State v. Dax D. Dronso

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
February 5, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos.
2023AP1748-CR Cir. Ct. Nos. 2020CF1449
2020CM1804
2023AP1749-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

DAX D. DRONSO,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from judgments of the circuit court for Waukesha County:
LLOYD V. CARTER, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Neubauer, Grogan and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
Nos. 2023AP1748-CR
2023AP1749-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Dax D. Dronso appeals from judgments of
conviction entered in these consolidated cases after a jury trial. Dronso argues that
the circuit court erred in granting the State’s motion to join these two cases for
trial.1 We affirm.

¶2 Dronso was charged with two counts of burglary after his estranged
wife identified him to police after identifying Dronso from video surveillance
footage as the person who burglarized two Muskego bars. Dronso’s wife was able
to recognize him immediately from the video based on some unique physical
characteristics of the burglar. She was also able to identify Dronso because of the
burglar’s clothes and the specific shoes he was wearing. Dronso’s wife
remembered buying the shoes depicted in the video, and presented the police with
a receipt verifying the shoe purchase. Dronso subsequently sent multiple
electronic messages to his wife calling her a “fucking snitching bitch,” threatening
to kill her, and otherwise harassing and scaring her. As a result, Dronso was
charged in a second case with using a computerized communication system to
send threats of physical harm.

¶3 After Dronso entered not guilty pleas in both cases, the State moved
to join the cases for trial. Dronso objected, and the circuit court held a hearing on
the motion. Dronso argued that joinder was improper because the two cases were
not connected. Citing the spousal privilege statute, WIS. STAT. § 905.05(1)
(2021-22),2 Dronso further asserted that his wife “is married to the defendant and

1
The Honorable Brad D. Schimel presided over these cases through Dronso’s sentencing
hearing. The Honorable Lloyd V. Carter signed the judgments of conviction.
2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.

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may not testify against him.” At the close of the hearing, the court granted the
State’s joinder motion. In support of its decision, the court made the following
findings:

[Dronso’s wife] provided critical information to the
State's prosecution. It’s not privileged private
communication, at least the part we are talking about here.
And the threats do appear to be linked to her cooperating
with law enforcement. So I will find that there is a
sufficient link between these cases and that if the cases had
been filed all at once, the State could have joined these
charges in a separate information.

Regarding spousal privilege, the court limited the extent to which Dronso’s wife
could testify against him, barring testimony that Dronso had confessed to his wife
that he had committed the Muskego burglaries, but allowing testimony regarding
the wife’s identification of Dronso from the video surveillance footage, as those
were not private communications between the couple.

¶4 The joined cases proceeded to a jury trial. Following a two-day trial,
the jury found Dronso guilty on all three counts. The circuit court imposed
concurrent sentences totaling three years of initial confinement and three years of
extended supervision. Dronso appeals.

¶5 Dronso argues that the circuit court erred in ordering joinder of the
threats case and the burglary cases for trial. He asserts that the criteria for joinder
under the statute were not satisfied because the charges were neither “of the same
or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction,” nor were they
“based … on [two] or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting
parts of a common scheme or plan.” See WIS. STAT. § 971.12(1). Dronso
contends that there was “no connection” between the threats count and the
burglary counts. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

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¶6 Joinder is governed by WIS. STAT. § 971.12. The “statute is to be
broadly construed in favor of initial joinder.” State v. Prescott, 2012 WI App 136,
¶15, 345 Wis. 2d 313, 825 N.W.2d 515 (citation omitted). Such broad
construction is warranted to serve the statute’s goals and purposes, namely, to
promote trial economy and judicial efficiency, and “to eliminate multiple trials
against the same defendant, which promotes fiscal responsibility.” See State v.
Salinas, 2016 WI 44, ¶36, 369 Wis. 2d 9, 879 N.W.2d 609. Whether crimes are
properly joined is a question of law that we review de novo. Id., ¶30.

¶7 Under WIS. STAT. § 971.12(1), crimes may be charged together in
the same complaint or information if: (1) they are of the same or similar
character; (2) they are based on the same act or transaction; (3) they are based on
two or more acts or transactions that are connected together; or (4) they are based
on two or more acts or transactions that constitute part of a common scheme or
plan. See id.; see also Salinas, 369 Wis. 2d 9, ¶31. Pursuant to § 971.12(4), two
or more complaints or informations may be tried together if the crimes alleged in
each charging document could have been joined in a single charging document.

¶8 Salinas directs Wisconsin courts to determine whether crimes are
“connected together” by examining:

a variety of factors, including but not limited to: (1) are the
charges closely related; (2) are there common factors of
substantial importance; (3) did one charge arise out of the
investigation of the other; (4) are the crimes close in time
or close in location, or do the crimes involve the same
victims; (5) are the crimes similar in manner, scheme or
plan; (6) was one crime committed to prevent punishment
for another; and (7) would joinder serve the goals and
purposes of WIS. STAT. § 971.12.

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Salinas, 369 Wis. 2d 9, ¶43. Charges may be connected together for purposes of
joinder when several of the listed factors are applicable, notwithstanding the
inapplicability of some of them. See id., ¶44.

¶9 Upon our de novo review, we conclude that the joinder was justified
here. Joining the two cases for trial served the objectives of trial economy and
convenience, and it was consistent with Wisconsin’s established preference for
joining charges in a single trial. See Francis v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 554, 560, 273
N.W.2d 310 (1979) (concluding that “a significant consideration” in deciding a
motion for joinder “is whether joinder would serve the goals of trial economy and
convenience.”). Additionally, joining the cases in one proceeding made sense for
at least the following reasons: Dronso was the sole defendant in both cases;
Dronso’s wife was the victim in one case and a key witness who identified Dronso
from video surveillance footage in the other; and, in both cases, evidence from the
other case was either necessary to understand or relevant to prove the charge or
charges. The fact of the burglary prosecution and his wife’s role in that
prosecution was necessary to understand why Dronso threatened to kill her.
Likewise, Dronso’s threats to harm his wife because she was a “snitching bitch”
demonstrated Dronso’s awareness of his own guilt, despite his claims of
innocence.

¶10 Turning to additional factors for consideration, we further conclude
that the threats charge “[arose] out of the investigation” of the burglaries charge
because the assistance of Dronso’s wife in the Muskego-burglaries investigation
so angered Dronso that he threatened to kill his wife. See Salinas, 369 Wis. 2d 9,
¶43. The threats from Dronso were made close in time to the burglaries; Dronso
sent the threatening messages to his wife within days of her cooperation with the
police and identified Dronso from the video surveillance footage. Moreover, one

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arguable purpose of the threats against Dronso’s wife was “to prevent
punishment” for the burglaries by intimidating her and discouraging her continued
cooperation with law enforcement in the prosecution for the burglaries. See id. In
this way, the threats were also a part of a “common scheme or plan” under WIS.
STAT. § 971.12(1) to avoid accountability for the burglaries.

¶11 In sum, a majority of the joinder factors, as interpreted by Salinas,
apply here and permit initial joinder under the theory that the two sets of crimes
are connected together. Undeniably, in circumstances where one set of crimes is
committed to avoid punishment for another set of crimes, “[t]here can be no
dispute” that joinder is authorized by WIS. STAT. § 971.12(1). See State v.
Bettinger, 100 Wis. 2d 691, 693-94, 303 N.W.2d 585 (1981) (concluding that a
charge of sexual assault was indisputably joined properly with a charge of trying
to bribe the victim-witness to drop the charge).

¶12 Dronso argues that joinder was improper because allowing his wife
to testify against him severely prejudiced him. Dronso’s prejudice argument
focuses on the spousal privilege in WIS. STAT. § 905.05(1). He argues that
“joinder of the cases was violative of spousal privilege.” Dronso takes the
position that simply calling his wife to testify at his trial constituted a violation of
the privilege. He further asserts that admission of the electronic messages sent to
his wife constituting the offense of threatening physical harm—“the so-called
threatening excerpts”—was improper. Again, we disagree.

¶13 As noted above, the circuit court considered the spousal privilege
and strictly limited the topics on which Dronso’s wife could testify to prevent
prejudice. WISCONSIN STAT. § 905.05(3)(b) provides, as relevant: “There is no
privilege … [i]n proceedings in which one spouse or former spouse … is charged

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with a crime against the person or property of the other.” Thus, Dronso’s
argument that he was prejudiced because joinder somehow violated spousal
privilege is without merit, and he fails to meet his burden to overcome the
presumption that joinder was not prejudicial. See State v. Linton, 2010 WI App
129, ¶15, 329 Wis. 2d 687, 791 N.W.2d 222 (establishing that when the criteria for
initial joinder are met, joinder is presumed to be non-prejudicial, and defendant
has the burden to overcome the presumption and prove “substantial prejudice”).

By the Court.—Judgments affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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