Bruce Fuchs v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 29, 2023
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP1264 Cir. Ct. No. 2021CV291

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

BRUCE FUCHS AND KAREN FUCHS,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

V.

WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT,

TOWN OF CALEDONIA,

DEFENDANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Columbia County:
TROY D. CROSS, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Kloppenburg, Graham, and Nashold, JJ.
No. 2022AP1264

¶1 GRAHAM, J. Bruce and Karen Fuchs appeal a circuit court order
that granted summary judgment against the Fuchses and dismissed their action to
quiet title to a portion of a public beach owned by the Town of Caledonia. The
circuit court concluded that the Fuchses’ adverse possession claim is barred by
WIS. STAT. §§ 236.16(3)(b) and 236.43 (2021-22),1 which together establish the
exclusive statutory procedure for obtaining title to property that provides platted
public access to navigable waters. On appeal, the Fuchses concede that they did
not commence an action under § 236.43 to vacate or alter the public beach, but
they contend that they are not required to do so. We reject the Fuchses’ arguments
and affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The following facts are taken from the summary judgment materials
and are undisputed for purposes of summary judgment.

¶3 The Fuchses own a parcel of land on the shore of Lake Wisconsin in
the Town of Caledonia. The Fuchses’ parcel abuts another parcel to the west that
is owned by the Town, and both parcels are bordered to the north by a public road.
The Town-owned parcel allows the public to access Lake Wisconsin.

¶4 The boundary lines of the two parcels were established by a 1929
plat of the “First Addition to [the] Bellevue Resort.”2 In drawing this plat, a

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.
2
A “plat” is a map of a subdivision. See WIS. STAT. § 236.02(8). A “subdivision” is “a
division of a lot, parcel, or tract of land by the owner thereof … for the purpose of sale or of
building development” when the act of division creates a certain number of smaller parcels of
certain dimensions. See WIS. STAT. § 236.02(12)(am)1., 2.

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No. 2022AP1264

surveyor subdivided a larger tract of land on the shore of Lake Wisconsin and
specifically designated the Town-owned parcel as a “PUBLIC BEACH.”
Throughout the opinion, we refer to this parcel as the “Town Beach.”

¶5 The Fuchses purchased their parcel in 1994. As a part of the sale,
the prior owners also purported to convey an existing shed and septic tank that are
located west of the property line on a portion of the Town Beach. The prior
owners had been using the shed and septic tank, and the Fuchses have continued to
use the shed and septic tank since they purchased the property.

¶6 In November 2021, the Fuchses filed a complaint against the Town
and the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (the DNR). In their
complaint, the Fuchses sought to quiet title pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 893.29
(1993-94) to the portion of the Town Beach that contains the shed and septic tank.
That portion of land, which we refer to as the “disputed area,” extends
approximately 65-75 feet beyond the Fuchses’ western boundary, encompassing
almost half of the width of the Town Beach. The Fuchses allege that they and
their predecessors in interest had adversely possessed the disputed area since at
least May 1994 by mowing, removing snow, maintaining the shed and septic tank,
and treating the disputed area to prevent the accumulation of goose droppings.

¶7 The DNR moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Fuchses’
action is barred by WIS. STAT. §§ 236.16(3)(b) and 236.43. The DNR argued that
the Town Beach constitutes public access to a lake established under WIS. STAT.
ch. 236, and that the Fuchses cannot obtain title to the disputed area through
adverse possession because § 236.43 provides the exclusive statutory procedure
for terminating public access to a lake established under ch. 236. The DNR
further argued that the Fuchses did not comply with the procedures set forth in

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No. 2022AP1264

§ 236.43, nor can they, because the Town will not agree to terminate public access
at any portion of the Town Beach. The Town joined the DNR’s motion for
summary judgment.

¶8 The circuit court concluded that the Fuchses’ action is barred by
WIS. STAT. §§ 236.16(3)(b) and 236.43 and it granted summary judgment in favor
of the DNR and the Town. The Fuchses appeal.

DISCUSSION

¶9 We review de novo a circuit court’s decision to grant summary
judgment. Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 314-17, 401
N.W.2d 816 (1987). “A party is entitled to summary judgment when there are no
genuine issues of material fact and that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Palisades Collection LLC v. Kalal, 2010 WI App 38, ¶9, 324 Wis. 2d 180,
781 N.W.2d 503; WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2). In this case, the parties appear to agree
that the material facts are undisputed, and that the sole issue presented for our
review is whether WIS. STAT. §§ 236.16(3)(b) and 236.43 bar the Fuchses’ adverse
possession claim. That issue presents a question of law, which we review de
novo. See Moya v. Aurora Healthcare, Inc., 2017 WI 45, ¶16, 375 Wis. 2d 38,
894 N.W.2d 405 (interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law).

¶10 “In Wisconsin, the state holds title to the beds of navigable lakes,
ponds and rivers in trust for the public’s use and enjoyment.” Vande Zande v.
Town of Marquette, 2008 WI App 144, ¶1, 314 Wis. 2d 143, 758 N.W.2d 187
(citing R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 2001 WI 73, ¶19, 244 Wis. 2d 497, 628
N.W.2d 781); WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1. For the public to use and enjoy the
navigable waters held in trust by the state, the public must, of course, be able to
access such waters. Vande Zande, 314 Wis. 2d 143, ¶1.

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No. 2022AP1264

¶11 Since 1923, the legislature has required persons who subdivide
lakefront property to set aside routes that allow the public to access navigable
lakes. Id., ¶1 (citing 1923 Wis. Laws, ch. 223). To that end, the statute that was
in effect at the time the Town Beach was established provided: “The owner of
[certain] lands … desiring to divide the same into lots … by the platting thereof,
shall, in the platting of such lands, cause the highways to any lake … to be laid out
and extended to [the] low-water mark of such lake … at intervals … of not more
than one-half mile, as measured along the shore ….” WIS. STAT. § 236.09(1)
(1929).3 The 1929 statute further provided that “such highways shall be not less
than thirty feet in width.” Id. That statute has been revised and renumbered over
the years, and the current version now provides: “All subdivisions abutting on a
lake or navigable stream shall provide public access at least 60 feet wide providing
access to the water’s edge … at not more than one-half mile intervals as measured
along the lake or navigable stream ….” WIS. STAT. § 236.16(3)(a).

¶12 In Vande Zande, we concluded that a separate statute in WIS. STAT.
ch. 236, WIS. STAT. § 236.43, is “the exclusive means for the termination of a
public access to a lake, regardless of when the access was laid out.” Vande
Zande, 314 Wis. 2d 143, ¶22. This interpretation was based on the language of
WIS. STAT. §§ 236.16(3)(b) and 236.43. Section 236.16(3)(b) provides that “[n]o
public access established under this chapter may be vacated except by circuit court

3
Throughout their briefing, the parties cite to the 1929 version of the Wisconsin Statutes
when discussing the law that was in effect when the subdivision in question was platted. We
observe that the 1929 version of the statutes were not published until the end of the 1929
legislative session, after this subdivision was platted. However, we have not identified any
substantive differences between the 1929 version and the version in effect when the subdivision
was platted as it pertains to the issues in this case, and we follow the parties’ lead in citing the
1929 statutes.

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No. 2022AP1264

action as provided in [§] 236.43.”4 Section 236.43, in turn, outlines conditions
precedent for a circuit court to “vacate[] or alter[]” “[p]arts of a plat dedicated to
and accepted by the public for public use.” One of the conditions is that “the
governing body of the … town in which the … public way is located [has] joined
in the application for vacation.” See § 236.43(1)(d).

¶13 As noted, the Fuchses commenced their adverse possession action
under WIS. STAT. § 893.29(1) (1993-94).5 For purposes of summary judgment, it
is undisputed that the facts adduced by the Fuchses could satisfy their burden to
prove adverse possession, provided that adverse possession is an available means
of acquiring title to a portion of the Town Beach. However, to the extent that the
Town Beach constitutes “public access established under [WIS. STAT. ch. 236],”
the Fuchses cannot obtain title to this property via adverse possession. See WIS.
STAT. § 236.16(3)(b). This is because, as we have explained, public access
established under ch. 236 can be terminated only through the procedure set forth in
WIS. STAT. § 236.43.6 Vande Zande, 314 Wis. 2d 143, ¶22.

