 13 -
. . . it concerns me that this discussion would even take place with
this child in a manner in which this child would be made to believe
that she is not believed by this court. It’s not that I don’t believe [J.K.].
It’s that I don’t believe Mr. Kirkwood and I do believe Mr. Engelbrecht.
In light of the court’s concerns that Jeffrey was using J.K. as a tool against
his ex-wife and her husband and abusing the litigation process to do so, we cannot
conclude the court abused its discretion in deciding not to permit Jeffrey to call J.K.
to testify.
Jeffrey argues the decision not to allow J.K. to testify violated J.K.’s due
process rights as a victim of domestic violence. 	We have no record that this
argument was raised below. 	Under RAP 2.5(a)(3), we will not consider an issue
raised for the first time on appeal unless it is a manifest error affecting a
constitutional right. 	In re G.W.-F., 170 Wn. App. 631, 649, 285 P.3d 208 (2012).
Even if an alleged error is of constitutional magnitude, an appellate court must
determine whether the error is “manifest.” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99, 217
P.3d 756 (2009). 	“Manifest” in RAP 2.5(a)(3) requires a showing of actual
prejudice. Id. To demonstrate actual prejudice, there must be a plausible showing
by 	the 	appellant 	that 	the 	asserted 	error 	had 	“practical 	and 	identifiable
consequences in the trial of the case.” State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935, 155
P.3d 125 (2007). Jeffrey has not made this showing.
Jeffrey could have presented J.K.’s testimony through a sworn declaration.
See 	Gourley 	v. 	Gourley, 	158 	Wn.2d 	460, 	467, 	145 	P.3d 	1185 	(2006)
(commissioner did not err in considering declaration testimony from 14-year-old
daughter describing sexual touching by father; the declaration was admissible
under ER 1101(c)(4)). 	And even if J.K. had testified, we are unconvinced the

No. 81375-7-I/14
- 14 -
outcome would have been different. The court expressed serious questions about
the timing of J.K.’s disclosures—they occurred the first weekend after the court
denied Jeffrey’s prior protection order request, allowing Katrina and Matthew to
have unsupervised visitation with the children—as well as concerns about Jeffrey’s
litigiousness and Del Buono’s bias toward Katrina and Matthew. 	We therefore
decline to reach Jeffrey’s constitutional claim on appeal.
Lack of Adequate Record for Review
Jeffrey contends the court “had a history” with his family law case and this
prior knowledge of the family dynamics led the court to prejudice the evidence. We
simply have an insufficient record to address this claim.
An appellant bears the burden of perfecting the record so that we have
before us all the evidence relevant to deciding the issues presented. Yorkston v.
Whatcom County, 11 Wn. App. 2d 815, 824, 461 P.3d 392 (2020). 	When the
appellant fails to so perfect the record, we are necessarily compromised in our
ability to fairly evaluate the findings in light of that record. Id. We may decline to
reach the merits of an issue if the burden of perfecting the record is not met. Id.
We do not have the complete verbatim report of proceedings or all relevant
exhibits from the hearing. There were pleadings from the family law case admitted
at the hearing. 	There was apparently significant evidence regarding the ongoing
battles between Jeffrey and Katrina. 	But we have none of that evidence before
us. 	Without that evidence, we decline to reach the merits of any claim that the
court’s decision to deny the protection order was based on an unrelated bias
against Jeffrey.

No. 81375-7-I/15
- 15 -
Challenges to the Court’s Credibility Determinations
The court found that a preponderance of evidence did not establish that
domestic violence had occurred. 	Jeffrey challenges this finding, arguing J.K.’s
statements to Del Buono and McLeod met this evidentiary standard under RCW
26.50.010(3). 	But the court’s oral ruling clearly indicated that it rejected Del
Buono’s testimony as not credible and that it would not rely on McLeod’s testimony
because the court was in a better position to adjudge credibility than she was. On
review, we “defer to the trier of fact on the persuasiveness of the evidence,
witness credibility, and conflicting testimony.” In re Knight, 178 Wn. App. 929, 937,
317 P.3d 1068 (2014).
Although Jeffrey has not supplied the entire transcript, we have Matthew’s
testimony 	in 	which 	he 	denied 	touching 	J.K. 	in 	any 	sexual 	or 	otherwise
inappropriate way. 	He testified the video evidence showed he and his children
were merely playing together in the hot tub and that it depicted no touching similar
to that reported by J.K. 	Matthew further testified that J.K. never expressed any
concern about sleeping in the same bed with him, that his young son was asleep
in the bed with them, that J.K. was the one who asked to do so because she was
uncomfortable on the rollaway, and that her mother was physically present in the
same room both nights. 	The court weighed conflicting testimony, assessed
witness credibility, and ultimately believed Matthew’s version of events over the
testimony of Jeffrey, Del Buono, or McLeod.
Jeffrey contends the court erroneously concluded that because Jeffrey did
not present the surveillance video as evidence, that evidence must have supported

