David J. Miescke v. Teresa Lynn Pahl

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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volune of the Official Reports.

October 8, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 80810
and RULE 809.2.
Appeal No. 2025AP1778 Cir. Ct. No. 2017FA2370
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT IV

DAVID J. MIESCKE,
PETITIONER-APPELLANT,
V.
TERESA LYNN PAHL,

RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Dane County:
RHONDA L. LANFORD, Judge. Affirmed and cause remanded.

Before Graham, P,J., Kloppenburg, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be Gted in any court of this state as precedent
or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in Wis. STAT. RULE 809,23().

No. 2025AP1778
2
¶1 PER CURIAM. David Miescke appeals two circuit court orders
entered in 2025 regarding legal custody and physical placement of a child whom
he and Teresa Lynn Pahl share. In one order, the court discharged the guardian ad
litem (GAL), dismissed Miescke’s most recently filed motion to modify legal
custody and physical placement, and restricted Miescke’s filing of future motions
for relief. In the other order, the court awarded sole legal custody to Pahl, required
that placement with Miescke be supervised and imposed conditions for reviewing
the supervision requirement, required that Miescke pay GAL fees, and prohibited
Miescke from making unapproved visits to the child’s daycare or school. We
reject Miescke’s multiple challenges to each order. We also grant Pahl’s motion
seeking costs and attorney fees for a frivolous appeal under WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.25(3) (2023-24) and remand to the circuit court to determine the amount
of the award.1
BACKGROUND
¶2 We present in detail the pertinent procedural facts, the evidence
presented at the pertinent hearings, and the circuit court’s rulings to provide
context for the issues addressed below.
¶3 Miescke and Pahl share a minor child. Since 2017, there has been
considerable litigation in the circuit court regarding the legal custody and physical
placement of their child.
¶4 In 2018, the circuit court entered a Paternity Judgment and
Stipulation Regarding Custody and Placement (the “2018 judgment”).
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

No. 2025AP1778
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¶5 In 2023, the circuit court entered an order amending the 2018
judgment, pursuant to the parties’ stipulations. As relevant to this appeal, the
order granted the parties joint legal custody of the child with Pahl having impasse
breaking authority regarding all legal custody and medical and health care
decisions. The order granted primary physical placement with Pahl and set out a
physical placement schedule that reduced the placement of the child with Miescke
from that set out in the 2018 judgment. In addition, the order required that the
child participate in “counseling/therapy,” and that the parties participate in the
child’s therapy only as the therapist permits, follow all recommendations by the
therapist, and not interfere with the child’s therapy. The order further required
that Miescke follow all recommendations in the court-ordered psychological
evaluation report “and participate in counseling/therapy to address his own
treatment needs.”
¶6 Also in 2023, the circuit court entered a separate order appointing a
parent coordinator to assist the parties with resolving conflicts related to the child.
That order outlined the parent coordinator’s specific responsibilities and what
disputes the parent coordinator would assist the parties with, and mandated that
the parent coordinator’s decisions be legally binding unless set aside by the court.
Between October 2023 and May 2025, the parent coordinator issued 17 decisions
resolving the parties’ disputes.
¶7 In 2024, Miescke filed motions for the circuit court to review and set
aside certain decisions by the parent coordinator. In June 2024, the court
reappointed the GAL, who had previously been discharged, due to the filing of
these motions. The court held a de novo hearing and, in December 2024,
dismissed all of Miescke’s motions.

No. 2025AP1778
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¶8 In the parent coordinator’s 17th decision issued in May 2025, the
parent coordinator concluded:
Mr. Miescke sent over 80 pages of documentation to me,
most of which was irrelevant to the issue at hand. Past
court proceedings and the [parent coordinator]’s 16 prior
Decisions make it clear that Mr. Miescke continues to place
his own needs, wants, and “rights” ahead of [the child’s].
He cannot or is unwilling to see how his own behavior has
compromised his daughter’s mental health care and has
created the problems about which he now complains and
for which he blames Ms. Pahl.
¶9 Also in May 2025, Pahl filed a letter in the circuit court requesting
that the GAL be discharged from the case, noting excessive filings and emails
from Miescke to the GAL when there was no current legal action pending in the
case.
¶10 On June 17, 2025, Miescke filed a “Motion to Modify Custody,
Placement, Enforcement and for Evidentiary Hearing.” In support of his request
to modify legal custody and physical placement, Miescke asserted that he had
worked with the GAL and followed all circuit court-ordered recommendations and
conditions in the 2023 stipulation and order. He argued that: modifying physical
placement was in the best interest of the child; Miescke had other positive life
changes that improved his “parental stability”; the child’s needs had changed; and
Pahl had not been complying with court orders and had been interfering with
Miescke’s relationship with and parenting of the child. Miescke also filed a letter
opposing Pahl’s request to discharge the GAL because “many issues remain
unresolved—including medical access, co-parenting barriers, and discrepancies
regarding compliance with treatment recommendations.”
¶11 On June 18, 2025, the GAL filed her report to the circuit court. The
report consisted of an email exchange between the GAL and the parties’ attorneys

No. 2025AP1778
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in which she advised them that Miescke had begun to work on meeting the
conditions but had “not gotten real far yet.”
¶12 The circuit court held a hearing on June 24, 2025. At the outset of
the hearing, the court said that:
We are set today for a hearing on whether the appointment
of the guardian ad litem should conclude in this case. I
know Mr. Miescke has filed a lot of information with the
court, none of that is going to be decided or heard today.
We are just going to discuss whether the appointment
should continue.
Attorney John Louderman appeared at the hearing on behalf of Miescke “on a
limited term engagement,” and he acknowledged that he would be arguing on
Miescke’s behalf at the hearing.
¶13 The circuit court heard argument from counsel for both parties and
the position of the GAL, regarding both the GAL’s appointment and whether
Miescke had established a significant change in circumstances in support of his
motion to modify legal custody and physical placement. The GAL informed the
court that Miescke is “not where [he] need[s] to be,” and has not made sufficient
progress in meeting the conditions to show a substantial change in circumstances.
The court issued an oral ruling: (1) discharging the GAL, but providing for
reappointment of the GAL should Miescke file a motion showing a substantial
change in circumstances warranting modification of physical placement;
(2) dismissing Miescke’s most recent motion to modify legal custody and physical
placement based on the GAL’s assessment that there was no substantial change in
circumstances in that Miescke had not met the conditions for additional physical
placement; and (3) ordering that any future motions for modification of legal
custody and physical placement filed by Miescke be reviewed and approved by the

No. 2025AP1778
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court before being scheduled before a court commissioner. On July 8, 2025, the
court entered a written order consistent with its oral ruling.
¶14 On August 14, 2025, Pahl filed several pleadings in which she
requested emergency relief based on certain instances of inappropriate behavior by
Miescke towards the child and her resulting concern for the child’s safety when
placed with him. Pahl sought sole legal custody of the child, primary placement of
the child, supervised placement of the child with Miescke, and reappointment of
the GAL with Miescke paying all GAL fees. On August 15, 2025, the circuit
court scheduled a hearing for August 27 and reappointed the GAL.
¶15 At the start of the hearing, the circuit court was informed that the
GAL wanted to call the child’s therapist to testify. Both the GAL and Pahl’s
attorney told the court that the child’s therapist was available to testify, but they
and the therapist were concerned that proceeding with the therapist’s testimony
would risk damaging the therapeutic relationship. Pahl’s attorney and the GAL
said that the GAL was prepared to tell the court what the therapist reported to the
GAL. Miescke agreed with their concerns about the therapeutic relationship and
agreed that the therapist should not testify. The court then directed the GAL to
present what the therapist told the GAL, which had led to Pahl’s emergency
request. The court characterized the GAL’s presentation of the therapist’s report
as “go[ing] to” the GAL’s recommendation. The GAL then reported what she had
been told by the child’s therapist regarding several instances of inappropriate
behavior by Miescke, as related to the therapist by the child.2 The GAL also said
2 The hearing transcript shows that the GAL framed her report of the therapist’s remarks
as “an offer of proof.” However, as we discuss below, this report was not an offer of proof as
statutorily defined. Rather, as the transcript also shows, the circuit court accepted this report as
part of the GAL’s “recommendation[]” to the court.

No. 2025AP1778
7
that the therapist, given her background and training in child abuse and standard
therapy, had a significant concern about the child having unsupervised placement
with Miescke.
¶16 Pahl, on direct examination by her attorney, testified about her
concerns for the child’s safety when placed with Miescke. Pahl testified that
Miescke unnecessarily bathed the child and gave her medication above safe
dosage limits during his six-hour placements; and that Miescke told the child he
did not care what the courts decide and that he would break into the child’s house
and take her away if he did not have placement with her. Pahl also testified that
she made an appointment for the child to see the child’s therapist right after the
child told Pahl about Miescke’s “frightening statements,” and that after the
appointment the therapist told Pahl that the therapist was going to make a referral
to Child Protective Services (CPS).
¶17 Pahl further testified about incidents when Miescke interfered with
the child’s therapy, health care providers, and medical treatment and
appointments. Pahl also testified that Miescke attempted to interfere with the
child’s summer camp and visited the child’s day care daily during the school year,
and that both staff and the child indicated that the visits were disruptive.
¶18 Miescke, pro se, cross-examined Pahl regarding Pahl’s medical
impasse authority, Pahl’s choice of healthcare provider for the child, a telehealth
appointment during the child’s physical placement with Miescke, Pahl’s
communication with Miescke regarding the results of the child’s medical
appointment, health insurance renewal, and an emergency room visit Pahl made
with the child. Miescke asked Pahl whether she had ever withheld placement from
Miescke for safety reasons. Pahl testified that she filed the emergency request due

No. 2025AP1778
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to concerns for the child’s safety with Miescke and, after the circuit court clarified
the question, that Pahl did not withhold placement from Miescke after filing the
request because she was obligated to continue to comply with the court-ordered
physical placement schedule despite her ongoing concerns for the child’s safety.
Miescke also asked Pahl about her payment of GAL fees, the expiration of the
parent coordinator’s contract, and Pahl’s request to discharge the GAL. During
Miescke’s cross-examination of Pahl, the court said:
We are wasting time at this point, Mr. Miescke. You have
spent all of your questions on medical impasse authority
and guardian ad litem fees. And the most important reason
we’re here are the allegations that have been made against
you for purposes of placement. I find it curious you
haven’t asked a single question about any of that; you just
want to talk about medical bills -- or medical records and
GAL fees…. And so your entire questioning has gone on,
on what I really find are sort of irrelevant issues.
Miescke continued to cross-examine Pahl regarding what he told the court was his
last exhibit, a letter from the parent coordinator, as well as some of the other issues
unrelated to the child’s safety identified above.
¶19 After cross-examining Pahl, Miescke requested that his father testify
as a rebuttal witness to address what Miescke described as “the safety issues.”
The circuit court denied the request because Miescke’s father had been present
throughout the hearing and had not been excluded from the courtroom. Miescke
also told the court that he would not testify at the hearing.
¶20 The GAL recommended to the circuit court, based on “the record”
developed at the hearing, that the child’s placement schedule with Miescke stay
the same but that all placement with Miescke be supervised. The GAL relatedly
emphasized that Miescke needed to address the safety concerns in a therapeutic
setting and to return to court “when something substantial has changed.” The

No. 2025AP1778
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GAL also recommended that Pahl be awarded sole legal custody for the child’s
health care, because the existing order of joint legal custody with Pahl having
impasse authority is confusing for care providers.
¶21 Pahl’s counsel asked that the circuit court’s order specify that
Miescke must comply with all established rules of supervision before the court
will review legal custody and physical placement in the future. Counsel also
asked that Pahl be awarded sole legal custody “across the board,” that Miescke not
be allowed to disrupt the child’s daycare, and that Miescke be required to address
his own behavioral issues.
¶22 The circuit court made its oral ruling the following day. The court
determined, based on the evidence presented, that Pahl had shown a substantial
change in circumstances, and that it is in the child’s best interest to grant Pahl’s
request for sole legal custody and Pahl’s request for supervised physical
placement.
¶23 Specifically, the circuit court credited Pahl’s testimony about the
most recent incident of Miescke unilaterally canceling the child’s medical
appointment and scheduling an appointment with a different provider; past and
more recent incidents of Miescke interfering with the child’s therapy; and
Miescke’s daily interruption of the child’s summer camp. The court found that
Miescke “puts his needs and interests above [the child]’s. He decides he knows
what is best and refuses to consider what is best for [the child].”
¶24 In granting sole legal custody of the child to Pahl, the circuit court
explained that:
This is a bright line that hopefully [Miescke] can follow --
he is not to cancel or otherwise interfere with [the child]’s

No. 2025AP1778
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physical or emotional treatment, including going to her day
care unannounced or school unannounced, and interfering
in her day. He may have access to [the child]’s medical
and school records, but he may not attend medical
appointments unless [Pahl] approves. [Pahl] is the sole
decision-maker regarding [the child]’s custodial decisions.
¶25 The circuit court then discussed the GAL’s recommendation,
including the GAL’s report about Miescke’s inappropriate behavior towards the
child. The court noted that the child’s therapist was so concerned about the
behavior, related to her by the child, that she offered to testify even though doing
so could damage her therapeutic relationship with the child. The court found it
significant that Miescke chose not to testify at the hearing: “He did not get on the
stand and say that none of those things happened…. Instead he only cross-
examined [Pahl] on medical decisions and guardian ad litem fees he did not think
he should have to pay. Not one question regarding the [safety] concerns” raised in
the GAL’s report. The court determined that supervised physical placement was
required based on the record regarding concerns for the child’s safety.
¶26 Consistent with its above-stated determination, the circuit court
granted Pahl’s request for supervised physical placement, following the parties’
existing schedule as long as it can be accommodated by an approved supervisor.
The court further ordered that the GAL consult with the therapist and determine
the circumstances under which Miescke may petition to resume unsupervised
physical placement, so that those conditions may be included in the court’s written
order.
¶27 The circuit court ordered that Miescke reimburse Pahl for her
payment of the GAL’s retainer when the GAL was reappointed and be responsible
for all GAL fees going forward, because “[b]ut for [Miescke]’s conduct, this
reappointment would not have been necessary.”

No. 2025AP1778
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¶28 In October 2025, the circuit court entered a written order consistent
with its oral ruling. The court made factual findings regarding Miescke’s
interference with the child’s therapy and medical appointments in violation of
Pahl’s impasse authority, and Miescke’s interference with the child’s summer
camp and day care. The court also found that “the parties stipulated on the record”
that the GAL could present the therapist’s report about what the child told the
therapist. The court further found that the child “made reports to her therapist
which were referred to CPS but were screened out,” and separately described
Miescke’s threatening statement related by the child to Pahl.
¶29 The circuit court determined that the record established “an
emergency related to the minor child” and, implicitly therefore, a substantial
change of circumstances. The court explicitly determined that the record also
established that it is in the best interest of the child that Pahl be granted sole legal
custody and that the placement of the child with Miescke be supervised. The
order: (1) awarded Pahl sole legal custody of the child; (2) ordered that Miescke’s
physical placement with the child be supervised; (3) required that Miescke pay for
all GAL fees going forward and reimburse Pahl for the retainer she paid to the
GAL when the GAL was reappointed, and that Miescke pay for all physical
placement-related expenses; (4) prohibited Miescke from making unapproved and
unannounced visits to the child’s daycare or school; and (5) imposed conditions
for Miescke to meet in order to seek review of the supervision of the child’s
physical placement with him.

No. 2025AP1778
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DISCUSSION
¶30 Miescke raises multiple challenges to the June 2025 hearing and
corresponding July 2025 order, and to the August 2025 hearing and corresponding
October 2025 order, which we address in turn.3
I. June 2025 Hearing and July 2025 Order
¶31 Miescke argues that the circuit court violated his right to due process
when it dismissed his most recently filed motion to modify legal custody and
physical placement, and when it restricted his filing of future motions for
modification. He also argues that the written order does not accurately represent
the hearing record.4
A. Dismissal of motion to modify legal custody and physical placement
¶32 Miescke argues that the circuit court violated his right to due process
when the court dismissed his motion because: the court said that the motion would
not be heard; he was unrepresented; and the court relied both on Pahl’s attorney’s
factual assertions and on the GAL’s opinion despite what he asserts was the
3 We observe that Miescke’s appellate briefs and abundant 2025 circuit court filings
contain several indicators of possible generative artificial intelligence (GAI) use, including false
quotes, misrepresentation of the record, and inaccurate citations. We caution Miescke that GAI
can produce misleading and unreliable results. In addition, given the sensitive information
regarding a minor child involved in this case, we further caution Miescke that GAI platforms may
not provide privacy protections for sensitive personal or confidential medical information
included in prompts, documents, or other data uploaded to the GAI platform.
4 Miescke does not make an argument addressing the part of the circuit court’s order
discharging the GAL, and so we do not address that part further.
Separately, Pahl argues that all of Miescke’s arguments are moot. Without deciding
mootness, we proceed to address Miescke’s arguments and explain why they lack merit.

No. 2025AP1778
13
GAL’s “uncertainty” regarding the scope and completion of her investigation,
without receiving testimony or exhibits or giving Miescke an opportunity to be
heard. Miescke also argues that the court failed to apply the correct legal
standard—whether he showed a substantial change in circumstances and whether
modification would be in the child’s best interest—and instead dismissed his
motion based on his “filing volume and procedural history.” At the same time,
Miescke inconsistently argues that the court determined, contrary to the record,
that there was no substantial change in circumstances. As we explain, none of
Miescke’s arguments have merit.
¶33 As stated, Miescke argues that the circuit court violated his right to
due process because it dismissed his motion after saying that it would not be heard
and because he was not represented. The record refutes this argument.
¶34 The record shows that the circuit court said that it was not going to
“schedule[]” the motion for an evidentiary hearing, and, therefore, that it was not
at the June hearing going to “decide[]” or “hear[]” the motion based on an
evidentiary hearing. The court instead dismissed the motion because it did not on
its face show a substantial change in circumstances to warrant further adjudication
and merely repeated prior similarly unsupported attempts to modify legal custody
and physical placement. As to Miescke being unrepresented, the attorney who had
been representing Miescke acknowledged that he would be arguing on Miescke’s
behalf at the hearing, and the attorney did vigorously argue in support of the
motion at the hearing. Miescke fails to show that the court violated his right to
due process in either respect.
¶35 Miescke also argues that the circuit court violated his right to due
process because it relied both on Pahl’s attorney’s factual assertions and on the

No. 2025AP1778
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GAL’s opinion despite what he asserts was the GAL’s “uncertainty” regarding the
scope and completion of her investigation, and without receiving testimony or
exhibits or giving him an opportunity to be heard. The record also refutes this
argument.
¶36 The record does not show that the circuit court relied on Pahl’s
attorney’s assertions in dismissing Miescke’s motion. The record does show that
Miescke misrepresents the GAL’s remarks at the hearing. The GAL said that, as
defined at earlier hearings, she understood her role was for Miescke to work with
her and see if he had met the conditions for additional placement, but that instead
he was inundating her with “complaints and ... filings and submissions” that were
time consuming for her to review, without showing that he had met the conditions.
She told the court that Miescke just keeps going without making changes to get
“where [he] need[s] to be.” It was in light of his persisting without making the
required changes that the GAL sought guidance going forward should her
appointment be continued. The GAL made no indication that she was uncertain,
or needed to further investigate, regarding her determination that, “[a]bsolutely,”
Miescke had not met the conditions for physical placement modification. Miescke
fails to show that the court violated his right to due process in relying on the
GAL’s remarks.
¶37 As for the circuit court dismissing Miescke’s motion without giving
him an opportunity to be heard, he filed before the hearing a “Written Statement in
Lieu of Oral Argument,” and, as noted, the attorney representing him at the time
argued vigorously on his behalf in support of the motion. Also as stated, the court
dismissed the motion without scheduling an evidentiary hearing because on its
face the motion did not show a substantial change in circumstances. Miescke fails
to show that the court violated his right to due process in proceeding as it did.

No. 2025AP1778
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¶38 While Miescke argues that the circuit court failed to determine
whether he showed a substantial change in circumstances, he also argues that the
court erred in determining that there was no substantial change in circumstances.
Specifically, he argues that the court’s determination that his motion failed to
show that he had met the conditions warranting modification was based on “stale”
assessments by the GAL and contradicted by his submissions. The record shows
that the court did determine that he failed to show a substantial change in
circumstances, and his argument that the court erred in doing so is also refuted by
the record. The GAL, in her report to the court, made it clear that she had
reviewed his most recent submissions and determined that he was “making an
effort” toward meeting the conditions, but had “not gotten real far” and was “not
where [he] need[s] to be.” That Miescke disagrees—that, as expressed by the
GAL, “he just cannot hear it” when he “does not get what he wants”—does not
suffice to show that the court erred in relying on the GAL’s report to determine
that his motion failed to show that he had met the conditions warranting
modification and to dismiss his motion on that basis.
B. Imposition of filing restriction
¶39 Miescke argues that the circuit court restricted his future filings
without statutory authority and without finding bad faith, frivolousness, or
vexatious litigation justifying the restrictions. This argument fails because
Miescke disregards the court’s explanation on the record for the restriction, and he
cites no legal authority supporting the proposition that the court erred in imposing
the restriction based on that explanation.

No. 2025AP1778
16
¶40 Circuit courts have broad discretion to control their dockets with
economy of time and effort. See Rupert v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 138 Wis. 2d 1, 7,
405 N.W.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1987).
¶41 The circuit court here ordered, “Any future motions or requests for
relief filed by [Miescke] in this matter will be subject to review by the court before
they are scheduled before the Circuit Court Commissioner’s Office.” At the
hearing, the court explained that the law requires that Miescke show a substantial
change in circumstances to support a motion to modify legal custody and physical
placement; that here that means that he has the met the conditions for modification
previously set in this case; and that he had repeatedly submitted similar motions
accompanied by voluminous documents to the GAL and the court, without making
the changes in his behavior sufficient to satisfy those conditions. The court
concluded that it “is not going to be a forum for … Mr. Miescke to air his
grievances every six months” without showing that he has met the conditions for
modification, and it required that future motions by Miescke be reviewed and
approved by the court before they are scheduled before the court commissioner.
¶42 It is evident from this explanation that the circuit court did impose
the filing restriction based on Miescke’s history of vexatious and frivolous
litigation relating to legal custody and physical placement modification, and in
order to minimize the unnecessary use of scarce court resources. In addition, as
stated, Miescke does not cite legal authority supporting his argument that the court
erred in doing so.

No. 2025AP1778
17
C. Asserted cumulative errors and inaccurate written order
¶43 Miescke argues that all of the errors identified above warrant
reversal or remand. Because we have rejected his arguments about those asserted
errors, there is no basis for reversal or remand.
¶44 Miescke also argues that the written order does not accurately reflect
the hearing record or the circuit court’s oral ruling in three respects. The record
refutes his argument.
¶45 Miescke asserts that the order inaccurately dismisses his motion to
modify legal custody and physical placement, when the circuit court said that it
was not scheduling the motion. However, the court said that it was not going to
“schedul[e]” the motion for an evidentiary hearing, or “hear[]” or “decide[]” the
motion based on an evidentiary hearing, and instead dismissed the motion because
on its face it did not show a substantial change in circumstances to warrant further
adjudication. The written order is not inaccurate in this respect.
¶46 Miescke asserts that the order inaccurately states that counsel made a
special appearance, when the attorney said that he was not representing Miescke
on the modification motion. However, the attorney did say that he was making a
“limited appearance,” and Miescke does not explain how “limited” is
meaningfully different from “special.” In addition, while the attorney did say that
he “will not be representing” Miescke on “other issues” including Miescke’s
motion to modify physical placement, the attorney also acknowledged that he
would be arguing on Miescke’s behalf at the hearing and did vigorously argue in
support of the motion at the hearing. The written order is not inaccurate in this
respect.

No. 2025AP1778
18
¶47 Miescke asserts that the order imposes filing restrictions when the
circuit court made no findings or analysis. However, the transcript of the hearing
shows that the court did impose, and explain why it was imposing, the filing
restriction: because Miescke repeatedly filed meritless motions that burdened the
GAL and court. Miescke fails to show that the order is inaccurate in this respect.
II. August 2025 Hearing and October 2025 Order
¶48 The determination of whether to modify a legal custody or physical
placement order is directed to the circuit court’s discretion. Keller v. Keller, 2002
WI App 161, ¶6, 256 Wis. 2d 401, 647 N.W.2d 426. “We affirm a [circuit]
court’s discretionary determination when the court applies the correct legal
standard to the facts of record and reaches a rational result.” Id. As a reviewing
court, our task “is to search the record for reasons to sustain the [circuit] court’s
exercise of discretion.” Id.
¶49 As a reviewing court, we also “defer[] to the circuit court’s findings
of fact unless they are unsupported by the record and are, therefore, clearly
erroneous.” Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen’s Mill, Inc., 2006 WI 46, ¶11, 290
Wis. 2d 264, 714 N.W.2d 530. “Under the clearly erroneous standard, ‘even
though the evidence would permit a contrary finding, findings of fact will be
affirmed on appeal as long as the evidence would permit a reasonable person to
make the same finding.’” Id., ¶12 (quoted source omitted).
¶50 Miescke challenges the August 2025 hearing and the October 2025
order modifying legal custody and physical placement in numerous respects. We
identify Miescke’s arguments in the headings below. As we explain, none of the
arguments have merit.

No. 2025AP1778
19
A. Circuit court erroneously found that Miescke cancelled child’s appointment
¶51 Miescke argues that the circuit court’s factual finding that he
recently cancelled his child’s medical appointment, in violation of Pahl’s legal
custody authority, is clearly erroneous because it “lacks any competent evidentiary
support.” Specifically, Miescke argues that this finding is clearly erroneous
because it is based solely on Pahl’s purported hearsay testimony, and because her
testimony was contradictory and the court did not resolve that contradiction.
Miescke’s hearsay argument fails because it is unsupported by relevant legal
authority, and his contradictory testimony argument fails because the record shows
no contradiction.
¶52 At the hearing, Pahl testified on direct examination as follows. The
child was a patient at a clinic where Miescke became employed. Miescke
obtained access to the child’s medical records and interacted with staff at the clinic
concerning the child’s treatment. Miescke’s presence and interactions with the
staff at the clinic were disruptive to the child’s treatment. For these reasons, and
because the child was not close to any of the providers she saw at that clinic, Pahl
acted in what she believed to be the child’s best interest and arranged, over
Miescke’s disagreement, for the child to see a different provider at a different
clinic. Pahl arrived at the new clinic on August 11 for the child’s appointment
with a new provider and was told by clinic staff that Miescke had cancelled the
appointment on August 5. Miescke had instead scheduled a new appointment with
the previous provider at the previous clinic, even though Pahl had impasse
authority over the decision to change clinics and providers.
¶53 Miescke objected based on hearsay to Pahl’s testimony that she was
told by the clinic staff that he had cancelled the appointment. The court overruled

No. 2025AP1778
20
the objection, explaining that the testimony was not hearsay by definition but a
statement by a party opponent, namely Miescke.
¶54 On cross-examination by Miescke, Pahl testified as follows. The
child had seen a different provider almost every time that Pahl took her to her
appointments at the previous clinic, and Pahl was concerned that Miescke was
communicating with the child’s providers outside of her appointments and
accessing the child’s records at the clinic that Pahl could not access. Pahl did
research as to which new clinic and provider to take the child to. The appointment
with the new provider at the new clinic did take place even though Miescke had
cancelled it.
¶55 Miescke argues that the circuit court erred in finding that he had
unilaterally cancelled the child’s medical appointment because it was based on
Pahl’s purported hearsay testimony and not on any testimony by the clinic staff or
documentary evidence. However, Miescke does not engage in any analysis citing
legal authority to support his hearsay argument. We reject his argument as
undeveloped and lacking legal support. See Industrial Risk Insurers v. American
Eng’g Testing, Inc., 2009 WI App 62, ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82 (we
need not consider arguments unsupported by legal authority); Wisconsin Conf.
Bd. of Trs. of the United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Culver, 2001 WI 55, ¶38, 243
Wis. 2d 394, 627 N.W.2d 469 (we do not address arguments that are conclusory
and insufficiently developed).
¶56 Miescke also argues that the circuit court erred in finding that he had
unilaterally cancelled the child’s medical appointment because it is based on
contradictory testimony that the court failed to reconcile. Specifically, he argues
that Pahl’s testimony that he cancelled the appointment is contradicted by her

No. 2025AP1778
21
testimony that the appointment “in fact occurred.” This argument fails because
the two facts to which Pahl testified are not contradictory. That is, both can be
true—Miescke cancelled the appointment and the provider managed to see the
child nevertheless.5 Miescke fails to develop an argument to the contrary.
B. Circuit court unequally allotted hearing time and improperly restricted cross-
examination, and improperly denied rebuttal testimony and post-ruling closing
argument
¶57 Miescke argues that the circuit court erred when it unequally allotted
hearing time between the parties and restricted his cross-examination of Pahl; and
when it denied his requests to present rebuttal testimony by his father and to make
a closing argument after the court issued its oral ruling.
¶58 Circuit courts have “broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence
and to control the order and presentation of evidence at trial.” State v. James,
2005 WI App 188, ¶8, 285 Wis. 2d 783, 703 N.W.2d 727; WIS. STAT. § 906.11(1)
(circuit courts have broad discretion to “exercise reasonable control over the mode
and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence”). We will affirm the
court’s exercise of its discretionary authority if the decision has a reasonable basis
and was made in compliance with the facts of record and accepted legal standards.
See James, 285 Wis. 2d 783, ¶8.
¶59 Miescke argues that the circuit court imposed “placement-affecting
consequences without affording [Miescke] a full and fair evidentiary hearing” due
to the unequally allotted hearing time between parties. Specifically, Miescke
5 To this point, Pahl’s testimony is clear and not contradictory. In response to Miescke’s
question during cross-examination about whether the appointment took place, Pahl testified that
“They saw us regardless of the fact that you canceled [the appointment].”

No. 2025AP1778
22
asserts that the court’s “interruptions” during his cross-examination of Pahl
prevented him from “probing credibility, testing factual assertions, and clarifying
inconsistencies central to the court’s ultimate findings.” However, Miescke does
not on appeal identify what additional relevant questions he did not have the
opportunity to ask Pahl in cross-examination. As noted, the court brought to
Miescke’s attention the issues that the court deemed most relevant to the
emergency request at issue, but Miescke did not question Pahl about those issues,
nor does he argue on appeal that he had no time to do so. The record also shows
that Miescke had sufficient time to thoroughly cross-examine Pahl regarding the
topics and exhibits that he indicated were relevant to him, presenting, as he told
the court, “the last thing I have,” towards the end of his cross-examination. Even
then Miescke continued to question Pahl before the court ended the cross-
examination so that the court could hear the GAL’s recommendation in the time
remaining for the hearing. The transcript of the hearing does not support
Miescke’s argument that any imbalance in the hearing time between the parties
prevented him from presenting his case or that the court’s “interruptions” during
cross-examination were made without a reasonable basis.
¶60 Miescke also argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his
request to present rebuttal testimony by his father. In support of this argument,
Miescke asserts that the court said: “No. I’m not taking any testimony.” But
Miescke’s citation to the record shows no such statement. Rather, as summarized
above, the court denied Miescke’s request because his father had not been
sequestered and had been present in the courtroom throughout the hearing. As
Pahl notes, Miescke did not identify his father as a witness before the hearing,
even as Miescke had been fully apprised well before the hearing of the concern for
the child’s safety alleged in the pleadings that Pahl filed in support of her request

No. 2025AP1778
23
for modification of legal custody and physical placement. In short, Miescke’s
argument relies on a misrepresentation of the record, and the court had a
reasonable basis for not allowing Miescke’s father to testify.
¶61 Miescke further argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his
request to make a closing statement after the court issued its ruling, explaining that
“I have already made my decision.” In support of this argument, Miescke asserts
that the court’s denial deprived him of the opportunity to “respond to adverse
factual assertions, correct misstatements relied upon by the court, or preserve
objections on the record.” However, the time for him to present evidence in his
favor and to make objections was during the hearing, not after the court issued its
ruling, and Miescke cites no legal authority supporting his argument to the
contrary.
¶62 To the extent that Miescke may also be arguing that he was denied
his right to testify at the hearing, the record refutes such an argument. The court
expressly asked Miescke if he intended to testify, and he answered, “No.”
¶63 For the reasons stated, Miescke fails to show that the circuit court
erroneously exercised its discretion in controlling the parties’ presentation of
evidence at the August 2025 hearing, in not allowing Miescke’s father to testify as
a rebuttal witness, and in not allowing Miescke to present additional argument
after it issued its ruling.
C. Circuit court erred in denying continuance to obtain counsel
¶64 Miescke argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion when it denied a continuance of the hearing for Miescke to obtain
counsel.

No. 2025AP1778
24
¶65 A decision to grant or deny a continuance lies within the sound
discretion of the circuit court and will be set aside only if there is an erroneous
exercise of discretion. Robertson-Ryan & Assocs., Inc. v. Pohlhammer, 112
Wis. 2d 583, 587, 334 N.W.2d 246 (1983). A court erroneously exercises its
discretion if it fails to exercise its discretion or if it has no reasonable basis for its
decision. Id. We will sustain the circuit court’s discretionary decision if the court
“examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a
demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could
reach.” Liddle v. Liddle, 140 Wis. 2d 132, 136, 410 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1987).
¶66 Here, the circuit court granted Miescke’s previous attorney’s motion
to withdraw from representing Miescke, other than on a limited basis, on June 17,
2025. Pahl filed her request for emergency modification of legal custody and
physical placement on August 14, 2025. On August 15, 2025, the court scheduled
a hearing on Pahl’s request for August 27. In a letter to the court dated August 21,
2025, Miescke asked the court to continue the hearing until after new counsel,
which he was “actively seeking,” could appear. At the start of the hearing, the
court denied his request, explaining that Miescke’s previous attorney had
withdrawn in June, that the hearing concerned a matter of an emergency nature,
and that it was necessary to hear from the parties on the matter as scheduled. In its
written order, the court specifically found that Miescke had sufficient opportunity
to obtain new counsel and that it was necessary to proceed because the matter
concerned an emergency related to the child.
¶67 On appeal, Miescke asserts that the circuit court’s denial of his
request for a continuance prejudiced his ability to present a defense, secure
witness testimony, present documentary evidence, and meaningfully rebut Pahl’s
claims. However, acting pro se, Miescke had in response to Pahl’s request filed a

No. 2025AP1778
25
detailed brief with exhibits opposing Pahl’s request as well as a motion to dismiss
and a motion for stay. He also extensively cross-examined Pahl and introduced
exhibits at the hearing. Miescke does not support his conclusory assertion by
identifying any additional defense or evidence that he was not able to present in
responding to Pahl’s allegations about his inappropriate behavior during the
child’s placement, his interference with the child’s therapy and medical
appointments and day care, and his threatening statement to the child. Moreover,
Miescke does not make an argument that in denying his request the court applied a
wrong legal standard, relied on non-record facts, or lacked an explanation and
reached an unreasonable conclusion. In short, he fails to show that the court
erroneously exercised its discretion in denying his request for a continuance.
D. Circuit court improperly credited GAL’s recommendation
¶68 Miescke argues that the circuit court improperly credited the GAL’s
recommendation, specifically, the GAL’s “offer of proof” regarding the therapist’s
report, without requiring supporting testimony, evidentiary development, or an
actual investigation, and without addressing his pending challenges to the GAL’s
appointment.
¶69 We pause to clarify what constituted the GAL’s recommendation at
the August 2025 hearing; specifically, we clarify that the therapist’s report as
presented by the GAL was not an offer of proof as statutorily defined, but was
accepted by the circuit court as part of the GAL’s recommendation to the court.
¶70 Under WIS. STAT. § 901.03(1)(b), an offer of proof is a means to
preserve for appeal the issue of whether excluded evidence should have been
admitted. Here, the circuit court did not exclude any evidence. Rather, as related
in the background above, Pahl’s attorney, the GAL, and Miescke agreed that,

No. 2025AP1778
26
while the child’s therapist was available to testify, the therapist should not testify
out of concern for the risk of damaging the therapeutic relationship. Accordingly,
pursuant to that agreement, the court directed the GAL to report what the therapist
told the GAL about the emergency request at issue. While the GAL referred to her
report as “an offer of proof,” there was no offer of proof by the GAL under the
statutory definition of the phrase. Rather, the parties agreed that the GAL could
report what the therapist told her, and the court heard that report as part of the
GAL’s recommendation. With this clarification, we proceed to address Miescke’s
arguments that the court erred in doing so.
¶71 As stated, Miescke faults the circuit court for crediting the GAL’s
recommendation based on the therapist’s report as presented by the GAL, without
any proper evidentiary support. But, Miescke did not object to the court allowing
the GAL to present the therapist’s report as part of her recommendation.
Accordingly, he has forfeited the objections he makes on appeal, and we reject his
argument on that basis. See State v. Freymiller, 2007 WI App 6, ¶¶15-17, 298
Wis. 2d 333, 727 N.W.2d 334 (2006) (appellate courts typically decline to review
issues on which the appellant has forfeited any objection by failing to object or
invited the error by affirmatively approving it in the circuit court). Nor did he
present evidence at the hearing so as to render clearly erroneous the court’s
crediting the GAL’s recommendation including the therapist’s report and
weighing it against Miescke. Accordingly, we reject his argument for this reason
as well.
¶72 Miescke also argues that the circuit court did not address challenges
that he made in other filings to the GAL’s appointment. But he does not explain
how those challenges relate to the court crediting the GAL’s recommendation