4
WISCONSIN STAT. § 236.16(3)(b) provides one exception to this rule, stating that
“public access may be discontinued under [WIS. STAT. §] 66.1003, subject to [WIS. STAT.
§] 66.1006.” It is undisputed that those statutes are inapplicable here.
5
In 1993, the then-existing statutes allowed the adverse possession of lands owned by
the state or political subdivisions. WIS. STAT. § 893.29 (1993-94). That statute has since been
amended, and the current version no longer permits adverse possession against the state or any
political subdivision. See § 893.29(1) (as amended by 1997 Wis. Act 108 and 2015 Wis. Act
219).
6
WISCONSIN STAT. § 893.29(1) (1993-94) could be read to authorize the adverse
possession of any type of public land, including public accesses established under WIS. STAT.
ch. 236. However, that interpretation of § 893.29(1) (1993-94) would conflict with WIS. STAT.
§ 236.16(3)(b), as that statute was interpreted in Vande Zande. See Vande Zande v. Town of
Marquette, 2008 WI App 144, ¶22, 314 Wis. 2d 143, 758 N.W.2d 187. If there is a conflict
between statutes, the specific statute controls over the more general statute. Belding v.
Demoulin, 2014 WI 8, ¶17, 352 Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 373. The Fuchses do not contest that,
to the extent that there is a conflict between § 893.29(1) (1993-94), which generally addresses
(continued)

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No. 2022AP1264

¶14 The Fuchses argue that their adverse possession claim is not barred
by WIS. STAT. §§ 236.16(3)(b) and 236.43 for what we discern to be two reasons.
They first contend that the Town Beach is not “public access established under”
the version of WIS. STAT. ch. 236 that was in effect in 1929 when the subdivision
was platted; therefore, they argue that § 236.43 is not the exclusive means to
obtain title to a portion of the Town Beach. In the alternative, they contend that,
even if the Town Beach is public access established under ch. 236, § 236.16(3)(b)
does not bar their adverse possession claim because they are not seeking to
“vacate” all public access to Lake Wisconsin from the Town Beach. We consider
and reject these arguments in turn.

I.

¶15 As noted, WIS. STAT. § 236.16(3)(b) provides that “[n]o public
access established under this chapter may be vacated except by” an “action as
provided in [WIS. STAT. §] 236.43.” And § 236.43, in turn, sets forth the
procedure for “vacat[ing] or alter[ing]” “[p]arts of a plat dedicated to and accepted
by the public for public use.”

¶16 The Fuchses contend that these statutes do not apply because the
Town Beach is not “public access established under [WIS. STAT. ch. 236].” More
specifically, the Fuchses argue that, for the Town Beach to constitute “public
access established under [ch. 236],” it must have been dedicated as such in
accordance with the version of ch. 236 that was in effect when the subdivision was

adverse possession of public lands, and § 236.16(3)(b) and WIS. STAT. § 236.43, which
specifically address vacating or modifying plats that provide public access to lakes, the more
specific statute controls.

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No. 2022AP1264

platted. We assume without deciding that this general premise is correct, and
further, as the Fuchses assert, that the access must have been dedicated to the
public pursuant to a statutory dedication.7

¶17 When land is subdivided, public spaces are established by means of
dedication to the public. Cohn v. Town of Randall, 2001 WI App 176, ¶6, 247
Wis. 2d 118, 633 N.W.2d 674. Statutory dedication “involves compliance with
the statutory procedure, and is generally accomplished [through] the platting
process.” Vande Zande, 314 Wis. 2d 143, ¶8. It consists of “whatever conduct is
prescribed by statute, which usually requires the execution and filing of a plat in
accordance with local law.” Cohn, 247 Wis. 2d 118, ¶6. We therefore look to
WIS. STAT. ch. 236 (1929) to determine whether the Town Beach was established
as public access in accordance with the then-existing statutes.

