Marinette County v. A. M. N.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 29, 2023
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP1395 Cir. Ct. No. 2022ME31

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF A. M. N.:

MARINETTE COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

A. M. N.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Marinette County:
JANE M. SEQUIN, Judge. Order affirmed; order reversed.

¶1 GILL, J.1 Alex2 appeals a WIS. STAT. ch. 51 commitment order and
an associated order allowing for the involuntary administration of medication.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2021-22).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2022AP1395

Alex argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by admitting
and relying on hearsay evidence regarding the dangerousness element, and that
such error is not harmless. Additionally, Alex contends that there was insufficient
evidence to support the involuntary medication order because Alex did not receive
the required reasonable explanation of the advantages, disadvantages, and
alternatives to the proposed medications, as required by WIS. STAT.
§ 51.61(1)(g)4.

¶2 We assume without deciding that the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion when it admitted hearsay evidence and subsequently relied,
in part, on the hearsay evidence in its findings. Regardless, we conclude that such
error was harmless because the court also relied on properly admitted evidence in
its findings and that evidence was sufficient to meet the dangerous standard.
Therefore, we affirm the commitment order. However, we conclude that the
County failed to show that Alex was provided with the explanation required by
WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)4. In doing so, we assume without deciding that Alex’s
challenge to the involuntary medication order is moot, but we conclude that Alex’s
appeal presents an “exceptional or compelling circumstance[]” warranting review.
Therefore, we reverse the involuntary medication order.

BACKGROUND

¶3 In April 2022, Alex was exhibiting “extremely paranoid” behavior
and reportedly “cutting wires on different appliances” in the home where he lived
with his grandparents. He was thereafter detained under WIS. STAT. § 51.15.

2
For ease of reading, we refer to the appellant and his family members in this
confidential appeal using pseudonyms, rather than their initials.

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No. 2022AP1395

¶4 In May 2022, at a final hearing, Dr. Michele Andrade, Dr. Kevin
Miller, Deputy David Oginski, and Alex all testified. Oginski testified regarding
his contact with Alex’s grandfather, Dwayne, and Alex at their home in April
2022. According to Oginski, Dwayne informed Oginski that he was awoken by a
loud bang in the basement, which is where Alex’s bedroom was located. Dwayne
also informed Oginski that “they had previous problems the last couple nights”
because Alex had “manipulat[ed] the furnace, water heater, freezer, [and] various
electrical appliances down in the basement” by “cutting wires.” Alex’s lawyer
objected to this testimony on hearsay grounds. After counsel explained that she
was “not offering this [testimony] for the truth of the matter,” the circuit court
overruled the objection and allowed the testimony, noting that “it’s just for
background.”

¶5 After Deputy Oginski further testified about Dwayne’s concerns
regarding Alex, Alex’s lawyer renewed his hearsay objection. Again, the circuit
court overruled the objection, stating that the challenged testimony was “only
allowed for the purpose of laying background.” The County then asked Oginski if
cutting wires was dangerous, to which Alex’s lawyer objected, on grounds of lack
of qualification. Oginski stated that “based on [his] training and experience[, he]
believe[d] these are things that should not be manipulated or cut by somebody
who is not a trained, qualified technician.” Oginski further stated that while he did
not see who cut the wires, he personally observed that the wires “were cut and
manipulated” on the water heater, the furnace, the freezer, and a control panel.

¶6 Doctor Miller testified next. He explained that Alex “elected to
remain silent,” so his examination was based on “collateral information.” The
County then asked Miller to give a “brief summary” of Alex’s history, “leading up
to this incident,” to which Miller responded:

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No. 2022AP1395

What I understood is that he has previously been treated for
psychosis with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and that he was
living with his grandparents and that it appeared as though
his grandmother was the main one that helped him. She
went out of town. He stopped taking medications after she
went out of town, and his mental status deteriorated. He
started to work on—

At that point, Alex’s lawyer objected, asserting a hearsay objection. The County
responded that the testimony “can be used because [Miller is] an expert and he can
use collateral information to base his opinions that he’s going to state today.” The
circuit court agreed and overruled the objection. Miller then testified that the
“information” indicated that Alex had stopped taking his medications as
prescribed, that his mental status had “deteriorated,” that he believed Alex’s
diagnosis to be schizophrenia “based on the history and documentation,” that the
records showed that Alex’s “mental status [had] deteriorated,” and that Alex was
doing unnecessary electrical work in his grandparents’ home.