No. 2025AP1778
27
including the therapist’s report. Accordingly, we reject this additional argument
as undeveloped.
E. Circuit court improperly discounted significance of outcome of CPS report
¶73 Miescke argues that the circuit court improperly discounted the
significance of the determination by CPS to “screen out” and close, without
further investigation, the report of Miescke’s inappropriate behavior as related by
the child to the therapist.
¶74 At the hearing, when the GAL as part of her recommendation
recounted the therapist’s report of Miescke’s inappropriate behavior, the circuit
court asked if the therapist had reported the behavior to CPS. The GAL informed
the court that the therapist had reported the behavior and the report had been
screened out because, as she understood from CPS, “there’s a high bar for sexual
abuse and this was in a gray area, and they felt that the report was reflective of a
mental health problem that the father had … [and] there wasn’t physical proof.”
¶75 In its oral ruling, the circuit court addressed the fact that the case
was screened out as follows. The court noted that the therapist “had such a
significant concern” about Miescke’s inappropriate behavior related by the child
that the therapist reported it to CPS, “but it was screened out due to the high bar
for a CPS complaint and no, quote, evidence.” The court explained:
A screen out by CPS means almost nothing in this
case. As a judge for 12 years, most of them in the civil
division and family court and some on criminal, I have seen
numerous cases of abuse being screened out by CPS only to
later have something more tragic follow. As a judge acting
in the best interest of [the child], I cannot ignore [the
therapist’s] significant concerns about [the child’s] safety
with [Miescke].

No. 2025AP1778
28
The court further noted that Miescke chose not to testify and did not say that none
of the behavior reported by the therapist happened; nor did he ask Pahl any
questions regarding the therapist’s concerns.6
¶76 Miescke argues that the circuit court erred in discounting CPS’s
determination to screen out the therapist’s report when there was no documentary
evidence presented at the hearing of the CPS determination or testimony by a
witness from CPS, and based on the court’s own judicial experience instead of an
evidentiary record. However, he cites to no evidence or testimony contesting the
GAL’s report to the court of the CPS determination. Nor does he cite to evidence
or testimony providing a basis for this court to determine that the circuit court
erred in according little weight to the CPS determination and greater weight to the
therapist’s concerns and to Pahl’s testimony about his inappropriate behavior. See
Jacobson v. American Tool Cos., Inc., 222 Wis. 2d 384, 390, 588 N.W.2d 67 (Ct.
App. 1998) (“As part of our analysis, we will accept the circuit court’s
determination as to weight and credibility.”). Even had the circuit court not
discredited the CPS determination, Miescke fails to show that it was clearly
erroneous for the court to rely on his failure to testify or cross-examine Pahl about
the substance of the therapist’s report to CPS or Pahl’s direct testimony regarding
his own behavior. For all these reasons, Miescke fails to show that the court erred
6 Miescke only cross-examined Pahl as to the fact that, after she filed her request to
change physical placement based on her concerns for the child’s safety in light of Miescke’s
recent inappropriate behavior, she complied with the physical placement schedule without
objection. The circuit court found, based on Pahl’s testimony in response to Miescke’s
questioning, that Pahl did so because the court had not signed her proposed order to require
supervised placement pending a hearing on her request. Miescke does not argue that this finding
was clearly erroneous or otherwise address this aspect of Pahl’s testimony in his appellate
briefing.

No. 2025AP1778
29
in weighing the CPS determination less heavily than other evidence and the
GAL’s recommendation presented at the hearing.
¶77 Miescke further argues that the circuit court ignored the record
showing that Pahl made “at least five CPS reports during the course of custody
litigation” and that CPS had screened out all five as unsubstantiated. However,
Miescke cites to the appellate record, rather than to the evidence presented at the
hearing. He fails to show that the court disregarded the record developed at the
hearing.
F. Circuit court improperly relied on stale evidence
¶78 Miescke argues that the circuit court improperly relied on one old
incident of his interference with the child’s therapy.7
¶79 In its oral ruling, as stated, the circuit court found that Miescke
interfered with the child’s medical appointments and therapy, citing as the most
recent example his unilateral decision to cancel a medical appointment that Pahl
made for the child after she notified him that she was using her impasse authority
to make that appointment. The court also cited as a past example of Miescke’s
interference his filing of a grievance against a previous therapist, which, according
to the court, destroyed the child’s therapeutic relationship with that therapist.
¶80 At the hearing, Pahl testified about the latter incident. Specifically,
Pahl testified that Miescke “managed to get [the child] discharged” from treatment
7 In this part of his appellant’s brief, Miescke also reiterates his assertions that the circuit
court improperly discounted CPS’s screen-out determination and improperly relied on Pahl’s
testimony about him cancelling the child’s medical appointment. We have addressed and rejected
his arguments regarding these assertions above.