¶18 Here, there is no dispute that the 1929 plat was itself “execut[ed] and
fil[ed]” in accordance with Wisconsin law. See id. Then, as now, WIS. STAT.
ch. 236 (1929) set forth statutory requirements regarding the platting process, and
the Fuchses do not identify any provision in ch. 236 (1929) regarding the
execution or filing of a plat with which the 1929 plat does not comply.8

7
Public spaces may be dedicated to the public through statutory or common law
dedication. Vande Zande, 314 Wis. 2d 143, ¶8.
8
WISCONSIN STAT. § 236.01 (1929) allowed owners to divide tracts of land into “lots,
… streets and alleys, commons or public grounds as [the owner] may choose,” and set forth
requirements for surveying and subdividing “the exterior boundaries of the tract of land so
surveyed and divided and of all the lots, blocks, streets, alleys, commons or public grounds into
which the same shall be divided.” See § 236.01(1), (4) (1929). The 1929 plat appears to have
satisfied all requirements set forth in WIS. STAT. § 236.02 (1929) “to entitle a map made under
the provisions of [§] 236.01 to be recorded.” Among other things, the 1929 plat contained an
acknowledgement from the former owner of the platted land, as required by § 236.02(3) (1929).
The 1929 plat also contained the following certification from the surveyor, as required by
§ 236.02(2)(d) (1929): “That in surveying and subdividing [the First Addition to Bellevue
(continued)

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No. 2022AP1264

¶19 We now turn to whether the Town Beach was dedicated to the public
for public use. Wisconsin cases have stated that this inquiry turns on the former
owner’s “[i]ntent to dedicate [land] to the public.” Vande Zande, 314 Wis. 2d
143, ¶8 (explaining that intent to dedicate to the public is an essential component
of either statutory or common law dedication). The statute in effect at the time,
WIS. STAT. § 236.11 (1929), required that all lands “donat[ed] or grant[ed] to the
public” be “marked or noted as such on [the] plat.” Section 236.11 (1929) further
provides: “Such map or the record thereof or a certified copy of such record shall
be presumptive evidence of the truth of the facts therein stated in accordance with
the provisions of this chapter.”9

Resort] I have complied with the provisions of [WIS. STAT.] Chapters 236-236.09 and 278
[(1929)] of the Wisconsin statutes as pertains to such platting.” It is undisputed that the Town
passed the following resolution approving the plat, which was required by WIS. STAT.
§ 236.08(1) (1929) and appeared on the face of the 1929 plat: “Be it resolved by the town board
of the Town of Caledonia, Columbia County, Wisconsin, that the plat of the First Addition to
‘Bellevue Resort’ as laid out and platted in accordance with the laws of Wisconsin, be and is
hereby approved.” It is further undisputed that the plat was recorded with the county register of
deeds, consistent with WIS. STAT. § 236.10 (1929).
9
For the reader’s convenience, we reproduce the text of WIS. STAT. § 236.11 (1929),
entitled “Title to land marked as donated,” in its entirety:

When any map shall have been made, certified, signed,
acknowledged and recorded as above in this chapter prescribed
every donation or grant to the public or any individual or
individuals, religious society or societies or to any corporation
marked or noted as such on said plat or map shall be deemed in
law and equity a sufficient conveyance to vest the fee simple of
all such parcel or parcels of land therein expressed, and shall be
considered to all intents and purposes a general warranty against
such donor or donors, their heirs or representatives to the said
done or donees, grantee or grantees for his, her or their use for
the uses and purposes therein expressed and intended and no
other use or purpose whatever; and the land intended to be for
the streets, alleys, ways, commons or other public uses as
designated on said plat shall be held in the corporate name of the
town, city or village in which such plat is situated in trust to and
for the uses and purpose set forth, expressed and intended. Such
(continued)

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No. 2022AP1264

¶20 Although the Fuchses make some gestures in this direction, they
cannot meaningfully dispute that, in designating the Town Beach parcel “PUBLIC
BEACH,” the former owner’s unambiguous intention was to dedicate that parcel
to the public for public use. See Vande Zande, 314 Wis. 2d 143, ¶13. The
Fuchses point to Hunt v. Oakwood Hills Civic Ass’n, 19 Wis. 2d 113, 119
N.W.2d 466 (1963), but that case is inapt. In Hunt, the plat designated one parcel
as a “Public Way” and a second parcel as a “Community Beach.” Our supreme
court determined that “the intention expressed [by the ‘Community Beach’
designation] was to reserve a common use for the [adjoining] lot owners,” and that
“[t]he word ‘community’ was not intended to mean ‘public.’” Id. at 117.