¶7 Doctor Miller noted that it is “a fairly common problem in people
with psychosis that they start to believe there’s something wrong with the
mechanical systems of the home.” Explaining further, Miller testified that people
who experience psychosis often “start doing electrical work or damaging property
in the home” because they “believe there’s something wrong” or “something
nefarious going on.” According to Miller, this behavior can lead to individuals
“electrocuting themselves or causing fires in the home,” which endangers
themselves and others.

¶8 Doctor Miller testified he believed that the applicable dangerousness
standard for Alex “was the third standard,” under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.,
and he opined that Alex presented “a significant risk of harm to others and
himself.” Miller reasoned that this risk was, in part, because Alex was cutting the

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No. 2022AP1395

wires “in a dangerous way,” “such as grabbing bare wires with his hands.” Miller
also expressed concern that Alex was unqualified to do such work, and that this
behavior “didn’t just happen once; it happened multiple times” while Dwayne was
home.

¶9 Regarding medication, Dr. Miller testified that the records indicated
that Alex “had stopped taking his medications as prescribed.” Miller opined that
Alex was incompetent to refuse medications because he was “not able to
understand the risks, benefits, and alternatives to medications.”

¶10 Doctor Miller further testified that “[t]he nurse practitioner tried at
least twice” to explain the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives of the
medications to Alex. Alex’s lawyer objected, and the circuit court overruled the
objection, explaining that Miller had reviewed the records from the nurse
practitioner.

¶11 Doctor Andrade also testified that she based her findings on
“collateral information” because Alex “refused the exam[ination].” Andrade
stated that this collateral information included speaking with nursing staff at the
Winnebago Mental Health Institute—where Alex was being treated—and Alex’s
grandparents. According to Andrade, Alex’s grandparents confirmed that there
was no one in the home, other than Alex, who could have cut the wires. Alex’s
lawyer objected based on hearsay. The circuit court overruled the objection,
stating, “Again, overruled given the fact that this is an expert.” Regarding
medication, Andrade testified that Alex was not competent to refuse medication,
which is the main treatment for schizophrenia.

¶12 Finally, during Alex’s testimony, he admitted that he cut the wires.
Alex explained that he used the “appropriate safety measures” when cutting the

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No. 2022AP1395

wires, such as ensuring “that the power was off.” Alex also testified that no one
explained to him the benefits or disadvantages of the medications recommended
for him.

¶13 Thereafter, the circuit court ordered Alex to be committed for six
months. In doing so, the court found that the grounds for an initial commitment
were established, concluding that Alex was mentally ill, “dangerous based upon
the opinions rendered by both Dr. Andrade and Dr. Miller,” and a proper subject
for treatment. The court specified that Alex exhibited a “substantial probability of
physical harm to himself or others, probability of physical harm to others, [and] a
substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself or other
individuals due to impaired judgment.” The court also reiterated that “the doctors
have the right to rely on collateral sources.”

¶14 Regarding involuntary medication, the circuit court noted that “the
testimony was clear that the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives of
medication had been explained to” Alex. The court determined that Alex was “not
competent” to refuse medication and was “substantially incapable of applying an
understanding of [the] advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives” of the
medications. The court entered an involuntary medication order for the period of
Alex’s commitment. Alex now appeals both the initial commitment order and the
involuntary medication order. Additional facts will be provided below as
necessary.

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No. 2022AP1395

DISCUSSION

I. Initial Commitment Order

¶15 For an initial commitment, a petitioner must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill, a proper subject for
treatment, and dangerous. WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)1.-2., (13)(e). “To establish
dangerousness, a petitioner in an initial commitment action must prove that the
individual meets at least one of four dangerousness standards by evidence of
“recent threats,” “a recent overt act,” “a pattern of recent acts or omissions” or
recent behavior.3 See § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-d. The circuit court determined in its
written order that Alex met three of the four potentially applicable dangerousness
standards. As previously noted, Alex argues that the court erroneously exercised
its discretion by admitting and relying on hearsay evidence regarding the
dangerousness element, and that such error is not harmless.4

¶16 More specifically, Alex argues that the circuit court “went beyond
the properly admitted evidence showing a single episode of conduct and relied on
inadmissible hearsay to conclude Alex had engaged in multiple [dangerous] acts”
and “posed a substantial risk” to himself or others.5 The County responds that
while the “court did admit some [hearsay] evidence as background and not for the

3
It is undisputed that the fifth dangerousness standard, which does not require evidence
of recent acts or omissions, is inapplicable in Alex’s case. See WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e.
4
Alex does not challenge the circuit court’s finding that he is mentally ill and a proper
subject for treatment; his sole challenge relates to the evidence submitted regarding
dangerousness.
5
Alex concedes that there is credible evidence that he cut the wires in his grandparents’
home at least once. In Alex’s briefing, he cites to his admission during the final hearing as
evidence of this event.

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No. 2022AP1395

truth of the matter asserted, the … court did not base it[s] final reasoning on
hearsay evidence.” According to the County, because it presented other evidence
that Alex cut wires in the home and engaged in the dangerous acts, the “court’s
findings … are not clearly erroneous because [the court] did not have to rely on
any hearsay.”

¶17 For purposes of our review, we assume without deciding that the
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by admitting and relying on
hearsay testimony in finding that Alex was dangerous. However, we conclude that
this error was harmless. Harmless error is applicable in WIS. STAT. ch. 51
proceedings. See S.Y. v. Eau Claire County, 162 Wis. 2d 320, 324, 469 N.W.2d
836 (1991). An error is harmless when the error did “not affect the substantial
rights of the adverse party.” WIS. STAT. § 805.18(1). “For an error to affect the
substantial rights of a party, there must be a reasonable possibility that the error
contributed to the outcome of the action or proceeding at issue.” Evelyn C.R. v.
Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768. Whether an error
was harmless presents a question of law that we review independently. State v.
Beamon, 2013 WI 47, ¶19, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681.

¶18 In finding dangerousness, the circuit court properly relied in part
upon the testimony of Deputy Oginski and Alex’s admission that he cut the wires.
In doing so, the court noted “the testimony of [Oginski] and of [Alex]” and the
“perception of law enforcement” that “the electrical work would result in harm to
the subject … and [the] family of the subject.” The court found Oginski’s
personal observations of the cut wires to be credible. This evidence in tandem
with Alex’s own admission that he cut the wires provided a basis for the court to
find dangerousness.

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No. 2022AP1395

¶19 Despite Alex’s testimony that the wires “were not cut with bare
hands” and that “the power was off,” the circuit court’s findings indicate that it did
not find this testimony to be credible. In fact, the court stated that “a large part” of
its findings were based on the “evidence that’s been presented with regard to the
cutting of the wires or the pulling of the wires,” but the court acknowledged that
Alex “disputes that” and claims “that he did do that but that he cut it in a fashion
that was safe.” Additionally, the court could have relied on Dr. Miller’s testimony
that people who experience psychosis often “start doing electrical work or
damaging property in the home” because they “believe there’s something wrong”
or “something nefarious going on.”

¶20 Alex’s testimony was not hearsay and, coupled with
Deputy Oginski’s testimony that an untrained individual engaged in this activity
could harm themselves, provided sufficient evidence from which the circuit court
could find Alex dangerous, specifically under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.6
Stated differently, even without the erroneously admitted hearsay evidence, other
properly admitted evidence was sufficient to establish that Alex “[e]vidence[d]
such impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or
omissions, that there [was] a substantial probability of physical impairment or
injury to himself … or other individuals.” See § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. There was
credible evidence that Alex demonstrated a pattern of cutting the wires on multiple

6
As noted above, the circuit court concluded that Alex met three of the four
dangerousness standards for an initial commitment within WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-d. The
County only needed to provide proof of one dangerousness standard to commit Alex. See
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. Because we conclude that Alex met the third dangerousness standard, see
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c., even without the improperly admitted hearsay evidence, we contain our
analysis to that standard. See State v. Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997)
(holding appellate courts should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds).

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No. 2022AP1395

appliances in his grandparents’ home. Alex cut the wires for the furnace, the
water heater, and the control panel, which were all actions the court reasonably
concluded created a substantial probability of physical impairment to himself and
Dwayne. Thus, the outcome of the proceeding would be the same even if the
court had not considered Dr. Miller’s and Dr. Andrade’s testimony and reports
about Alex’s recent dangerous acts of cutting the wires.

II. Involuntary Medication Order

A. Mootness

¶21 Alex contends that the County failed to prove that he was given the
required reasonable explanation of the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives
to the proposed medications.7 The County contends that we should not reach the
involuntary medication order issue because it is moot under Outagamie County v.
L.X.D.-O., 2023 WI App 17, ¶14, 407 Wis. 2d 441, 991 N.W.2d 518.8

¶22 “An issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical effect on
the underlying controversy.” Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶11, 386
Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. Mootness is an issue that we review de novo.
L.X.D.-O., 407 Wis. 2d 441, ¶11.

7
Alex also argues that the County failed to prove he was not competent to refuse
medication. Because we conclude that the County failed to prove that it provided Alex with the
required explanation and reverse the involuntary medication order on those grounds, we do not
address Alex’s argument regarding his competency to refuse medication.
8
In July 2023, this court ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the
involuntary medication order was moot in light of our opinion in Outagamie County v.
L.X.D.-O., 2023 WI App 17, ¶14, 407 Wis. 2d 441, 991 N.W.2d 518.

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No. 2022AP1395

¶23 This court held in L.X.D.-O., that an involuntary medication order
was moot because our review of the merits of that order would not have had a
“practical effect” on the collateral consequences (a firearms ban and cost of care
liability) because “[t]hose collateral consequences [would] remain in effect under
the [undisputedly] valid commitment order regardless of our decision on appeal.”
Id., ¶¶12, 14; see WIS. STAT. § 51.20(13)(cv) (relating to the firearm restriction);
WIS. STAT. § 46.10(2) (relating to the cost of care liability). We reasoned that the
“there [was] no ‘causal relationship’ between the medication order alone and the
collateral consequences stemming from the commitment.” L.X.D.-O., 407
Wis. 2d 44, ¶14 (citation omitted). We acknowledged that under § 46.10(2), “an
argument could be made that the costs of care may be reduced if a medication
order were vacated.” L.X.D.-O., 407 Wis. 2d 44, ¶14 n.8. We reserved the cost of
care liability issue for another day, however, because the appellant did not make
that argument. Id.

¶24 Here, Alex adopts the argument from L.X.D.-O.’s footnote 8, and he
contends that the involuntary medication order is not moot because of the cost of
care liability under WIS. STAT. § 46.10(2). We will assume without deciding that
the cost of care liability does not save the issue from mootness. Nonetheless, we
conclude that Alex’s case presents an “exceptional or compelling circumstance[]”
warranting review. See L.X.D.-O., 407 Wis. 2d 441, ¶15 (citation omitted).

There are several established exceptions under which this
court may elect to address moot issues: (1) “the issues are
of great public importance;” (2) “the constitutionality of a
statute is involved;” (3) the situation arises so often “a
definitive decision is essential to guide the [circuit] courts;”
(4) “the issue is likely to arise again and should be resolved
by the court to avoid uncertainty;” or (5) the issue is
“capable and likely of repetition and yet evades review.”

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No. 2022AP1395

Id. (citation omitted).

¶25 We conclude that two exceptions to mootness apply to the
involuntary medication order: the fourth exception, in which we conclude that our
analysis will provide further clarity and resolve uncertainty; and the fifth
exception, in which we conclude that the issue is “capable and likely of repetition
and yet evades review.” Therefore, we choose to address the involuntary
medication order.9

¶26 Regarding the fourth exception, Alex’s challenge to the involuntary
medication order is not solely based on the sufficiency of the evidence in this
particular case. See L.X.D.-O., 407 Wis. 2d 441, ¶19. Alex’s challenge also
implicates circumstances regarding a subject’s invocation of his or her right to
remain silent. “Thus, this appeal will clarify and provide guidance in evaluating
sufficiency of the evidence challenges in other cases, [where a subject remains
silent] which will be of practical assistance to future litigants.” See id.

¶27 Addressing the fifth exception, our supreme court has explained that
the exception “is limited to situations involving ‘a reasonable expectation that the

9
The County’s only response to Alex’s reliance on these two exceptions is that
L.X.D.-O. “already addressed” the exceptions and, therefore, Alex’s case no longer provides an
“exceptional or compelling circumstance[]” warranting review. See L.X.D.-O., 407 Wis. 2d 441,
¶15 (citation omitted). We disagree with the County’s argument for two reasons. First, as we
will explain, the fifth mootness exception is focused on whether the same party will be subject to
the same action. See Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶30, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d
509. Therefore, the fact that L.X.D.-O. addressed a similar issue under the fifth mootness
exception is irrelevant. Further, L.X.D.-O. considered “what circumstances and to what extent an
examiner’s report may be considered by the circuit court in initial commitment proceedings,”
L.X.D.-O., 407 Wis. 2d 441, ¶19, not with the circumstances here, which surround the
explanation of the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to the proposed medications, as
required by WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)4., when a subject elects to remain silent (as we will explain,
the facts of this case differ from those presented in L.X.D.-O., 407 Wis. 2d 441, ¶40).

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No. 2022AP1395

same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.’” J.W.K.,
386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶30 (citation omitted). In L.X.D.-O., we decided to address the
involuntary medication order issue, even though the order was moot, because
“[t]here [was] ample evidence in the record to suggest that [the subject’s] mental
health concerns [were] ongoing and that [the subject] may likely be subject to a
WIS. STAT. ch. 51 commitment with a medication order again in the future.”
L.X.D.-O., 407 Wis. 2d 441, ¶18. Alex could again be subjected to ch. 51
proceedings given his history of mental illness, which includes previous treatment
for psychosis and schizophrenia, a history of noncompliance, and evidence that he
stopped taking his medications. Thus, as in L.X.D.-O., “we conclude that the
same legal issue will likely arise again specifically for [Alex].” See L.X.D.-O.,
407 Wis. 2d 441, ¶18.

¶28 Additionally, “both in regard to [Alex] as well as similarly situated
individuals, given the short duration of commitment orders and the corresponding
medication orders … the issue presented by this appeal is likely to evade review
because appellate review may not be accomplished before a commitment order
expires.” See id.; J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶29.

¶29 As such, we assume without deciding that Alex’s challenge to the
involuntary medication order is moot, and we conclude that the fourth and fifth
exceptions to mootness apply.

B. Sufficiency of the evidence

¶30 For a circuit court to order an individual be involuntarily medicated,
the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
individual: (1) “is incapable of expressing an understanding of the advantages and
disadvantages of accepting medication or treatment and the alternatives”; and

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No. 2022AP1395

(2) “is substantially incapable of applying an understanding of the advantages,
disadvantages and alternatives to his or her mental illness … in order to make an
informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment.” WIS.
STAT. §§ 51.20(13)(e), 51.61(1)(g)4.a.-b. In evaluating whether the petitioner has
met its burden, “the circuit court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, but
application of those facts to the statute and interpretation of the statute are
reviewed independently.” Winnebago County v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶50,
366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109.

¶31 An individual subject to an involuntary medication order is entitled
to an explanation of “the advantages and disadvantages of and alternatives to
accepting the particular medication or treatment.” WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)4.
This explanation should include why particular medications are “being prescribed,
what the advantages of the [medications] are expected to be, what side effects may
be anticipated or are possible, and whether there are reasonable alternatives to the
prescribed medication.” Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶67, 349
Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.

¶32 Alex argues that the County did not provide sufficient evidence that
he was given the explanation required by WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)4.
Doctors Miller and Andrade both testified that Alex was unable to apply an
understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to his
recommended medications, and that Alex was incompetent to refuse medication.
However, neither doctor provided details regarding the reasoning for their
conclusions on the issue. Moreover, the doctors’ testimony and their reports state
that they did not explain to Alex the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to
the recommended medications. At most, Miller testified that a “nurse practitioner
tried at least twice” to provide the required explanation. Miller did not provide

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No. 2022AP1395

any details regarding these attempts, however, and the content and format of these
alleged conversations with Alex regarding the explanations are unclear.

¶33 We agree with Alex that the evidence before the circuit court was
insufficient to prove he was provided the required explanation. The County did
not call the nurse practitioner to testify regarding any attempts to provide the
required explanation to Alex, nor did the County introduce into evidence
documentation regarding either attempt. The records Dr. Miller relied upon in
testifying about the nurse practitioner’s attempted explanations were not
introduced into evidence. Neither doctor testified or stated in their report that they
tried to provide the required explanation. Doctor Andrade testified that she did not
know whether “the Winnebago [Mental Health Institute] staff were able to
[provide an explanation] or not.” It is unclear whether Alex was informed of what
medications he was to be prescribed, whether any of the prescribed medications
would have side effects, or if there were any alternatives to the medications. See
Melanie L., 349 Wis. 2d 148, ¶67. Without evidence that the nurse practitioner
tried to provide the required explanation, there was insufficient evidence before
the court to warrant an involuntary medication order.

¶34 We recognize that an individual can relinquish his or her right to the
statutorily required explanation. See L.X.D.-O., 407 Wis. 2d 441, ¶¶39-40 (“[B]y
his own express conduct, [the subject] refused to engage with [a doctor] to receive
the full, required explanations. [The subject] cannot now assert that his efforts to
avoid the medication discussion should defeat the medication order.”); Waukesha
County v. M.J.S., No. 2017AP1843, unpublished slip op. ¶29 (WI App Aug. 1,
2018) (holding that an individual “cannot just plug his [or her] ears with his [or
her] fingers to avoid hearing the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to
treatment, and then subsequently complain that he [or she] was not provided the

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No. 2022AP1395

statutory explanation”).10 However, unlike L.X.D.-O., there was no admissible
evidence provided at the final hearing as to the nature and extent of any attempt to
provide Alex with the required explanation. As stated earlier, experts are allowed
to rely on inadmissible evidence in forming their opinions, but they are not
allowed to “act as a mere conduit for the opinion of another.” State v. Williams,
2002 WI 58, ¶19, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919. Without the nurse
practitioner’s testimony or the relevant medical records that Dr. Miller allegedly
relied upon, the circuit court could not reasonably assess whether Alex refused an
explanation, or whether an explanation simply was not provided to him.

¶35 The County responds that both experts, Dr. Andrade and Dr. Miller,
testified that Alex was unable to apply the advantages and disadvantages of, and
alternatives to, medication or treatment. According to the County, the doctors
based this testimony “on their review of [Alex’s] history of noncompliance.” The
County’s response is unpersuasive. There was no foundation for either doctor’s
opinion on this issue given the fact that neither doctor personally provided the
required information to Alex nor attempted to provide the required explanation,
and they had no evidence of the nurse practitioner’s attempts to do so. The
doctors were unable to assess Alex’s ability to understand or apply the advantages,
disadvantages and alternatives regarding the medications, and, therefore, their
opinions is this regard are without any foundation.

10
Unpublished opinions authored by a single judge and issued on or after July 1, 2009,
may be cited for their persuasive value. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b).

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No. 2022AP1395

¶36 We conclude that the County presented no evidence showing that
Alex was provided with the explanation required by WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)4.
Therefore, we reverse Alex’s involuntary medication order.

By the Court.—Order affirmed; order reversed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)4.

17