Terry A. Lange v. Paul M. Nigl

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 30, 2019
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2017AP1492 Cir. Ct. No. 1997PA174PJ

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN RE THE PATERNITY OF B. C. L.:

TERRY A. LANGE,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

OUTAGAMIE COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT AGENCY,

RESPONDENT,

V.

PAUL M. NIGL,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Outagamie County:
VINCENT R. BISKUPIC, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.
No. 2017AP1492

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Paul Nigl, pro se, appeals an order denying a
motion, based upon his ongoing incarceration, to reduce the balance of his child
support arrears, eliminate the accrued interest on those arrears, and modify his $5
weekly arrearage payment. We reject Nigl’s various arguments and affirm the
order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In February 1998, Nigl stipulated to his adjudication as the father of
Benjamin.1 At that time, Nigl was ordered to pay $100 per month in child support.
In October 2000, Nigl’s child support obligation was modified by stipulation to
$44.80 per week plus an additional $10 per week to be applied to arrears. In 2001,
Nigl was convicted of two counts of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor
vehicle and sentenced to consecutive terms consisting of a total of sixty years’
initial confinement followed by forty years’ extended supervision. The revocation
of an imposed and stayed sentence in another case increased Nigl’s total initial
confinement to sixty-six years.

¶3 In September 2002, the family court commissioner sent a letter to
Nigl, stating the court was returning Nigl’s “Motion to Reduce Child Support and
Defer until Released” and his motion for visitation. It appears Nigl’s requests
were not in the proper form as the court commissioner’s letter goes on to explain

1
Pursuant to WIS. STAT. RULE 809.81(8) (2017-18), we use a pseudonym when referring
to the child in this confidential matter. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the
2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.

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No. 2017AP1492

the process for seeking modification of an existing circuit court order. The record
does not reflect that Nigl properly filed a motion as directed by the letter. In
December 2005, the family court commissioner sent another letter to Nigl, stating
it was returning his “Motion to Modify Order of Physical Placement,” and again
explaining the process for seeking modification of an existing order. The record
does not reflect that Nigl followed up with a properly filed motion at that time.

¶4 On August 31, 2015, based upon his incarceration and Benjamin’s
emancipation, Nigl moved the family court commissioner to terminate his child
support payments, to reduce his arrears and interest owed, and to modify his
payment on arrears to $5 per week. Because Benjamin had reached the age of
eighteen, the family court commissioner terminated Nigl’s child support
payments, but it denied Nigl’s motion to reduce the amount of the arrears and
interest owed. Although Nigl remained obligated to pay $20 per month toward
birth expenses, his payment on arrears was reduced to $5 per week.

¶5 In March 2017, Nigl filed the underlying motion to reduce his child
support arrears from $32,464.34 to $824.46 and to forgive the $30,907.30 he owed
in interest on those arrears. He also sought to modify his monthly payment on
birth expenses and child support arrears from $40 per month to a lesser amount to
be determined. A family court commissioner denied the motion, and Nigl moved
the circuit court for de novo review. After a hearing, the court denied Nigl’s
requests and this appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

¶6 First, Nigl argues he is entitled to a reduction in the arrears balance
based on the Child Support Agency’s (CSA) failure to periodically review his
support obligation, consistent with WIS. STAT. § 767.59(4). The statute provides,

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in relevant part: “In any case in which the state is a real party in interest … the
department shall review the support obligation periodically and, if appropriate,
petition the court for revision of the judgment or order with respect to the support
obligation.” Sec. 767.59(4) (emphasis added). At the de novo hearing, counsel
for the CSA informed the circuit court that a “Notice of Right to Review” was sent
to Nigl in 2003 with no response. When the same notice was given in 2005, Nigl
requested review, but the CSA determined that a petition for modification was not
appropriate at that time. Nigl was instructed on the process to file his own motion
for review, but he did not file a motion. Counsel for the CSA added that Nigl
requested review in May 2015, however the CSA again determined it was not
appropriate to petition for modification. The court determined that these reviews
constituted “at least minimal compliance” with the statute.

¶7 Nigl nevertheless contends the arrears balance and the interest now
owed should be adjusted retroactive to 2005, when he first requested review. As
noted above, the CSA determined that a petition for modification was not
appropriate at that time. Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 767.59(1m), the circuit court
“may not revise the amount of child support … or an amount of arrearages in child
support … that has accrued, prior to the date that notice of the action is given to
the respondent, except to correct previous errors in calculations.” Nigl did not file
a motion to modify his child support obligation until 2015, fourteen years after his
incarceration began. Most importantly, his present motion does not seek to correct
any errors in calculations but, rather, seeks to compensate him for his own failure
to earlier move for modification of his child support obligation. Therefore, the
exception in § 767.59(1m) does not apply to Nigl’s present motion.