¶21 This case is more akin to Vande Zande, 314 Wis. 2d 143. In that
case, we rejected an argument that the designation “Public Access” was
insufficient to dedicate a parcel to the public for public use. Id., ¶13. Otherwise,
we explained, one “would have to conclude that the word ‘public’ was not
intended to mean ‘public,’” which we would not do. Id. Here, as in Vande
Zande, we conclude that the designation “PUBLIC BEACH” demonstrates an
unambiguous intent to dedicate the parcel to the public for public use.

¶22 We now turn to the question that appears to be at the heart of the
Fuchses’ argument—whether the designation “PUBLIC BEACH” was sufficient
to dedicate the parcel as “public access established under [WIS. STAT. ch. 236].”
The Fuchses appear to advance two arguments why it was not, the first argument

map or the record thereof or a certified copy of such record shall
be presumptive evidence of the truth of the facts therein stated in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

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No. 2022AP1264

focuses on the term “access” and the second focuses on the phrase “established by
this chapter.”

¶23 The Fuchses first argue that the designation “PUBLIC BEACH” is
not synonymous with “public access” to navigable water, as that term is used in
WIS. STAT. § 236.16(3)(b). This argument is a nonstarter. The Fuchses cannot
dispute that, as a factual matter, the Town Beach allows members of the public to
access Lake Wisconsin without crossing private property. Turning to the pertinent
law, the Fuchses do not identify any statute, case, or other source of law requiring
a plat to specifically use the designation “public access” for a parcel to constitute
“public access [to navigable waters] established under this chapter” as that phrase
is used in § 236.16(3)(b). We conclude that “public access” is a broad term that
encompasses any means by which the public may be granted access to navigable
water, and a public beach is one such means.

¶24 Second, the Fuchses argue that, even if the public beach could
constitute public access to navigable water, this particular beach does not
constitute public access “established under [WIS. STAT. ch. 236].” This is because,
the Fuchses contend, the 1929 version of the statutes required access by
“highway,” and a public beach is not a “highway.” See supra ¶11 (quoting WIS.
STAT. § 236.09(1) (1929)).10 In other words, the Fuchses appear to be arguing that

10
Again, for convenience, we reproduce the text of WIS. STAT. § 236.09(1) (1929),
entitled “Plats, lake frontage,” in its entirety:

The owner of any lands lying outside the corporate
limits of any city or village in this state desiring to divide the
same into lots or blocks by the platting thereof, shall, in the
platting of such lands, cause the highways to any lake or stream
shown on the map thereof, to be laid out and extended to [the]
low-water mark of such lake or stream, at intervals, wherever
practicable unless the topography and ground conditions prevent,
(continued)

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No. 2022AP1264

the Town Beach cannot constitute public access established under ch. 236 because
the version of ch. 236 in effect at the time did not mandate public access to
navigable waters through any means other than a highway. For its part, the DNR
contends that the term “highway” means nothing more than “a public way,” and,
as such, is synonymous with the term “public access” as used in the current
version of WIS. STAT. § 236.16. See WIS. STAT. § 990.01(12) (defining “highway”

of not more than one-half mile, as measured along the shore,
such highways to be not less than thirty feet in width, which
platting shall be to the satisfaction and approval of the town
board or boards of the town or towns in which such lands are
situated, and also of the state board of health; but approval by the
state board of health shall not be necessary for the platting of
land lying within one and one-half miles of the corporate limits
of any city of the first class, or within three miles of the
corporate limits of any city of the second or third class, nor for
any plats in counties governed by the provisions of [§] 236.03, or
which have a county park commission. Such map or plat shall
show the exterior boundaries, courses and distances of boundary
lines of all lots shown thereon, with the number of each lot and
of the block in which the same is located, together with a
certificate of the engineer or surveyor by whom the same was
prepared, certifying to the correctness of the same, and that it
complies with the requirements of this section. Such map or plat
shall further contain the acknowledgement of the owner or
owners of the lands platted, made before an officer authorized to
take acknowledgements under the laws of Wisconsin to the
effect that such owner or owners caused such plat to be made. If
such plat shall be approved by the town board or boards of such
town or towns, such owner or owners shall be approved by the
town board or boards of such town or towns, such owner or
owners, shall file a true copy thereof will with the clerk of each
town in which the said lands are situated, and shall thereafter and
within thirty days after the date of the last approval, cause such
map and plat, together, with a certified copy of each resolution
approving the same, to be left for record in the office of the
register of deeds of the county in which such lands are located.