No. 2025AP1778
30
with a therapist with whom the child had an established relationship by filing a
grievance against the therapist, and that it took “quite a while” to find a new
therapist for the child. Miescke objected based on “[s]peculation for cause.” The
circuit court overruled the objection, explaining that this incident had been
testified to at a prior hearing and was “well established.”
¶81 Miescke argues that the circuit court erroneously overruled his
objection, but he does not cite any supporting legal authority. Instead, he
misrepresents the court’s explanation as foreclosing reconsideration of unspecified
issues relating to the child’s therapy, and argues that “new evidence” since the
prior testimony about the grievance incident contradicted the court’s finding that
his grievance caused the disruption in the child’s therapy. However, he does not
cite to evidence presented at the hearing calling into question that finding.
¶82 In sum on this issue, Miescke’s argument fails for lack of support by
legal authority and the record.
G. Circuit court erred in not hearing Miescke’s pending motions filed after the
court’s oral ruling dismissing his prior motion to modify legal custody and
physical placement
¶83 Miescke argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion in not hearing his emergency motion to modify physical placement and
for interim relief, or his motion to file supporting exhibits under seal. Those
motions were filed on July 28, 2025, and Miescke does not direct us to a record
item showing that the court scheduled them to be heard at the August 27 hearing.
At the start of the August 27 hearing, the court said that it set the hearing to
address Pahl’s request for emergency relief modifying legal custody and physical
placement. Pahl’s counsel noted that there were also pending motions to compel

No. 2025AP1778
31
and for contempt concerning GAL fees; the court responded that it would not
likely have time to address those motions, and that the court commissioner could
address them at a hearing on September 2. Miescke did not raise his motions at
that or any other time during the August 27 hearing. Miescke fails to show that
the court erroneously exercised its discretion in not addressing motions that were
not scheduled to be heard.
H. Circuit court issued temporary order with no review mechanism
¶84 Miescke argues that the circuit court characterized its order as
interim or temporary but did not provide for a review hearing, compliance check,
subsequent evidentiary proceeding, or timeline for review or modification or
reconsideration. Miescke mischaracterizes the order and disregards the statutory
review mechanism that applies to the court’s order.
¶85 Miescke provides no record support for his assertion that the circuit
court characterized its order as interim or temporary. The citation to the court’s
ruling that he does provide contains no such words or characterization. Rather, the
court identified the two requests before it—to modify legal custody to award sole
legal custody to Pahl, and to modify physical placement to order supervised
placement. The court then proceeded to explain its determination that the
evidence established a substantial change in circumstances and that it is in the
child’s best interest to grant both requests. Miescke points to nothing in the
court’s ruling, or in the written order that followed, indicating that the order is
interim or temporary.
¶86 As Miescke himself states, the statutory standard for modifying legal
custody and physical placement is a substantial change in circumstances, as stated
in WIS. STAT. § 767.451(1)(b). The written order sets forth the specific conditions

No. 2025AP1778
32
that Miescke must meet to show a substantial change in circumstances “for the
purpose of reviewing” the terms in the order.
¶87 Miescke’s arguments on this issue are baseless.
I. Circuit court improperly ordered that Miescke pay GAL fees
¶88 Miescke argues that the circuit court improperly ordered that he pay
all of the GAL fees without requiring evidence and making findings regarding his
ability to pay, causation, and “allocation factors.”8
¶89 The allocation of GAL fees is a matter within the circuit court’s
discretion. See WIS. STAT. § 767.407(6) (“The court shall order either or both
parties to pay all or any part of the compensation of the guardian ad litem.”).
¶90 Here, the circuit court found that it was Mesicke’s behavior that
necessitated the reappointment of the GAL. For that reason, the court ordered that
Miescke reimburse Pahl for the retainer that she paid the GAL when the GAL was
reappointed, and that Meiscke pay the full amount of GAL fees going forward.
¶91 Miescke’s argument that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion in doing so fails for at least the following reasons. Miescke did not
raise his ability to pay, causation, or “allocation factors” in the circuit court, either
at the hearing or in a motion for reconsideration, and we will not blindside the
circuit court with resolution of an argument that was not presented to it. See
8 Miescke also includes in this argument the circuit court’s order that he pay all expenses
related to the supervision of his placement. However, he does not make an argument addressed to
the supervision expenses separately from his argument about the GAL fees. Accordingly, we
refer solely to the GAL fees.

No. 2025AP1778
33
Schonscheck v. Paccar, Inc., 2003 WI App 79, ¶11, 261 Wis. 2d 769, 661
N.W.2d 476 (“A fundamental appellate precept is that we ‘will not … blindside
trial courts with reversals based on theories which did not originate in their
forum.’”) (quoted source omitted). Nor does Miescke support this argument with
citation to relevant legal authority, and we generally do not consider arguments
unsupported by legal authority. See Industrial Risk Insurers, 318 Wis. 2d 148,
¶25. And, Miescke disregards the record, which shows that the court explained
that it ordered that he pay the GAL fees because his behavior caused the need for
the reappointment of the GAL. Accordingly, this argument fails for lack of record
support and legal authority.
J. Cumulative errors require reversal or remand
¶92 Miescke argues that all of the asserted errors identified above
warrant reversal or remand. Because we have rejected his arguments about those
asserted errors, there is no basis for reversal or remand.
III. Motion for fees and costs for frivolous appeal
¶93 Pahl has moved for fees and costs based on a claim that Miescke’s
appeal is frivolous under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.25(3). “Whether an appeal is
frivolous is a question of law.” Kraemer v. Traun, 2025 WI App 8, ¶55, 415
Wis. 2d 125, 17 N.W.3d 49 (2024). “Sanctions for a frivolous appeal will be
imposed if the court concludes that the party ‘knew, or should have known, that
the appeal … [had no] reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law.’” Id. (citing RULE 809.25(3)(c)2.). While “we give some allowance
to pro se parties, the standard is objective, so we must examine what a reasonable
person ‘in the position of this pro se litigant kn[e]w or [should] have known about

No. 2025AP1778
34
the facts and the law relating to the arguments presented.’” Id. (quoted source
omitted). This court awards attorney fees under RULE 809.25 only when the entire
appeal is frivolous. Thompson v. Ouellette, 2023 WI App 7, ¶30, 406 Wis. 2d 99,
986 N.W.2d 338.
¶94 As explained above, Miescke’s arguments misrepresent or
mischaracterize the record, disregard our standard of review, are conclusory, or are
unsupported either by the record or by citation to relevant legal authority. We
discern no reasonable basis in law or equity for his arguments, and no reasonable
basis in his arguments for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
For these reasons, we conclude that Miescke’s entire appeal is frivolous and grant
Pahl’s motion for costs and fees. We remand to the circuit court to assess costs
and fees as allowed by WIS. STAT. RULE 809.25(3).
CONCLUSION
¶95 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s August and
October 2025 orders. We separately grant Pahl’s motion for costs and attorney
fees based on our determination that Miescke’s entire appeal is frivolous, and we
remand to the circuit court to assess costs and fees as allowed by WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.25(3).
By the Court.—Orders affirmed and cause remanded.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.