¶8 Next, citing both a decrease in his prison income and a newly
enacted federal regulation, Nigl argues there has been a substantial change in

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circumstances justifying a reduction in his payments on arrears and the
forgiveness of accrued interest. This court reviews a circuit court order denying a
motion to modify child support under an erroneous exercise of discretion standard,
see Rottscheit v. Dumler, 2003 WI 62, ¶11, 262 Wis. 2d 292, 664 N.W.2d 525,
and we conclude the same standard of review applies to a request to modify
payments on arrears and interest arising from a previous child support obligation.
We will affirm the circuit court’s exercise of discretion if it examined the evidence
before it, applied the proper legal standards, and reached a reasonable conclusion.
Id. Even if a circuit court fails to articulate the reasons for its decision, this court
will independently review the record to determine whether there is any reasonable
basis upon which we may uphold the circuit court’s discretionary decision. State
v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶53, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606.

¶9 The burden of demonstrating a substantial change in circumstances
is on the party seeking modification. Kelly v. Hougham, 178 Wis. 2d 546, 556,
504 N.W.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1993). Here, Nigl argues that the reduction in his
income from 2015—when the support orders were last modified, resulting from
his transfer to a new institution—constitutes a substantial change in circumstances
justifying the relief sought.2 Incarceration by itself, however, neither mandates
nor prevents modification of a child support obligation. Rottscheit, 262 Wis. 2d
292, ¶1. Rather, “[i]ncarceration is one factor that should be considered, but the
determination should be made on a case-by-case basis, looking at the totality of

2
Nigl’s prison income decreased from $70 per month as a plumber and HVAC
technician at Waupun Correctional Institution to $8 per month at Redgranite Correctional
Institution, despite his efforts to attain comparable employment at Redgranite. Nigl asserted that
better paying jobs are reserved for those that are closer to their release date.

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the relevant circumstances.” Id. The factors for consideration regarding an
incarcerated payer include, but are not limited to

the length of incarceration, the nature of the offense and the
relevant course of conduct leading to incarceration, the
payer’s assets, the payer’s employability and the likelihood
of future income upon release, the possibility of work
release during incarceration, the amount of arrearages that
will accumulate during the incarceration, and the needs of
the children.

Id., ¶41.

¶10 In denying Nigl’s motion, the circuit court properly considered
factors set forth in Rottscheit, noting Nigl was, in effect, “serving a life term,” thus
limiting his ability to have income or assets. The court engaged Nigl in a colloquy
regarding his employability and the possibility of work release during
incarceration, specifically acknowledging that Nigl’s opportunities for
employment were reduced following his transfer from Waupun Correctional
Institution to Redgranite Correctional Institution. The court heard argument
regarding the nature of Nigl’s offenses and the course of conduct leading to his
incarceration.

¶11 The circuit court also noted the significant amount of arrears plus
interest that will continue to accrue during Nigl’s incarceration, recognizing it is
unlikely the full amount will ever be collected. The court further considered the
child’s needs in discussing the financial impact of the child support order. The
court acknowledged that even if the child sees only a “very, very small
percentage” of the support obligation, it “can be very important to the custodial
parent and child.” Although the court lamented the “flaw” in the correctional
system that limits Nigl’s ability to earn more income through work, it correctly

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determined those limitations were not attributable to either the mother or the child.
Ultimately, the court reiterated—as one Rottscheit factor, among other factors—
that Nigl alone was responsible for his incarceration and, looking at the totality of
the circumstances, it properly exercised its discretion when it denied the motion to
either modify Nigl’s payment on arrears or forgive the interest on those arrears.

¶12 Nigl alternatively contends that pursuant to changes in the federal
guidelines for setting child support orders, see 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c)(3) (2016)
(effective January 19, 2017), “incarceration may not be treated as voluntary
unemployment in establishing or modifying support orders.” Here, the circuit
court did not treat Nigl’s incarceration as involuntary unemployment but, rather, it
merely applied the Rottscheit factors in deciding Nigl’s motion. Because we
discern no violation of 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c)(3), Nigl fails to show that this newly
enacted regulation constitutes a change in circumstances warranting the
modifications sought.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)5.

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