The Fuchses do not dispute that the 1929 plat was established consistent with all the procedural
requirements set forth in § 236.09(1) (1929).

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No. 2022AP1264

to include “all public ways and thoroughfares and all bridges upon the same”);
WIS. STAT. § 370.01(5) (1929) (same).

¶25 We need not resolve the parties’ dispute over whether the Town
Beach can or cannot be considered a “highway” because the Fuchses’ argument
rests on an unsupportable premise—that the public access established by the 1929
plat must have been specifically mandated by the then-existing statutes to
constitute “public access established under [WIS. STAT. ch. 236 (1929)].” WIS.
STAT. § 236.16(3)(b) (1929). There is no support for this premise in the
Wisconsin statutes. The unambiguous language of WIS. STAT. § 236.16(3)(b)
pertains to “public access established under [ch. 236].” And, as we have already
determined, the Town Beach was dedicated to the public, it provides access to
navigable water, and such access was “established” following the procedures set
forth in ch. 236 (1929). Thus, regardless of whether this specific form of access
was or was not mandated by ch. 236 (1929), the Town Beach is “public access
established under this chapter,” as that phrase is used in § 236.16(3)(b).

II.

¶26 The Fuchses’ alternative argument focuses on the term “vacated,” as
that term is used in WIS. STAT. § 236.16(3)(b). As noted, § 236.16(3)(b) provides
that “[n]o public access established under this chapter may be vacated except by
circuit court action as provided in [WIS. STAT. §] 236.43.” The Fuchses argue that
their adverse possession claim is not governed by § 236.16(3)(b) because quieting
title to the disputed area will not eliminate all public access to Lake Wisconsin
from the Town Beach.

¶27 According to the Fuchses, the term “vacate” in WIS. STAT.
§ 236.16(3)(b) means “to make legally void,” and they contend that they are not

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No. 2022AP1264

attempting to legally void all public access to Lake Wisconsin through the Town
Beach. Because the Fuchses claim to have adversely possessed only a portion of
the Town Beach, they explain that the public will continue to have access to Lake
Wisconsin through other portions of the Town Beach even after they obtain title to
the disputed area. We reject the Fuchses’ alternative argument for three reasons.

¶28 First, the Fuchses provide no legal support for their argument. See
State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992)
(providing that we need not consider arguments that are unsupported by legal
authority).

¶29 Second, the Fuchses’ position is not consistent with the pertinent
statutory language. As noted, WIS. STAT. § 236.16(3)(b) refers to the process set
forth in WIS. STAT. § 236.43, which addresses “[v]acation or alteration of areas
dedicated to the public.” (Emphasis added.) Section 236.43, in turn, provides that
“[p]arts of a plat dedicated to and accepted by the public for public use may be
vacated or altered” following the process set forth in that statute. (Emphasis
added.) Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Fuchses’ action will not
“vacate” all public access at the Town Beach, as that term is used in
§§ 236.16(3)(b) and 236.43, it will certainly “alter” the public’s access by
allowing the Fuchses to exclude the public from nearly half of that parcel.

¶30 Finally, if accepted, the Fuchses’ argument would thwart the purpose
of WIS. STAT. §§ 236.16 and 236.43. Section 236.16 promotes the public trust
doctrine by requiring public access of a certain width at certain intervals along the
shore, and § 236.43 also promotes the public trust doctrine by requiring, among
other things, the consent of the municipality in which the public access is located
to vacate or alter that access. Under the Fuchses’ construction of §§ 236.16(3)(b)

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No. 2022AP1264

and 236.43, an individual could evade these statutory requirements by obtaining
title via adverse possession to all but a foot-wide strip of an existing public access,
over the municipality’s objection. That construction would allow private
individuals to chip away at the public access mandated by statute, and would
undermine the rights safeguarded by the public trust doctrine.

¶31 For all these reasons, we reject the Fuchses’ arguments. We
conclude that the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the
DNR and the Town because the Fuchses’ adverse possession claim is barred by
WIS. STAT. §§ 236.16(3)(b) and 236.43.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

Not recommended for publication in the official reports.

15