No. 81375-7-I/16
- 16 -
Matthew’s version of events. But “where evidence which would properly be a part
of a case is within the control of the party whose interest it would naturally be to
produce it, and, without satisfactory explanation, he fails to do so, the jury may
draw an inference that it would be unfavorable to him.” Walker v. Herke, 20 Wn.2d
239, 249, 147 P.2d 255 (1944). 	The video footage showed Matthew and J.K. in
the hot tub at the Leavenworth hotel. 	Matthew received a copy of this evidence
from Jeffrey’s counsel, and he testified that it showed him playing with his two sons
and J.K. together and did not show him engaging in any sexual misconduct.
Jeffrey did not dispute this testimony. The court could conclude here that Jeffrey’s
failure to produce the video evidence, over which he had control, would support
Matthew’s version of events and was therefore unfavorable to him.
The record before this court, albeit limited, supports the finding that there
was insufficient credible evidence to establish domestic violence occurred.
Lack of Findings Required by RCW 26.50.060
Jeffrey next challenges the court’s failure to enter written findings of fact and
conclusions of law as required by RCW 26.50.060(7). 	RCW 26.50.060(7)
provides: “If the court declines to issue an order for protection or declines to renew
an order for protection, the court shall state in writing on the order the particular
reasons for the court's denial.”
The denial order signed by the court is a standard form order. 	The court
checked the box finding “A preponderance of the evidence has not established
that there is domestic violence.” 	Before signing this order, the court issued a

No. 81375-7-I/17
- 17 -
lengthy oral ruling explaining its assessment of the evidence. 	We conclude the
court adequately stated in writing the reason it denied Jeffrey’s petition.
Jeffrey relies on this court’s decision in Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn.
App. 779, 391 P.3d 546 (2017), for the proposition that the denial order did not
comply with RCW 26.50.060(7). But Maldonado is distinguishable. In that case,
a father filed a petition for a domestic violence protection order on behalf of three
children. 	Id. at 783. 	A commissioner entered temporary orders as to all three
children. Id. at 784. After a hearing, the commissioner granted the petition as to
one of the three children only and merely struck the names of the other two children
from the order. Id. at 786. There was no denial order entered and thus no written
finding as to the basis for denying the petition as to these two children. Id.
Although the commissioner confirmed the father had not alleged that the
mother had committed any act of domestic violence against two of the three
children, the father argued on revision that under In re Marriage of Stewart, 133
Wn. App. 545, 137 P.3d 25 (2006), children who witness domestic violence are
psychologically harmed by the violence and are entitled to protection. Id. at 787.
The superior court denied the motion for revision.
This court concluded that the lack of written findings justifying the exclusion
of two of the three siblings from the order of protection hampered appellate review.
Id. at 790. The petition alleged that all three of the children had been abused and
all three feared future visits with their mother. 	Id. 	There was no explanation for
why the commissioner or the court, on revision, focused exclusively on the
allegations relating to one of the three children given the sworn testimony from the

No. 81375-7-I/18
- 18 -
father in the petition. Id. Because the definition of domestic violence included not
only direct physical harm but also the “infliction of fear of imminent physical harm,”
once the court found the mother’s treatment of one child met the definition of
domestic violence, it would have been reasonable to consider whether the other
children were fearful of similar treatment. 	Id. at 791. 	We remanded the case for
the court to reconsider the father’s petition as to the two excluded children. Id. at
792.
Here, unlike in Maldonado, we have a written order denying Jeffrey’s
petition in its entirety. 	We also have a written finding by the court that it found
insufficient evidence to establish that domestic violence had occurred. 	And also
unlike Maldonado, we have a lengthy oral ruling from the court explaining how the
court weighed the disputed evidence. 	A trial court’s oral ruling may be used to
complement and explain written findings. 	Spencer v. Badgley Mullins Turner,
PLLC, 6 Wn. App. 2d 762, 801, 432 P.3d 821 (2018), review denied, 193 Wn.2d
1006 (2019). Our review here is not hampered by the lack of more detailed findings
than set out in the denial order. We conclude the court’s denial order is sufficient
to comply with RCW 26.50.060(7).
Jeffrey 	alternatively 	relies 	on 	Maldonado 	to 	argue 	that 	the 	court
“disregarded the danger” that Matthew presented to his other children, D.K. and
A.K. But the court here found insufficient evidence of any domestic violence. And
we have no record to indicate that either D.K. or A.K. were victims of domestic
violence or observed Matthew sexually molesting J.K. 	Thus, Maldonado is
inapplicable here.

No. 81375-7-I/19
- 19 -
Attorney Fees and Costs
Jeffrey requests attorney fees and costs under RCW 26.50.060(1)(g).
Because he has not prevailed on appeal, his request is denied.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: