Steven K. Stack v. Donald Lecheler

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
September 12, 2019
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2019AP473 Cir. Ct. No. 2018SC2293

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STEVEN K. STACK,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

DONALD LECHELER,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for La Crosse County:
GLORIA L. DOYLE, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause
remanded with directions.

¶1 GRAHAM, J.1 Donald Lecheler, pro se, appeals a $2,000 small
claims judgment in favor of his former tenant, Steven K. Stack. I affirm in part,

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This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(a) (2017-18).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2019AP473

reverse in part, and remand with instructions to enter a modified judgment in favor
of Stack in the amount of $1,000.

¶2 Lecheler rented a room in his house to Stack, and the landlord/tenant
relationship got off to a bad start when Stack discovered that the room was
infested with bedbugs. The parties argued about the safety and effectiveness of
Lecheler’s plan for eradicating them. Specifically, Lecheler planned to move the
kitchen oven to other rooms throughout the house, which he believed would
increase the temperature and kill the bedbugs. Stack considered this to be a fire
hazard and was also concerned about the loss of cooking space. Stack claims that
Lecheler acted “very belligerent” and threatened an illegal eviction, and that Stack
felt unsafe in the home and ultimately moved out. According to Stack, Lecheler
refused to return his $200 security deposit, and Stack had to dispose of his
mattress and items of clothing.

¶3 Stack filed a small claims action seeking unspecified money
damages in the amount of $950 and emotional distress damages in the amount of
$5,000. Both parties testified at the hearing, and the circuit court granted
judgment in Stack’s favor. It awarded the following damages: $400 as double
damages for Lecheler’s failure to timely return Stack’s security deposit; $450 for
the replacement cost of the mattress, $250 for the replacement cost of the clothing,
and $1,000 in damages for emotional distress. The circuit court then reduced the
damages award to $2,000 to account for an unrelated prior debt. Lecheler contests
each item of damages in this appeal.

¶4 Lecheler’s arguments regarding the security deposit and the
replacement cost of the discarded property lack merit.

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¶5 Lecheler argues that the $200 payment Stack sent in advance of the
move-in date cannot be considered a “security deposit” as defined in the
Wisconsin Administrative Code because it was not an amount “in excess of one
month’s rent.” Lecheler misreads the regulatory language. A “security deposit” is
defined as “the total of all payments and deposits given by a tenant to the landlord
as security for the performance of the tenant’s obligations, and includes all rent
payments in excess of 1 month’s prepaid rent.” WIS. ADMIN. CODE § ATCP
134.02(11) (through August 2019). It is true that rent payments exceeding one
month’s prepaid rent are security deposits, but, as the first clause of the definition
makes clear, payments made “as security for the performance of the tenant’s
obligations” are security deposits as well, regardless of the amount. The record
supports the circuit court’s characterization of the $200 payment as a security
deposit.

¶6 Regarding the discarded property, Lecheler argues that Stack misled
the circuit court and that the court should have credited his version of events
instead. To the extent that Lecheler’s brief relies on factual allegations that were
not introduced during the small claims proceeding, I do not consider them. See
State v. Flynn, 190 Wis. 2d 31, 46 n.4, 527 N.W.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1994) (court of
appeals is limited to the record before the circuit court). Lecheler has not
demonstrated that any of the circuit court’s credibility determinations were
patently incredible, nor that its factual findings were clearly erroneous. See
Dickman v. Vollmer, 2007 WI App 141, ¶¶14-17, 303 Wis. 2d 241, 736 N.W.2d
202 (credibility determinations are left to the fact finder unless inherently or
patently unreliable, and factual findings will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous).

¶7 Lecheler’s argument regarding emotional distress damages fares
better. He argues that Stack would have to show (among other things) that he

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No. 2019AP473

suffered “an extreme and disabling response,” and that Stack failed to introduce
evidence sufficient to satisfy this standard. After reviewing the record, I conclude
that Stack is not entitled to emotional distress damages as a matter of law. He did
not introduce evidence of “severe” emotional distress required for a direct claim of
negligent infliction of emotional distress, see Camp ex rel. Peterson v. Anderson,
2006 WI App 170, ¶18, 295 Wis. 2d 714, 721 N.W.2d 146, nor did he introduce
evidence of “an extreme disabling response” required for a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, see Terry v. Journal Broadcast Corp., 2013 WI
App 130, ¶42, 351 Wis. 2d 479, 840 N.W.2d 255.

¶8 Finally, some portions of Lecheler’s brief may be read to suggest
that the circuit court judge was unfairly biased against him, though Lecheler does
not cite any controlling law on this point. I do not consider this argument since it
is not supported by adequate legal citations and is otherwise undeveloped. See
State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992)
(undeveloped legal arguments). While the court of appeals makes some
allowances for the failings of parties who, as here, are not represented by counsel,
I will not scour the record to develop viable, fact-supported legal theories on the
appellant’s behalf, see State v. Jackson, 229 Wis. 2d 328, 337, 600 N.W.2d 39
(Ct. App. 1999).

¶9 For the reasons discussed above, I affirm the circuit court judgment
in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions to enter a modified judgment in
favor of Stack in the amount of $1,000.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause
remanded with directions.

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No. 2019AP473

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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